Sternwest Corp. v. Ash, 183 Cal. App. 3d 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Sternwest Corp. v. Ash, 183 Cal. App. 3d 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
58 citation events (39 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Chodos v. Borman (calctapp, 2014-06-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chodos v. Borman
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
For example, in Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ], the court held, without discussion, that a trial court had the discretion to enhance lodestar fees with a multiplier in a contract case under Civil Code section 1717, which statute provides that if there is a contractual attorney fees clause, the prevailing party in a contract dispute is entitled to attorney fees.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(See Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76-77 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ] [once attorney fee award is determined by the trial court, it is added to the judgment, and the total judgment bears statutory postjudgment interest until paid].) “Postjudgment Enforcement Costs.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
(See Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76-77 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ] [once attorney fee award is determined by the trial court, it is added to the judgment, and the total judgment bears statutory postjudgment interest until paid].) Postjudgment Enforcement Costs.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(PLCM).) The first step involves the lodestar figure—a calculation based on the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the lawyer’s hourly rate. ‘The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.’ (Id. at p. 1095.) In short, after determining the lodestar amount, the court shall then ‘ “consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garcia v. Santana (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
We do so in the context of "`the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]'" ( Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 634 P.2d 352 ].) (4) In PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 2d 198 , 997 P.2d 511 ], the Supreme Court addressed the method of determining a reasonable fee as follows: "`After the trial court has performed the calculations [of the lodestar], it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reas…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Enpalm, Lcc v. Teitler Family Trust
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
“The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Id. at p. 1095.) In short, after determining the lodestar amount, the court shall then “ ‘consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1095-1096, quoting Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 77 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Gorina
Bankr. C.D. Cal. · 2002 · confidence medium
“After the trial court has performed the calculations [of the lodestar], it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.” Id., quoting Sternwest Corp. v. Ash, 183 Cal.App.3d 74 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 804, 806 (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ketchum v. Moses
Cal. · 2001 · confidence medium
Proc., § 1021.5]; City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 78, 83-84 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 606 ] [eminent domain]; Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 75-76 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ] [Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler
Cal. · 2000 · confidence medium
(Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49 .) Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. {Id. at p. 48, fn. 23.) Thus, applying the lodestar approach to the determination of an award under Civil Code section 1717, the Court of Appeal in Stemwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 77 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ] explained: “Section 1717 provides for the payment of a ‘reasonable’ fee.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Dieguito Partnership, L.P. v. San Dieguito River Valley Regional Open Space Park Joint Powers Authority
Cal. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
As previously noted, under the Supreme Court’s reading of section 1717, “ ‘attorney’s fees’ . . . [are] the consideration that a litigant actually pays or becomes liable to pay in exchange for legal representation.” (Trope v. Katz, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 280 , italics added.) JPA also relies on Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ], in which the court held, without discussion, that a trial court has the discretion to enhance lodestar fees with a multiplier in a contract case under section 1717.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Contractors Labor Pool, Inc. v. Westway Contractors, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
(Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) Here, the trial court indicated by its remarks from the bench that it did not take due consideration of the factors listed in Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 628 , 659 and Hadley v. Krepel, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d 677 , 682 in making its attorney fee award.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. California Pension Administrators & Consultants, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
(Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s award *350 of attorney fees and costs of $4,694.41 to Sanwa, and $3,862.24 to CALPAC against each plaintiff who signed the Adoption Agreement. 4 Nor do we find any error in the court’s refusal to apportion fees between the contract and tort claims.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fontana Unified School District v. Burman
Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
(See Sternwest Corp. v. Ash (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 76-77 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) * Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ulead Systems, Inc. v. Lex Computer & Management Corp. (2×)
C.D. Cal. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, Intel Corp., 6 F.3d at 622 ; see also, Sternwest v. Ash, 183 Cal.App.3d 74, 77 , 227 Cal.Rptr. 804 (1986).
STERNWEST CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH ASH, Defendant and Appellant
B017945.
California Court of Appeal.
Jul 3, 1986.
183 Cal. App. 3d 74
Counsel, Charrow & Slee, Dennis Slee and Stanley M. Clark for Defendant and Appellant., Mark S. Novak and Craig Weinstein for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kingsley.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published

Opinion

KINGSLEY, J.

This present appeal is the latest piece of litigation in a longstanding lawsuit wherein, in 1980, plaintiff originally sued defendant Eugene Cvetkov who was found liable to the plaintiff for work in connection with certain gold owned by the plaintiff. In that action the present appellant, Ash, and others were joined as defendants on the theory that they were partners of the principal defendant and equally liable with him. After long and complicated litigation, Ash was found not liable to the plaintiff and was dismissed from the action and was found entitled to attorney’s fees under section 1717 of the Civil Code.

After a hearing, the trial court decided that the normal attorney’s fees in Los Angeles County were $120 per hour and awarded appellant a recovery under section 1717 based on the hours found to have been devoted by his counsel in his defense in this action, but denied defendant’s request that such recovery for hours expended-referred to in the record as the "lodestar"[*76] recovery—should be enhanced because of the “novelty and difficulty of the case” and because of the long delay in calculating and paying the amount of recovery by Ash because of the work of his attorneys. We conclude that the trial court erred in both respects and, therefore, reverse its order with directions.

I

The trial court denied enhancement of “lodestar fees” because it concluded that such enhancement could be awarded only in cases involving a so-called private attorneys general where the attorney’s services were devoted to maintaining a public interest. In so concluding, the trial court was wrong since the trial court has discretion to grant the kind of enhancement here sought. (Vella v. Hudgins (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 515 [198 Cal.Rptr. 725].) It is true, as respondent argued, that the trial court has a wide discretion in making an award under Civil Code section 1717. But here it is clear that the denial of enhancement was not a matter of discretion, but of the trial court’s erroneous view of its power. The case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court with directions to enhance the lodestar award by such factor (two, three, four or otherwise) that the court, in its discretion shall deem proper.

II

The matter of interest depends on a different footing. In denying interest on the attorney’s fees, the court stated in its minute order: “2. As to the claim for interest on the attorney fees, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, denies interest even if it has authority to award same, cf. Alhambra etc. v. Bloodgood 137 C.A.3d 29 (allowing interest on attorney fees awarded pursuant to authorizing payment of attorney fees). In the instant case, interest would be difficult, if not impossible, to calculate since the fees were incurred over a period of several years in varying amounts.” We regard that statement in the minutes as a finding by the trial court that interest should be awarded.

As a matter of fact, appellant’s opening brief points out computation of interest on the attorney’s fees involves only simple arithmetic. It is the duty of the trial court to determine a rate of interest involved, and apply that rate to the period of delay. Appellant’s opening brief suggests two methods for determining the period of delay. In the present case, we regard, as the fairest period to select, the period from the filing of the appellant’s claim for attorney’s fees and the date of computation of the award. A litigant can scarcely be expected to pay Civil Code section 1717 fees until an appropriate demand is made on him. If a claimant is delayed in filing a claim due to conduct of the obligor, that amount of delay should be considered in de[*77] termining the factor above discussed. In the present case that requires two arithmetical computations, since appellant made two claims and the court determined the “lodestar fees” on two different claims, one adjudicated in the order of November 11, and the second one, adjudicating the “lodestar fee” for sixteen subsequent hours.

The interest, computed at the rate of interest selected by the trial court, should, under the terms of section 1717, be awarded to plaintiff in addition to the “lodestar fees” enhanced because of the difficulty of the case and as provided in section 1717. That total figure should be added to appellant’s normal costs of appeal and other items normally included in a judgment.

III

Section 1717 provides for the payment of a “reasonable” fee. After the trial court has performed the calculations above discussed, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure. The total judgment, as so entered, will, of course, bear interest at the statutory rate of 10 percent until paid. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.010.)

The judgment appealed from is reversed and case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Woods, P. J., and McClosky, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied July 22, 1986.