green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
10.7 score
“a court has the inherent power to supervise and control its own proceedings and to sanction counsel or a litigant for bad faith conduct”
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
Ruffin v. San Francisco Sheriff's Department
See, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S.Ct. 52 , 53–54 (2020) (per curiam) (four days in cell covered “nearly floor to ceiling, in massive 24 amounts of feces: all over the floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even packed inside the water faucet,” followed by two days in “frigidly cold cell” with sewage on the floor and no bed or 25 clothes such that plaintiff was “left to sleep naked in sewage” violates the Eighth Amendment); but cf. Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 , 1314–15 (9th Cir. 1995) (temporary placement in 26 safety cell that was dirty and smelled bad did n…
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
In re Bambi
a court has the inherent power to supervise and control its own proceedings and to sanction counsel or a litigant for bad faith conduct
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
Whitworth v. Whitworth
(2×)
he icwa does not apply to 'child custody proceedings' pursuant to divorce proceedings.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Covington v. North Carolina
All such criteria were “subordinated ... to racial considerations.” Miller, 516 U.S. at 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475 . b.
discussed
Cited "see"
Milliken v. Studervant
See Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 8 1995) (no contact with any other inmate in administrative segregation, either for exercise, day 9 room access or otherwise not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 (1995). 10 Anderson was a class action brought by inmates housed in Ad-Seg.
discussed
Cited "see"
Tammy Renee Whitworth v. Douglas Wayne Whitworth and Carol Whitworth
See Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis , 53 F.3d 298, 302 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995) ("[T]he ICWA does not apply to 'child custody proceedings' pursuant to divorce proceedings."); DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court , 874 F.2d 510 , 514 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). (24) The only proper factors for the trial court to consider in determining the best interest of K.C. are those applicable in a SAPCR attendant on divorce proceedings under the Texas Family Code, not factors applicable to cases for termination of parental rights and placement in foster care brought …
cited
Cited "see"
National Council on Compensation Insurance v. Caro & Graifman, P.C.
See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 457 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Bailey v. Bailey (In Re Bailey)
See Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1489 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Merrill v. Merrill (In Re Merrill)
See In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1489 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Campanaro v. Pennsylvania Electric Co.
See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 306 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Polishuk v. Polishuk (In Re Polishuk)
See In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1489 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Kohn v. AT & T CORP.
See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 306 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995); see also Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper where the facts are undisputed ....”), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 537 , 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985); Estate of Reddert v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 261, 265 (D.N.J.1996).
cited
Cited "see"
Jackson National Life Insurance v. Greycliff Partners, Ltd.
See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Browning v. Rohm & Haas Tennessee, Inc.
See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham, Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 306 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995) (strongly intimating that there is no disparate impact liability under the ADEA), Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 844 F.Supp. 1073, 1076-77 (W.D.Pa.), aff'd, 43 F.3d 1461 (3d Cir.1994) (holding that there is no disparate impact liability under ADEA); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 , 115 S.Ct. 2612 , 132 L.Ed.2d 855 (1995) (disparate impact theory of liability unavailable in Sev…
discussed
Cited "see"
Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol
See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 , 456 (2d Cir.) (holding that “pre-1993 version of Rule 11” applied where conduct in question occurred in 1991), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bellemead Development Corp. v. New Jersey State Council of Carpenters Benefit Funds
See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 306 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995); see also Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) (“summary judgment is proper where the facts are undisputed”), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 537 , 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985); Estate of Reddert v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 261, 265 (D.N.J.1996).
discussed
Cited "see"
Bellemead Dev. v. NJ COUNCIL, CARP. BEN. FUNDS
See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 306 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995); see also Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) ("summary judgment is proper where the facts are undisputed"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 , 106 S.Ct. 537 , 88 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985); Estate of Reddert v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 261, 265 (D.N.J. 1996).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Caddell Construction Co., Inc. v. United States
Co., 463 U.S. at 43 , 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 304 , 133 L.Ed.2d 209 (1995)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
One Largo Metro, Llc v. United States
Co., 463 U.S. at 43 , 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 304 , 133 L.Ed.2d 209 (1995)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
American Apparel, Inc. v. United States
Co., 463 U.S. at 43 , 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 304 , 133 L.Ed.2d 209 (1995)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), PTE Ltd. v. States
Co., 463 U.S. at 43 , 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed.Cir.) cert. denied 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 304 , 133 L.Ed.2d 209 (1995)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mobile Medical International Corp. v. United States
Co., 463 U.S. at 43 , 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 304 , 133 L.Ed.2d 209 (1995)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Metropolitan Van & Storage, Inc. v. United States
Co., 463 U.S. at 43 , 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”); see also R & W Flammann GmbH v. United States, 339 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed.Cir.)) cert. denied 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 304 , 133 L.Ed.2d 209 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Doyle v. Turner
“The test is conjunctive and neither meritlessness alone nor improper purpose alone will suffice.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 776 F.2d 383 , 390 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 , 106 S.Ct. 1464 , 89 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986); see also Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 460 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995) (same).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Henkin v. AT & T CORP.
See also DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3rd Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 306 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995) (opining disparate impact is not viable theory of liability under ADEA, but reserving ruling on issue until another day).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Simon Debartolo Group, L.P., Gordon Altman Butowsky Weitzen Shalov & Wein v. The Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., and New England Development, Inc.
Construing Cooter & Gell’s “deferential” standard in Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 , 111 S.Ct. 681 , 112 L.Ed.2d 673 (1991), we explained that “to constitute a frivolous legal position for purposes of Rule 11 sanction, it must be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance of success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.” Id. at 1047 (reversing sanction award); see also Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.) (holding that district court abused its discretion by imposing sanct…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Sylvie M. v. Board of Education of Dripping Springs Independent School District
Second, the court must determine whether the IEP developed for the disabled child was “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id.; see also Buser v. Corpus Christi I.S., 51 F.3d 490, 492 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Sternberg v. Fletcher
See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 457 (2d Cir.) (district court's imposition of sanctions could not be upheld on the ground that the complaint was frivolous in light of that court's ruling that the dismissal of the complaint (a) should be without prejudice, and (b) would be granted only if the defendants acceded to certain conditions permitting litigation of the claims in another forum), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 , 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher
See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 457 (2d Cir.) (district court’s imposition of sanctions could not be upheld on the ground that the complaint was frivolous in light of that court’s ruling that the dismissal of the complaint (a) should be without prejudice, and (b) would be granted only if the defendants ae- ceded to certain conditions permitting litigation of the claims in another forum), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916, 116 S.Ct. 305 , 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
County of Kern
v.
Anderson
v.
Anderson
No. 95-294.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 10, 1995.
Cited by 2 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Texas (2) · S.D. New York (1)
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.