Riedman v. Brison, 18 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1933). · Go Syfert
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Riedman v. Brison, 18 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1933). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
78 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: DeVita v. County of Napa (cal, 1995-03-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1935 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1935 1980 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeVita v. County of Napa (2×)
Cal. · 1995 · confidence medium
(See COST, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 506 [construing statute providing funding mechanism for construction of major thoroughfares in Orange County through joint action of county and city governments]; Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387-388 [ 18 P.2d 947 ] [construing statute governing withdrawal from regional metropolitan water district].) In other cases, exclusive delegation was inferred in part on the grounds that the Legislature must have intended to prevent disruption of routine operations of government. ( Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal. App.2d 558, 565 [ 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 ] [holding…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City and County of San Francisco v. Patterson
Cal. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
“Thus, for example, election officials have been ordered not to place initiative and referendum proposals on the ballot on the ground that the *100 electorate did not have the power to enact them since they were not legislative in character (e.g., Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 129-134 [ 222 P.2d 225 ]; Fishman v. City of Palo Alto (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 506, 511-512 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 326 ]; cf. Farley v. Healey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 328-329 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 26 , 431 P.2d 650 ]), the subject matter was not a municipal affair (e.g., Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387 [ 18 P.2d 947 ];…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (4×)
Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
(See Ferrini v. City of San Luis Obispo (1983) 150 Cal. App.3d 239, 249 [ 197 Cal. Rptr. 694 ] ["It has long been established that the powers of initiative and referendum reserved to the people of the cities apply `only to the acts of the city council ... which are exercises of its legislative power'"]; Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal. App.2d 558, 562 [ 11 Cal. Rptr. 340 ] ["`The provisions of the charter of the city relating to the initiative apply only to its legislative acts,'" quoting Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387 ]; Riedman v. Brison, supra, 217 Cal. at p. 387 ["The provisio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Building Industry Assn. of Southern California, Inc. v. City of Camarillo (2×)
Cal. · 1986 · confidence medium
(See Reidman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387 [ 18 P.2d 947 ].) (4a) If the language is clear, there can be no room for interpretation; effect must be given to the plain meaning of the words. ( Teachers Management & Inv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brosnahan v. Eu (2×)
Cal. · 1982 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Thus, for example, election officials have been ordered not to place initiative and referendum proposals on the ballot on the ground that the electorate did not have the power to enact them since they were not legislative in character (e.g., Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 129-134 [ 222 P.2d 225 ]; Fishman v. City of Palo Alto (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 506, 511-512 [ 150 Cal. Rptr. 326 ]; cf. Farley v. Healey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 328-329 [ 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 , 431 P.2d 650 ]), the subject matter was not a municipal affair (e.g., Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387 [ 18 P.2d 947 ]; Merv…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. City of Lincoln
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
(Simpson v. Hite, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 131 ; Riedman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383, 387-388 [ 18 P.2d 947 ] ; Mervynne v. Acker, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 562, 565 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 340 ] ; Alexander v. Mitchell, 119 Cal.App.2d 816, 826 [ 260 P.2d 261 ].) “When the sole basis for a determination is whether a certain ‘contingent effect' exists to warrant local application of state legislation, the exercise of that narrow authority is an administrative act and not a legislative one.” (Housing Authority v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 558 ; Andrews v. City of San Bernardino, 175 Cal.App.2d 459…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mervynne v. Acker
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
As was said in Riedman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383, 387-388 [2-3] [ 18 P.2d 947 ]: “We are therefore of the view, without further citation of the many authorities on the question, that the legislature, in its general act, which is superior to and which controls the charter provisions in the matter of withdrawal from the district, has designated the city council of the city of Long Beach as the state agency which may initiate proceedings for the withdrawal of the municipality from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, of which it at the present time forms a part.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simpson v. Hite
Cal. · 1950 · confidence medium
The situation is similar to that in Riedman v. Brison (1933), 217 Cal. 383, 387 [ 18 P.2d 947 ], There the state Legislature, by general act, provided that the governing body of a city might submit to the electors of the city the proposition of withdrawing from a water district.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1935 · confidence medium
(Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, supra; Wright v. Jordan, 192 Cal. 704 [ 221 Pac. 915 ] ; Riedman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383, 386 [ 18 Pac. (2d) 947 ].) The members of the board are public officers with all the powers of police officers in enforcing the provisions of the act.
discussed Cited "see" Blakemore v. Bruce CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
(Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo, at p. 818; see Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383, 387 [construing reference in the Metropolitan Water District Act to the “‘governing body’” barred an initiative to withdraw a city from regional metropolitan water district].) Considering our conclusions ante, we need not address the arguments regarding other possible bases for finding the proposed initiatives invalid.
examined Cited "see, e.g." City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See footnotes 12, 13, and 14 (examples of other requirements). 17 California Constitution, article n, section 11, subdivision (a) provides: “Initiative and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city and county under procedures that the Legislature shall provide. . . .” 18 Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 776-777 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 814 , 884 R2d 645] (legislative intent to bar the referendum power was unmistakable because statute stated actions taken under it were to go into effect immediately). 19 DeVita, v. County of Napa (…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lockhart v. City of Bakersfield (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1954 · signal: see also · confidence low
XI, § 6; see, also, Riedman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383 -387 [ 18 P.2d 947 ].) The property and projects contemplated under the Housing Authorities Law are those to be acquired, developed, constructed, owned and operated by the housing authority, and are governed by that statute except as otherwise specifically required.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Drake v. City of Los Angeles (2×)
Cal. · 1952 · signal: see also · confidence low
XI, § 6; see, also, Riedman v. Brison, 217 Cal. 383 -387 [ 18 P.2d 947 ].) The property and projects contemplated under the Housing Authorities Law are those to be acquired, developed, constructed, owned and operated by the housing authority, and are gover by that statute except as otherwise specifically required. local law governing the acts and authority of the city coum as to slum-clearance and low-rent housing projects has bee. superseded by the statute.
FRED C. RIEDMAN, Petitioner,
v.
J. OLIVER BRISON, as City Clerk, Etc., Et Al., Respondents
Docket No. L.A. 13832..
California Supreme Court.
Feb 6, 1933.
18 P.2d 947
Eugene C. Campbell for Petitioner. Nowland M. Reid, City Attorney, and Beach Vasey, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents. James H. Howard and Charles C. Cooper, Jr., as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Respondents.
Waste.
Cited by 33 opinions  |  Published
WASTE, C. J.

An initiative petition, purporting to be signed by 7,253 duly qualified electors of the city of Long Beach, was presented to the city council of that municipality, submitting for adoption an ordinance directing the council to call an election on some future date not definitely fixed, at which there should be submitted to the voters the question whether or not the city of Long Beach should withdraw from membership in the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, of which the city now forms a part. Before the city clerk had examined the petition for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it was signed by the requisite number of qualified voters, he was restrained from proceeding further with the examination by service on him of a preliminary injunction issued out of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

The clerk, having thereafter taken no steps toward the examination and certification of the petition, tills petition for a writ of mandate to compel him to act was filed. It is alleged that the petition submitted to the city council has in excess of 1400 more signers than the number required by the Long Beach charter to constitute a sufficient initiative petition. By way of answer to the petition, the city clerk and certain of the members of the city council plead the issuance and service upon the clerk of the preliminary injunction restraining him from proceeding further with the examination. The record in the injunction proceeding is not before us, other than that a copy of the preliminary injunction is made a part of all the answers filed. We are not informed as to the theory on which that proceeding was instituted.

[*386] It is the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of the city clerk, under the plain terms of the charter of the city of Long Beach, to examine and report to the city council as to the sufficiency of the petition, and that mandamus is the proper proceeding to compel him to do so. (Wright v. Jordan, 192 Cal. 704, 710 [221 Pac. 915].) It is further contended that the facts that the respondent city clerk may be a party to the action in the superior court, and that the preliminary injunction affects his action in the matter of the examination of the initiative petition, have no> force or effect on his duty, in view of the provisions of section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly declares that “An injunction cannot be granted: ... To prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.” Undoubtedly an injunction granted in derogation of this provision of the code is void. (Wright v. Jordan, supra; Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672 [154 Pac. 845].) But, as we are of the view, as contended by amici curiae for the water district, that the action of the municipality in seeking to withdraw, or in withdrawing, from a duly constituted metropolitan water district is not a municipal affair to be governed by local charter provisions, but is a matter governed by a general state law, the injunction appears to present an immaterial issue, for the question is one of law relating to the jurisdiction of the city clerk to act at all in this matter.

In our decision in City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653 [269 Pac. 630], the Metropolitan Water District Act (Stats. 1927, p. 694), under which the city of Long Beach became a part of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, was given consideration. It was held (pp. 659, 660) that the act is a general law and that its general purpose “takes it beyond the narrow scope of dealing with a merely municipal affair”. The conclusion reached by the court was that the procedure governing the district must be that set out in the act, and not that prescribed in local charters. This conclusion was cited with approval in Metropolitan Water District v. Whitsett, 215 Cal. 400 [10 Pac. (2d) 751], wherein it was said, “the general purposes and objects to be subserved by the organization of a district under the act are not municipal affairs”. For like holdings in similar cases, see People v. City of Los Angeles, 154 Cal.[*387] 220, 228, 229 [97 Pac. 311], Allen v. Board of Trustees, 157 Cal. 720, 723 [109 Pac. 486], and Henshaw v. Foster, 176 Cal. 507, 511, 512 [169 Pac. 82].

Such being the settled law, it follows that resort must be had to the general law—the Metropolitan Water District Act—for the procedure to be followed when a municipality seeks to withdraw from the district. Section 10 of the act declares that: “Any municipality whose corporate area has become or is a part of any water district may withdraw therefrom in the following manner: The governing tody of any such municipality [italics ours] may submit to the electors thereof at any general or special election the proposition of withdrawing from any water district incorporated thereunder. Notice of such election shall be given in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of section 9 hereof. Such election shall be conducted and the returns thereof canvassed in the manner provided by law for the conduct of municipal elections in said city. ...” This language cannot be properly construed to mean other than that the legislature, in providing the manner in which territory may be withdrawn from the district, has designated the “governing body” of the municipality as the agency for submitting the proposition to withdraw, and has prescribed the formalities it has deemed necessary to effectuate the withdrawal. That this may be done, and that the power may be conferred only on the legislative body of the municipality, is well established by the decisions, supra. (See, also, People v. Town of Ontario, 148 Cal. 625, 630 [84 Pac. 205].)

We are therefore of the view, without further citation of the many authorities on the question, that the legislature, in its general act, which is superior to and which controls the charter provisions in the matter of withdrawal from the district, has designated the city council of the city of Long Beach as the state agency which may initiate proceedings for the withdrawal of the municipality from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, of which it at the present time forms a part. The provisions of the charter of the city relating to the initiative apply only to its legislative acts which, unless otherwise authorized, can relate only to municipal affairs, of which this is not one. (Hopping v. Council of City of Richmond, 170 Cal. 605, 611 [150 Pac. 977].) The matter to which the petition in the[*388] hands of the city clerk relates, not being a matter of municipal legislation, that official has no legal duty to perform in relation to it under the charter.

Amici curiae advance the further point that the term “governing body”, as used in section 10 of the Metropolitan Water District Act, supra, to designate the body which may submit the question of withdrawing from the district, does not include the electorate of the municipality. That is correct. A reading of section 9 of the act, providing for the inclusion or annexation of territory to a water district, confirms such conclusion. That section, considered in the light of the construction given the water district act by this court in Pasadena v. Chamberlain, supra, sustains the contention of amici curiae. The decision of this court in In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 89, 90 [88 Pac. 270, 11 Ann. Cas. 911, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092], on an almost identical question, supports this view.

Por another reason, the mandate here sought should be denied. The proposed ordinance submitted to the city council would not, if adopted, submit to the electors of the city the proposition of withdrawing from the district, as must be done under the provisions of section 10 of the Metropolitan Water District Act. It merely purports' to provide that an election shall be called, in the future, by the “legislative body” of the city, at which subsequent election the question of withdrawal shall be submitted to the electors. Action under the petition seems, therefore, a useless act, which does not warrant the intervention of a writ of mandate.

The alternative writ of mandate is discharged, and the application for a permanent writ is denied.

Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Langdon, J., Preston, J., and Seawell, J., concurred.