Justus v. Florida, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). · Go Syfert
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Justus v. Florida, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
183 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 34 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Williams v. Professional Transportation, Inc. (ca4, 2002-07-01) · Strongest negative: Francis v. Dugger (flsd, 1988-10-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Francis v. Dugger (2×)
S.D. Fla. · 1988 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Justus v. Florida, 465 U.S. 1052, 1053 , 104 S.Ct. 1332, 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (Combs analysis "simply untenable”).
cited Cited "see" Williams v. Professional Transportation, Inc.
4th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Utilities Comm’n of N. C., 713 F.2d 1024 , 1028 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Perry Williams Teddi Williams, D/B/A Williams Transport v. Professional Transportation, Incorporated United Leasing, Incorporated Csx Transportation, Incorporated, Perry Williams Teddi Williams, D/B/A Williams Transport v. Professional Transportation, Incorporated United Leasing, Incorporated Csx Transportation, Incorporated
4th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Utilities Comm'n of N. C., 713 F.2d 1024 , 1028 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Fuller v. Bartlett
D. Maryland · 1995 · signal: accord · confidence high
Speaking to the issue of federal question jurisdiction, the court held “a plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute ... presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction ... to resolve.” Id. at 96 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 2899 n. 14; accord Aluminum Co. v. Utilities Comm’n of North Carolina, 713 F.2d 1024, 1028 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Pearson v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Douglas v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984); Combs v. State, 403 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 , 102 S.Ct. 2258 , 72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Van Gotum v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Iavarone v. Raymond Keyes Associates, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
The Supreme Court has held that a fact is “material” under the Williams Act “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 , 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2126-32 , 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976); see Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir.1983), ce rt. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir.1979); Schmidt, supra, 598 F.Supp. at 1540 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Wells (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" In Re PHLCORP Securities Tender Offer Litigation (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.D.N.Y. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1983) (“the fairness or unfairness to shareholders of a transaction engaged in by a control group is irrelevant under Section 14(e)”), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984); Browning Debenture Holders’ Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1084 (2d Cir.1977); Klausner v. Ferro, 604 F.Supp. 1188, 1195 (E.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd mem., 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.1988); Billard v. Rockwell International Corp., 526 F.Supp. 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (“failure to ‘disclose’ that an offered price is …
cited Cited "see" Wilson v. Great American Industries, Inc.
2d Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
cited Cited "see" New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. The Council of the City of New Orleans
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aluminum Co. of America v. Utilities Comm’n, 713 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984); American Elec.
discussed Cited "see" Torres-Arboledo v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358, 366 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Mapps v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Field v. Trump
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984) (Sections 10(b) and 14(e)); Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir.1979) (Section 14(a)); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S, 1092, 102 S.Ct. 658 , 70 L.Ed.2d 631 (1981) (plaintiff cannot bootstrap a fiduciary duty claim into a federal securities action by alleging nondisclosure of the culpability of defendants’ acts or motives).
cited Cited "see" Bunker Ramo-Eltra Corp. v. Fairchild Industries, Inc.
D. Maryland · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Sterman v. Ferro Corp.
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984). .
discussed Cited "see" Sterman v. Ferro Corporation
6th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) 5 Plaintiffs cited precedent is not convincing since the cases relied upon address factual situations wherein the profiting parties attempted to avoid the repayment of short swing profits imposed by Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
cited Cited "see" Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
M.D. Penn. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Aluminum Company of America v. Utilities Commission, 713 F.2d 1024 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
cited Cited "see" Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 97,420
2d Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 , 5-6 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,001
2d Cir. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 , 5 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984). 41 Nor could the shareholders look to Chenango's other directors for representatives with undivided loyalty.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Synalloy Corp. v. Gray
D. Del. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533, 542 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (affirming exclusion from damages under § 16(b) the "expenses truly incidental to the transaction — brokerage commissions and transfer taxes"); Reece Corp. v. Walco National Corp., 565 F.Supp. 158, 166 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (allowing deduction from § 16(b) damages for brokerage commission, but disallowing legal expenses). 6 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." David Colan, and Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., David Colan, and Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Texas Int’l Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir.1983) (“[T]he volitional character of the exchange is sufficient reason to trigger applicability of the language of section 16(b).”), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984); Gund v. First Florida Banks, Inc., 726 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir.1984) (“The vast majority of cases in which the pragmatic approach has been followed involve involuntary transactions which are triggered by a corporate reorganization....”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." David Colan, and Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., David Colan, and Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Texas Int’l Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir.1983) (“[T]he volitional character of the exchange is sufficient reason to trigger applicability of the language of section 16(b).”), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984); Gund v. First Florida Banks, Inc., 726 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir.1984) (“The vast majority of cases in which the pragmatic approach has been followed involve involuntary transactions which are triggered by a corporate reorganization....”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Zeigler v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1991 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1332 , 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 , 104 S.Ct. 1326 , 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984); Camelot Indus., Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 535 F.Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y.1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,764 Charles Kademian and Stan Janes v. Ladish Co., a Wisconsin Corporation, Stan Janes v. Ladish Co., a Wisconsin Corporation, William Dixon, Jane Schennum and Robert Eisele v. Ladish Co., a Wisconsin Corporation
7th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
(CCH) p 97,142 at 96,301 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff'd without opinion, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 , 101 S.Ct. 120 , 66 L.Ed.2d 48 (1980). 31 Rather, we explained in Panter, the critical issue is "whether the conduct complained of includes the omission or misrepresentation of a material fact." 646 F.2d at 288 ; see also, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984), (examining only "objective factual material").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kademian v. Ladish Co.
7th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
Rather, we explained in Panter , the critical issue is “whether the conduct complained of includes the omission or misrepresentation of a material fact.” 646 F.2d at 288 ; see also, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984), (examining only “objective factual material”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Buddy Earl Justus
v.
Florida
83-5956.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Feb 21, 1984.
465 U.S. 1052
Marshall, Brennan.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

Petitioner Justus was sentenced to death through the retroactive application of a statutory aggravating factor in violation of the Federal Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto punishments. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The murder for which petitioner was convicted occurred in 1978. In 1979, Florida added a new aggravating factor to the State’s death penalty statute. As a result of the amendment, a judge and jury could for the first time consider during the sentencing stage of trial whether the homicide was “committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal[*1053] justification.” 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353 (codified at Fla. Stat. §921.141(5)(i) (1981)). In 1980, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In imposing the death penalty, the Florida Circuit Judge relied on two aggravating factors, one of which was the factor added to the Florida death penalty statute after petitioner committed his crime.

In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 30 (1981), this Court held that a change in sentencing procedures violates the Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto punishments “if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.” Both the Florida Supreme Court and the State’s Attorney General concede that the constitutionality of applying Florida’s new aggravating factor to petitioner must be measured by the Weaver test. See Combs v. State, 403 So. 2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 984 (1982), quoted in 438 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1983); Brief in Opposition 4.

The State’s sole argument is that the application of this new aggravating factor had no detrimental effect on petitioner, and therefore was not onerous under Weaver. See 438 So. 2d, at 368. The State’s view is that, since premeditation was already an element of first-degree murder, the retroactive application of Florida’s new aggravating factor placed no additional burden on petitioner. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has taken the peculiar position that this new factor “inure[s] to the benefit of a defendant” because the factor adds to premeditation the limitations of “cold, calculated and . . . without . . . moral or legal justification.” Combs v. State, supra, at 421.

The State’s position is simply untenable. A Florida Circuit Judge relied upon Florida’s new aggravating factor to sentence petitioner to death. Before 1979, the Florida death penalty statute contained no aggravating factor analogous to the one added by 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353. Had the new factor not been applied at petitioner’s sentencing trial, the sentencing judge would have found only one aggravating factor, and it is impossible to know whether he still would have chosen to impose the death penalty. The application of the new aggravating factor made it easier for the Florida judge to sentence petitioner to death, and for that reason alone was more onerous for petitioner than the sentencing procedure in place at the date of his offense. See Weaver v. Graham, supra.

The detrimental effect of 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353, on petitioner is in no way ameliorated by the fact that premeditation was[*1054] an element of petitioner's underlying conviction. For one thing, “homicide . . . committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any . . . moral or legal justification” is not synonymous with premeditated murder. If the language of 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-353, is to carry its natural meaning, the new aggravating factor covers crimes that are more ruthless and coldblooded than ordinary first-degree murder.

More importantly, defending an aggravating factor by reference to elements of the underlying offense is inconsistent with this Court’s prior death penalty decisions. The sole purpose of requiring a sentencing authority to balance aggravating factors against mitigating circumstances is to force the sentencer to look beyond the offense to determine whether capital punishment is warranted given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime. By amending its death penalty statute, Florida changed the ground rules for judging the totality of the circumstances. This change most definitely prejudiced petitioner.

As the State itself concedes, “[wjhether a retrospective state criminal statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessor is a federal question.” Brief in Opposition 3. Because I believe that the Florida Supreme Court incorrectly decided this question, I would grant the petition and vacate the sentence.* I dissent.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).