Merrell v. United States, 463 U.S. 1230 (1983). · Go Syfert
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Merrell v. United States, 463 U.S. 1230 (1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …the courts of appeals have also recognized that only customers are outside the purview of the statute.
107 citation events across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. William P. Rieger (ca3, 1991-08-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. William P. Rieger (3×)
3rd Cir. · 1991 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the courts of appeals have also recognized that only customers are outside the purview of the statute.
discussed Cited "see" Friends of the Crystal River v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2×)
W.D. Mich. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Alabama Power Co. v. F.E.R.C., 685 F.2d 1311 , 1315 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573, 3574 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1415 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Penn v. State
Fla. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Middleton v. State, 426 So.2d 548, 553 (Fla. 1982) ("[T]he jury's recommendation of a sentence of death is a strong indication that it did not find appellant's emotional state particularly compelling as a mitigating circumstance."), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1413 (1983).
examined Cited "see" Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7×)
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brief for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Utah Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1415 (1983), Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 95, 106-07.
examined Cited "see" Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (7×)
D.C. Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brief for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Utah Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1415 (1983), Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 95, 106-07.
discussed Cited "see" Missouri v. Bowen (2×)
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 , 1315 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1415 (1983). .
discussed Cited "see" State of Missouri v. Bowen (2×)
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Alabama Power Co. v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 , 1315 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1415 (1983). 16 We note that one purpose of the 60-day deadline may be to ensure that a state is kept apprised of the status of its proposed plan.
cited Cited "see" Holcomb v. State
Md. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Middleton v. State, 426 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1413 (1983).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Nathan Wall (95-5007) and Donald Wall (95-5008) (6×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
This court has added that “[t]he pleasure of participation and association in a gambling enterprise which otherwise meets the statutory test is sufficient.” United States v. Rowland, 592 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir.1979); see also United States v. Merrell, 701 F.2d 53, 55 (6th Cir.) (serving coffee to bettors and cleaning up after they left was enough to sustain a conviction under § 1955), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3558 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1415 (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Larry Eugene Mann v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent (2×)
11th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Middleton v. State, 426 So.2d 548, 552-53 (Fla.1982) (approving trial court’s imposition of death sentence and reiterating in conclusion that jury had recommended death), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230 , 103 S.Ct. 3573 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1413 (1983); Francois v. State, 407 So.2d 885, 891 (Fla.1982) (same), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 , 102 S.Ct. 3511 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982); Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d 1362, 1373 (Fla.1981) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982); cf. Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833 , 839 n. 1, 13 Fla.L.Weekly 127, 133 n. 1 (…
Buster Franklin Merrell
v.
United States
82-6645.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jul 6, 1983.
463 U.S. 1230
White, Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 66%
Citer courts: Third Circuit (3)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice WHITE, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

[*1231] Justice White, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

Between May 11, 1979, and April 19, 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation maintained surveillance of certain premises in Detroit that were suspected of being the site of an illegal gambling operation. The surveillance, which entailed videotaping and recording activities and conversations, revealed an illegal dice game. As a result, 13 people were charged with violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1955 * and conspiracy under 18 U. S. C. §371. Eight codefendants, the lessor of the premises, the game operator, three dealers, and three watchmen, pleaded guilty after three days of trial. The remaining five codefendants waived a jury for the rest of the trial. Four of them were acquitted of all charges because they were “mere bettors.” The evidence presented by the Government concerning petitioner established that he regularly served coffee to bettors during the gambling sessions; after the sessions he stacked tables and chairs, swept the floor, cleaned ashtrays, and repositioned the tables and chairs. Petitioner was convicted of the substantive offense of conducting an illegal gambling business, but acquitted of conspiracy.

On appeal, petitioner claimed that his activities did not justify his conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the[*1232] proper standard to employ in resolving petitioner’s claim is whether he performed “any act, duty or function which is necessary or helpful in operating the enterprise.” 701 F. 2d 53, 55 (1983). That holding conflicts with the decision in United States v. Boss, 671 F. 2d 396, 400 (CA10 1982), where it was held that the proper standard is whether the person performs “a function . . . necessary to the illegal gambling business.” That court interpreted the term “conduct” to require “some actual involvement in the gambling operation,” ibid., and found that neither a waitress, a bartender, nor a band member could be considered “conductors” under § 1955, id., at 402.

There is a significant difference between activities that are “necessary” to the operation of an illegal gambling establishment and those that are only “helpful.” The Boss case involved the question whether waitresses who served drinks to the bettors in the illegal gambling establishment as well as to customers in the adjacent dance hall were “conductors” within the meaning of § 1955. The Tenth Circuit found they were not because their functions were not necessary, but merely helpful. I do not find that case distinguishable from the present one. The difference between conviction and acquittal should not rest on whether an illegal gambling establishment existed in isolation or was concealed within another, legal, establishment. If a waitress who functions solely as a waitress in an illegal gambling establishment could not be convicted under § 1955, as the Tenth Circuit has held, then a waiter/janitor who functions solely as a waiter/janitor should not be convicted either.

Because a case involving a conflict among the courts of appeals concerning the standard to be applied in determining criminal liability involves either the unjust conviction of an innocent person or the frustration of congressional intent to criminalize specific conduct, it necessarily presents an important question. Certiorari should be granted, and the case should be set for argument. I dissent.

Title 18 U. S. C. § 1955 provides, in pertinent part:

“Prohibition of illegal gambling businesses
“(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
“(b) As used in this section—
“(1) ‘illegal gambling business’ means a gambling business which—
“(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;
“(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
“(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.”