Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924 (1974). · Go Syfert
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Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924 (1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
98 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: David L. Adams v. R.S. Peterson, Superintendent of O.S.C.I. (ca9, 1992-03-27) · Strongest negative: In Re Cook County Grand Jury (illappct, 1983-03-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" In Re Cook County Grand Jury
Ill. App. Ct. · 1983 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. In re Persico (2d Cir.1974), 491 F.2d 1156 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 924 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 , 95 S.Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that "[d]elay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased" ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n. 23).
cited Cited "but see" People v. Taddeo
Ill. App. Ct. · 1983 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. In re Persico (2d Cir. 1974), 491 F.2d 1156 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 924 , 42 L.
examined Cited "but see" Davis v. State (4×)
Md. · 1976 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924 , 95 S.Ct. 200 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974) (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari on the ground that Boykin established that trial courts must obtain from defendants pleading guilty a specific and knowing waiver of the three enumerated rights).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David L. Adams v. R.S. Peterson, Superintendent of O.S.C.I. (2×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Id. 419 U.S. at 925-26 , 95 S.Ct. at 200 (citation omitted).
examined Cited "see" People v. Saffold (3×)
Mich. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 925 , 95 S.Ct. 200 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974).
cited Cited "see" In the Matter of Special February, 1977 Grand Jury. Appeal of Alfred Pavone
7th Cir. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See note 5, supra. In In Re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 , 95 S.Ct. 199 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 , similar discovery and hearing issues were considered.
examined Cited "see" State v. Reaves (4×)
Iowa · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924 , 95 S.Ct. 200 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michael L. Shakman, and v. Democratic Organization of Cook County, and City of Chicago and Michael Cardilli
7th Cir. · 1976 · signal: see also · confidence low
Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 704, at 159 (1969); see also In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 , 95 S.Ct. 199 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974); Southern Railway Company v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968); Comment, Right to Trial in Contempt Cases: A Critical View of the Sentence Aggregation Rules, 70 Nw.U.L.Rev. 533, 534 n.3 (1975).
Lee Ann Johnson
v.
State of Ohio
73-1746.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 21, 1974.
419 U.S. 924
Douglas, Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the Ohio for Clark County.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr. Justice MARSHALL concur, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Ct. App. Ohio, Clark County. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,

dissenting.

Approximately one month after pleading guilty, petitioner sought to vacate her plea on the ground that she had not been adequately advised of the rights thereby waived. The record shows that before accepting petitioner’s plea the trial judge advised her of her right to be tried by a jury and to confront witnesses against her. Petitioner’s motion was denied by the trial court and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.

[*925] In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969), we emphasized that a guilty plea is a waiver of important constitutional rights designed to protect the fairness of a trial:

"Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145. Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.”

Waiver of such rights as these can be accomplished only by “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). Only recently we reaffirmed the stringent standard for demonstrating the waiver of rights designed to safeguard the accused at trial, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 236-237 (1973).

The accused can waive only a known right, Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, and the State has the burden of demonstrating a knowing waiver. To repeat what we said in Boykin, “[w]e cannot presume a waiver . .. from a silent record.” Boykin established that the State must demonstrate the defendant’s knowing waiver of the three constitutional rights there enumerated. Two States have so interpreted Boykin as a constitutional minimum. People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21, 194 N. W. 2d 868 (1972); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P. 2d 449 (1969). The record here fails to satisfy even this minimum standard, for the[*926] trial judge failed to advert to the privilege against self-incrimination.

The Boykin enumeration was illustrative, not exhaustive. The necessity that one be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)) and the right to a speedy trial (Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972)) are likewise involved. Ohio seems to recognize the need to accommodate constitutional rights other than the three mentioned in Boykin, since its own Supreme Court has held that a trial judge must advise the defendant of his right to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before accepting a guilty plea. State v. Griffey, 35 Ohio St. 2d 101, 298 N. E. 2d 603 (1973). Yet the record here fails even to meet this standard.

Since the Court has now held that a guilty plea forecloses constitutional challenge to the process that brought the defendant to the bar, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973), strict scrutiny over the standards for acceptance of the plea becomes all the more imperative. I would grant certiorari.