[*154] Opinion

Henry Honeycutt appeals from a judgment upon a jury conviction of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.) He contends that the foreman of the jury was guilty of prejudicial misconduct which requires that we reverse the judgment. We agree. Although we need not reach defendant’s further contention that it was error not to suppress an extrajudicial confession; we nevertheless conclude for guidance of the trial court on retrial, if any, that such confession was extracted without compliance with the proscriptions of Miranda v. Arizona (1965) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974],

Defendant spent the night of March 3, 1975, at William Batiste’s home. He discovered in the morning that $72 of his money was missing. When Batiste failed to respond to inquiries concerning the money, defendant kicked and beat Batiste who offered no resistance. In an attack lasting 45 minutes defendant stabbed and slashed his victim more than 100 times with a large two-pronged barbeque fork. A woman, who had also spent the night at Batiste’s home, implored defendant to stop the beating. When her requests went unheeded she left the premises and notified the police. When police arrived defendant fled but was apprehended four blocks away. Batiste died that afternoon. The coroner found Batiste’s body to have not less than 143 lacerations and puncture wounds covering his head, back, chest, abdomen, groin, penis and hip.

Defendant, an alcoholic for many years, had been drinking heavily for a four-week period prior to the killing. Expert witnesses testified, not without dispute, that based on the elapsed time and blood alcohol determinations made after defendant’s arrest, that his approximate blood alcohol level was .24 percent at the time of the offense, sufficient to impair his ability to meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of any contemplated act or to understand the societal duty not to commit acts which involved the risk of great injury or death.

The jury began its deliberations on a Thursday. On Friday morning it requested and received reinstruction on, inter alia, involuntary manslaughter and diminished capacity. Deliberations continued through the afternoon when a weekend recess was taken. While the jury foreman was still at home on Monday morning he telephoned an attorney who was associated with the foreman’s business. The foreman advised the[*155] attorney that he was a member of a jury panel but he did not state that he was then involved in deliberations. The foreman asked if involuntary manslaughter was a felony or a misdemeanor. The attorney answered that his criminal practice had generally been limited to defending against charges of felony drunk driving, and that such an offense would be treated as a felony until sentencing when it could be reduced to a misdemeanor. When asked to explain diminished capacity, the attorney stated that it was a defense based on a defendant’s state of mind which, if established, would negate the existence of a specific criminal intent in cases wherein such an intent was an element of the crime and legal insanity could not be established. To illustrate his explanation he described how he had obtained a reduction of charges in the case of a client who, in cashing bad checks, actually intended to repay the victims. The attorney emphasized that he had not practiced criminal law for about five years and that his knowledge of the applicable rules might not be current. He advised that in any event the foreman should follow the judge’s instructions on the applicable law.^[1]

After his conversation with the attorney the foreman reported to court for further deliberations. He later stated that he did not mention the conversation to the other jurors. On Monday afternoon the juiy was reinstructed on first degree murder, diminished capacity and malice aforethought. The following morning the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.^[2]

[*156] When the attorney learned three days after their conversation that at the time thereof the foreman had actually been engaged in deliberations, he notified the court. Defendant moved for a new trial (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 3), and the attorney and the foreman testified at the hearing thereon. The court denied the motion concluding that although the foreman was guilty of misconduct, defendant had not been prejudiced thereby.

It is well settled that a presumption of prejudice arises from any juror misconduct. In an early case we said: “For, when misconduct of jurors is shown, it is presumed to be injurious to defendant, unless the contrary appears.” (People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 616, 628 [44 P. 314].) We have often restated the presumption. (See, e.g., People v. Wong Loung (1911) 159 Cal. 520, 528-529 [114 P. 829].) In Remmer v. United States (1954) 347 U.S. 227, 229 [98 L.Ed. 654, 656, 74 S.Ct. 450], the United States Supreme Court stated: “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial . . . .” However, the presumption may be rebutted by proof that no prejudice actually resulted. (In re Winchester (1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 535 [2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904].)

Juror misconduct has occurred in several forms requiring reversal when prejudice is presumed in the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption. The mere presence of an alternate although silent juror during deliberations has repeatedly been held to constitute prejudicial misconduct. (People v. Britton (1935) 4 Cal.2d 622 [52 P.2d 217, 102 A.L.R. 1065]; People v. Bruneman (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 75 [40 P.2d 891]; People v. Adame (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 402 [111 Cal.Rptr. 462]; cf. People v. French (1939) 12 Cal.2d 720, 770-771 [87 P.2d 1014] (presence of alternate jurors after submission but before commencement of deliberations held not to justify granting of a new trial).) The reading by jurors of newspaper accounts of trial proceedings and unauthorized communications between jurors and bailiffs or other court officers has also been condemned as prejudicial misconduct. (People v. Wong Loung, supra, 159 Cal. 520, 525-527.)^[3]

[*157] When, as occurred in the instant case, a juror contacts an outside attorney for advice during deliberations in a criminal case, he is guilty of egregious misconduct. Such conduct in clear violation of the trial court’s admonitions interjects outside views into the jury room and creates a high potential for prejudice. In People v. Conkling, supra, 111 Cal. 616, 628, we stated that jurors cannot investigate the case outside the courtroom and that they must decide the guilt or innocence of a defendant based only on evidence introduced at trial. It is equally manifest that we cannot condone a practice whereby a juror receives outside counseling relative to the applicable law, as to do so would subordinate the court’s evaluation of the law to that of the juror’s outside source and would be contrary to legislative directives that the court shall instruct on the applicable law (Pen. Code, § 1127) and maintain control of the proceedings (Pen. Code, § 1044). We cannot, therefore, disapprove too strongly the foreman’s decision to disregard the court’s instructions and to solicit outside legal advice.

We next proceed to the question of prejudice flowing from this serious misconduct. The attorney advised the foreman, inter alia, that in his experience, which mainly concerned vehicular manslaughter, involuntaiy manslaughter is an alternative felony-misdemeanor depending on the sentence imposed. Although the attorney’s advice was accurate concerning vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. 3, 193) it was inaccurate with respect to the particular charge of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. 2, 193), which can never become a misdemeanor upon sentencing. Such advice could have left the foreman with the impression that if defendant were convicted of manslaughter be might thereafter be sentenced only to county jail rather than to state prison. The foreman’s questions to the attorney can be interpreted to imply that he was contemplating a conviction of involuntary manslaughter because of defendant’s diminished capacity due to intoxication, but that he was concerned, in view of the gravity of defendant’s conduct, that if he were convicted of such lesser manslaughter charge he might escape state prison.^[4]

[*158] The People point out, however, that the information provided by the attorney was essentially accurate and that all but two of the jurors executed statements that the foreman never mentioned his conversation with the outside attorney. Nevertheless the errant juror was the foreman whose perceptions and conclusions may often sway other jurors. With a belief that manslaughter can sometimes be a misdemeanor the foreman may have elected in favor of a murder conviction notwithstanding considerable evidence supporting the defense of diminished capacity. If so, and particularly if his conclusion influenced other jurors, defendant may have been deprived of the benefit of the jury’s full consideration of his diminished capacity defense. (Accord, Horn v. State (1953) 216 Miss. 439 [62 So.2d 560].)

Under these circumstances the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted but rather was reinforced by the evidence.

Defendant also complains that the court erred in failing to suppress an extrajudicial confession. It appears that following his arrest near the victim’s residence defendant was placed in the back seat of a patrol car. He was not advised of his Miranda rights. (See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436.) Detective Williams tried to talk to defendant who looked back silently at the officer. During the short ride to the police station, however, defendant volunteered that Williams knew him under a different name. At that point Williams recognized defendant whom he had known through police contacts for about 10 years. They did not converse again while en route to the police station.

Upon arrival at the station detectives escorted defendant to an interview room. Defendant was initially hostile to Detective Tague, calling him racist epithets and spitting at him. Tague left the room and Williams engaged defendant in a half-hour unrecorded discussion. Williams testified that they discussed unrelated past events and former acquaintances and, finally, the victim. Williams mentioned that the victim had been a suspect in a homicide case and was thought to have homosexual tendencies. Although he stated that he did not expect defendant to talk about the offense, Williams testified that “It was my duty to continue the efforts to try to get him to talk. And I was successful in it.” In the course of their interview Williams “could see that [defendant] was softening up.” Williams said that they stayed away from a discussion of the offense, but by the end of the half-hour defendant indicated that he would talk about the homicide.

[*159] Defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights in the presence of a reporter three hours after his arrest. When asked whether he understood his rights defendant replied, “I heard what you said, Mr. Johnnie, but I have no rights.” Williams asked again if defendant understood his rights and defendant said, “Yes, I understand all my rights.” He then expressly waived his rights and confessed that he beat and stabbed the victim to force him to return the missing $72.

Defendant contends that the waiver of his rights was neither knowing nor voluntary. In the normal case, failure to warn a suspect of his rights results in the total exclusion of any statements he might make. (People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 106 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272].) If a suspect is advised of his rights and invokes them, all interrogation must cease and any subsequent statements must be suppressed. (People v. Superior Court (Zolnay) (1976) 15 Cal.3d 729, 736-737 [125 Cal.Rptr. 798, 542 P.2d 1390].) In the instant case, however, no incriminating extrajudicial statements were made by defendant until after the Miranda admonitions and defendant’s waiver of those rights. However, Detective Williams had, prior to explaining the Miranda rights, already succeeded in persuading defendant to waive such rights. Thus the critical question is what effect failure to give a timely Miranda warning has on the voluntariness of a decision to waive which is induced prior to the Miranda admonitions.

It is clear that routine booking questions and responses as to a defendant’s identity and other statistical information do not render involuntary a later waiver of constitutional rights. (See People v. Hernandez (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 242, 253-254 [69 Cal.Rptr. 448].) Similarly, when a person who is not yet a suspect talks to the police without being admonished, such a conversation does not make involuntary his later waiver of rights after a proper Miranda warning. (People v. Hill (1969) 70 Cal.2d 678, 693-694 [76 Cal.Rptr. 225].) In Hill, we stated, “The initial statements made by defendant prior to receiving the required warnings of his constitutional rights were not in response to in-custody interrogation designed to elicit incriminating information.” (Id., at p. 694.) The instant case differs from Hill, however, in that here defendant was at all times the primary suspect and the conversation-waming-interrogation sequence was intended to elicit a confession from the inception of the conversation.

In Miranda the Supreme Court stated: “Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy[*160] interrogation or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminaiy ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 476 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724-725].)^[5]

Although the Miranda court nowhere expressly disapproved the conversation-warning-interrogation sequence that occurred here and the rule as generally stated is that the warning must precede any custodial interrogation designed to elicit incriminating statements (see People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]), we nevertheless conclude that in making his decision to waive a suspect should have that knowledge of his rights afforded him by Miranda. The self-incrimination sought by the police is more likely to occur if they first exact from an accused a decision to waive and then offer the accused an opportunity to rescind that decision after a Miranda warning, than if they afford an opportunity to make the decision in the first instance with full knowledge of the Miranda rights. (See People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221 [137 Cal.Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261], The police by applying practices condemned in Miranda cannot be heard to contend that they should benefit because they have violated only the spirit of Miranda. It must be remembered that the purpose of Miranda is to preclude police interrogation unless and until a suspect has voluntarily waived his rights or has his attorney present. When the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntaiy for the same reason that an incriminating statement made under police interro[*161] gation without a Miranda warning is deemed to be involuntary. The court thus erred in refusing to suppress defendant’s extrajudicial statements. As the judgment must be reversed because of the jury foreman’s misconduct we need not consider the prejudicial effect of the court’s failure to suppress such statements.

The judgment is reversed.

Tobriner, Acting C. J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J.,* concurred.

Retired Chief Justice of California sitting under assignment by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the. Judicial Council.