Robins v. United States, 404 U.S. 1049 (1971). · Go Syfert
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Robins v. United States, 404 U.S. 1049 (1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · “In some instances ... five days or even one day might prove to be constitutionally intolerable.”
364 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 66 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Langley v. Coughlin (nysd, 1989-06-08) · Strongest negative: George Parrish and Charles Giles v. Perry Johnson, Charles Anderson, K.L. Cole, and Clarence Turner (ca6, 1986-09-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 38 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" George Parrish and Charles Giles v. Perry Johnson, Charles Anderson, K.L. Cole, and Clarence Turner
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: but see · confidence high
Yet, a prison official’s discretion is not unlimited in this regard and several courts have held that mail relating to a prisoner’s legal matters may not be read and may only be opened in the prisoner’s presence, Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 477 (5th Cir.1976), Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910 , 94 S.Ct. 3202 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1974); Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir.1972); see Harrod v. Halford, 773 F.2d 234 , 236 n. 1 (8th Cir.1985) (per curiam), cert. denied — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2254 , 90 L.Ed.2d 699 (1986); but see…
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Langley v. Coughlin
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
in some instances ... five days or even one day might prove to be constitutionally intolerable.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sledge v. Carlson
W.D. Okla. · 1975 · confidence medium
Sostre v. McGinnis, supra, 404 U.S., at 201, 92 S.Ct. 719 .
discussed Cited "see" Lawrence G. Spaight v. Thomas Coughlin
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 192-94 (2d Cir.1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). 7 Because both of these issues are well settled in this Circuit, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Spaight's complaint. 8 We have considered all the arguments raised by Spaight and find them to be without merit. 9 Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
discussed Cited "see" Williams v. Greifinger
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 208 (2d Cir.1971) (Feinberg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“the means used to exact submission must be constitutionally acceptable, and the threat of virtually endless isolation that endangers sanity is not”), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 , cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Gilbert v. Selsky
S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir.1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972). 4 .
discussed Cited "see" Collins v. Ward
S.D.N.Y. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
E.g., La Batt v. Twomey, supra; Hodges v. Klein, 421 F.Supp. 1224 (D.N.J.1976); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 , 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2571 , 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1977) (“A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”) It is with these provisos in mind that I now turn to a determination of whether the various conditions of plaintiffs’ *413 confinement for fifteen days at Ossining amounted to punishment that shocks the conscience, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denie…
cited Cited "see" Engblom v. Carey
unknown court · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 ; 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Engblom v. Carey
unknown court · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 ; 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Clay v. Miller
4th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom., Sostre v. Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) (one hour of exercise per day not unconstitutional).
cited Cited "see" Clay v. Miller
4th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom., Sostre v. Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) (one hour of exercise per day not unconstitutional).
discussed Cited "see" Victor Bono v. William Saxbe, Individually and in His Capacity as Attorney General of the United States
7th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sweet, supra, 529 F.2d 854 , 860-866 and Sostre v. McGin-nis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) and 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Rhem v. Malcolm
S.D.N.Y. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F.Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.1970), aff’d in part, sub nom., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Frazier v. Ward
N.D.N.Y. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. den., 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
cited Cited "see" McKinnon v. Patterson
S.D.N.Y. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Masia A. Mukmuk, Also Known as Sylvester Cholmondeley v. Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 202-03 (2 Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 , 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972); United States ex rel.
cited Cited "see" Vargas v. Correa
S.D.N.Y. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Mcredmond v. Wilson
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191-94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972). 22 Nor does appellants' claim that, because neglected or abused children are not placed in training schools, the placement of PINS in such schools violates the Equal Protection Clause rise to the level of constitutional substantiality.
cited Cited "see" McRedmond v. Wilson
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,191-94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montanye
2d Cir. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 , 202 & n.47 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 and 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 , 89 S.Ct. 747 , 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Montanye
2d Cir. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 , 202 & n.47 (2d Cir. 1971) (enbanc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 and 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 , 89 S.Ct. 747 , 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969).
discussed Cited "see" Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Department of Correctional Services
S.D.N.Y. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Corby v. Conboy, supra. And accepting the October 15, 1971 complaint’s allegations as true, it does not appear that the plaintiff has been subjected to cruel' or unusual punishment for his prison-rule infractions nor denied due process under the requirements of Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Sostre v. Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
cited Cited "see" McCray v. Burrell
D. Maryland · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
cited Cited "see" Clements v. Turner
D. Utah · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 , 192 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) (citing cases). 9 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Frank Peter Teresi
7th Cir. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. White, 447 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 714 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Miles Christman v. Albert Skinner (2×)
2d Cir. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200-201 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) and 405 U.S. 978 (1972); cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 , 89 S.Ct. 747 , 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). 16 The third cause of action claims that restrictions on inmate receipt of reading material violated the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments, 3 and seeks damages therefor.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ryan's Express Transportation Services, Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc.
Nev. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ct., 123 Nev. 419, 427 , 168 P.3d 703, 709 (2007); Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 556, 571 , 138 P.3d 433, 444 (2006); see also Robins v. United States, 404 U.S. 1049 , 1052 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carlson v. Jess, 507 F. Supp. 2d 968, 980 (E.D.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Davidson v. COUGHLIN, III
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir.1996); Anderson, 757 F.2d at 35 ; see also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 , 193 & n. 25 (2d Cir.1971) (noting that availability of exercise is an important consideration in determining whether conditions of segregated confinement violate the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Alnutt v. Cleary
W.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
Franco, supra at 589 ; See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200 (2d Cir.1971) (in banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Frank Gonzales v. Danny Martinez
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.1986) (finding two meals a day sufficient if nutritionally and calorically adequate); see also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 186, 193-94 (2d Cir.1971) (finding diets of 2,800 to 3,300 calories per day constitutionally adequate), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir.1982) (finding one meal a day for 15 days, where the meal contained 2,000-2,500 calories and was sufficient to maintain health, constitutionally adequate). 10 Gonzales alleged that he was effectively denied 4 breakfast and l…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Griffin v. Smith
W.D.N.Y. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190-94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Robert Mata v. George Sumner (2×)
9th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972); Bennett, Who Wants To Be Warden?, 1 New England J.Prison L. 69, 69-70 (1974).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Roy Buise v. Donald Hudkins, Individually and as Superintendent of the Indiana State Farm (4×)
7th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, E. g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 201 (2d Cir. 1971) (En banc ), certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 ; 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 ; Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1971), certiorari denied, 409 U.S. 968 , 93 S.Ct. 279 , 34 L.Ed.2d 233 ; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 , 97 S.Ct. 1491 , 52 L.Ed.2d 72 , adds that mere availability is not enough and that the key inquiry is whether a "reasonably adequate opportunity" to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights is provided.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jefferson v. Southworth
D.R.I. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Nevin Mawhinney v. Robert J. Henderson, Superintendent, Peter Preiser, Commissioner of Corrections, and Norris, Lieutenant
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 189 (2 Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 , and 405 U.S. 978 , 92 S.Ct. 1190 , 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972) (confinement to segregation for past or threatened litigation against prison officials constituted due process violation).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Paul J. Cardaropoli v. John J. Norton, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut
2d Cir. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States of America Ex Rel. Roy Schuster v. Leon J. Vincent, Warden, Green Haven Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 1975 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Juan G. Morales v. Wilbur J. Schmidt (2×)
7th Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also the Second Circuit's expression of misgivings about 'judicial activism' in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 , 92 S.Ct. 719 , 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert Joe Robins
v.
United States
71-5405.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jul 27, 1971.
404 U.S. 1049
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 72%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (1)
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,

dissenting.

On March 4, 1964, petitioner was arraigned in the United States District Court on charges of prison escape and accompanying assaults. Counsel was appointed that day, and after petitioner and the attorney assured the court they had had sufficient time earlier in the day to[*1050] confer, the court accepted petitioner’s guilty pleas. On June 22, 1964, petitioner returned for sentencing, and the following occurred:

“The Court: Mr. Robbins [sic], when [last] before the Court, was represented by appointed counsel, Mr. Sheldon Crossette, a member of the bar of Wyan-dotte County and of this Court.
“I excused Mr. Corssette [sic] from further representation of Mr. Robbins [sic] since he is in Kansas City and this hearing is in Leavenworth.
“Mr. Robbins [sic], do you desire that other counsel be appointed to represent you at this hearing?
“Defendant Robbins [sic]: No.
“The Court: You understand that you have the right to have counsel?
“Defendant Robbins [sic]: Yes.
“The Court: And you waive that right?
“Defendant Robbins [sic]: Yes, sir.”

Petitioner was then sentenced to consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment on two counts and a concurrent five-year term on a third, all to follow any sentence then being served.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion in the sentencing court to vacate sentence under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, contending, first, that in summarily relieving his appointed attorney, the trial court had denied him his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and, second, that he had not validly waived his right to counsel. In particular, petitioner alleges that he did not accept the court’s offer to appoint new counsel for fear of angering the court, and because he did not think a new attorney, unfamiliar with the case, could help him. The District Court in an unreported order denied relief without a[*1051] hearing, on the ground that the records of the case “conclusively” demonstrated a valid waiver. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in an unreported per curiam opinion.

The principles governing this case are well established. Petitioner, of course, had a constitutional right to counsel at his sentencing proceedings. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U. S. 2 (1968); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967). Although the Constitution “does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant,” Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 174-175 (1946), a waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if it is voluntarily and understandingly made. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).

“The fact that an accused may tell [the judge] that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of . . . all . . . facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 724 (1948).

Moreover, “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights and ... we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ ” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, at 464. See also, e. g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962) ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 (1957); Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942). Finally, petitioner was entitled to “a prompt hearing” on his motion “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner [was] entitled to no relief . . . .” 28 U. S. C. § 2255. See, e. g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963).

[*1052] Whether petitioner was properly denied a hearing presents a serious question. Nothing in the record suggests, let alone demonstrates “conclusively,” that petitioner’s statement of waiver of new counsel at sentencing was made “with an apprehension of . . . all . . . facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra, at 724. Nothing reveals an awareness on his part that the offer of new counsel was more than “a mere procedural formality,” id., at 722— that counsel would have been appointed not merely to stand by his side while the court pronounced sentence. Nothing indicates an appreciation that a continuance might have been granted to permit new counsel to familiarize himself with the case and render the services that this Court has said are integral to “ 'the very integrity of the fact-finding process.’ ” McConnell v. Rhay, supra, at 3. On the contrary, the record offers some support for petitioner’s allegation that, although he wanted meaningful representation, he felt he could not press for it without antagonizing the court.

Moreover, the record is silent on any waiver of error in the dismissal of petitioner’s already appointed attorney, and that dismissal itself raises substantial constitutional questions. In Vellucci v. United States, 430 F. 2d 188 (1970), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held it to be plain error for a trial judge to excuse the defendant’s attorney before sentencing. The Court of Appeals below distinguished Vellucci on the ground that the defendant there, unlike petitioner here, was not offered new counsel. But an unaccepted offer of new counsel can hardly render harmless any error in dismissing an already appointed attorney.

Lawyers are not necessarily fungible goods, to be replaced at the whim of the court. Counsel’s prior experience in a case, his familiarity with the facts and prior proceedings, and the position of trust he may have[*1053] gained with the defendant are factors arguing for continued representation by the same attorney. This case is barren of any indication that the interests of petitioner were considered in the dismissal of his appointed counsel. I would accordingly grant this petition for certiorari.