green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
19.1 score
“if during the pre-dissolution period the expenses are allocated equally, where one spouse has the ability to pay and the other does not, the net effect can be to invade the asset share of the low-income spouse.”
Treatment trajectory · 1993 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1993
2009
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Kranz v. Kranz
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
if during the pre-dissolution period the expenses are allocated equally, where one spouse has the ability to pay and the other does not, the net effect can be to invade the asset share of the low-income spouse.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
OTTO HANS VAN MAERSSEN v. DIANA GERDTS
Roth, 973 So. 2d at 585 (alteration in original) (emphasis added); see also Levy, 900 So. 2d at 746 (reversing award of dissipated asset because the wife’s testimony that she used the asset for attorney’s fees and living expenses during the dissolution proceedings was unrebutted and the trial court did not find the wife guilty of misconduct); Bush, 824 So. 2d at 294 (reversing award of dissipated asset when the evidence showed that the husband exercised his stock options to pay the parties’ financial obligations during the dissolution proceedings); Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So. 2d 153, 155 (…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Goldman v. Goldman
Wife argued below that, these assets were her nonmarital property, while Husband argued they were marital property. 1 In its final judgment, the court stated that “[e]ach party shall be entitled to the sole and exclusive use and possession of the checking/savings, money market, CD and cash accounts in their respective names.” “Under the equitable distribution statute, the court must categorize the parties’ assets as nonmarital and marital.” Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (citing § 61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (1991); Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So.2d 491, 493 (Fla.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
JAMES S. WINDER, Former Husband v. Dian A. Winder, Former Wife
“As a general proposition, it is error to include assets in an equitable distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings.” Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bush v. Bush, 824 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Motie v. Motie
We have held that when the husband was generally responsible for paying the mortgage and other household expenses during the marriage, by virtue of being the primary breadwinner, it is “inappropriate for the trial court to award a credit to [the husband] for paying the expenses on the marital home during the separation.” Cortese v. Cortese, 72 So.3d 269, 269-70 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Kranz v. Kranz, 737 So.2d 1198, 1202-03 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)); accord Valentine, 42 So.3d at 274-75 ; Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lopez v. Lopez
“As a general proposition, it is error to include assets in an equitable distribution scheme that have been diminished or dissipated during the dissolution proceedings.” Roth v. Roth, 973 So.2d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bush v. Bush, 824 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fashingbauer v. Fashingbauer
When, however, the marital assets “were acquired largely on the strength of the husband’s income, which provided the cash flow to meet the mortgage payments and expenses,” and the court divides predissolution expenses equally, “the net effect can be to invade the asset share of the low-income spouse.” Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (rejecting husband’s claim that he was automatically entitled to full credit for mortgage payments he made during the separation).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Roth v. Roth
(2×)
Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Bush v. Bush, 824 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Woellmer v. Woellmer
When one spouse uses non-marital monies to “maintain the marital home[,]” the trial court has discretion to credit the paying spouse for the amount expended when “fashioning an equitable distribution in light of all relevant circumstances!.]” Grieco v. Grieco, 917 So.2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing Stock v. Stock, 693 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993))).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mobley v. Mobley
Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Levy v. Levy
See Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Karimi v. Karimi, 867 So.2d 471, 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Bush v. Bush, 824 So.2d 293, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Konsoulas v. Konsoulas
Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); see also Segall v. Segall, 708 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Cooper v. Cooper, 639 So.2d 153, 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Reis v. Reis
The former husband claims that his testimony on this issue was uncontradicted and he relies on Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), for the proposition that if a litigant must sell assets to obtain income to live on during the dissolution process, then that should not be counted as an asset for purposes of equitable distribution.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bonilla v. Bonilla
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The trial court relied on Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 885-86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cummings v. Cummings
Under Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), rev. denied, 639 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1994), the valuation and award of an asset which in fact has been depleted is error.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Heim v. Heim
In Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), the third district reversed a trial court’s finding of a special equity, noting that pursuant to Robertson his conclusion was not “supported by the greater weight of the evidence.” 1 On a different issue, the trial court upheld the validity of the prenuptial agreement and ordered the husband to pay his wife $100,000 out of marital assets. 2 Nothing in the final judgment addresses the husband’s claim that his obligation to pay $100,-000 should be modified pursuant- to paragraph 4, because the circumstances of the parties had ch…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Young v. Young
Florida law is clear that "the purpose of permanent alimony is to enable the former spouse to maintain the life-style enjoyed during the marriage." Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So. 2d 883, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), rev. denied, 639 So.2d 978 (Fla.1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cole v. Roberts
Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
cited
Cited "see"
Grieco v. Grieco
See Stock v. Stock, 693 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)).
cited
Cited "see"
Lamont v. Lamont
See Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), rev. denied, 639 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1994).
cited
Cited "see"
Bush v. Bush
See Cummings v. Cummings, 719 So.2d 948, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(citing Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)); see also Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte, 692 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Saporta v. Saporta
See Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), review denied, 639 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1994).
cited
Cited "see"
Banton v. Parker-Banton
See Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).
discussed
Cited "see"
Brock v. Brock
See Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA), 639 So.2d 978 (Fla.1994); Akers v. Akers, 582 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 592 So.2d 679 (Fla.1991); Lanier v. Lanier, 594 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). .
discussed
Cited "see"
Becker Holding Corp. v. Becker
See S & E Contractors v. City of Tampa, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.1993); Aetna Casualty & Surety, 631 So.2d at 310 ; Central Constructors, 621 So.2d at 527 ; United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Smith, 527 So.2d 281, 283-84 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1988); West, 530 So.2d at 436 .
cited
Cited "see"
Sciandra v. First Union Nat. Bank
See S & E Contractors, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Valentine v. Van Sickle
See also Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (reversing credit to husband for mortgage payments made during the period between separation and dissolution because “the marital assets were acquired largely on the strength of the husband’s income, which provided the cash flow to meet the mortgage payments and expenses”).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Cooper v. Gibson Group, Ltd., of Pinellas County
City of Tampa v. Janke Constr., Inc., 626 So.2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also S & E Contractors, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
S & E CONTRACTORS, Inc., as assignee of the rights of Hillsborough County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF TAMPA, a municipal corporation of the State of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
v.
CITY OF TAMPA, a municipal corporation of the State of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
92-04384.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov 10, 1993.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 46 opinions | Published
Mary M. Piccard of Cummings, Lawrence & Vezina, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellant.
Leo H. Meirose, Jr. of Allen & Meirose, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant/cross-appellee, S & E Contractors, Inc. (S & E), asserts in this appeal that the trial court erred in failing to award S & E attorney's fees. Appellee/cross-appellant, City of Tampa (City), cross-appeals the award of costs and prejudgment interest to S & E. We find no error in the appeal or cross-appeal except that the final judgment awarded S & E post-judgment interest on all sums found due in the final judgment, including the prejudgment interest award. It is error to award interest on interest and, accordingly, we reverse only that part of the final judgment which awards postjudgment interest on the amount found due as prejudgment interest. See Cent. Constructors, Inc. v. Spectrum Contracting Co., 621 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
FRANK, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.