Calhoun v. Maryland, 480 U.S. 910 (1987). · Go Syfert
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Calhoun v. Maryland, 480 U.S. 910 (1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1989 · …we make clear ... that we are unwilling to decide any question ... on which there has not been a full development of the record. ⚠ not in text
167 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Mo. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. KANSAS CITY, MO. (mowd, 1989-06-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1970 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1970 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Mo. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. KANSAS CITY, MO. (2×)
W.D. Mo. · 1989 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we make clear ... that we are unwilling to decide any question ... on which there has not been a full development of the record.
examined Cited "see" Grandison v. State (3×)
Md. · 1995 · signal: accord · confidence high
In rejecting that argument we reasoned that: “[t]here is simply no comparison between the admission of a reliable report of prison conduct, which concededly occurred, and the admission of unadjudicated murder charges.” Hunt, 321 Md. at 433 , 583 A.2d at 240 ; accord State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 728 , 511 A.2d 461, 479 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1339 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 577-78 , 500 A.2d 272, 281 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1023 , 106 S.Ct. 3315 , 92 L.Ed.2d 745 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Storer Cable Communications v. City of Montgomery (2×)
M.D. Ala. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 610 F.Supp. 891, 898 (W.D.Mo.1985), affd 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1358 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987). 40 Finally, the plaintiffs’ argument that the first amendment is implicated because the franchise of a franchisee who violates Ordinance 48-90 may be terminated is also mer-itless.
discussed Cited "see" Lexton-Ancira Real Estate Fund v. Heller (2×)
Colo. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F.Supp. 891, 910 (W.D.Mo.1985) (punitive damages have similar purpose to treble damages and parties may not collect both), aff'd, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1358 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Eastern Star, Inc. v. Union Bldg.
discussed Cited "see" Department of Labor v. Goldstein (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986) (All-Writs Act “authorizes a federal court in exceptional circumstances to issue ... orders to persons ‘who, though not parties to the original action ... are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice ...’”) (quoting United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 , 98 S.Ct. 364, 373 , 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1358 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Consolidated Welfare Fund ERISA Litigation (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1986) (All-Writs Act "authorizes a federal court in exceptional circumstances to issue ... orders to persons `who, though not parties to the original action ... are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice ...'") ( quoting United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 , 98 S.Ct. 364, 373 , 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1358 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987).
discussed Cited "see" Cox Cable Communications, Inc. v. United States (2×)
M.D. Ga. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1358 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Omega Satellite Products Co. v. Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.1982); Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 , 102 S.Ct. 2287 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1296 (1982).
examined Cited "see" Trimble v. State (3×)
Md. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 736 , 511 A.2d 461 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 , 107 S.Ct. 1339 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987). 5.
discussed Cited "see" Leckliter v. State (2×)
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 717 , 511 A.2d 461, 473 (1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1339 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987) (where the Court refers to the civil rule in holding the issue of whether to sequester a jury in a capital case is left to the discretion of the trial court). .
discussed Cited "see" Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz
N.D. Cal. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cabletelevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1358 , 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987); Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 , 102 S.Ct. 2287 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1296 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
D.N.J. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
The exception, in this limited sense, is inapplicable to defendants’ activity — plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that defendants offered jobs to legislators in order to directly harm plaintiff, and that defendants had no interest in the pending legislation in Congress. *410 However, several courts have also held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was not “intended to protect those who employ illegal means to influence their representatives in government.” Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096 , 1099 (9th Cir.1971); see Centr…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James Calhoun
v.
Maryland
86-5867.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 2, 1987.
480 U.S. 910
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 57 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 72%
Citer courts: W.D. Missouri (2)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

The petition for a writ of

certiorari is denied.

Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice MARSHALL, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

Maryland's capital sentencing statute provides that, "[i]f [the sentencing jury] finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death." Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 413(h)(2). The trial court's jury instruction in this case similarly stated: "If you find that the mitigating factors do not by a preponderance of the evidence outweigh the aggravating factors, then you mark that accordingly and proceed to Section 4 and enter a sentence of death." 306 Md. 692, 698, 511 A.2d 461, 464 (1986). Once again the Maryland Court of Appeals has reviewed the statute and jury instruction and has concluded that defendant was not assigned the burden of proof during his sentencing proceeding, even though neither the statute nor the instruction otherwise expressly addressed the placement of this burden.

"[I]t is plain that any rational juror would understand the language of § 413(h) and [this instruction] as placing the burden of persuasion on the accused. Indeed, I cannot imagine any other way to read the statute that does not completely ignore its words. No fair-minded juror could have understood from these instructions that the burden was upon the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances before a sentence of death could be returned." Huffington v. Maryland, --- U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 3315, 3318, 92 L.Ed.2d 745 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Lead Opinion

Ct. App. Md. Cer-tiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Dissent

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Maryland’s capital sentencing statute provides that, “[i]f [the sentencing jury] finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(h)(2) (1957). The trial court’s jury instruction in this case similarly stated: “If you find that the mitigating factors do not by a preponderance of the evidence outweigh the aggravating factors, then you mark that accordingly and proceed to Section 4 and enter a sentence of death.” 306 Md. 692, 698, 511 A. 2d 461, 464 (1986). Once again the Maryland Court of Appeals has reviewed the statute and jury instruction and has concluded that defendant was not assigned the burden of proof during his sentencing proceeding, even though neither the statute nor the instruction otherwise expressly addressed the placement of this burden.

“[I]t is plain that any rational juror would understand the language of § 413(h) and [this instruction] as placing the burden of persuasion on the accused. Indeed, I cannot imagine any other way to read the statute that does not completely ignore its words. No fair-minded juror could have understood from these instructions that the burden was upon the State to[*911] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances before a sentence of death could be returned.” Huffington v. Maryland, 478 U. S. 1023, 1027 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

I adhere to my belief that the Maryland statute, as written, and as applied, unconstitutionally places the burden of proof on capital defendants at the sentencing phase of their trials. I would grant the petition for certiorari.