Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., Admiral Corp., Admiral Distributors, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). · Go Syfert
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., Admiral Corp., Admiral Distributors, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3,467 citation events (364 in the last 25 years) across 115 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bogan v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance (nysd, 1997-02-05) · Strongest negative: Lovett v. General Motors Corp. (mnd, 1991-06-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1959 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1959 1992 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Lovett v. General Motors Corp.
D. Minnesota · 1991 · signal: but see · confidence high
Id. at 734 & n. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 1525 & n. 5 (also distinguishing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647-50 , 100 S.Ct. 1925, 1927-28 , 64 L.Ed.2d 580 (1980) (per curiam) and Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 , 79 S.Ct. 705 , 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959) because they involved horizontal combinations); but see id. 485 U.S. at 742-43, 747-48 , 108 S.Ct. at 1529, 1531-32 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that the only distinction between General Motors and Sharp was that the former involved an agreement between three parties rather than two); Piraino, Sharp Dealin…
examined Cited "but see" United States v. Irving Bitz (6×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 1960 · signal: but see · confidence high
See, e.g., Shotkin v. General Electric Co., 10 Cir., 1948, 171 F.2d 236 ; Feddersen Motors v. Ward, 10 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 519 ; but see Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 9 Cir., 255 F.2d 214 , reversed 1959, 359 U.S. 207 , 79 S.Ct. 705 , 3 L.Ed.2d 741 . 3 .
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Bogan v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
S.D. Ohio · 1983 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Singh v. American Racing-Tioga Downs Inc.
N.D.N.Y. · 2021 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
group boycotts .. . have long been held to be in the forbidden category .
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Preston Hollow Capital LLC v. Nuveen LLC (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
generally consist of agreements by two or more persons not to do business with other individuals or to do business with them only on specified terms. . . .
examined Cited as authority (quoted) IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. (3×)
2d Cir. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
group boycotts ... have long been held to be in the forbidden category .
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Field v. The National Collegiate Athletic Association. (3×)
Haw. · 2018 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
as such is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Pennsylvania v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (6×) also: Cited "see"
M.D. Penn. · 2013 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
he act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Minnesota Made Hockey, Inc. v. Minnesota Hockey, Inc. (3×)
D. Minnesota · 2011 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
he act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objecfives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) O'DELL v. General Motors Corp. (5×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Tex. · 2000 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with 729 other traders, have long been held to be
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
group boycotts, or concerted refusals . . . to deal . . . , have long been held to be .
examined Cited as authority (quoted) PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co. (6×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 2000 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
group boycotts, or concerted refusals ... to deal ..., have long been held to be .
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. (3×)
W.D. Va. · 1997 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the ... recognized that the act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations ... which have other objectives.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Brown University In Providence In The State Of Rhode Island (6×) also: Cited "see"
3rd Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
he act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations ... which normally have other objectives
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Brown University in Providence in the State of Rhode Island (6×) also: Cited "see"
3rd Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
he act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations ... which normally have other objectives
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Greene County Memorial Park v. Behm Funeral Homes, Inc. (6×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Pa. · 1992 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
klor's inc.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States Football League v. National Football League (3×)
2d Cir. · 1988 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States Football League v. National Football League (3×)
2d Cir. · 1988 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
category
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Precision Polymers, Inc. v. Pillar Industrial Products Corp. (3×)
W.D. Pa. · 1977 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be .
examined Cited as authority (rule) ZombieBox International Incorporated v. Generac Power Systems Incorporated (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. Ariz. · 2024 · confidence medium
This agreement took “from Klor’s its freedom to buy appliances in an open 13 competitive market” and drove “it out of business as a dealer in the defendants’ products.” 14 Id. at 213.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Premier Concrete LLC v. Argos North America Corp. (2×)
N.D. Ga. · 2021 · confidence medium
Id. at 210.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(Palsson, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 935 , quoting Klor’s, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 213; see Klor’s, supra, at p. 213 [per se analysis of Sherman Act monopoly claim noting that horizontal group boycott at issue “clearly has, by its ‘nature’ and ‘character,’ a ‘monopolistic tendency’ ” and “[a]s such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose 55 business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy”]; see also Palsson, supra, at pp. 933–934 [distinguishing Klor’s in determining rule of reason, not per se analysi…
cited Cited as authority (rule) CENTRAL JERSEY, CML v. PATEL
D.N.J. · 2020 · confidence medium
The complaint in K/or’s alleged a boycott consisting of “a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer.” K/or’s, 359 U.S. at 213.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Med. Ctr. at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys.
6th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Id. at 208-09.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Steve F. Montoya, Jr., M.D., West Texas Renal Care and West Texas Nephrology v. San Angelo Community Medical Center and Kirk Brewer, M.D. (5×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Memorial Hermann has not requested relief regarding the trial court's denial of those special exceptions, however, and we do not consider whether pleading these markets in the alternative provides Memorial Hermann with "information sufficient to enable [it] to prepare a defense." See Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 810 . 138 See Boczar, 993 F.2d at 1517 ("When Dr. Boczar joined its staff, Manatee Hospital had suffered defections by members of its ob/gyn staff and feared still more ob/gyn departures to a competing hospital."). 139 Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-24 , 82 S.Ct. 1502 ,…
examined Cited as authority (rule) American Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7, International Ass'n of Bridge Workers (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
1st Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Under a group boycott theory, “[a] violation of section 1 may well occur when a group of independent competing firms engage in a concerted refusal to deal with a particular supplier, customer, or competitor.” Gonz alez-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 249 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 212, 79 S.Ct. 705 ).
examined Cited as authority (rule) MM Steel, L.P. v. Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co., e (6×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 461-63 , 61 S.Ct. 703 , 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941))); Klor’s, Inc., 359 U.S. at 208-09, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sanger Insurance Agency v. HUB International, Limi
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. at 209.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sanger Insurance Agency v. HUB International, Limi
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. at 209.
examined Cited as authority (rule) in Re Memorial Hermann Hospital System Memorial Hermann Physician Network Michael MacRis, M.D. Michael MacRis, M.D., P.A. And Keith Alexander (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. · 2015 · confidence medium
Klor’s Inc., 359 U.S. at 213, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Orchard Supply Hardware LLC v. Home Depot USA, Inc.
N.D. Cal. · 2013 · confidence medium
To avoid this result, Plaintiff's counsel, at oral argument, again cited Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 207, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Reversing the grant of summary judgment against Klor’s, the Court found that “Klor’s allegations clearly show one type of trade restraint and public harm the Sherman Act forbids,” Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 210, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson Bros. Liquor Co. v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc.
D. Minnesota · 2011 · confidence medium
Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14, 79 S.Ct. 705 , 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959) (holding that concerted refusal to deal among appliance manufacturers and distributors was violation of antitrust laws).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
“An anticompetitive practice ‘is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.’ ” (Marin County, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 935 , quoting Klor’s, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 213.) In sum, the antitrust injury requirement means that an antitrust plaintiff must show that it was injured by the anticompetitive aspects or effects of the defendant’s conduct, as opposed to being injured by the conduct’s neutral or even procompetitive aspects (as in Brunswick).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Tableware Antitrust Litigation
N.D. Cal. · 2007 · confidence medium
A retailer, Broadway, entered into an agreement with suppliers of appliances “either not to sell to Klor’s or to sell to it only at discriminatory and highly unfavorable prices.” Id at 209, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Services, LLC
N.D. Okla. · 2006 · confidence medium
They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality.” Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 212, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Southern Volkswagen, Inc. v. Centrix Financial, LLC (2×)
D. Maryland · 2005 · confidence medium
Broadway-Hale and electronics manufacturers is because the agreement between manufacturers not to deal with Klor’s is a horizontal restraint, see Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 210-13, 79 S.Ct. 705 , later Supreme Court cases have conclusively determined that that interpretation is no longer merely a “suggestion”.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SOUTHERN TOOL & SUPPLY v. Beerman Precision, Inc. (2×)
La. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors, and a retailer." Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213, 79 S.Ct. at 710.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richard J. Angelico, M.D. v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
S 1 , which prohibits "contracts, combinations or conspiracies `in restraint of trade.' " The court's approach may have been the result of the similar "antitrust injury" label which is applied to the injury component of antitrust standing analysis and to the marketplace harm element under section 1. 3 We reject Angelico's assertion (citing Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)) that the hospital defendants' acts should be held illegal per se.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see"
10th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 293 , 105 S.Ct. 2613 (“Cases to which this Court has applied the per se approach have generally involved joint efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage competitors by either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle.” (quotations and citation omitted)); Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 209, 212, 79 S.Ct. 705 (finding per se illegal group boycott involving a “wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors, and a retailer,” brought about by the retailer a…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc. (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1998 · confidence medium
The Court considered a boycott created when a retail store, Broadway-Hale, and 10 household appliance manufacturers and their distributors agreed that the distributors would not sell, or would sell only at discriminatory prices, household appliances to Broadway-Hale’s small, nearby competitor, namely, Klor’s. 359 U. S., at 208-209.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc.
3rd Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. at 143-44, 147 , 86 S.Ct. 1321 ; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212-13, 79 S.Ct. 705 ; Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1376; Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 114 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rossi v. Standard Roofing Inc (Part I)
3rd Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. at 143-44, 147 ; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212-13; Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1376; Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 114 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Diaz v. Farley (4×) also: Cited "see"
D. Utah · 1998 · confidence medium
Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 213, 79 S.Ct. 705 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Discon, Incorporated v. Nynex Corporation, Nynex Material Enterprises, New York Telephone Company, Robert J. Eckenrode, and Bernard O'Reilly (2×)
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Oreck sought to elaborate on the Supreme Court’s decision in Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 211-12, 79 S.Ct. at 708-09, where the Court held that a retañer may not induce its manufacturers to refrain from sell *1061 ing to a competing retailer.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Smilecare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of California, Inc. (8×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
SmileCare does not take issue with the court's characterization of its claims. 22 On appeal, SmileCare cites Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 , 79 S.Ct. 705 , 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959), and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 , 105 S.Ct. 2847 , 86 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985), in support of its group boycott and refusal to deal claims. 7 In Klor's, the Supreme Court held that an alleged conspiracy between Broadway-Hale and various manufacturers and distributors to refuse to sell to its competitor, or to sell to it only on unfavorable terms, stated a claim und…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Ass'n (4×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court found that this agreement was a per se antitrust violation, reasoning that “[gjroup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.” 359 U.S. at 212, 79 S.Ct. at 709.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Association (4×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court found that this agreement was a per se antitrust violation, reasoning that "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category." 359 U.S. at 212, 79 S.Ct. at 709.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doctor's Hospital of Jefferson, Inc. v. Southeast Medical Alliance, Inc.
E.D. La. · 1995 · confidence medium
The Court dismisses this argument for the same reason as set forth in the previous “Order and Reasons.” In Klor’s the Supreme Court clearly stated that a group boycott requires “a concerted refusal by traders to deal with traders.” Id. at 212, 79 S.Ct. at 709.
Klor's, Inc.
v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., Admiral Corporation, Admiral Distributors, Inc.
76.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 6, 1959.
359 U.S. 207

359 U.S. 207

79 S.Ct. 705

3 L.Ed.2d 741

KLOR'S, INC., Petitioner,
v.
BROADWAY-HALE STORES, INC., Admiral Corporation, Admiral Distributors, Inc., et al.

No. 76.

Argued Feb. 25, 26, 1959.

Decided April 6, 1959.

Mr. Maxwell Keith, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.

Mr. Philip Elman, Washington, D.C., for the United States, as amicus curiae.

Mr. Moses Lasky, San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

[*~207]1

Klor's, Inc., operates a retail store on Mission Street, San Francisco, California; Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., a chain of department stores, operates one of its stores next door. The two stores compete in the sale of radios, television sets, refrigerators and other household appliances. Claiming that Broadway-Hale and 10 national manufacturers and their distributors have conspired to restrain and monopolize commerce in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, Klor's brought this action for treble damages and injunction in the United States District Court.[1]

2

In support of its claim Klor's made the following allegations: George Klor started an appliance store some years before 1952 and has operated it ever since either individually or as Klor's, Inc. Klor's is as well equipped as Broadway-Hale to handle all brands of appliances. Nevertheless, manufacturers and distributors of such well-known brands as General Electric, RCA, Admiral, Zenith, Emerson and others[2] have conspired among themselves and with Broadway-Hale either not to sell to Klor's or to sell to it only at discriminatory prices and highly unfavorable terms. Broadway-Hale has used its 'monopolistic' buying power to bring about this situation. The business of manufacturing, distributing and selling household appliances is in interstate commerce. The concerted refusal to deal with Klor's has seriously handicapped its ability to compete and has already caused it a great loss of profits, goodwill, reputation and prestige.

3

The defendants did not dispute these allegations, but sought summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. They submitted unchallenged affidavits which showed that there were hundreds of other household appliance retailers, some within a few blocks of Klor's who sold many competing brands of appliances, including those the defendants refused to sell to Klor's. From the allegations of the complaint, and from the affidavits supporting the motion for summary judgment, the District Court concluded that the controversy was a 'purely private quarrel' between Klor's and Broadway-Hale, which did not amount to a 'public wrong proscribed by the (Sherman) Act.' On this ground the complaint was dismissed and summary judgment was entered for the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. 255 F.2d 214. It stated that 'a violation of the Sherman Act requires conduct of defendants by which the public is or conceivably may be ultimately injured.' 255 F.2d at page 233. It held that here the required public injury was missing since 'there was no charge or proof that by any act of defendants the price, quantity, or quality offered the public was affected, nor that there was any intent or purpose to effect a change in, or an influence on, prices, quantity, or quality * * *.' Id., at page 230. The holding, if correct, means that unless the opportunities for customers to buy in a competitive market are reduced, a group of powerful businessmen may act in concert to deprive a single merchant, like Klor, of the goods he needs to compete effectively. We granted certiorari to consider this important question in the administration of the Sherman Act. 358 U.S. 809, 79 S.Ct. 23, 3 L.Ed.2d 54.

4

We think Klor's allegations clearly show one type of trade restraint and public harm the Sherman Act forbids, and that defendants' affidavits provide no defense to the charges. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and § 2 forbids any person or combination from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any part of interstate commerce. In the landmark case of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619, this Court read § 1 to prohibit those classes of contracts or acts which the common law had deemed to be undue restraints of trade and those which new times and economic conditions would make unreasonable. Id., at pages 59—60, 31 S.Ct. at pages 515—516. The Court cnst rued § 2 as making 'the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the 1st section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monpolize, or monopolization thereof * * *.' Id., at page 61, 31 S.Ct. at page 516. The effect of both sections, the Court said, was to adopt the common-law proscription of all 'contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolistic tendency * * *' and which interfered with the 'natural flow' of an appreciable amount of interstate commerce. Id., at pages 57, 61, 31 S.Ct. at page 514; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609, 34 S.Ct. 951, 953, 58 L.Ed. 1490. The Court recognized that there were some agreements whose validity depended on the surrounding circumstances. It emphasized, however, that there were classes of restraints which from their 'nature or character' were unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by both the common law and the statute. 221 U.S. at pages 58, 65, 31 S.Ct. at page 515.[3] As to these classes of restraints, the Court noted, Congress had determined its own criteria of public harm and it was not for the courts to decide whether in an individual case injury had actually occurred. Id., at pages 63—68, 31 S.Ct. at pages 517—518—519.[4]

[*207]5

Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.[5] They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they 'fixed or regulated prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality.' Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 466, 467—468, 61 S.Ct. 703, 707, 85 L.Ed. 949. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700. Even when they operated to lower prices or temporarily to stimulate competition they were banned. For, as this Court said in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213, 71 S.Ct. 259, 260, 95 L.Ed. 219, 'such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment.' Cf. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542, 33 S.Ct. 141, 145, 57 L.Ed. 333.

[*~207]6

Plainly the allegations of this complaint disclose such a boycott. This is not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with another,[6] nor even of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting or manufacturers, distributors and a retailer. This combination takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and drives it out of business as a dealer in the defendants' products. It deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor's at the same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale and in some instances forbids them from selling to it on any terms whatsoever. It interferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce. It clearly has, by its 'nature' and 'character,' a 'monopolistic tendency.' As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.[7] Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In recognition of this fact the Sherman Act has consistently been read to forbid all contracts and combinations 'which 'tend to create a monopoly," whether 'the tendency is a creeping one' or 'one that proceeds at full gallop.' International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, 68 S.Ct. 12, 15, 92 L.Ed. 20.

[*~208]7

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for trial.

8

Reversed.

[*~214]9

Mr. Justice HARLAN, believing that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to entitle the petitioner to go to trial, and that the matters set forth in respondents' affidavits are not necessarily sufficient to constitute a defense irrespective of what the petitioner may be able to prove at the trial, concurs in the result.

1

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: 'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal * * *.' Section 2 of the Act reads, 'Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * * *.' Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, states, Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor * * * and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained * * *.'

2

The appliance manufacturers named in the complaint are: Admiral Corp., Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corp., General Electric Co., Olympic Radio and Television, Inc., Philco Corp., Rheem Manufacturing Co., Radio Corp. of America, Tappan Stove Co., Whirlpool Corp., Zenith Radio Corp.

3

See also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179, 31 S.Ct. 632, 648, 55 L.Ed. 663, where the Court noted that the statute forbade all 'acts or contracts or agreements or combinations * * * which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously retrained trade * * *.'

4

See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395—401, 47 S.Ct. 377, 378—379—380—381, 71 L.Ed. 700; Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453—454, 77 S.Ct. 390, 394—395, 1 L.Ed.2d 456. In this regard the Sherman Act should be contrasted with § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b), which requires that the Commission find 'that a proceeding by it * * * would be to the interest of the public' before it issues a complaint for unfair competition. See Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27, 50 S.Ct. 1, 374 L.Ed. 138. But cf. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 466—467, 61 S.Ct. 703, 707—708, 85 L.Ed. 949.

5

See, e.g., Eastern State Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S.Ct. 951, 58 L.Ed. 1490; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 44 S.Ct. 96, 68 L.Ed. 308; Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214, 71 S.Ct. 259, 261, 95 L.Ed. 219; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625, 73 S.Ct. 872, 889, 97 L.Ed. 1277; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Uite d States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 545.

6

Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992, with United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 40 S.Ct. 251, 64 L.Ed. 471; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 719—723, 64 S.Ct. 805, 811—812—813, 88 L.Ed. 1024; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 72 S.Ct. 181, 96 L.Ed. 162.

7

The court below relied heavily on Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, in reaching its conclusion. While some language in that case can be read as supporting the position that no restraint on trade is prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act unless it has or is intended to have an effect on market prices, such statements must be considered in the light of the fact that the defendant in that case was a labor union. The Court in Apex recognized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939. Moreover, cases subsequent to Apex have made clear that an effect on prices is not essential to a Sherman Act violation. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 466, 61 S.Ct. 703, 707, 85 L.Ed. 949.