Jarvis v. United States, 435 U.S. 934 (1978). · Go Syfert
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Jarvis v. United States, 435 U.S. 934 (1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · "no evidence is being challenged which could not have been obtained without the illegal arrest"
114 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 33 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Davis (njsuperctappdiv, 1985-09-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) State v. Davis (2×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1985 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
no evidence is being challenged which could not have been obtained without the illegal arrest
discussed Cited "see" State v. Belt
Kan. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied with dissent 435 U.S. 934 (1978) (“John Doe” warrant without name, description by which defendant could be identified with reasonable certainty invalid, could not be cured by availability of extrinsic evidence arrest nevertheless because federal agents had probable cause for warrantless arrest).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. James (2×)
E.D.N.Y · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Thai 29 F.3d at 810 (citing United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1511 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978)).
discussed Cited "see" Patsy Kelly Jarrett v. Frank R. Headley, Superintendent of Bedford Hills Correctional Facility (2×)
2d Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 , 499 & n. 8 (2d Cir.1977) (positive identification prior to confirmatory remarks and repeated showings), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1511 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978); United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 755 (2d Cir.) (post-viewing confirmatory remark), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 , 100 S.Ct. 3027 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1980); see also United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1067 (6th Cir.1976) (suggestive procedure not dispositive if it did not produce the alleged misidentification).
discussed Cited "see" Miller v. C a Muer Corp.
Mich. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Emory v Georgia Hospital Service Ass’n, 4 FEP Cases 891 (MD Ga, 1971), aff'd 446 F2d 897 (CA 5, 1971). 11 See Yuhas v Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, 562 F2d 496, 499 (CA 7, 1977), cert den 435 US 934 (1978); Keckeisen v Independent School Dist 612, 509 F2d 1062, 1066 (CA 8, 1975), cert den 423 US 833 (1975); Cutts v Fowler, 223 US App DC 414, 417; 692 F2d 138 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Ernestine KING, Appellant, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Appellee
8th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Espinoza v. Thoma, 580 F.2d 346, 348-49 (8th Cir.1978) (no immediate family rule applied to non-married couple upheld), citing Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 499-500 (7th Cir.1977) (no-spouse rule upheld), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1510 , 55 L.Ed.2d 531 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Dennis Dean Mahoney (2×)
5th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1511 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978).
cited Cited "see" Maurice Winkler v. County of Dekalb, Etc.
5th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bossard v. Exxon Corp., 559 F.2d 1040, 1041 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1510 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" State Division of Human Rights v. Village of Spencerport
N.Y. App. Div. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
In doing so, they reasoned that the acts were unlawful because motivated by proscribed considerations such as sex (e.g., Matter of Sanbonmatsu v Boyer, 45 AD2d 249 [“nepotism rule”]; see Yuhas v Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F2d 496, cert den 435 US 934 [“no spouse rule”] ; Lansdale v Air Line Pilots Assn.
discussed Cited "see" Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc. (2×)
D.D.C. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1510 , 55 L.Ed.2d 531 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Morrison v. Fox (2×)
W.D. Pa. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See U. S. v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1511 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Nancy Reed and Morris Goldsmith, A/K/A \Marlowe
unknown court · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 , 498 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 1511 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 , 46 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. David Thai, Lan Ngoc Tran, Minh Do, Jimmy Nguyen, Hoang Huy Ngo, Quang Van Nguyen, and Lv Hong, A/K/A \l.v. Hong\"" (2×)
2d Cir. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 , 98 S.Ct. 1511 , 55 L.Ed.2d 532 (1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Whirlpool Corp. v. Civil Rights Commission
Mich. · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Yuhas v Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, 562 F2d 496 (CA 7, 1977), cert den 435 US 934 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Allison
unknown court · 1979 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Jarvis, 560 F. 2d 494 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1977); United States v. Reed, 572 F. 2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978); United States v. Cravero, 545 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); United States v. Shye, 492 F. 2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Salvador v. United States, 505 F. 2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phillips, 497 F. 2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Davis, 461 F. 2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972); Vance v. State of North Carolina, 432 F. 2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970).
Wallace Jarvis
v.
United States
77-5757.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 20, 1978.
435 U.S. 934
White, Brennan.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 85%
Citer courts: New Jersey Superior Court App … (2)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

In denying certiorari in this case, the Court allows the Second Circuit’s “but for” corollary to the exclusionary rule to pass unreviewed, at least for the present. As applied in this case, the Second Circuit rule allows into evidence the fruits of an arrest involving serious constitutional questions, because the court below could envision a set of circumstances in' which the arrest might have been carried out constitutionally.

Petitioner was arrested on April 20, 1976, on the authority of a “John Doe” bench warrant. The arresting agents broke down the door of petitioner’s home and arrested him in his bed. The trial court approved the arrest on the basis of extrinsic evidence which supplemented the nameless and descriptionless warrant. However, the Second Circuit found the “John Doe” warrant to be invalid, and went on to consider whether the[*935] arrest might otherwise be defended under 18 U. S. C. § 3052, which grants FBI agents authority to make felony arrests based on reasonable suspicion. Observing that United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), left unresolved the constitutionality of probable-cause arrests pursuant to statutory authority effected in a private home without a warrant, the Second Circuit concluded that the facts of this case raised “serious question whether the forcible entry into Jarvis’ home without a valid warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances meets the requirement of the statute or fourth amendment standards of reasonableness.” 560 F. 2d 494, 498 (CA2 1977).

Nevertheless, the Second Circuit affirmed the admissibility of photographs, fingerprints, and identifications resulting therefrom, all of which followed petitioner’s arrest. Its reasoning was that the agents could have legally arrested petitioner on probable cause as he emerged from his home, and, had they done so, all the evidence complained of would then have materialized anyway. “The illegal arrest thus was not a 'but for’ cause for the introduction of the evidence appellant seeks to suppress.” Id., at 498-499.

This “but for” test presents a substantial question for the proper enforcement of the exclusionary rule. Its origin is dubious,[1] and its use has not been explicitly sanctioned outside of the Second Circuit.[2] Most importantly, it sanctions a post [*936] hoc hypothesizing by a court as to what the conditions for an arrest of a search might have been. If a court is satisfied that the Constitution need not have been violated in the conduct of a particular arrest, then, under this rule, evidence derived from the arrest, which in fact violated the Constitution, may be admitted. In short, the exclusionary rule is suspended when constitutional infringements are gratuitous.

The “but for” rule is not a mere application or extension of our cases sustaining the admissibility of evidence arguably the product of a prior constitutional breach. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), this Court sanctioned the use of evidence possibly stemming from an illegal arrest, where the “connection between the arrest and the [evidence] had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,’ ” id., at 491, citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975), we recently reaffirmed that “[i]n order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires . . . that the statement ... be 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’ ” Id., at 602. In both cases it was recognized that evidence which would not have arisen “but for” an illegal arrest might still be admitted if, under the facts as they actually developed, a break in the chain occurred. But in this case, the Government does not argue that an act of the petitioner’s free will intervened to break the causality between arrest and identification. Rather, this case deals in suppositions of how the illegality of the arrest might have been avoided.

The primary rationale for the exclusionary rule is to deter official misconduct. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,[*937] 347-348 (1974). Evidence that comes to light after official misconduct but not because of it may be introduced. No deterrent purpose is served by excluding it. The Second Circuit rule poses the problem of evidence which comes to light because of official misconduct, but which might well have arisen anyway. It makes the exclusion decision turn not on what events transpired but on what might have transpired. It makes courts not factfinders but fact predictors. As a deterrent, it removes the exclusion sanction from that police misconduct which is gratuitous and avoidable, precisely the type of behavior most in need of deterrence. I believe this Court should give plenary consideration to the interpretation the Second Circuit has given to the exclusionary rule this Court originally fashioned.

I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

1

United States v. Galante, 547 F. 2d 733 (CA2 1976), which the Second Circuit cites as supporting the “but for” test, engaged in speculation in a fashion similar to the court’s action in this case, but it also based the holding of admissibility on the interruption of the chain connecting illegal arrest and seizure of evidence by an independent act of the suspect. Id., at 741. In United States v. Edmons, 432 F. 2d 577 (CA2 1970), also relied on by the Solicitor General in opposing this petition, the Second Circuit excluded the fruits of “flagrantly illegal arrests,” while reserving the question of exclusion after “an arrest made in good faith” but lacking probable cause. Id., at 584.

2

The Solicitor General relies on only one Circuit case outside of the Second Circuit, Sutton v. United States, 267 F. 2d 271 (CA4 1959). The[*936] defendant there sought to suppress all evidence in order to punish the Government for an unreasonably long prearraignment delay. The absence of any causal link between the right infringement and the evidence sought to be suppressed clearly distinguishes Sutton from the present case and from the discussion of “but for” causation generally.