In Re Rosencrantz, 297 P. 15 (Cal. 1931). · Go Syfert
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In Re Rosencrantz, 297 P. 15 (Cal. 1931). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
40 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Camillo (calctapp, 1988-02-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1931 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1931 1978 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Camillo
Cal. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
(In re Watkins (1966) 64 Cal.2d 866, 869-870 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 917 , 415 P.2d 805 ]; In re Rosencrantz (1931) 211 Cal. 749, 750-751 [ 297 P. 15 ]; People v. Widener (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 826, 830 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 130 ].) For these reasons we reject defendant’s constitutional attacks on her conviction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rocha
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
(In re Watkins (1966) 64 Cal.2d 866, 870 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 917 , 415 P.2d 805 ]; In re Rosencrantz (1931) 211 Cal. 749, 750-751 [ 297 P. 15 ]; People v. Widener (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 826, 830 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 130 ]; see also Smith v. Rhay (9th Cir. 1958) 254 F.2d 306, 308 ; Daloia v. Rhay (9th Cir. 1958) 252 F.2d 768, 770 .) Furthermore, the authorities relied upon are readily distinguishable in that they were concerned with the ultimate question of life or death involving standardless discretion of juries in capital cases, grounding their decisions upon the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Arredondo
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
Since every person charged with the offense has the same chance for leniency as well as the same possibility of receiving the maximum sentence, there is nothing discriminatory in the statute.” (In re Rosencrantz (1931) 211 Cal. 749, 751 [ 297 P. 15 ].) Because the statute does not on its face establish classifications appellant must show that his sentence to state prison resulted from arbitrary and discriminatory application of the statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Anderson (2×)
Cal. · 1968 · confidence medium
Code, §§ 17, 476a, 489, 496, 524.) Such sections have been held not to violate due process or equal protection. ( In re Watkins, supra, 64 Cal.2d 866, 869-870 ; In re Rosencrantz, 211 Cal. 749, 750-751 [ 297 P. 15 ]; People v. Widener, 220 Cal. App.2d 826, 830 [ 34 Cal. Rptr. 130 ]; cf. Smith v. Rhay, 254 F.2d 306, 308 ; Daloia v. Rhay, 252 F.2d 768, 770-771 .) In re Watkins, supra, at page 870, states, "`Since every person charged with the offense has the same chance for leniency as well as the same possibility of receiving the maximum sentence, there is nothing discriminatory in the statut…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Smith
Cal. Ct. App. · 1968 · confidence medium
(In re Rosencrantz (1931) 211 Cal. 749, 750-751 [ 297 P. 15 ].) *873 Whenever .the statute leaves undetermined the precise punishment- to be meted out to a certain defendant, Penal Code sections 12 and 13 impose a duty upon the trial court to make that determination.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jackson (2×)
Cal. · 1964 · confidence medium
(In re Riddle (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 848, 851 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 372 P.2d 304 ]; In re Ferguson (1961) 55 Cal.2d 663, 669 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 361 P.2d417].) The decisions have thus broadened the compass of the writ not by an expansion of the concept of jurisdiction but by a proliferation of its availability in situations in which the trial court in a strict sense could exercise “jurisdiction.” (See In re McInturff (1951) 37 Cal.2d 876, 880 [ 236 P.2d 574 ]; In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 270 [ 176 P.2d 40 ]; Granucci, Review of Criminal Convictions by Habeas Corpus in California (1962…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Lamey
Cal. Ct. App. · 1948 · confidence medium
However, his contention here is that he was not charged with “forgery. ’ ’ In 1918, at the time of his said former conviction, section 470 of the Penal Code, which had been amended in 1905, provided and now provides as follows: “ [Forgery of conveyances, negotiable instruments, stock certificates, wills, and other instruments: Utterance of forged instrument with knowledge of falsity and intent to defraud: Falsification of records.] Every person who, with intent to defraud, signs the name of another person, or of a fictitious person, knowing that he has no authority so to do, to, or fal…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Seeley (2×)
Cal. · 1946 · confidence medium
The rule in this state is also in accord with the text in 12 Ruling Case Law at page 1209 that, “Prior to the expiration of that part of the sentence that the court could legally impose, the prisoner will not, according to the prevailing rule, be discharged on habeas corpus, on the ground that the sentence is excessive.” (In re Rosenerantz, 211 Cal. 749, 752 [ 297 P. 15 ] ; 205 Cal. 534, 541 [ 271 P. 902 ] ; In re Spaulding, 8 Cal.App.2d 497 [ 48 P.2d 133 ]; In re Miller, supra, 133 Cal.App. 228 .) No difficulty is likely to arise in ascertaining the lawful portion of the sentence which sh…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Brown
Cal. Ct. App. · 1942 · confidence medium
Code, §§ 667, 668.) " It is established in this state, both by statute and judicial decision, that whether a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony is to be determined by the punishment; and where a crime is punishable either by incarceration in the state prison or the county jail, the sentence actually given determines the nature of the offense.” (In re Rosencrantz, 211 Cal. 749, 751 [ 297 Pac. 15 ].) In charging theft, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully took the property of another.
In the Matter of Evelyn Rosencrantz, on Habeas Corpus.
Docket No. Crim. 3414..
California Supreme Court.
Mar 17, 1931.
297 P. 15
Thos. T. Califro for Appellant., U. S. Webb, Attorney- General, and Wm. F. Cleary, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.
Langdon.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published
LANGDON, J.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner was tried in the Superior Court of Alameda County and convicted of a violation of section 476a of the Penal Code. The information filed against her also charged the prior conviction of three separate felonies. Petitioner admitted the second and third, but denied the alleged first prior conviction. A finding against her was made on this issue, and she was thereupon sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, under the provisions of section 644 of the Penal Code.

Petitioner has heretofore made application for writs of habeas corpus to this court, as well as to the Superior Court of Marin County and to the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, all of which applications were denied. It is urged, however, that the grounds for the present petition are raised here for the first time, and accordingly we have examined them with great care.

The contention is made that section 476a of the Penal Code is unconstitutional in that by reason of the discretion which it gives to the trial judge to sentence the convicted offender either to the state prison or the county jail, it is discriminatory in operation, and constitutes a denial[*751] of equal protection of the laws. The legislative practice of vesting in trial courts or juries discretion in fixing punishments, within certain limits, is quite general, and not new. Since every person charged with the offense has the same chance for leniency as well as the same possibility of receiving the maximum sentence, there is nothing discriminatory in the statute.

The main point urged in the petition is that the judgment and commitment under section 644 of the Penal Code was improper because, it is contended, petitioner had not previously been convicted of three prior felonies. It is asserted that the alleged first conviction never occurred. The record shows that she was charged on January 12, 1920, in the county of San Diego, with violation of the same statute as in her later convictions. She pleaded guilty and was granted probation for a period of two years. No judgment of conviction was pronounced by the court. The question is whether this constitutes the conviction of a felony within the meaning of Penal Code, section 644.

It is established in this state, both by statute and judicial decision, that whether a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony is to be determined by the punishment; and where a crime is punishable either by incarceration in the state prison or the county jail, the sentence actually given determines the nature of the offense. (Cal. Pen. Code, sec. 17; People v. Bigelow, 94 Cal. App. 28 [270 Pac. 460].) Hence if petitioner had been sentenced to the state prison, she would have been convicted of a felony; and had she been sentenced to the county jail, she would have been convicted of ‘a misdemeanor. However, she was not sentenced at all, nor was any judgment of conviction pronounced; and this appears to us to be decisive of the problem. There being no conviction, there is nothing to bring this first case within the provisions of section 644.

It therefore appears that petitioner should not have been sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole; nor does her case come within the language of section 644 providing for life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after two prior convictions for certain enumerated felonies. Issuing checks with intent to defraud is not one of these specified felonies. The applicable section is obviously Penal Code, section 667, subdivision 1, which provides: “If the offense of which such person is subse[*752] quently convicted is such that, upon a first conviction, an offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, such person is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for the maximum period for which he might have been sentenced, if such offense had been his first offense.” Under this section, petitioner is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for the maximum period provided for a violation of Penal Code, section 476a, which is fourteen years.

The judgment committing petitioner to incarceration in the state prison for life without eligibility for parole was therefore improper; but inasmuch as petitioner should have been sentenced to the state prison anyway, there is at the present time no ground upon which she may be discharged from custody. We gave consideration to this precise question in a prior application of petitioner (In re Rosencrantz, 205 Cal. 534 [271 Pac. 902, 905]), and we there said, quoting from In re Morck, 180 Cal. 384 [181 Pac. 657], “It is the established practice of the Supreme Court not to consider any question of excess of sentence until the expiration of the time for which the prisoner may be lawfully confined. It is clear, therefore, that a writ should not be granted at this time”.

It follows that the writ must be discharged, and it is so ordered.

Shenk, J., Richards, J., Seawell, J., Curtis, J., Preston, J., and Waste, C. J., concurred.