In Re Weisberg, 12 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1932). · Go Syfert
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In Re Weisberg, 12 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1932). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
100 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Strauss v. Horton (cal, 2009-06-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1933 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1933 1979 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Strauss v. Horton
Cal. · 2009 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 627-628 [ 12 P.2d 446 ] [pursuant to the police power, the Legislature may “place such restrictions upon the use of any property or the conduct of any business as may be reasonably necessary for the public safety, comfort or health”].) Third, the “inalienable” nature of a constitutional right never has been understood to preclude the adoption of a constitutional amendment that limits or restricts the scope or application of such a right.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Butler v. City of Palos Verdes Estates
Cal. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
(See In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 629 [ 12 P.2d 446 ] [“[a] law is general and uniform and affords equal protection in its operation when it applies equally to all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided that such class is founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction between the persons composing it and others not embraced in it”].) Moreover, because no other property owner sought permission to keep peafowl on its property, it is all the more difficult to see any uniformity flaw in the fact that the homes association, as the trial…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goodman v. Cory
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
(In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 627-628 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; People v. Hurd (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 865, 877 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 718 ].) In construing the challenged statute, “ . .“[a]ll presumptions and intendments favor [its] validity . . . and mere doubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Park & Shop Markets, Inc. v. City of Berkeley
Cal. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Such a clause is persuasive evidence that “the legislature would have passed the act, irrespective of the invalidity of any particular portion thereof.” (In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 632 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; see also 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, § 66.) *90 We conclude that section 2c(3) may be stricken from the ordinance while the remainder stands. 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Parker
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
(Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45, 53 [ 49 L.Ed. 937, 940 , 25 S.Ct. 539 ]; In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 627-628 [ 12 P.2d 446 ].) Penal statutes proscribing illicit sexual contacts constitute a legitimate and proper exercise of that power.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Drolet
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
(Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U.S. 45, 53 [ 49 L.Ed. 937, 940 , 25 S.Ct 539 ]; In *212 re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 627-628 [ 12 P.2d 446 ].) Penal statutes proscribing illicit sexual contacts constitute a legitimate and proper exercise of that power.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Horman
Cal. · 1971 · confidence medium
No authority is cited to establish the second part of this proposition, [ ] [but assuming arguendo that claimants' statement may be correct, at least in some circumstances] it avails claimants nothing, for the discrimination charged is not against them. (22) To challenge the *78 constitutionality of a statute on the ground that it is discriminatory, the party complaining must show that he is a party aggrieved or a member of the class discriminated against. ( In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 630 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; DuBois v. Land, 212 Cal. App.2d 563, 567 [ 28 Cal. Rptr. 167 ].) (23a) Claimants next …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gumen v. State
Cal. · 1971 · confidence medium
(In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 630 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; DuBois v. Land, 212 Cal.App.2d 563, 567 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 167 ].) Claimants next contend that Probate Code, section 1026 is unconstitutional in that it deprives claimants of a vested property right without due process of law and contrary to international standards of justice.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hurd
Cal. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
(Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 [ 49 L.Ed. 937, 940 , 25 S.Ct. 539, 541 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 627-628 [ 12 P.2d 446 ].) (12) Penal statutes proscribing illicit sexual contacts constitute a legitimate and proper exercise of that power.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francis v. County of Stanislaus
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
(Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 534 [ 73 P. 424 , 96 Am.St.Rep. 161 ]; People v. Globe Grain & Mill Co., 211 Cal. 121, 128 [ 294 P. 3 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 630 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; Fox-Woodsum Lumber Co. v. Bank of America etc. Assn., 7 Cal.2d 14, 22 [ 59 P.2d 1019 ]; Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal.App.2d 727, 730-731 [ 197 P.2d 788 ]; In re Durand, 6 Cal.App.2d 69, 70 [ 44 P.2d 367 ] ; Hooker v. Burr, 137 Cal. 663, 671 [ 70 P. 788 , 99 Am.St.Rep. 17 ]; Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 233-234 [ 118 P. 714 ] ; In re Willing, 12 Cal.2d 591, 597 [ 86 P.2d 663 ]; Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal.2d 2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitehead-Donovan Corp. v. Herald Publishing Co.
Cal. · 1964 · confidence medium
Legislation excusing existing businesses from noncompliance with new regulations has frequently been upheld (Hunter v. Justice’s Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 315, 320 [ 223 P.2d 465 ] ; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 631 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; Matter of Stoltenberg (1913) 165 Cal. 789 [ 134 P. 971 ]; Ex parte Whitley (1904) 144 Cal. 167, 171 [ 77 P. 879 , 1 Ann.Cas. 13]; Bohannon v. Board of Medical Examiners (1914) 24 Cal.App. 215 [ 140 P. 1098 ] ; see discussion in 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 1960) p. 1958…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Norwalk Call
Cal. · 1964 · confidence medium
Legislation excusing existing businesses from noncompliance with new regulations has frequently been upheld (Hunter v. Justice's Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 315, 320 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; In re Weisberg (1932) 215 Cal. 624, 631 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; Matter of Stoltenberg (1913) 165 Cal. 789 [ 134 P. 971 ]; Ex parte Whitley (1904) 144 Cal. 167, 171 [ 77 P. 879 , 1 Ann.Cas. 13]; Bohannon v. Board of Medical Examiners (1914) 24 Cal.App. 215 [ 140 P. 1098 ]; see discussion in 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed. 1960) p. 1958; 12…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duskin v. State Board of Dry Cleaners
Cal. · 1962 · confidence medium
As held in American Distilling Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 55 Cal.App.2d 799, 805 [ 131 P.2d 609 ], “[T]he Legislature may delegate authority to administrative boards to adopt and enforce reasonable rules for carrying into effect the expressed purpose of a statute even though such rules include the authorization to exercise discretion in doing so, *162 provided that discretion is not purely arbitrary and does not amount to a sanction to add to or change the statute or confer upon the board a right to determine what the law shall be in a particular case.” (Accord: Jersey Maid Milk P…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. Municipal Court of Salinas Judicial Dist.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(See In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 632 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; People v. Lewis, 13 Cal.2d 280 [ 89 P.2d 388 ] ; Looff v. City of Long Beach, 153 Cal.App.2d 174, 186 [ 314 P.2d 518 ] ; 11 Cal.Jur.2d 424 et seq.) If, then, we conclude that the Legislature has not unlawfully delegated the power to impose a penalty, and that the sections of the ordinance, which do not describe penalties, may stand, we must finally examine appellant’s third conten- *558 tion that the legislation attempts an unlawful delegation of power to fix rules and regulations.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Shephard
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(People v. Mistriel, 110 Cal.App.2d 110, 112 [ 241 P.2d 1050 ] ; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 627 [ 12 P.2d 446 ] ; In re Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 649 [ 226 P. 914 , 34 A.L.R. 51 ].) Apparently, the appellant questions whether the Legislature can enact such a statute under the guise of protecting the health and morals of the people, when in fact the statute prohibits a person from offering to sell a narcotic and delivering a substance in lieu of the narcotic.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. California Employment Stabilization Commission
Cal. Ct. App. · 1958 · confidence medium
Co., 20 Cal.2d 684, 693 [ 128 P.2d 529 ]; Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal.2d 259, 270 [ 57 P.2d 932 , 105 A.L.R. 148 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 629 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; Martin v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 93, 100 [ 227 P. 762 ]; Ex parte Sohncke, 148 Cal. 262, 263 [ 82 P. 956 , 113 Am.St.Rep. 236 , 7 Ann.Cas. 475, 2 L.R.A.N.S. 813 ]; Vail v. County of San Diego, 126 Cal. 35, 37 [ 58 P. 392 ].) Such a classification must not be arbitrary or unreasonable, but must be characterized by some substantial qualities or attributes which render the particular exclusion from benefits necessary or appropriate.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Accounting Corp. of America v. State Board of Accountancy
Cal. · 1949 · confidence medium
(In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 631 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167 [ 77 P. 879 ,1 Ann.Cas. 13]; Elliot v. University of Illinois, 365 Ill. 338 [ 6 N.E.2d 647 ]; 12 Am.Jur. 164; 136 A.L.R. 207 , 219.) But where a statute discriminates against individuals or corporations solely because they are new to the field and such discrimination does not appear to have any relation to the public interest, the legislation disregards constitutional protections against arbitrary classification.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ferrante v. Fish & Game Commission (2×)
Cal. · 1946 · confidence medium
Co., 20 Cal.2d 684, 691 [128 P.2d 529]; In Re Fuller, 15 Cal.2d 425, 437 [ 102 P.2d 321 ] ; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 629 [ 12 P.2d 446 ].) In Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 429 [ 56 S.Ct. 518 , 80 L.Ed. 772 ], the Supreme Court of the United States said of a claim of unreasonable discrimination in an earlier statute of this state governing the processing of fish: “It has never been found possible to lay down any infallible or all-inclusive test by the application of which it may be determined whether a given difference between the subjects of legislation is enough to j…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Fruit Growers v. Parker
Cal. · 1943 · confidence medium
A., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 348 [ 56 S.Ct. 466 , 80 L.Ed. 688 ]; United States v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.2d 189, 197, 198 [ 120 P.2d 26 ] ; Estate of Childs, 18 Cal.2d 237 , 244 [ 115 P.2d 432 , 136 A.L.R. 333 ]; In re Willing, 12 Cal.2d 591, 596 [ 86 P.2d 663 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 630 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]), the respondents cannot now challenge the enforcement of the license upon the ground that it restricts the marketing of more than one agricultural product.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County of Los Angeles v. Hurlbut (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1941 · confidence medium
(In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 629 [12 PaCal.2d 446].) We find nothing arbitrary in the provision.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Willing
Cal. · 1939 · confidence medium
(Bacon Service Corp. v, Huss, 199 Cal. 21 [ 248 Pac. 235 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 629 [ 12 Pac. (2d) 446 ]; Lloyd Garretson Co. v. Robinson, 178 Wash. 601 [ 35 Pac. (2d) 504, 506 ].) In its brief the state says that bulk milk is sold according to butter fat content, ascertained by the purchaser, upon whose honesty the producer is, therefore, dependent, whereas bottled milk is sold to retail stores at a fixed price per bottle which can be computed on delivery and a cash sale provided for, and that this distinction furnishes additional grounds for exempting retail stores from filing a bo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Helping Hand Home for Children v. County of San Diego
Cal. Ct. App. · 1938 · confidence medium
(Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161, 180 ; City of Eureka v. Diaz, 89 Cal. 467, 469 [ 26 Pac. 961 ]; Davis v. Hart, 123 Cal. 384, 387 [ 55 Pac. 1060 ] ; Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361 [ 5 Pac. (2d) 882 ]; Earl Ranch, Ltd., v. Industrial Acc. Com., 4 Cal. (2d) 767, 769 [ 53 Pac. (2d) 154 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 632 [ 12 Pac. (2d) 446 ]; Rumetsch v. Davie, 47 Cal. App. 512, 515 [ 190 Pac. 1075 ] ; Dodge v. Mitchell, 94 Cal. App. 779, 781 [ 272 Pac. 352 ].) Resort to debates in constitutional conventions or to arguments made to voters is to be had only with caution and no…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rainey v. Michel
Cal. · 1936 · confidence medium
This court in In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 629 [ 12 Pac. (2d) 446 ], stated the established rule as follows: “A law is general and uniform and affords equal protection in its operation when it applies equally to all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided that such class is founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction between the persons composing it and others not embraced in it.” The same general principle was applied by this court in State Savings etc. Bank v. Anderson, 165 Cal. 437, 438, 449 [ 132 Pac. 755 , L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Department of Public Works
Cal. · 1934 · confidence medium
Co., 211 Cal. 121 [ 294 Pac. 3 ]; Carter v. Stevens, 211 Cal. 281 [ 295 Pac. 28 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 632, 633 [ 12 Pac. (2d) 446 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wiggins v. Pacific Indemnity Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1933 · confidence medium
(In re Carlson, 87 Cal. App. 584, 587 [ 262 Pac. 792 ]; In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 632 [ 12 Pac. (2d) 446 ].) If the act means that while the required bond purports to be in the penal sum of $2,000, “yet after recovery of that amount the obligors shall continue to be liable for other and additional amounts without limit, then the requirement is clearly unreasonable.
In the Matter of the Application of Jacob Weisberg for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Docket No. Crim. 3505..
California Supreme Court.
Jun 17, 1932.
12 P.2d 446
Chas. I. Rosin for Petitioner. Charles P. Johnson, City Prosecutor, Joe W. Matherly and John L. Bland, Deputies City Prosecutor, for Respondent. U.S. Webb, Attorney-General, Charles Wetmore, Jr., and James S. Howie, Deputies Attorney-General, Amici Curiae for Respondent.
Waste.
Cited by 50 opinions  |  Published
WASTE, C. J.

Application for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was taken into custody and incarcerated by the chief of police of the city of Los Angeles upon a complaint charging that he wilfully and unlawfully conducted, maintained and operated a cleaning and dyeing shop and store and operated a sponging and pressing establishment without a license from the state fire marshal, contrary to and in, violation of “An act to regulate the location, construction, occupancy and operation of cleaning and dyeing shops or stores and spotting, sponging, and/or pressing establishments, or agencies thereof, and private schools and colleges of spotting, sponging and/or pressing; providing for the registration and licensing of persons engaged in such business; providing for the enforcement thereof by the state fire marshal as chief of the division of fire safety in the department of industrial -relations; providing ways and means for enforcement, and providing penalties for violations.” (Stats. 1931, p. 972, chap. 425.)

It is urged that the act does not constitute a proper exercise of the police power. With this contention we cannot agree. Citation of authority is unnecessary to establish that the police power extends to everything expedient for the preservation of the public safety, health, comfort or good morals. It is within the legislative discretion in the exercise of such power to place such restrictions upon the use of any property or the conduct of any business as may be reasonably necessary for the public[*628] safety, comfort or health. (Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal: 589, 592, 593 [8 A. L. R 418, 185 Pac. 855]; Mattei v. Hecke, 99 Cal. App. 747 [279 Pac. 470].)

The regulatory provisions of the act here attacked undoubtedly tend to foster fire prevention and safeguard life and property. The act therefore constitutes a. proper exercise of the police power. In the case of Carter v. Stevens, 211 Cal. 281 [295 Pac. 28], we recently upheld as a proper exercise of the police power a statute (Stats. 1927, p. 1924) regulating the maintenance and operation of cleaning and dyeing establishments, keeping and storing liquid volatile and inflammable products in excess of one gallon, or solid volatile and inflammable products in excess of eight pounds. While the storing of such volatile and inflammable products in lesser quantities may correspondingly reduce the fire hazard and potential public danger, the fact still remains that their storage and use in any quantity may prove detrimental to the public welfare. Cleaning and dyeing shops, sponging and pressing establishments, and other kindred businesses, using such lesser quantities of volatile and inflammable products, may with propriety be subjected to reasonable legislative regulation in the exercise of the police power.

This brings us to a consideration of the reasonableness of the regulations prescribed. The petitioner urges that the act is discriminatory, unconstitutional and void because it excludes from its operation certain types of cleaning establishments (those storing in excess of one gallon of liquid volatile and inflammable products or in excess of eight pounds of solid volatile and inflammable products), also all stores whose major business is selling merchandise, and which are not engaged in cleaning, dyeing, spotting, sponging and pressing as a business for compensatory gain, and all hotels, hospitals and sanitariums doing cleaning, spotting, sponging, etc., solely for their proprietors, employees, guests or patients, and not commercially.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, there has been no discrimination in favor of cleaning establishments using quantities of volatile and inflammable products in excess of those designated in the act here assailed. Cleaning establishments using such excessive quantities of volatile and inflammable products are governed and regulated by[*629] a statute peculiarly applicable to them (Stats. 1927, p. 1924), the constitutionality of which, as already indicated, was upheld by this court in Carter v. Stevens, supra.

The classification created for the purpose of legislation must, of course, be a reasonable one. It must not be arbitrary. We do not think it discriminatory to exclude from the operation of the present act all merchandising stores, hotels, hospitals and sanitariums not engaged in cleaning, sponging, dyeing, etc., commercially and for compensatory gain. It is not the rule that all laws shall be universal or general in their application. It is sufficient that laws of a general nature have “a uniform operation”. A law is general and uniform and affords equal protection in its operation when it applies equally to all persons embraced within the class to which it is addressed, provided that such class is founded upon some natural or intrinsic or constitutional distinction between the persons composing it and others not embraced in it. (In re Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 391 [170 Pac. 823].)

The act here assailed is general and uniform in its regulation of and operation upon cleaning and dyeing shops or stores, and spotting, sponging and pressing establishments, using the quantities of volatile and inflammable products therein designated. In our opinion there is a natural and intrinsic distinction between such commercial entities and merchandising stores, hotels, hospitals and sanitariums that engage in cleaning and dyeing only casually and solely as an incident to their main purpose. Thus it has been held that the fact that casual employees and agricultural and domestic employees are excepted from the operation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not involve an arbitrary distinction. (Western Indemnity CVo v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 702 [151 Pac. 398].) In Ex parte Murphy, 8 Cal. App. 440 [97 Pac. 199], it is held that public billiard and pool rooms form a class subject to special regulatory legislation, and the fact that the legislature made reasonable exceptions in favor of private billiard and pool rooms and billiard and pool rooms in hotels for the use of guests, did' not render the law discriminatory and unconstitutional.

The legislative determination as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant a classification will not be[*630] overthrown unless it is palpably arbitrary. (Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, supra.) We are satisfied that the act here complained of does not create any artificial, unreasonable or arbitrary distinctions. Operating as it does, uniformly on all persons and entities in the same category it does not deny the equal protection of the laws or violate other constitutional prohibitions.

To petitioner's further contention that the act is discriminatory in so far as it purports to exclude from its regulatory provisions all hospitals and sanitariums without the commercial field but not those within the commercial field, there are two sufficient answers. In the first place, this alleged discrimination is the result of petitioner’s misconstruction of the act. A fair reading of the pertinent provision discloses that it excludes from its operation all hotels, hospitals and sanitariums (commercial and noncommercial) that do cleaning, spotting and sponging only incidentally and solely for their own purposes and “entirely without the commercial field”. Petitioner’s error in this regard is in his misapplication of the quoted phrase. However, assuming that such asserted discrimination is apparent from the terms of the act, it does not lie in the mouth of petitioner to attack its validity upon this ground for he does not bring himself within the class affected thereby and the point is not, therefore, properly before us in this proceeding. If the complaining party does not belong to the class discriminated against, he cannot, as a general rule, complain of the alleged discrimination. (Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 233 [118 Pac. 714].)

This latter reasoning is also applicable to petitioner’s claim that the act discriminates between private schools and colleges and other schools and colleges teaching the operations and processes employed in cleaning, sponging, spotting, etc. A similar reply may properly be made to petitioner’s contention that the act exceeds the bounds'in so far as it purports to include within its provisions agencies conducted merely for the purpose of collecting clothing, etc., for spotting and renovating. Not being aggrieved by these several provisions petitioner is not in a position to effectively complain of them.

[*631] The act is not objectionable because it provides for the issuance without examination, of certificates of registration and licenses to those operating and maintaining cleaning and dyeing shops or spotting and sponging establishments for a period of at least three months prior to the effective date of the act. In the adoption of qualifications and regulatory provisions governing the pursuit of certain callings or businesses falling within the regulatory power of the legislature, it is not infrequent to exempt therefrom those who have lawfully practiced or carried on such callings and businesses for a prescribed time, and such provisions have received the sanction of the courts as not being violative of the Constitution on the grounds of unreasonableness or discrimination. (Ex parte Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 172 [1 Ann. Cas. 13, 77 Pac. 879]; Bohannon v. Board of Medical Examiners, 24 Cal. App. 215, 220 [140 Pac. 1089].) The registration and licensing provisions of the act here in question, including the provision for the payment of a registration fee, are reasonable and free from constitutional objection.

Citing section 24 of article IV of the Constitution, petitioner next contends that section 5 of the act providing for the posting of a bond in the sum of $100 as a condition precedent to the issuance of a certificate of registration and license, is unconstitutional and void. Failure of the title of the act to specifically mention the bond does not invalidate this provision. The title of an act need not contain an abstract or detailed statement of its contents. Where the body of an act embraces provisions which are germane to the general subject stated in its title, the title will be held sufficient to comprehend all of the provisions of the act. (Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507, 510, 511 [289 Pac. 160]; People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 394 [156 Pac. 451].) The bond provision here complained of is germane to the regulation, registration and licensing mentioned in the title of the act and, therefore, need not find definite expression therein.

Undoubtedly the legislature may with propriety require cleaning and dyeing shops and spotting and sponging establishments to furnish a reasonable bond for the protection of that portion of the public having dealings with them in that line of endeavor. Such provision might well[*632] be held to be reasonably connected with the purpose of the act, i. e., to protect the public from potential loss by reason of the fire hazard involved in such business. While in all probability such was the legislative intention in the instant case, the language employed in section 5 is not conducive of that result. Eead literally the section requires the owners and operators of such shops and establishments to furnish an undertaking for the benefit of “any person having dealings” with them. This language is sufficiently broad to include any and all kinds of dealings, whether associated with or disassociated from the businesses regulated by the act. A provision requiring such a bond is undoubtedly discriminatory and void. To uphold the same it would be necessary to limit its operation as above indicated. This would require reading into the statute a limitation not therein contained. This we cannot do, for the courts are without power to rewrite a statute so as to make it conform to the presumed intention of the legislature. (Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361 [5 Pac. (2d) 882].)

The invalidity of the bond provision does not, however, affect the remaining regulatory provisions of the act, for they are severable and distinct therefrom and not dependent thereon. (Bacon Service Corp. v. Suss, 199 Cal. 21, 32, 33 [248 Pac. 235].) Moreover, section 8 of the act contains the usual saving clause to the effect that the legislature would have passed the act, irrespective of the invalidity of any particular portion thereof.

We find no merit in petitioner’s claim that the act confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the state fire marshal to determine the persons entitled to pursue and the conditions upon which they may conduct the regulated businesses. This contention is sufficiently answered by Carter v. Stevens, supra, 289-293, and Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 436 [166 Pac. 348, 349]. As stated in the latter case, “it has become increasingly imperative that many gwem'-legislative and quasi-judicial functions,' which in smaller communities and under more primitive conditions were performed directly by the legislative or judicial branches of the government, are entrusted to departments, boards, commissions and agents. No sound objection can longer be successfully advanced to this growing[*633] method of transacting public business. These things must .be done in this way or they cannot be done at all, and their doing, in a very real sense, makes for the safety of the republic, and is thus sanctioned by the highest law. For, as the Supreme Court of the United States declares: ‘Indeed, it is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right under the Constitution, to delegate the power to determine some fact or the state of things upon which the enforcement of its enactment depends, would be “to stop the wheels of government” and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business.’ (Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 367 [51 L. Ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367].)”

We cannot say that the present act confers unreasonable and arbitary powers upon a subordinate officer or agent. The various duties and powers bestowed upon the fire marshal by the act may not be arbitrarily discharged but must be discharged in the exercise of a reasonable discretion with a view to effectuating the purposes of the act. An abuse of these duties and powers may readily be remedied by resort to the courts. However, it is not to be presumed that the fire marshal will exceed his authority in making such rules as may be necessary to administer and carry out the terms of the act. (Carter v. Stevens, supra.) Any abuse in this regard would not, however, affect the validity of the act. (Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 337 [90 Pac. 702],)

The act does not improperly delegate a legislative function. It declares what the law shall be. This function has not been delegated to the fire marshal. He is merely given authority to adopt any necessary and reasonable rules and means to carry out the legislative intention as expressed in the act.

•Section 4 of the act provides that the fire marshal shall not suspend, revoke or refuse to issue or renew any license except upon twenty days’ notice in writing designating the reasons for such action and fixing a time for hearing all interested parties. In the event of an adverse decision the section further authorizes the person affected thereby to institute “an action in a court of competent jurisdiction . . . for the purpose of canceling or obtaining other relief therefrom”. It does not appear, therefore, that the due process clauses[*634] of either the state or federal Constitution are impinged upon by the act under consideration.

We have carefully examined petitioner’s several briefs and find nothing calling for further discussion.

The writ is discharged and petitioner is remanded to the custody of the chief of police of the city of Los Angeles.

Tyler, "J., pro tern., Langdon, J., Curtis, J., Preston, J., Seawell, J., and Shenk,' J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.