Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1965). · Go Syfert
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Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1965). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“to defeat a motion which is supported by evidence which reveals no genuine issue, it is not sufficient for the opposing party merely to assert that an issue does exist.”
161 citation events (38 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tania Medina v. Casino Miami, LLC, Etc. (fladistctapp, 2026-01-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1965 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1965 1995 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 44 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Tania Medina v. Casino Miami, LLC, Etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
to defeat a motion which is supported by evidence which reveals no genuine issue, it is not sufficient for the opposing party merely to assert that an issue does exist.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Budzinski v. Mystic Powerboats, Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the existence of express or implied knowledge is usually a problem for the jury to resolve.
cited Cited as authority (rule) HOCHMAN FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC, INC., A/A/O REBECCA BOSSLEY v. ALLSTATE FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
If he fails to do this his motion is lost.” (quoting Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) VELO CHIRO FIZIK, INC., A/A/O ALFONSO QUIROGA v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
If he fails to do this his motion is lost.” (quoting Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CARLOS VEGA v. SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
It is well-established that the party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to present evidence supporting “the claimed non-existence of a material issue.” Id. at 1036 (quoting Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CERTIFIED PRIORITY RESTORATION a/a/o JAMES KREMPLER v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Corp., 273 So. 3d 1031, 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JUAN PABLO BENAVIDES v. ISAIAS MEDINA, JR.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
In this regard, “the summary judgment motion may be categorized as a ‘pre-trial motion for a directed verdict.’ At least it has most of the attributes of a directed verdict motion.” Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965) (citing Locke v. Stuart, 113 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)). 1 But summary judgment can perform its function as having some of the attributes of a “pre-trial motion for a directed verdict,” id., only if the parties are 1 “Harvey Building . . . remains the black letter law today.” Gonzalez v. Citizens Prop.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Keys Country Resort v. 1733 Overseas Highway
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 1965) (citations omitted).2 In this regard, the Rule requires that “opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Fla. R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonzalez v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 1965) (citations omitted).3 7 In this regard, the Rule requires that “opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Fla. R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sexton v. Southfield Subdivision Maintenance & Property Owners' Association, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 643 (Fla. 1999) (“It is a well- *929 settled principle of Florida jurisprudence that summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are so clear and undisputed that only questions of law remain.” (citing Moore v. Morris, 475 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985))); Babul v. Golden Fuel, Inc., 990 So.2d 680, 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that conflicting affidavits concerning the identity of contracting parties to an ambiguous contract precluded summary judgment); Smith v. Harr, 571 So.2d 575, 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (observing that an affidavit in …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Harkless v. Laubhan (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“A summary judgment motion will be- defeated if the evidence by affidavit or otherwise demonstrates the existence of a material factual issue.” Harvey Bldg., Inc, v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla. 1965). ■ Florida law holds that “[t]he words ‘subject to’ in a deed or contract generally create an ambiguous deed or contract.” Hastie v. Ekholm, 199 So.3d 461, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citing Procacci v. Zaceo, 324 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)); see also Cook v. Tradewinds W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hibbs Grove Plantation Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Avraham Aviv and Helen Aviv
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
To adopt the trial court’s narrow reading of the complaint would not only render the allegations setting forth the specific violation, including the statements in the demand letter, meaningless, but would also violate the general rule that “evidence presented at [a summary judgment] hearing plus favorable inferences reasonably justified thereby are liberally construed in favor of the opponent.” Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla.1965) (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla.1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buzzi v. Quality Service Station, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla.1965) (after moving party presents evidence to support a motion for summary judgment, party “will be entitled to summary judgment unless the opposing party comes forward with some evidence which will change the result — that is, evidence sufficient to generate an issue on a material fact”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gerard v. Eckerd Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
If he fails in this, he must suffer a summary judgment against him. 175 So.2d at 782-83 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cassady v. Moore
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
At that point, the burden shifted to Cassady, as the non-movant, to "come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue." Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla.1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tucker v. Resha
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
After reviewing the evidence before the trial court, we find unpersuasive Petitioner's argument that the evidentiary provisions of Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979), and Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 1965), afford a basis for certiorari relief.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boehm v. American Bankers Ins. Group, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Court explained in Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 1965): `To defeat a motion which is supported by evidence which reveals no genuine issue, it is not sufficient for the opposing party merely to assert that an issue does exist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leviton v. Philly Steak-Out, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979); Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965); James v. Naumann, 464 So.2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 476 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1985); Eastland Inv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sepmeier v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc.
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1986 · confidence medium
Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla. 1965); Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1979); Guitar v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 396 F.Supp. 1042, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 438 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976); Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ins. Co. v. Julien P. Benjamin Equip. Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782 (Fla. 1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. Stack
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Osher v. Carvel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Thus, having precluded reliance upon the Mister case, we are unable to say on the basis of the record before us that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law upon the principles expressed in Visingardi v. Tirone, Fla. 1966, 193 So.2d 601 , and Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla.1965, 175 So.2d 780 .
discussed Cited "see" Penzera v. O'Neal
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Byrd v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (holding that the nonmoving party "may not merely assert that an issue does exist, but . . . must go forward with evidence sufficient to generate an issue on a material fact" (citing Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So. 2d 780, 782-3 (Fla. 1965))).
discussed Cited "see" Penzera v. O'Neal
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Byrd v. Leach, 226 So.2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (holding that the nonmoving party “may not merely assert that an issue does exist, but ... must go forward with evidence sufficient to generate an issue on a material fact” (citing Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-3 (Fla.1965))).
cited Cited "see" Laremont v. Absolute Health Care for Women of All Ages, PA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
Id.; see Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla.1965).
discussed Cited "see" Schneider v. Slichter
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla.1965) (“If the moving party presents evidence to support the claimed non-existence of a material issue, he will be entitled to a summary judgment unless the opposing party comes forward with some evidence which will change the result — that is, evidence sufficient to generate an issue on a material fact.”); Latour Auto Sales, Inc. v. Stromberg-Carlson Leasing Corp., 335 So.2d 600, 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (once a movant “sustains his initial burden of proof, the opponent then has the burden of coming forward with evide…
cited Cited "see" Butler v. Butler
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Bldg., Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780, 782-83 (Fla.1965).
cited Cited "see" Williams v. Garden City Claims, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla.1965); Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla.1957).
cited Cited "see" McMillan v. Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 , 782 (Fla.1965); Pelz v. City of Clearwater, 568 So.2d 949, 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
cited Cited "see" Pelz v. City of Clearwater
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
cited Cited "see" Kala Investments, Inc. v. Sklar
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965); Jenkins v. Brackin, 171 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
cited Cited "see" Robert C. Malt & Co. v. Kelly Tractor Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
cited Cited "see" DeMesme v. Stephenson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965).
discussed Cited "see" Dorset House Ass'n, Inc. v. Dorset, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See the principles of law in Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1965); and Turner Produce Company v. Lake Shore Growers Cooperative Association, 217 So.2d 856, 860-861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
cited Cited "see" Schulman v. Washington Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, 175 So.2d 780 (Fla.1965).
discussed Cited "see" REFLEX, NV v. Umet Trust
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 780 . [1] Appellant presents an additional point urging that the trial court proceeded too hastily in entering the summary final judgment prior to the disposition of the interlocutory appeal from the order denying Reflex's motion to dismiss the complaint.
discussed Cited "see" Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 780 ; Morton v. Mastan Co., Inc., Fla.App.1966, 181 So.2d 575 ; Holl v. Talcott, Fla.1966, 191 So.2d 40 ; Page v. Staley, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 129 ; Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., Fla.App. 1970, 236 So.2d 154 , and Cristel v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App.1971, 246 So.2d 595 .
cited Cited "see" Fitzgerald v. Addison
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 780 .
cited Cited "see" Ham v. Heintzelman's Ford, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 780 ; Feiner's Organization, Inc. v. Dickson, supra; Fechtmeyer v. Caribbean Keys, supra; Hix v. Sirkis, Fla.App. 1966, 190 So.2d 207 .
cited Cited "see" Barsotti v. Jaffe
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla.1965, 175 So.2d 780 ; Holl v. Talcott, Fla.1966, 191 So.2d 40 ; Visingardi v. Tirone, Fla.1967, 193 So.2d 601 .
cited Cited "see" Williams v. Gulf Life Insurance
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1967 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla. 1965, 175 So.2d 780 .
cited Cited "see" Gatto v. Baron Properties, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bailey v. Folks, District Court of Appeal, First District, 182 So.2d 477 , Opinion filed February 10, 1966, and Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla.1965, 175 So.2d 780 .
cited Cited "see" Hair v. Stemmler
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Harvey Building, Inc. v. Haley, Fla.1965, 175 So.2d 780 and Commercial Credit Corporation v. Varn, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 638 .
HARVEY BUILDING, INC., Petitioner,
v.
Ocie M. HALEY, Respondent.
33879.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jun 2, 1965.
175 So. 2d 780
Thornal.
Cited by 119 opinions  |  Published

[*781] Kirk Sullivan, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Earnest, Pruitt & Schulle, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

THORNAL, Justice.

By petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, which is allegedly in conflict with a decision of another District Court of Appeal on the same point of law.

We must consider primarily the extent of the evidentiary showing required of a movant for a summary judgment.

Respondent Haley, a business invitee, entered petitioner Harvey's office building during a rain. A rubber mat extended from the entrance toward the elevators. The floor itself was tile or marble. Respondent Haley slipped and fell as she stepped off the rubber mat onto the marble floor. Mrs. Haley sued Harvey, Inc., for ensuing injuries. She alleged negligent failure to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition by allowing a foreign substance to remain on the marble floor. Harvey, the building owner, moved for a summary judgment, claiming no genuine issue as to any material fact. The trial judge granted the motion and entered final judgment for the defendant. The Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed.[*782] Haley v. Harvey Building, Inc., 168 So.2d 330. It is this decision which we now have for review.

To support its motion for a summary judgment the building owner, Harvey, offered a deposition of plaintiff Haley. By her deposition Mrs. Haley appeared to concede that she was not certain as to the exact cause of her fall. She did, however, attribute it to a "slick floor". She didn't know what made the floor slick, didn't remember water on the floor, nor did she know how long the floor had been slick.

In opposition to the summary judgment motion Mrs. Haley offered affidavits of a Phillips Clarke and a Mrs. Eunice Taylor. Clarke stated that at the time of the accident, about 9:30 A.M., he was in the lobby of the Harvey Building; he "heard a commotion and turned and saw Mrs. Ocie Haley on the floor." He stated that, "the floor was of marble construction and was wet, causing it to be slippery." Mrs. Taylor, by affidavit, stated that at about 9:00 A.M. on the morning of the accident, as she entered the Harvey Building she slipped and almost fell, "and that the floor was wet and slippery."

The District Court correctly stated the responsibility of the building owner as related to dangerous floor conditions. It properly ruled that in order to hold an owner liable it must be shown that he knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the existence of the dangerous condition. The existence of express or implied knowledge is usually a problem for the jury to resolve. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Patty, Fla., 109 So.2d 5; Carl's Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, Fla., 69 So.2d 789.

However, in reversing the summary judgment, the District Court held that "a motion for summary judgment should not be granted if it could be inferred from the evidence that the plaintiff could prove at trial that the defendant was negligent." (Emphasis added.)

By the petition for certiorari it is contended that the quoted holding collides directly with the decision of the Court of Appeal, Third District, in Hardcastle v. Mobley, Fla.App., 143 So.2d 715.

In Hardcastle the losing party in a summary judgment contended that he "was entitled to an inference that he had other evidence which could be presented." The Third District Court decided otherwise in holding that "the party moved against by summary judgment * * * must come forward with facts contradicting those submitted by the movant and demonstrating a real issue between the parties." Pritchard v. Peppercorn and Peppercorn, Inc., Fla., 96 So.2d 769.

Obviously the Second and Third District Courts are in conflict on the point stated regarding the alleged burden of a movant to exclude every possible inference that the opposing party might have other evidence available to prove his case. We agree with Hardcastle that such a requirement is not a part of the burden imposed upon a summary judgment movant.

Having noted the jurisdictional conflict of decisions we now proceed to the merits. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Company, Inc., v. Pope, Fla., 127 So.2d 441.

A movant for a summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue on any material fact. Rule 1.36(c), F.R.C.P., 30 F.S.A. All doubts regarding the existence of an issue are resolved against the movant, and the evidence presented at the hearing plus favorable inferences reasonably justified thereby are liberally construed in favor of the opponent. A summary judgment motion will be defeated if the evidence by affidavit or otherwise demonstrates the existence of a material factual issue. To defeat a motion which is supported by evidence which reveals no genuine issue, it is not sufficient for the opposing party merely to assert that an issue does exist. If the moving party presents evidence to support[*783] the claimed non-existence of a material issue, he will be entitled to a summary judgment unless the opposing party comes forward with some evidence which will change the result — that is, evidence sufficient to generate an issue on a material fact. Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., Fla., 89 So.2d 482; Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright Edition), Vol. 3, Section 1235. When analyzed in this fashion the summary judgment motion may be categorized as a "pre-trial motion for a directed verdict." At least it has most of the attributes of a directed verdict motion. Locke v. Stuart, Fla.App., 113 So.2d 402.

The initial burden, therefore, is upon the movant. When he tenders evidence sufficient to support his motion, then the opposing party must come forward with counter-evidence sufficient to reveal a genuine issue. The movant, however, does not initially carry the burden of exhausting the evidence pro and con, or even examining all of his opponent's witnesses. To fulfill his burden he must offer sufficient admissible evidence to support his claim of the non-existence of a genuine issue. If he fails to do this his motion is lost. If he succeeds, then the opposing party must demonstrate the existence of such an issue either by countervailing facts or justifiable inferences from the facts presented. If he fails in this, he must suffer a summary judgment against him.

In the decision under review, we have concluded that the District Court reached a sound judgment but for reasons other than those which it announced. The deposition and affidavits, when accorded the benefit of all favorable inferences, appear sufficient to generate trial issues on the question of negligence. We do not here explore the problem of manifest weight of evidence which could develop at the trial. This would involve an evaluation and credibility process which is not an aspect of the summary judgment procedure. Moore's Federal Practice, Section 56.23, p. 2341.

Because of the conflict we have mentioned, the decision of the District Court is modified to harmonize with the views herein expressed and on remand the trial judge will be governed accordingly. Since, however, it is unnecessary to disturb the judgment of the District Court the writ heretofore issued is hereby discharged.

It is so ordered.

DREW, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur.