SR v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977). · Go Syfert
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SR v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“as used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory”
103 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Psychiatric Institute of Del-Ray, Inc. v. Keel (fladistctapp, 1998-03-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Psychiatric Institute of Del-Ray, Inc. v. Keel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
as used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trillium Transportation Fuels LLC v. Integral Energy LLC
W.D. Okla. · 2023 · confidence medium
See Osprey LLC v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co. Inc., 984 P.2d 194, 199 (Okla. 1999) (“‘Shall’ is ordinarily construed as mandatory[.]”); S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977) (noting that shall “is normally meant to be mandatory in nature”). 18 Scalia & Garner, supra, at 114 (emphasis in original). 19 See id. at 170 (explaining that “a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning” and “where the document has used one term in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a different idea”). denoti…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Lennen v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (“Although there is no fixed construction of the word ‘shall,’ it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature.” (quoting S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) W. Douglas Harris v. Gary McMichael
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co. v. Orthopedic Specialists, 212 So. 3d 973, 978 (Fla. 2017) (quoting S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977)) (brackets omitted).4 Nothing in the parties’ agreements indicates that this Court should construe the word “shall” contrary to its normal usage.
cited Cited as authority (rule) HOMER MCABEE, III v. ALICIA MARIE MCABEE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Id. at 1019.
cited Cited as authority (rule) REV RECREATION GROUP, INC. & GENERAL RV CENTER, INC. v. LDRV HOLDINGS CORP.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 192 So. 3d 1223, 1229 (Fla. 2016) ("Generally, the word 'shall' is interpreted as mandatory in nature." (citing S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977))).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Allstate Insurance Company v. Orthopedic Specialists, etc. (4×)
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
This Court has recognized that “[a]lthough there is no fixed construction of the word ‘shall,’ it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature” and “[i]ts interpretation depends upon the context in which it is found.” S. R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mills v. Martinez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
"Generally, where the word `shall' refers to some required action preceding a possible deprivation of a substantive right, the word is given its literal meaning." Stanford v. State, 706 So.2d 900, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (relying on S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla.1977), and Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla.1962)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeGregorio v. Balkwill
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
"Generally, where the word `shall' refers to some required action preceding a possible deprivation of a substantive right, the word is given its literal meaning." Stanford v. State, 706 So.2d 900, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (relying on S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla.1977), and Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla.1962)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Goode
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
We have previously stated that "[a]lthough there is no fixed construction of the word `shall,' it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature." See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
S.R., 346 So.2d at 1019.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
S.R., 346 So.2d at 1019.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.G. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Therefore, dismissal of the delinquency petition was mandatory in this case if the petition was filed after the expiration of the statutory period. 346 So.2d at 1019.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marshek v. Marshek
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Although I conclude that the legislature, in enacting section 742.12(1), has clearly and expressly manifested its intent, I am not unaware that the Third District in Vidal v. Rivas, 556 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), construed the following language in section 742.12(2) as directory only: "If the test results or the expert analysis of the inherited characteristics is disputed, the court, upon reasonable request of a party, shall order that an additional test be made... ." In so deciding, the court applied the rule recognized in S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977), stating that alth…
examined Cited as authority (rule) M.F. v. State (4×)
Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
It is undisputed that under the applicable law, juveniles have a substantive right to have a delinquency petition dismissed with prejudice if the petition is not timely filed. § 39.05(6), Fla.Stat.; 2 see S.R., 346 So.2d at 1018.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Donald v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission v. Blancett
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Drury v. Harding, 461 So.2d 104 , 107 (Fla.1984); S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977); Holloway v. State, 342 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla.1977); White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Bystrom v. Florida Rock Industries, Inc., 502 So.2d 35, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 511 So.2d 297 (Fla.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. G. B. P.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court of Florida had an opportunity to resolve the procedural/substantive dichotomy regarding delinquency petitions in S. R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla.1977), in determining whether the mandatory aspect of the rule should apply or the more permissive aspect of the statute.
discussed Cited "see" Lyantie Townsend, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited "see" Wright v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977) (noting that the word "shall" is "normally meant to be mandatory in nature").
cited Cited "see" SHANDS TEACHING HOSP. AND CLINICS v. Sidky
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla.1977).
cited Cited "see" Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Sidky
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited "see" Hines v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla.1977) (holding that a statute which required dismissal of a juvenile petition when the State failed to file the petition within 30 days superseded a procedural rule which gave the court discretion to dismiss the petition after the 30-day time period, because the statute "provides a juvenile with a substantive right and substantive statutes supersede procedural rules"); M.F. v. State, 583 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Fla.1991) (explaining that "[p]revious decisions of this Court reaffirm the strength of the legislature's policy decision to require the state to …
cited Cited "see" Kinder v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited "see" Henry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977) (interpretation of the word "shall" as mandatory or discretionary "depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute.").
cited Cited "see" State v. Book
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
cited Cited "see" Saul v. Basse
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1962).
discussed Cited "see" Tascano v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); Holloway v. State, 342 So.2d 966 (Fla. 1977); City of Orlando v. County of Orange, 276 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1973); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1962); Johnson v. State, 355 So.2d 857 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978); In the Interest of J.W.H. v. State, 345 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977); White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973); Florida Tallow Corporation v. Bryan, 237 So.2d 308 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970); United Bonding Insurance Company v. Tuggle, 216 So.2d 80 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968); Headley v. State ex rel.
cited Cited "see" Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20 (1 D.C.A.
cited Cited "see" In the Interest of S. L. M.
Fla. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See In the Interest of S. R., a child v. State of Florida, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Grady C. Judd, Sheriff of Polk County v. Christina Haegele, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Chance Haegele
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Under these circumstances, when the requirements of section 57.105(1) are met, the statute directs that a trial court “shall” award a reasonable attorney’s fee. § 57.105(1), Fla. Stat.; see also S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977) (“Although there is no fixed construction of the word ‘shall,’ it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature.” (citing Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 1962))).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM/SUNBELT, INC. D/B/A FLORIDA HOSPITAL ALTAMONTE AND WILLIAM HUETHER, III, M.D. vs SALLY MACHALEK AND MATTHEW APTER, M.D.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See §§ 766.201, .206, Fla. Stat.; see also Goode, 830 So. 2d at 823 (noting that the proper “interpretation ‘depends upon the context in which [“shall”] is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute’ ” (quoting S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977))).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Stanford v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 , 1019 (Fla.1977); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529, 532-533 (Fla.1962).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Walker v. Bentley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Williamson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Seaboard Airline Railway Co. v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1027 , 130 So. 587, 593 (1930) (where statute says a thing "may" be done by a public official for the public benefit, it is to be construed that it must be done); Allied Fidelity Insurance Co. v. State, 415 So.2d 109, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("may" will be deemed obligatory where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice); see also S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977) (whether "shall" is to be considered mandatory or permissive depends on its context and legislative intent); Schneider v. Gustafson, 139 So.2d 423…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Interest of S.R., a Child, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
50144.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 29, 1977.
346 So. 2d 1018
Hatchett.
Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 81%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Howard L. Crown, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Robert J. Landry and C. Marie King, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

HATCHETT, Justice.

The following question was certified to the Second District Court of Appeal by the Circuit Court of Pinellas County:

[*1019] Is dismissal with prejudice mandatory or discretionary when a petition alleging delinquency is not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was received by the intake office or intake officer of the Division of Youth Services?

The Second District Court held that dismissal is discretionary. In the Interest of S.R., a child v. State, 336 So.2d 662 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). That decision directly conflicts with Interest of S.L.M., 336 So.2d 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We hold that dismissal is mandatory.

On February 27, 1976, S.R., a child, was taken into custody by the St. Petersburg Police Department and referred to the Division of Youth Services on three charges: obscene language, resisting arrest with violence, and obstructing and opposing an officer. The Division of Youth Services received the complaint February 28, 1976. On April 9, 1976, 41 days later, the State Attorney filed three petitions alleging delinquency. The child's attorney filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), which reads:

On motions by or in behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency shall be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was referred to the intake office. (Emphasis supplied).

The state opposed the motion relying on Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.020 which reads:

On motions by or in behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency or need of supervision may be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 30 days from the date the complaint was received by the Intake officer.
(Emphasis supplied).

The language of the above-quoted statute is essentially identical to that of the rule. The difference lies in the use of the words "shall" and "may." The Second District Court of Appeal determined that the statute is a grant of authority and that its language is discretionary. We do not agree. Although there is no fixed construction of the word "shall," it is normally meant to be mandatory in nature. Neal v. Bryant, 149 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1962). Its interpretation depends upon the context in which it is found and upon the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute. White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). By enactment of Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), the legislature provided that a juvenile shall be free from further prosecution if a petition alleging delinquency is not filed within 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office of the Division of Youth Services. The statute further provides that an untimely petition shall be dismissed with prejudice. We can think of no better example of a mandatory requirement.

The Second District Court of Appeal also held that Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), is procedural in nature and therefore subject to the rules promulgated by this Court. Again, we disagree. Section 39.05(7), Florida Statutes (1975), provides a juvenile with a substantive right and substantive statutes supersede procedural rules, State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1969). We therefore hold that dismissal with prejudice is mandatory when a petition alleging delinquency is filed more than 30 days after a complaint is received by the intake office of the Division of Youth Services.

Accordingly, the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal is quashed, and this matter is remanded for action consistent with this opinion.

OVERTON, C.J., and ENGLAND and KARL, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents.