Albert Smith, President of the Vill. of Skokie, Illinois v. Frank Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). · Go Syfert
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Albert Smith, President of the Vill. of Skokie, Illinois v. Frank Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
99 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 36 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Courtemanche v. General Services Administration (mad, 2001-11-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Courtemanche v. General Services Administration
D. Mass. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 447 F.Supp. 676, 685 (N.D.Ill.1978) (noting lack of record evidence that municipality had ever been threatened with damage by a public assembly which would have been prevented or alleviated by an insurance requirement), aff' d, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Thomas, Caren C. v. City of Chicago
7th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (suit allowing the National Socialist Party of America, a Nazi organization, to march through Skokie, Illinois); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (suit prohibiting gay and lesbian organization from participating in Boston’s St.
discussed Cited "see" Robert MacDonald Caren C. Thomas and Windy City Hemp Development Board v. City of Chicago, Cross-Appellee (2×)
7th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (suit allowing the National Socialist Party of America, a Nazi organization, to march through Skokie, Illinois); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (suit prohibiting gay and lesbian organization from participating in Boston's St.
discussed Cited "see" Knudtson v. City of Coates (2×)
Minn. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Jeffries v. Harleston
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978) (First Amendment protects right of Nazi party to march through predominantly Jewish town containing many Holocaust survivors); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 , 89 S.Ct. 1827 , 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (First Amendment protects right of Ku Klux Klan leader to make derogatory remarks against Jews and blacks); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 , 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (First Amendment protects right of person to burn U.S. flag during protest rally).
cited Cited "see" Rogers v. Mount Union Borough Ex Rel. Zook
M.D. Penn. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. den’d sub nom., 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
cited Cited "see" NY CTY. ANCIENT ORDER OF HIBERNIANS v. Dinkins
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
cited Cited "see" New York County Board of Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" R. David Finzer, Father v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor, District of Columbia (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (Nazi rally in Skokie, Illinois), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978); Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 578 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.1978) (Ku Klux Klan rally).
cited Cited "see" State v. Bellamy
Conn. App. Ct. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S. Ct. 291 , 58 L.
discussed Cited "see" Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority
N.D. Ill. · 1984 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 , 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978); and see the extended discussion in NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund [“LDF”] v. Devine, 727 F.2d 1247, 1261-64 (D.C.Cir. 1984) of the offensiveness to the First Amendment of succumbing to what the late Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. termed the “heckler’s veto.” 15.
cited Cited "see" William Blameuser v. Colonel Donald Andrews, United States Army
7th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Edgar
Ariz. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Dost, 575 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 290 , 58 L.Ed.2d 263 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook Cty. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Ill. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 , 1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978). 15 .
cited Cited "see" Blameuser v. Andrews
E.D. Wis. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Edgar
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See, United States v. Dost, 575 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 290 , 58 L.Ed.2d 263 (1978), wherein the fact that the defendant might have received some bad advice from his lawyer did not shield him from the consequences of his act.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." John McGlone v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville (2×)
6th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence low
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty. cases suggest, “cordon off” protestors seeking to deliver a message contrary to a public festival, or even “disperse [an] entire crowd” that has gathered to counterprotest.5 See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 253 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 , 1201–02 & n.8 (7th Cir.) (discussing, in dicta, various limitations that could permissibly have been imposed on Nazi demonstrators in Skokie), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'antisemitisme (2×)
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978) (striking down on First Amendment grounds several Skokie, Illinois ordinances prohibiting the National Socialist Party of America from marching through the town: “First Amendment rights are truly precious and fundamental to our national life....
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Yahoo Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
INC. v. LA LIGUE CONTRE LE RACISME Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (striking down on First Amendment grounds several Skokie, Illinois ordinances prohibiting the National Socialist Party of Amer- ica from marching through the town: “First Amendment rights are truly precious and fundamental to our national life . . . .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. (2×)
Cal. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
(National Socialist Party v. Skokie (1977) 432 U.S. 43 [ 97 S.Ct. 2205 , 53 L.Ed.2d 96 ]; see also Collin v. Smith (7th Cir. 1978) 578 F.2d 1197 , cert. den. 439 U.S. 916 [ 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 ].) In each instance, racist and discriminatory views are being expressed.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Americans United For Separation Of Church And State v. City Of Grand Rapids
6th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (upholding right of Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids
6th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (upholding right of Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Bruce Roy Lee (2×)
8th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978) (Nazi Party march through a heavily Jewish city held protected by the First Amendment).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Bill Wilkinson and James Farrands v. Lester Forst, Donald Long, Austin McGuigan and the City of Meriden
2d Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Collin v. Smith, 447 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Henrico Professional Firefighters Association v. Board Of Supervisors Of Henrico County
4th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978) (invalidating Village of Skokie ordinance directed at Nazis, which forbade dissemination of religious materials promoting hatred by reason of race or religion) 13 The Firefighters Association has pressed upon us the argument that the Board, by regularly providing opportunity to members of the public, including nonemployee associations, to address it, created a limited public forum which it might not then deny to a speaker on the basis of its identity as an association of e…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Henrico Professional Firefighters Ass'n, Local 1568 v. Board of Supervisors
4th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978) (invalidating Village of Skokie ordinance directed at Nazis, which forbade dissemination of religious materials promoting hatred by reason of race or religion). .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Aiello v. City Of Wilmington
3rd Cir. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Aiello v. City of Wilmington
3rd Cir. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S.Ct. 291 , 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Smith, President of the Village of Skokie, Illinois, Et Al.
v.
Collin Et Al.
77-1736.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 16, 1978.
439 U.S. 916
Blackmun, White.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

G. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice White joins,

dissenting.

It is a matter of regret for me that the Court denies certiorari in this case, for this is litigation that rests upon critical, disturbing, and emotional facts, and the issues cut down to the very heart of the First Amendment.

The village of Skokie, Ill., a suburb of Chicago, in 1974 had a population of approximately 70,000 persons. A majority were Jewish; of the Jewish population a substantial number were survivors of World War II persecution. In March 1977, respondents Collin and the National Socialist Party of America, which Collin described as a “Nazi organization,” publicly announced plans to hold an assembly in front of the Skokie Village Hall. On May 2, the village enacted three ordinances. The first established a permit system for parades and public assemblies and required applicants to post public liability and property damage insurance. The second prohibited the dissemination of material that incited racial or religious hatred with intent so to incite. The third prohibited public demonstrations by members of political parties while wearing military-style uniforms.

On June 22, respondent Collin applied for a permit under the first ordinance. His application stated that a public assembly would take place on July 4, would consist of persons demonstrating in front of the Village Hall, would last about a[*917] half hour, and would not disrupt traffic. It also stated that the participants would wear uniforms with swastikas and would carry placards proclaiming free speech for white persons, but would not distribute handbills or literature. The permit was denied.

Skokie's Village Hall stood on a street that was zoned commercial. There were residential areas, however, adjoining to the North, South, and West. The front of the Village Hall was visible from dwellings in those areas.

Upon the rejection of the permit application, respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the president of the village of Skokie, its manager, its corporation counsel, and the village itself. Respondents asked that the ordinances be declared void and their enforcement enjoined. The District Court, after receiving evidence, ruled that the ordinances were unconstitutional on their face, and granted the requested declaratory and injunctive relief. It filed a comprehensive opinion. 447 F. Supp. 676 (1978). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting in part, affirmed. 578 F. 2d 1197 (1978).

A permit then was issued to respondents for a demonstration on the afternoon of June 25, 1978, in front of the Village Hall. Respondents, however, shifted their assembly from Skokie to Chicago where activities took place on June 24 and July 9.

Other aspects of the controversy already have reached this Court. In April 1977, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill., entered an injunction against respondents prohibiting them, within the village, from parading in the National Socialist uniform, displaying the swastika, or displaying materials that incite or promote hatred against persons of the Jewish or any other faith. The Illinois Appellate Court denied an application for stay pending appeal. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in turn, denied a stay and also denied leave for an expedited appeal. Relief was sought here. This Court, per curiam but[*918] by a divided vote, reversed the denial of a stay and remanded the case for further proceedings. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43 (1977).

On remand, the Illinois Appellate Court reviewed and modified the injunction the Circuit Court had entered and this time upheld only that portion thereof that prevented the display of swastikas “in the course of a demonstration, march, or parade.” Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 295, 366 N. E. 2d 347, 359 (1977). The Supreme Court of Illinois denied an application for stay pending expedited review. Mr. Justice Stevens, as Circuit Justice, denied a stay of the injunction as so modified. 434 U. S. 1327 (1977). The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately reversed the remaining injunctive feature, “albeit reluctantly,” and with one justice dissenting. 69 Ill. 2d 605, 619, 373 N. E. 2d 21, 26 (1978).

Thereafter, the village and its codefendants in the present federal litigation filed an application to stay the Seventh Circuit’s mandate or, in the alternative, to stay enforcement of the injunction entered by the District Court. This Court, with two Justices dissenting, denied the application. 436 U. S. 953 (1978).

These facts and this chronology demonstrate, I believe, the pervading sensitivity of the litigation. On the one hand, we have precious First Amendment rights vigorously asserted and an obvious concern that, if those asserted rights are not recognized, the precedent of a “hard” case might offer a justification for repression in the future. On the other hand, we are presented with evidence of a potentially explosive and dangerous situation, enflamed by unforgettable recollections of traumatic experiences in the second world conflict. Finally, Judge Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit observed that “each court dealing with these precise problems (the Illinois Supreme Court, the District Court and this Court) feels the need to apologize for its result.” 578 F. 2d, at 1211.

[*919] Furthermore, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952), this Court faced up to an Illinois statute that made it a crime to exhibit in any public place a publication that portrayed “depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion,” thereby exposing such citizens “to contempt, derision, or obloquy.” The Court, by a divided vote, held that, as construed and applied, the statute did not violate the liberty of speech guaranteed as against the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I stated in dissent when the application for stay in the present litigation was denied, 436 U. S., at 953, that I feel the Seventh Circuit’s decision is in some tension with Beauharnais. That case has not been overruled or formally limited in any way.

I therefore would grant certiorari in order to resolve any possible conflict that may exist between the ruling of the Seventh Circuit here and Beauharnais. I also feel that the present case affords the Court an opportunity to consider whether, in the context of the facts that this record appears to present, there is no limit whatsoever to the exercise of free speech. There indeed may be no such limit, but when citizens assert, not casually but with deep conviction, that the proposed demonstration is scheduled at a place and in a manner that is taunting and overwhelmingly offensive to the citizens of that place, that assertion, uncomfortable though it may be for judges, deserves to be examined. It just might fall into the same category as one’s “right” to cry “fire” in a crowded theater, for “the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).