Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1934). · Go Syfert
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Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1934). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
252 citation events (25 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Optional Capital v. DAS Corp. CA2/1 (calctapp, 2022-03-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1934 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1934 1980 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Optional Capital v. DAS Corp. CA2/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 ; see also Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Optional Capital v. DAS Corp. CA2/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 ; see also Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santa Barbara Channelkeeper v. City of San Buenaventura
Cal. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
(See Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 693 [“Where separate causes of action for personal injuries and for damages to the automobiles involved arise from an automobile collision, such accident may be said to be the ‘transaction’ out of which said causes arise”].) And the cross-complaint would be proper.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Villacres v. Abm Industries Inc. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 [ 299 P.2d 865 ]; see Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “California law defines a cause of action ‘by focus…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
The doctrine of collateral estoppel ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues as were actually litigated and determined in the first action’ ” (citing Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]); and (3) stating in its opposition to Manatt’s motion for nonsuit that “these findings are binding on Manatt under the doctrine of collateral estoppel” (again citing Todhunter), acknowledging that Manatt had argued that it was not bound because its interests were not represented in the underlying lawsuit, and arguing that Manatt’s subsequent ad…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chinese Yellow Pages Co. v. Chinese Overseas Marketing Service Corp. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
(Powerine Oil Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 377, 387 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 , 118 P.3d 589 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) In the bankruptcy proceeding, the issue of the extent to which the creditor was entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees and costs was not litigated.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barragan
Cal. · 2004 · confidence medium
RES JUDICATA/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL As generally understood, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 280, p. 820.) The doctrine “has a double aspect.” (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) “In its primary aspect,” commonly known as claim preclusion, it “operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action. [Citation.]” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Golf Ass'n v. Arroyo Software Corp.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
(City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 64 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 139 , 785 P.2d 522 ]; Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 874 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 285 , 587 P.2d 1098 ]; Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 811-813 [ 122 P.2d 892 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Department of Industrial Relations v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1512 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 ]; McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18, 29 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. *616 1997) Judgment, §§ 354-356, pp. 915…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Branson v. SUN-DIAMOND GROWERS OF CA.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Although a second action between the parties on a different cause of action is not barred by res judicata, nevertheless “. . . the first judgment ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ [Citations.]” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 253, p. 691, italics in original, quoting Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) “In general, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues litigated and decided in a prior proceedin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Riverside County Department of Public Social Services v. Robert C.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
(See Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; In re Walter P. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 113, 125-126 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 602 ]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, §§ 198, 253, pp. 636, 691.) Consequently, collateral estoppel principles did not bar the juvenile court from determining the issue of whether minors’ father had sexually molested them. 2.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Riverside County Department of Public Social Services v. Duane P.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
(E.g., Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; see 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 253, p. 691.) II.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors
Cal. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
(Henn v. Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323, 329-330 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 502 , 605 P.2d 10 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 253, p. 691.) Issues are actually litigated if the judgment itself indicates they have been litigated or litigation of the issue was necessary to the judgment.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lounge-A-Round v. GCM Mills, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].
cited Cited as authority (rule) Henn v. Henn
Cal. · 1980 · confidence medium
Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Babcock v. Antis
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
(Sellery v. Ward (1942) 21 Cal.2d 300, 304-305 [ 131 P.2d 550 ]; Schwartz v. Cal. Claim Service (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 56 [ 125 P.2d 883 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) Even if the amount of the claim ultimately falls below the jurisdictional minimum, and even if the final judgment is less than the jurisdictional minimum, the superior court retains jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the cause.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corral v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? [citations] . . . .” (See also Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) “The doctrine has ‘a double aspect’: “First, in a new action on the same cause of action, a prior judgment for the defendant is a complete bar ....
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gorman v. Gorman (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
(Clark v. Lesher, 46 Cal.2d 874, 880-881 [ 299 P.2d 865 ]; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; see Murphy v. Allstate Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murphy v. Allstate Insurance
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
(Clark v. Lesher, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 880-881; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; see Myers v. County of Orange, supra; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, §§ 197, 198, pp. 3335-3337.) The determination as to whether the identical issue was litigated in a prior action is not an easy one and generally requires factual proof.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kingsbury v. Tevco, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
(See Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; see generally 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 197, pp. 3335-3336; Rest., Judgments, § 68.) With respect to the statutes of limitations as to both causes of action, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether either is barred by such statutes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carroll v. Puritan Leasing Co. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
Co., supra, 182 Cal. App.2d 573, 580 [reference to prior judgment in complaint coupled with judicial notice invoked defense of res judicata].) Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment in a prior action between the same parties operates to preclude relitigation of those issues which were actually litigated and determined in the first action. ( Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Saunders v. New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc. (1964) 231 Cal. App.2d 324, 330, 333 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 703 ]; Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d 415, 428-429 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chern v. Bank of America
Cal. · 1976 · confidence medium
(Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Pacific Maritime Assn. v. California Unemp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Day v. Sharp
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
(Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Lortz v. Connell, 273 Cal.App.2d 286, 296-297 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 6 ].) It is manifest that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this matter.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Melendres v. City of Los Angeles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
It is true that a prior judgment “operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in [a second suit between the same parties but based upon a different cause of action] as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal.2d 749, 757 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 371 P.2d 758 ].) But if new facts or changed circumstances have occurred since the prior decision, the former judgment may not bar a later suit.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Spirtos
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
As stated in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]: “. . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
Co. (1951) 104 Cal. App.2d 816, 821 [ 232 P.2d 560 ]; and note Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) In Rodley v. Curry, supra , the court stated, "It is so well settled that the amount for which judgment is demanded in the complaint determines the jurisdiction of the court that no authorities need be cited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
Co. (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 816, 821 [ 232 P.2d 560 ]; and note Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) In Rodley v. Curry, supra, the court stated, “It is so well settled that the amount for which judgment is demanded in the complaint determines, the jurisdiction of the court that no authorities need be cited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry
Cal. Ct. App. · 1971 · confidence medium
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel dictate generally that a judgment in a prior action between the same parties, even though based upon a different cause of action, “ ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action’. [Citation.]” (Clark v. Lesher, 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 [ 299 P.2d 865 ]; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) In addition, “the prior determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties as to that issu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Cates
Cal. Ct. App. · 1971 · confidence medium
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?’ ( 19 Cal.2d at p. 813 .)” In Lortz v. Connell (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 286, 296-297 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 6 ], the rules governing the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel were stated with a quotation from Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ], as follows: “In Todhunter v. Smith, supra, the court ruled: ‘By virtue of the doctrine of res judicata the final determination of a court of competent jurisdiction necessarily affirming the existence of any…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perry v. Farley Bros. Moving & Storage, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
(Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank (1940) 308 U.S. 371 [ 84 L.Ed. 32 , 60 S.Ct. 317 ]; Estate of Estrem (1940) 16 Cal.2d 563, 569 [ 107 P.2d 36 ].) Next, plaintiff contends that the equitable rights of appellant were not required to be and were not adjudicated in the prior action, but she concedes that “[the first judgment] operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Schumacker v. Industrial Acc. Com. (19…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lortz v. Connell
Cal. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
(See Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 201-202 [ 99 P.2d 652 , 101 P.2d 497 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Tevis v. Beigel (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 8,12 [ 319 P.2d 98 ]; and 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Judgment, § 62, p. 1947.) In Todhunter v. Smith, supra, the court ruled: “By virtue of the doctrine of res judicata the final determination of a court of competent jurisdiction necessarily affirming the existence of any fact is conclusive evidence of the existence of that fact when it is again in issue in subsequent litigation between *297 the same p…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc.
Cal. · 1969 · confidence medium
(Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 693 (dictum) [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Bowman v. Wohlke (1913) 166 Cal. 121 [ 135 P. 37 , Ann.Cas. 1915B 1011]; Lamb v. Harbaugh (1895) 105 Cal. 680 [ 39 P. 56 ]; McCarty v. Fremont (1863) 23 Cal. 196 ; Morgan v. French (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 785, 787 (dictum) [ 161 P.2d 800 ]; Pratt v. Vaughan (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 722 [ 38 P.2d 799 ]; Ross v. Goins (1921) 51 Cal.App. 412 [ 197 P. 132 ]; Weisshand v. City of Petaluma (1918) 37 Cal.App. 296, 302 [ 174 P. 955 ]; Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dunzweiler v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1968 · confidence medium
(See Schrader v. Neville, supra, at pp. 114-115 ; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 693-694 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) With respect to cross-complaints, we also note the rule that a defendant may file a cross-complaint at the time of answering, but thereafter it may only be done by permission of the court; and that the ruling of the trial court on an application for permission to file such a pleading is within its discretion and will be reversed only upon a showing that such *576 discretion was abused.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Powers v. Floersheim
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
(Cromwell v. County of Sac (1876) 94 U.S. 351 [ 24 L.Ed. 195 ]; Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) Collateral estoppel is not applicable to the decision of a mixed question of fact and law, particularly if there has been an intervening change in the law or a doctrinal change.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
As the court stated in Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ], ‘[a] former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first. action.’ [Citations.] In its first aspect, res judicata is effective as a merger or bar; in the second as a collateral estoppel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berry v. City of Santa Barbara
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Co., Ltd., 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ] ; Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal.2d 749, 757 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 371 P.2d 758 ] ; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Restatement, Judgments, §68.) The issue of the City’s negligence causing the damage to the sewers involved was actually and necessarily litigated in the municipal court action.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'Connor v. O'Leary
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
The trial court expressed the opinion the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply to this case; refused admission of evidence showing the prior conviction for this purpose; and rejected instructions applying the doctrine. 1 The doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment is a specific aspect of the general doctrine of res judicata (Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 810 [ 122 P.2d 892 ] ; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]) ; decrees that any issue necessarily decided in the litigation of a cause of action finally determined by a court of competent jurisdictio…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
The contention is grounded on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the secondary aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, under which “A former judgment operates ... in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, . . . as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]; Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 201-202 [ 99 P.2d 652 , 101 P.2d 497 ]; Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880-881 [ 299 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Hawk…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Adoption of Stroope
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were explained by the Supreme Court in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saunders v. New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1964 · confidence medium
Under the doctrine considered in its secondary aspect as a collateral estoppel “ [a] former judgment operates ... in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, ... as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ] ; Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195 , 201-202 *331 [ 99 P.2d 652 , 101 P.2d 497 ]; Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880-881 [ 299 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Hawkinson (1957) 47 Cal.2d 893, 895-896 [ 306 P.2d…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haun v. Hyman
Cal. Ct. App. · 1963 · confidence medium
It is settled that a judgment in a prior action ‘ ‘ operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues ... as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]) If title or interest in real property was at issue in a former action, the judgment is conclusive in later proceedings involving the same title or interest.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1963 · confidence medium
As the court stated in Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ], “ [a] former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (See also Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 201 [ 99 P.2d 652 , 101 P.2d 497 ] ; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 1927.) In its first aspect, res judicata is effective as a merger or bar; in the second as…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Estate of Tassi
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
Where a second action between the same parties is brought on a different cause of action, the first judgment “ ‘ 11 operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” ’ ” (Taylor v. Hawkinson (1957), 47 Cal.2d 893, 895, 896 [ 306 P.2d 797 ] ; Todhunter v. Smith (1934), 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) In Pacific Mut.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brian v. Ivey
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
As stated in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ] : “. . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stout v. Pearson (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1960 · confidence medium
A former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” (Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694-695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) (Emphasis added.) Cross-complainants rely upon the estoppel feature of the doctrine in support of their contention that the judgment on the complaint is conclusive in their favor on all of the issues of liability raised by the cross-c…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Haines v. Pigott
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
(Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) Generally, when two successive actions deal with the same controversy, the first court to take jurisdiction has priority.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell v. Jones
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
“The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Citation.) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher, supra; Taylor v. Hawkinson, supra; Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) It is clear that the instant cause of action is not the same as the one previously litigated and, therefore, we a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Quan
Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. · 1959 · confidence medium
(Todhunter v. Smith (1934), 219 Cal. 690, 694 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) In that ease, involving the jurisdictional relationships between the municipal and the superior court, it was stated, the one having the cross-demand “may permit the action in the inferior court to go to judgment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tevis v. Beigel
Cal. Ct. App. · 1957 · confidence medium
As this court stated in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ] : ‘A prior judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ . . . [A] determination of a particular issue in the prior action is res judicata in the second action. [Citation.] “Next is the question, under what circumstances is a matter to be deemed decided by the prior j…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lee v. MERCHANTS COLLECTION ASSN. OF OAKLAND
Cal. Ct. App. · 1957 · confidence medium
While it is true that “. . . questions of law and of fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action are conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action” (Braye v. Jones, 129 Cal.App.2d 827, 830 [ 278 P.2d 29 ]), that “The final adjudication of an inferior court made within its jurisdiction is binding and conclusive upon a higher court in a subsequent action” (Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ]), and that on appeal from a judgment the appellate court will sustain the judgment if supported on any *771 theory raised below and sustained by the evidence,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Braslow v. Kelly
Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. · 1957 · confidence medium
A former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.” Todhunter v. Smith (1934), 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].
GEORGE C. TODHUNTER, Respondent,
v.
D. S. SMITH, Appellant
Docket No. S.F. 14944..
California Supreme Court.
Jan 20, 1934.
28 P.2d 916
McEnerney & Morris for Appellant., Vincent W. Hallinan and James J. Roach for Respondent.
Seawell.
Cited by 123 opinions  |  Published
SEAWELL, J.

Defendant D. S. Smith appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco awarding plaintiff George C. Todhunter $500 as damages for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff by reason of an automobile truck which he was driving colliding with an automobile driven by defendant Smith at a street intersection in the city of San Francisco. The sole point urged upon this appeal is that the superior court erred in ruling that a judgment of the Municipal Court of San Francisco in an action between the same parties arising out of the same collision was not a bar to plaintiff Todhunter’s recovery of damages for personal injuries in the action herein.

D. S. Smith, defendant in the action herein, commenced suit in the justice’s court against Todhunter to recover $800 for the total destruction of his automobile. Before Tod-hunter filed his answer the municipal court was established in San Francisco, and all pending justice court actions were transferred to the municipal court by constitutional provision. (Art. VI, sec. 11, Const.) By his answer in the municipal court action Todhunter prayed that plaintiff take nothing, and “by way of cross-complaint” prayed judgment against plaintiff for $100 for damages done to his autotruck. The municipal court heard the action sitting without a jury and entered judgment as follows: “It is adjudged that D. S. Smith recover from Geo. Todhunter nothing; each party pay costs.” No appeal was taken from said judgment.

Smith, defendant and appellant in the 'superior court action herein, contends that Todhunter should have set up his claim for personal injuries in the municipal court action.[*693] Section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: “If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim upon a cause arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim, neither he nor his assignee nan afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor.” (See sections 855 and 856, Code of Civil Procedure, governing counterclaims in justice’s court actions until their repeal in 1933.) But for the fact that Todhunter in his complaint filed in the superior court prays for damages for personal injuries in the sum of $10,900, which is beyond the jurisdictional limit of the municipal court, we are of the view that section 439, supra, would be a bar to prosecution of said action for personal injuries.

Under the 1927 amendment to section 438 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the sole requisites of a counterclaim are that it “must tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff’s recovery, and must exist in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment might be had in the action”. (Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428 [292 Pac. 474] ; Luse v. Peters, ante, p. 625 [28 Pac. (2d) 357].) Upon counterclaim a defendant may recover damages exceeding the plaintiff’s demand. (Secs. 626, 666, 857a, Code Civ. Proc.) In an action for damages to plaintiff’s automobile sustained in a collision with defendant’s automobile, defendant’s separate causes of action for damages to his automobile and for personal injuries sustained in the collision arise out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiff’s claim, under the provisions of section 438, subdivision 1, as it read before the 1927 amendment. Under section 439, which continues in force, counterclaims of this nature must be set up unless they exceed the jurisdictional limit of the court in which the complaint is filed. Where separate causes of action for personal injuries and for damages to the automobiles involved arise from an automobile collision, such accident may be said to be the “transaction” out of which said causes arise. (Engleman v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 754 [288 Pac. 723]; Morris v. Warner, 207 Cal. 498, 503 [279 Pac. 152] ; Story & Isham Commercial Co. v. Story, 100 Cal. 30 [34 Pac. 671].) Although the allegations upon which Todhunter relied in the municipal court to recover ofor damage to his automobile were set forth “by way of cross-[*694] complaint”, the character of a pleading is determined from its allegations regardless of the designation given it by the pleader. (Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, supra, at p. 434; Luse v. Peters, supra, at p. 359 of 28 Pac. (2d).)

in the action for personal injuries filed in the superior court Todhunter prayed for damages in the sum of $10,900. The jury returned a verdict in his favor for $500. However, appellant herein raises no issue as to the good faith of Todhunter. It may well he that although Tod-hunter did not reasonably believe that he was injured to the extent of $10,900, he nevertheless was of the view that he had a legitimate claim exceeding $2,000. In this situation the rule that the ad damnum clause of the complaint is the test of jurisdiction must prevail. (7 Cal. Jur. 692, and cases there cited.)

There is authority which holds that where the defendant in a justice court action has a counterclaim arising out of the transaction upon which the complaint is founded which is beyond the jurisdictional limit of the justice court, such defendant may bring an action in the superior court and compel the plaintiff in the justice court action to litigate the entire controversy in the superior court. To this end such defendant may procure an injunction restraining further prosecution of the justice court action. (Gregory v. Diggs, 113 Cal. 196 [45 Pac. 261]; Englemam, v. Superior Court, supra.) No reason exists why the same rule should not apply where the original action is in the municipal court. But it is not necessary that the defendant should resort to this procedure and apply for the extraordinary remedy of injunction. He may permit the action in the inferior court to go to judgment. If he adopts this course the final judgment of the inferior court, although not a complete bar to subsequent prosecution in the superior court of his cause of action arising from the same accident, is nevertheless conclusive and binding upon him in so far as the subsequent action involves issues adjudged and determined in the prior action. By virtue of the doctrine of res judicata the final determination of a court of competent jurisdiction necessarily affirming the existence of any fact is conclusive evidence of the existence of that fact when it is again in issue in subsequent litigation between the same parties in the same or any other court. The facts decided[*695] in the first suit cannot be disputed or relitigated although the later suit is upon a different cause of action. (Estate of Clark, 190 Cal. 354, at p. 360 [212 Pac. 622] ; Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, at 461 [194 Pac. 34] ; Price v. Sixth Dist. Agricultural Assn., 201 Cal. 502 [258 Pac. 387]; Martin v. Holm, 197 Cal. 733 [242 Pac. 718]; 15 Cal. Jur. 134, 136; 2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., 1425.) The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect. A former judgment operates as a bar against a second action upon the same cause, but in a later action upon a different claim or cause of action, it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action. (See authorities cited supra, this paragraph. The final adjudication of an inferior court made within its jurisdiction is binding and conclusive upon a higher court in a subsequent action. (2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., 1336; 15 Cal. Jur. 107; Wiese v. San Francisco Mus. Soc., 82 Cal. 645 [23 Pac. 212, 7 L. R. A. 577].) The determination of an issue presented in a former action by the defendant by way of counterclaim or cross-complaint against the plaintiff is res judicata as fully as if determined in a separate action brought by defendant against plaintiff. (Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91, 94 [77 Pac. 765, 103 Am. St. Rep. 66] ; 15 Cal. Jur. 157.)

In the superior court action herein,' the right of plaintiff Todhunter to recover for personal injuries sustained by him in the automobile collision depended upon his establishing the negligence of appellant Smith and his own freedom from contributory negligence. These are the identical issues which were involved in the municipal court action, wherein Todhunter sought damages for injury to his automobile truck sustained in the same collision upon allegations set forth by him “by way of cross-complaint’’, which in legal effect constituted a counterclaim. By the judgment of the municipal court he was denied recovery. Smith having advanced the plea of res judicata by his answer in the superior court action herein, Todhunter cannot relitigate these issues. (See Allamong v. Falkenhof, 39 Ohio App. 515 [177 N. E. 789, 791].)

It cannot be held that because the judgment in the municipal court did not expressly provide that Todhunter[*696] take nothing upon his counterclaim that said court failed to determine the claim on its merits. Todhunter’s claim for $100 for injuries to his automobile truck was a counterclaim within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, which he was required to set up under section 439, of the Code of Civil Procedure. By its silence the court decided said claim against him. (Ernsting v. United Stages, Inc., 206 Cal. 733, 737 [276 Pac. 103].) Had the court intended only to rule against Smith on his complaint it would not have provided that each party pay his costs. The prevailing party in the municipal court is allowed his costs. (Sec. 831d, Code Civ. Proc.)

The judgment that plaintiff Todhunter recover damages in the sum of $500 is reversed, with directions to the court below to enter judgment for defendant that plaintiff take nothing.

Langdon, J., Curtis, J., Shenk, J., Thompson, J., and Waste, C. J., concurred.