Richardson v. City of San Diego, 193 Cal. App. 2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). · Go Syfert
Search
Richardson v. City of San Diego, 193 Cal. App. 2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: S v. v. Superior Court (calctapp, 2018-10-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1965 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1965 1995 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S v. v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Proc., § 1858; Richardson v. San Diego (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 650 [“[I]n the construction of a statute the judiciary must simply ascertain and declare what is in terms and in substance contained 7 therein, and may not insert thoughts that have been omitted or omit thoughts that have been inserted. [Citation.] A court may not rewrite the statute [citation], nor insert words in a statute under the guise of interpretation [citation], nor enlarge the plain provisions of a law [Citations].”].) In any event, before ordering services for a parent described by section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Strickland v. Foster
Cal. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
But the change, if any, is a legislative matter, not judicial. “ ‘Criticisms of policy, wisdom or technique inherent in any legislative enactment “are matters with which the courts have no concern, such arguments being proper ones to address to the legislature for its determination.” ’ ” (Richardson v. City of San Diego (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 651 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) The summary judgment is reversed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horwath v. Local Agency Formation Commission (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Moreover, and particularly where the legislative purpose is otherwise apparent, "`criticisms of policy, wisdom or technique inherent in any legislative enactment "are matters with which the courts have no concern, such arguments being proper ones to address to the legislature for its determination."'" ( Richardson v. City of San Diego (1961) 193 Cal. App.2d 648, 651 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 494 ].) Another contention of the appeal is founded on MOA (Gov.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cemetery Board v. Telophase Society of America (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
Co., 211 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 599 ]; Richardson v. City of San Diego, 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 650 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ]; Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal.App.2d 454, 458 [ 190 P.2d 984 ].) In applying and explaining this principle, the court in Rudley v. Tobias, supra, said: “Relying on the so-called doctrine of judicial empiricism, the appellant insists that the appellate court should ‘fill in the gaps’ in the law, and, for reasons of public policy and in ‘the interest of society as a whole,’ sanction the action contended for.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gillett-Harris-Duranceau & Associates, Inc. v. Kemple
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
(Richardson v. City of San Diego (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 650 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) Where the words of a statute are clear, the courts cannot add to them or alter them or insert qualifying *220 provisions to conform to an assumed intent or accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative histoiy.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
A liberal construction does not permit us to disregard or enlarge the plain provisions of the statute, nor does it go beyond the meaning of the words used when they are clear and unambiguous. (45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 180, p. 680; People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 242 , 526 P.2d 250 ]; Richardson v. City of San Diego (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 651 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) Section 1782, subdivision (a), is clear and unambiguous, not requiring interpretation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Cruz
Cal. · 1974 · confidence medium
(See Baxter v. Shanley-Furness Co. (1924) 193 Cal. 558, 560 [ 266 P. 391 ]; Richardson v. City of San Diego (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 651 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buss v. J. O. Martin Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1966 · confidence medium
The court is limited to the intention expressed. [Citations.]" (People v. *133 One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 475 [ 224 P.2d 677 ]; Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959) 53 Cal.2d 313, 318 [ 347 P.2d 909 ]; Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay (1931) 214 Cal. 361, 365-366 [ 5 P.2d 882 ]; Richardson v. City of San Diego (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 650 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ]; Code Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Millsap v. San Pasqual Union School District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
(Richardson v. City of San Diego, 193 Cal.App.2d 648, 651 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 494 ].) Further indication of the Legislature’s intent not to impose the obligation of employment of a district superintendent on the new school district after a mandatory unification is evidenced by the Legislature’s acquiescence in the Attorney General’s opinion, dated March 18, 1958, and found in 31 Opinions of the California Attorney General 117,118.
ETHEL RICHARDSON Et Al., Appellants,
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO Et Al., Respondents
Civ. 6441.
California Court of Appeal.
Jul 10, 1961.
193 Cal. App. 2d 648
Kenneth Sperry for Appellants., J. F. DuPaul and Alan M. Firestone, City Attorneys, and Robert L. Bergen, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents.
Shepard.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
SHEPARD, Acting P. J.

Plaintiffs-appellants are all widows of retired members of the Police or Fire Departments of the City of San Diego. They filed a complaint of declaratory and other relief to determine their pension rights and to recover unpaid pension funds. The trial court, in construing the city’s charter, awarded judgment on a basis of maximum allowable benefits of $75 per month. The appeal is from those portions of the judgment which limit their recovery to said maximum of $75 a month.

The facts are undisputed, and the sole question presented is whether or not, under the provisions of sections 161 and 162(b) of article X, dealing with police relief and pension fund, and sections 183 and 184(b) of article XI, dealing with firemen’s relief and pension fund, of the Charter of the City of San Diego, plaintiffs are entitled to receive pay without limitation under the fluctuating provisions of said sections, or are limited to the maximum of $75 per month decreed by the trial court.

The sections with which we are particularly concerned were all adopted at the same time as a part of the Charter of the City of San Diego in the year 1931 (Stats. 1931, ch. 47, pp. 2920-2926). Sections 161 and 183 are identical in form, 161 relating to the police department and 183 to the fire department. They provide that “All pensioners shall have their pensions increased or decreased to meet the prevailing scale of salary in the Police Department [or the Fire Department, as the case may be] from time to time.”

Section 162 relates to the police department and section 184 relates to the fire department. Section 184(b), except for minor differences in the language relating to dependent[*650] parents and siblings, is identical with 162(b). After providing for retirement of the member involved after 20 years of service, as therein defined, section 162(b) proceeds as follows:

“Upon the death of said pensioner, one-third (%) of the amount of his annual salary shall be paid to his widow, until she remarries, but in no case shall such pension exceed seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month; and if there be no widow, each child under eighteen (18) years of age, if unmarried, shall receive twenty dollars ($20.00) per month, but in no case shall such pension exceed the sum of seventy-five ($75.00) per month for one family; and if no widow or children, one-third (%) of his annual salary, not to exceed fifty dollars ($50.00) per month, shall be paid to his mother or father, if either of them were dependent upon him during his lifetime; and if no mother or father, then to any sister or brother under the age of eighteen (18) years and unmarried who was dependent upon him during his lifetime, so long as said sister or brother are under the age of eighteen (18) years and dependent. ’ ’

Appellants contend that the fluctuating provisions of sections 161 and 183 control over the language of the limitation above quoted. They advance this argument on the assumption that the term “all pensioners” used in sections 161 and 183 includes plaintiffs herein and that the terminology “upon the death of said pensioner” merely is intended to fix the amount to which a widow would be entitled at that particular time, and that the words “in no case shall such pension exceed seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month” are not intended as a limitation thereon.

With this contention we cannot agree. It is, of course, true that pension laws are to be liberally construed and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the pensioner. (Lesem v. Board of Retirement, 183 Cal.App.2d 289, 298 [1-7] [6 Cal.Rptr. 608].) However, it is also true that in the construction of a statute the judiciary must simply ascertain and declare what is in terms and in substance contained therein, and may not insert thoughts that have been omitted or omit thoughts that have been inserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) A court may not rewrite the statute (Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal.2d 313, 318 [2] [1 Cal.Rptr. 494, 347 P.2d 909]), nor insert words in a statute under the guise of interpretation (Kirkwood v. Bank of America, 43 Cal.2d 333, 341 [273 P.2d 532]), nor enlarge the plain provisions of a law (Mulville v. City of San Diego, 183[*651] Cal. 734, 739 [4] [192 P. 702]; MacLeod v. City of Los Altos, 182 Cal.App.2d 364, 369 [5] [6 Cal.Rptr. 326]).

As was said in Baxter v. Shanley-Furness Co., 193 Cal. 558, 560 [1] [226 P. 391] : “. . . the most extended application of the rule of liberal construction has never gone so far as to disregard plain, unequivocal requirements of a statute. . . . ‘Liberal construction does not mean enlargement or restriction of a plain provision of a written law.’ ”

As was said in Rakow v. Swain, 178 Cal.App.2d 895, 901 [4] [3 Cal.Rptr. 404] : “Criticisms of policy, wisdom or technique inherent in any legislative enactment ‘are matters with which the courts have no concern, such arguments being proper ones to address to the legislature for its determination.’ ”

The rule that specific provisions of a statute control general statements is expressed in Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 723 [5] [123 P.2d 505], as follows: “It is well settled, also, that a general provision is controlled by one that is special, the latter being treated as an exception to the former. A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provision relates. ’ ’

See also People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638, 643 [4, 5] [150 P.2d 888]; Simpson v. Cranston, 56 Cal.2d 63, 69 [4] [13 Cal. Rptr. 668, 362 P.2d 492],

The language of sections 162(b) and 184(b) is plain, certain and unambiguous, that “in no case shall such pension exceed seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month.” All sections were enacted at the same time. Sections 161 and 183 numerically precede sections 162 and 184, respectively. We are not here confronted with an attempted reduction of retirement allowance by a later statute, such as is found in Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 438 [326 P.2d 484], nor a complete lack of statement of limitation, as was true in Hafey v. City of Berkeley, 163 Cal.App.2d 474 [329 F.2d 711]. We are satisfied that the interpretation applied by the trial court and the judgment rendered are correct.

The judgment is affirmed.

Coughlin, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 6, 1961.