Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1976). · Go Syfert
Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
76 citation events (31 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: STATE OF FLORIDA v. JAMAL SANDERS (fladistctapp, 2023-11-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. JAMAL SANDERS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
The State is permitted to amend an information during trial, even if the defendant objects, "unless there is a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Clements, 903 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 2005) (quoting State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Fla. 1989)). "[T]he State's ability to amend an information is not unfettered," 2 see id., but "technical defects which have no bearing upon the substantial rights of the parties" are typically excused, Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Lackos v. State, 326 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ngoc C. Thach v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
Legal Standard Our well-established standard for amending an information midtrial was first adopted in Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ngoc C. Thach v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
In Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court set forth due process standards for amending an information during trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GISELLE LUGONES v. PHYSICIAN'S INDEMNITY RISK RETENTION GROUP, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act § 3, cmt. (2007) (observing that a “Court of Record” under the act “includes anyone who is authorized to issue a subpoena under the laws of that state”); Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976) (stating that the modern trend in both civil and criminal proceedings is to excuse technical procedural defects that “have no bearing upon the substantial rights of the parties”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Quoting from Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976), the court noted: -3- The modern trend in both criminal and civil proceedings is to excuse technical defects which have no bearing upon the substantial rights of the parties.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Goldman v. Campbell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.'" [c.o.] Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hauss v. Waxman
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial." [c.o.] Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wells v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Harris dissenting) or Lack os v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ward v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
And we would agree that the accused is entitled to "a fair trial, not a perfect trial." Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Molina v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Pedone v. State, 341 So.2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Lawson v. State, 251 So.2d 683, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); cf. Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976) (amendment of information to correct technical defect permissible in absence of showing of prejudice to defendant).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Woodfin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
As our supreme court remarked in Hoffman v. State, 397 So.2d 288, 290 (Fla. 1981): "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one." ( Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976), quoting Grimes, J.) While the record sub judice is not perfect, it is not unfair.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Fla. · 1986 · confidence medium
Stang v. State, 421 So.2d 147, 149 (Fla. 1982); Hall v. State, 420 So.2d 872, 874 (Fla. 1982); Hoffman v. State, 397 So.2d 288, 290 (Fla. 1981); Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stang v. State
Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial." [ Lackos v. State, ] 339 So.2d 217 at 219 [(Fla. 1976)] (quoting Grimes, J.). 397 So.2d at 290 .
cited Cited "see" Calvin Weatherspoon v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gray, 435 So.2d at 818 (citing Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited "see" Calvin Weatherspoon v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gray, 435 So. 2d at 818 (citing Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217 (Fla.1976)).
cited Cited "see" State v. Conroy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976) (granting the State's amendment to include the correct corporate name when the defendant failed to show any prejudice); Fla. R.
discussed Cited "see" White v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lachos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976) (“We agree that a showing of prejudice should be a condition precedent to undertaking the kind of procedural niceties envisioned by [prior decisions strictly enforcing a procedural rule].”).
cited Cited "see" Price v. State
Fla. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gray, 435 So.2d at 818 (citing Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976)).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Grandstaff
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976) ("The modern trend in both criminal and civil proceedings is to excuse technical defects which have no bearing upon the substantial rights of the parties.
cited Cited "see" Matthews v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited "see" Hugh v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 , 219 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited "see" Fairchild v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hoffman v. State, 397 So.2d 288, 290 (Fla.1981) (“A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” (quoting Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976))).
cited Cited "see" Budd v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited "see" Jenkins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited "see" State v. Kopulos
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited "see" State v. Stell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited "see" Falco v. State
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." R.R. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976); State v. Anderson, 537 So.2d 1373, 1375 (Fla.1989); Rivera v. State, 745 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Garcia, 692 So.2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Sanders v. State, 669 So.2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." RR v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976); State v. Anderson, 537 So.2d 1373, 1375 (Fla.1989); Rivera v. State, 745 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Garcia, 692 So.2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Sanders v. State, 669 So.2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Davis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla.1976); Huffman v. State, 636 So.2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Bowden v. State, 642 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Young v. State, 632 So.2d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Huffman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
Assuming without deciding that the amendment was substantive, the court did not err in allowing the amendment because, "the state may substantively amend an information during trial, even over the objection of the defendant, unless there is a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Anderson, 537 So.2d 1373, 1375 (Fla. 1989); see also, Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Adams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976); Rule 3.140( o ), Fla.R.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Fields
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Lackos v. State, 339 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1976); Adirim v. State, 350 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1978); Gaynor v. State, 196 So.2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 201 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1967). *132 With such major reforms in the criminal justice system as guaranteed reciprocal discovery and near universal representation by counsel, it is anachronistic to tag every pleading error as fundamental or fatal.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lewis Joseph LACKOS, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
48898.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov 4, 1976.
339 So. 2d 217
Sundberg.
Cited by 52 opinions  |  Published

[*218] Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, and Judge C. Luckey, Jr., Public Defender, and Wayne Chalu, Asst. Public Defender, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SUNDBERG, Justice.

This case is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. We have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

Petitioner Lackos was convicted of buying, receiving or aiding in the concealment of stolen property. In the information the owner of the property was specified to be Remington Electric Razors, Incorporated. During the State's case, the local manager of the company from which the electric razors had been stolen testified that the correct corporate name of the firm at the time of the theft was Remington Electric Shavers, a Division of Sperry Rand Corporation. At this point, the State moved to amend its information to include the correct corporate name. After objection, the court offered to continue the trial for as long as reasonably necessary for the petitioner to seek to obtain evidence indicating that he would be prejudiced by the amendment. Petitioner's counsel asserted that the question of prejudice was immaterial and declined the offer of continuance. Thereupon, the State was permitted to amend, and the petitioner was subsequently convicted.

In an opinion reported at 326 So.2d 220, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the action taken by the trial court. Because of conflict in decision with Alvarez v. State, 157 Fla. 254, 25 So.2d 661 (1946), and Sipos v. State, 90 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1956), we issued our order allowing certiorari and dispensing with oral argument. After studying the briefs submitted by the parties, we have concluded that the District Court of Appeal reached the proper result in the instant case.

In Alvarez, supra, the information charged the defendant with breaking and entering a building owned by Harold McGucken with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny. At trial it was determined that the building was actually owned by McGucken Liquor Stores, Inc., a corporation. Over the defendant's objection, the court permitted the State to amend its information by striking out the name of the alleged owner and inserting in lieu thereof the appropriate name. This decision was found to be reversible error in a Supreme Court opinion which indicated that when an information is amended in a matter of substance, it should be re-signed by the prosecutor, re-sworn to by him, and re-filed with the clerk. The Court further held that the defendant should be re-arraigned,[*219] should re-plead, and that the jury should be re-selected and re-sworn upon new issues joined. Alvarez was followed in Sipos v. State, supra, wherein it was held that a trial court erred in permitting an information charging burglary of a building owned by Sterchi Brothers, Inc., a corporation, to be amended to read Sterchi Brothers Stores, Inc., a corporation.

Rule 3.140(o), Fla.R.Cr.P., first adopted in 1967, governs the resolution of this issue. That rule reads as follows:

"Defects and Variances. No indictment or information, or any count thereof, shall be dismissed or judgment arrested, or new trial granted on account of any defect in the form of the indictment or information or of misjoinder of offenses or for any cause whatsoever, unless the court shall be of the opinion that the indictment or information is so vague, indistinct and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense."

As pointed out by the District Court, there is no showing that language similar to the foregoing, contained in former Section 906.25, Florida Statutes, was considered by the Alvarez and Sipos courts.

We are persuaded by the reasoning articulated by Judge Grimes, writing for the District Court in the instant case:

"The modern trend in both criminal and civil proceedings is to excuse technical defects which have no bearing upon the substantial rights of the parties. When procedural irregularities occur, the emphasis is on determining whether anyone was prejudiced by the departure. A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Michigan v. Tucker, 1974, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182. Appellant received a fair trial."

We agree that a showing of prejudice should be a condition precedent to undertaking the kind of procedural niceties envisioned by Alvarez, supra, and Sipos, supra. While we note that the District Court of Appeal sought to distinguish those earlier decisions from the case sub judice, to the extent that Alvarez and Sipos conflict with the principles enunciated herein they are expressly overruled.

Accordingly, the writ is discharged.

OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, ENGLAND and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., dissents.