Liles Et Al. v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963 (1976). · Go Syfert
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Liles Et Al. v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963 (1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
117 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 42 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Fenje v. Feld (ilnd, 2003-12-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "see" Fenje v. Feld
N.D. Ill. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 574 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); Rooney v. Secretary of Army, 293 F.Supp.2d 111, 127-28 (D.D.C.2003). 2.
discussed Cited "see" Margaret S. DOSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTH CENTRAL BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (2×)
5th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
Wright & A. Miller, supra § 1255 (demand for improper remedy not fatal if claim shows potential entitlement to different form of relief); see Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 581 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976) (court will grant relief to which plaintiff entitled even though he has not demanded it); cf. East Girard Savings Assoc. v. Citizens National Bank & Trust Co. of Baytown, 593 F.2d 598, 604 (5th Cir.1979) (allegation that plaintiff injured by defendant’s wrongful dishonor of letter of credit sufficien…
cited Cited "see" Lucille E. ROHLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRW, INC., William N. Lesley and Ralph M. Lehman, Defendants-Appellees
7th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); 2A Moore’s Federal Procedure 18.14.
discussed Cited "see" Gentile v. Wallen
2d Cir. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577-78 (7th Cir. 1975) (defense available in teacher discharge context), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976).
discussed Cited "see" Gentile v. Wallen
2d Cir. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577-78 (7th Cir. 1975) (defense available in teacher discharge context), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976).
cited Cited "see, e.g." International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.
E.D. Wis. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior Colleges, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1975).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gay Student Services v. Texas a & M University
5th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (school board permitted to be sued “in all courts” under a state code provision held to waive immunity); Soni v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee, 513 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 , 96 S.Ct. 2623 , 49 L.Ed.2d 372 (1976) (suit permitted due to waiver explicit in University’s charter allowing suit “in any court of law or equity”). 7 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Huemmer v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL, ETC.
D. Maryland · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
In the context of immunity for the municipality itself, the dissent reasoned that “[t]he consensus among the circuits appears to be . that a municipality is not entitled to the defense of ‘good faith’.” 579 F.2d at 182 -183 and n.78, citing Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 934 (8th Cir. 1977); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Turpin v. Mailet
2d Cir. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
He concludes with the observation, "The risks of confrontation are serious." 74 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) 75 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951) 76 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) 77 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 , 95 S.Ct. 2486 , 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) 78 See Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 934 (8th Cir. 197…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Turpin v. Mailet
2d Cir. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 934 (8th Cir. 1977); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976) (school board held liable despite good faith of individual members). .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hodge v. Seiler
5th Cir. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 658 (N.D.Ga. 1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hodge v. Seiler
5th Cir. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 658 (N.D.Ga.1973).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jarius Piphus, a Minor and Geneva Piphus, Guardian Ad Litem for Jarius Piphus v. John D. Carey, People United to Save Humanity v. John D. Carey
7th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976). 3 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pitrone v. Mercadante
E.D. Pa. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District Number 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 , 96 S.Ct. 1748 , 48 L.Ed.2d 208 (1976); Hanna v. Drobneck, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975); Adkins v. Duval County School Board, 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Illinois, 415 F.Supp. 149 (N.D.Ill.1976); Marvasi v. Shorty, 70 F.R.D. 14 (E.D.Pa.1976); Barszca v. Board of Trustees, 400 F.Supp. 675 (N.D.Ill.1975); Devore v. Edgefield County School District, 68 F.R.D. 423 (D.S.C.1975); Everette v. City of Chester, 391 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.Pa.1975); Peacock v. Board of Regents, 3…
Joel Anthony Liles and Ralph Alexander Bremner
v.
State of Oregon
75-983.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 3, 1976.
425 U.S. 963
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Stewart.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of oregon.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice STEVENS, concurring in the denial of certiorari.

The question we must first decide when acting on a petition for certiorari is whether we should set the case for full briefing and oral argument and thereafter decide the merits. Nothing in Mr. Justice BRENNAN'S opinion dissenting from the denail of certiorari in this case persuades me that any purpose would be served by such argument.1 For there is no reason to believe that the majority of the Court which decided Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, is any less adamant than the minority. Accordingly, regardless of how I might vote on the merits after full argument, it would be pointless to grant certiorari in case after case of this character only to have Miller reaffirmed time after time.

Since my dissenting Brethren have recognized the force of this reasoning in the past,2 I believe they also could properly vote to deny certiorari in this case without acting inconsistently with their principled views on the merits. In all events, until a valid reason for voting to grant one of these petitions is put forward, I shall continue to vote to deny. In the interest of conserving scarce law library space, I shall not repeat this explanation every time I cast such a vote.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring in the denial of, certiorari.

The question we must first decide when acting on a petition for certiorari is whether we should set the case for full briefing and oral argument and thereafter decide the merits. Nothing in Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in this case persuades me that any purpose would be served by such argument.[1] For there is no reason to believe that the[*964] majority of the Court which decided Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, is any less adamant than the minority. Accordingly, regardless of how I might vote on the merits after full argument, it would be pointless to grant certiorari in case after case of this character only to have Miller reaffirmed time after time.

Since my dissenting Brethren have recognized the force of this reasoning in the past,[2] I believe they also could properly vote to deny certiorari in this case without acting inconsistently with their principled views on the merits. In all events, until a valid reason for voting to grant one of these petitions is put forward, I shall continue to vote to deny. In the interest of conserving scarce law library space, I shall not repeat this explanation every time I cast such a vote.

1

His quotation of the standard of obscenity applied by the trial judge in this case supports the argument made in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 73, that there has been a failure to define standards which will give adequate guidance to the lower state and federal courts in making obscenity determinations with any degree of predictable consistency. I do not understand him to be using the quotation as a separate argument for granting certiorari in this particular case because the Oregon Court of Appeals did not consider the constitutionality of that standard, but held instead that petitioners had not properly preserved this claim under Oregon law.

2

Ratner v. United States, 423 U. S. 898, 900 n. (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sandquist v. California, 423 U. S. 900, 902 n. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Dissent

MR. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

Petitioners were convicted of selling obscene motion picture films in violation of the recently enacted provisions of Oregon Laws 1973, c. 699, § 4, now codified as Ore. Rev. Stat. § 167.087 (1975). Section 4 provides in pertinent part:

“(1) A person commits the crime of disseminating obscene material if he knowingly makes, exhibits, sells, delivers or provides, or offers or agrees to make, exhibit, sell, deliver or provide, or has in his possession with intent to exhibit, sell, deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture, motion picture, films, slides, drawings or other visual reproduction.
“(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section, matter is obscene if:
[*965] “(a) It depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct;
“(b) The average person applying contemporary state standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and
“(c) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.”

The judgments of conviction were affirmed by the Oregon Court of Appeals, 22 Ore. App. 132, 537 P. 2d 1182, and a timely petition for review was subsequently denied by the Oregon Supreme Court.

It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, Oregon Laws 1973, c. 699, § 4, is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals was rendered after Miller, reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other question presented by petitioners merits plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 495 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

I note that this case particularly exemplifies the difficulty and arbitrariness inherent in any attempt to articulate a standard of obscenity. I need only quote the standard as applied by the judge before whom petitioners’ case was tried:

“ ‘Well, what is patently offensive?
[*966] “ 'And, frankly, I had to kind of apply my own standard, which, I believe, corresponds with the standards of the community. And the standard probably, simply stated and boiled down, is the same one that was taught to me by my mother from the day I was a small child. If there was something of which I would not want her to know, then don’t do it. Pretty simple.
“ 'Applying that standard I would think that I wouldn’t get any quarrel out of anyone in this room, that they wouldn’t want their mothers sitting next to them while they looked at either one of those movies. They are patently offensive.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 8-9.