Warner v. Kenny, 165 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1946). · Go Syfert
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Warner v. Kenny, 165 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1946). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
81 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Planning & Conservation League, Inc. v. Lungren (calctapp, 1995-09-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1950 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1950 1988 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Planning & Conservation League, Inc. v. Lungren
Cal. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
(Warner v. Kenny (1946) 27 Cal.2d 627, 630-631 [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) PCL, a private, nonprofit corporation founded in 1965, is engaged in lobbying and other activities for the protection of the environment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. County of San Mateo (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Whether the burden of the interpretation adopted by the Legislature and the Board outweighs its benefits is a debatable issue on which reasonable minds can differ. (14-16) (See fn. 14.), (13b) What does seem to us clear, however, is that, taken as a whole, the results of the legislative and administrative interpretation are not productive of absurd consequences (see Warner v. Kenny (1946) 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ], and State Bd. of Equalization v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 105 Cal. App.3d at p. 824) or so manifestly inconsonant with the purposes of article XIII A — which include …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizens Against Legalized Gambling v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics
D.D.C. · 1980 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Convention Center Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, supra, at 30 (Gallagher, J., dissenting); Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal,2d 627, 165 P.2d 889, 890 (1946); cf. Kamins v. Board of Elections, 324 A.2d 187,192 (D.C.1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Board of Equalization v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
In Warner v. Kenny (1946) 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ], the court in interpreting a provision of the Elections Code, held: “The interpretation adopted must be reasonable, and where the language is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair, and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted.” Finally, despite the well established rule of statutory construction which provides a statute will be presumed to operate prospectively only unle…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Francisco Fire Fighters v. Board of Supervisors (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
(Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794, 799 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]; Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587, 593 [ 299 P. 713 ].) Article XI, section 3, of the state’s Constitution thus gives to San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors the unabridged right to propose charter amendments to the city’s electors.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Schmitz v. Younger (4×)
Cal. · 1978 · confidence medium
The right to propose initiative measures cannot properly be impeded by a decision of a ministerial office, even if supported by the advice of the city attorney, that the subject is not appropriate for submission to the voters." (Italics added.) (3) The duty of the Attorney General to prepare title and summary for a proposed initiative measure is a ministerial one and mandate will *93 lie to compel him to act when the proposal is in proper form and complies with statutory and constitutional procedural requirements. ( Warner v. Kenny (1946) 27 Cal.2d 627, 630-631 [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) The single su…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Morales
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
Fundamental rules of statutory construction require related sections of a statute be considered as a whole (People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638, 642 [ 150 P.2d 888 ]) and interpreted to avoid an absurd result (Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County of Orange v. Heim
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
Bechtel Co., 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [ 273 P.2d 5 ]; Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) Appellants attack the existence in the case at bench of virtually every condition set forth in Mansell as necessary to a valid exchange of article XV, section 3 tidelands.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Christward Ministry v. County of San Diego
Cal. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
(Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) Plaintiff contends the evidence establishes as a mat *811 ter of law all of the 600 acres actually was used for religious purposes.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Escondido v. Municipal Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
(Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, 24 Cal.2d 796, 812 [ 151 P.2d 505 , 157 A.L.R. 324 ]; Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]; Adoption of Thevenin, 189 Cal.App.2d 245, 249 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 219 ].) By plain language section 73957 directs that a department of the Municipal Court of the North County Judicial District shall hold sessions at a location in the City of Escondido.; that the judge of the superseded Escondido Justice Court, or his successor, shall be assigned to this department; that this assignment “shall include the trial and proper disposition of all matters fil…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rodriguez
Cal. Ct. App. · 1966 · confidence medium
(Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]; People v. Kuhn, 216 Cal.App. 2d 695, 698 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 253 ].) It has been held a conviction is such for prior conviction purposes, even though imposition of judgment thereon is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Greiner
Cal. · 1964 · confidence medium
(See People v. Elkins (1922) 59 Cal.App. 396, 404 [211 P.34] ; Collins v. City & County of San Francisco (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 729 [ 274 P.2d 362 ] ; Warner v. Kenny (1946) 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) The problem before us compels a choice between two possible interpretations of an ambiguous statutory pattern.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cranston v. Wyman
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
It is argued hy respondent, the State Controller, that one of the terms of the major premise must be interpreted by the court otherwise than according to its literal meaning; that is, that the term “any public retirement system,” as used in the statute, means “any public retirement system established by the State of California or by any of its agencies or political subdivisions. ’ ’ This proposition at once appears to transgress the circumscription of the court’s function of construction of statutes as contained in section 1858 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads: “In the…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brodsky v. Seaboard Realty Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
Bechtel Co., 43 Cal.2d 227, 223 [ 273 P.2d 5 ]; Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ] ; Dempsey v. Market St.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kasunich v. Kraft
Cal. Ct. App. · 1962 · confidence medium
Bechtel Co., 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [ 273 P.2d 5 ]; Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]; Dempsey v. Market St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DiGenova v. State Board of Education (2×)
Cal. · 1962 · confidence medium
"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] Moreover, `every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.' ... [P. 647.] It is not to be presumed that the Legislature used language in a sense which would render nugatory important provisions of the statute." ( Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [1, 2] 647 [11] [ 335 P.2d 672 ]); also A…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Town of Atherton v. Templeton
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
The proper rule is set forth *150 in Warner v. Kenny (1946) 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ], where the court stated: “The interpretation adopted must be reasonable, and where the language is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair, and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted.” We do not believe that the plain language of the Atherton ordinance is susceptible of any reasonable interpretation which would exclude the sides and back…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Cregler (2×)
Cal. · 1961 · confidence medium
(See Warner v. Kenny (1946), 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [3] [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) [5] A statute "will not be given an interpretation in conflict with its clear purpose, and ... general words used therein will be given a restricted meaning when reason and justice require it, rather than a literal meaning which would lead to an unjust and absurd consequence." (People v. Kelley, (1937), 27 Cal.App.2d Supp. 771, 774 [3] [ 70 P.2d 276 ]; see also People v. King (1952), 115 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875, 877-880 [ 252 P.2d 78 ].) *313 In the light of these rules the cases relied upon by petitioner (such as In re Bell (…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Ass'n
Cal. Ct. App. · 1959 · confidence medium
Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620 at 648 [ 91 P.2d 577 ] ; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 at 800 [ 147 P.2d 387 ] ; Warner v. Kenney, 27 Cal.2d 627, at 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ] ; In re La Belle, 37 Cal.App. 2d 32 at 39 [98 P.2d778].) Our recent decision in Agnew v. Cronin, 167 Cal.App.2d 154 [ 334 P.2d 256 ], upon which appellant places his main reliance, does not support his position.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (2×)
Cal. · 1954 · confidence medium
And where the language of a statutory provision is susceptible of two constructions, one of which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted (Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ] ; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794, 799, 800 [ 147 P.2d 387 ]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, Engine No. 18-5601077 (2×)
Cal. · 1950 · confidence medium
Co., 23 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 142 P.2d 929 ], "it is ... well settled that statutes and even constitutional enactments must be given a reasonable interpretation, and that a literal construction which will lead to absurd results should not be given if it can be avoided." Similar expressions may be found in many cases. ( Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 32 Cal.2d 620, 630-631 [ 197 P.2d 543 ]; Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ]; Reuter v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314, 321 [ 30 P.2d 417 ]; Robbiano v. Bovet, 218 Cal. 589, 595 [ 24 P.2d 466 ]; Holmes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. …
discussed Cited "see" Perales v. Department of Human Resources Development (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
(Bilyeu v. State Employees’ Retirement System, 58 Cal.2d 618, 627-628 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 562 , 375 P.2d 442 ]; see Warner v. Kenney, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629 [ 165 P.2d 889 ].) We can do this by construing the 1256 presumption as rebuttable.
ERIC G. WARNER Et Al., Petitioners,
v.
ROBERT W. KENNY, as Attorney General, Etc., Respondent
S. F. 17274.
California Supreme Court.
Feb 6, 1946.
165 P.2d 889
J. Wesley Cupp and Robert E. Sease for Petitioners., Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Charles W. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Robert 0. Cur-ran, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
Carter.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published
CARTER, J.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to compel the respondent attorney general to forthwith issue a title and summary for a proposed initiative measure.

On October 15, 1945, petitioners submitted to the attorney general a draft of their proposed measure together with the required fee of $200, and requested the preparation of a title and summary (Elec. Code, §1401). No action was taken by the attorney general until January 2, 1946, when petitioners were notified by letter of his refusal to issue a title and summary on the ground that the measure was substantially the same as a measure which had been duly entitled and summarized in May, 1945, but on which no petitions had been "[*629] filed within the prescribed 90-day period thereafter (Elec. Code, § 1407). Petitioners thereupon instituted the present proceeding.

The question presented is that of proper interpretation of section 1407, supra, of which the pertinent portion provides that “No petitions for a proposed initiative measure shall be circulated for signatures prior to the official summary date. First petitions with signatures on a proposed initiative measure shall be filed with the clerk or registrar of voters not later than 90 days from the ‘Official summary date’ of such proposed initiative measure, and no clerk or registrar of voters shall accept first petitions on such proposed initiative measure thereafter.”

The position taken by the attorney general is that if he were to issue a title and summary for a measure which is substantially the same as a previously entitled and summarized measure which has lapsed by reason of the failure of its proponents to qualify it for a place on the ballot, the effect would be to nullify the above quoted provision of section 1407 prohibiting the acceptance for filing of any first petition on a measure later than 90 days from the official summary date.

Unquestionably the Legislature has authority to supplement the constitutional provisions for the initiative (Const., art. IV, § 1) with statutes designed to further its purpose and safeguard the process from abuse (see Elec. Code, div. IV), and any reasonable legislative regulation which is in furtherance of and not a limitation upon the power reserved in the Constitution to the people is valid and enforceable. (Chesney v. Byram, 15 Cal.2d 460 [101 P.2d 1106]; Uhl v. Collins, 217 Cal. 1 [17 P.2d 99, 85 A.L.R. 1370]; Gray v. Kenny, 67 Cal.App.2d 281 [153 P.2d 961]; Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d 794 [147 P.2d 387].) However, any doubt as to the construction of a pertinent provision is to be resolved in favor of the initiative and such legislation is to be given the same liberal construction as that afforded election statutes generally. The interpretation adopted must be reasonable, and where the language is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair, and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted. (Gage v. Jordan, 23 Cal.2d supra, at pp. 799-800.)

[*630] Testing the questioned provision of section 1407 in the light of these rules of construction, it at once appears that the plain wording neither expressly nor impliedly manifests any legislative intent to bar from the ballot a proposed measure merely because it is substantially similar to or identical with a previously submitted and lapsed measure. The statute reads as a purely procedural provision designed to aid an orderly administration of necessary ministerial duties leading up to the preparation of the ballot. The prohibition against accepting first petitions after 90 days obviously refers to petitions on the proposed measure itself, not petitions on the same subject matter when covered by some later measure.

Under the meaning attributed to the language by respondent, the provision would limit and restrict the initiative power reserved to the people by the Constitution, and it would therefore be invalid. It would lead to absurd consequences. An opponent, learning of a measure in course of preparation and desiring to defeat it, would need only to prepare and first submit a similar measure, and then permit it to lapse. The true proponents would be barred. Or a proponent of a submitted measure, discovering some defect of language and desiring to draft and submit a similar and properly worded bill, would find himself barred. The statute was never intended to have this" drastic effect and no such meaning may be read into its provisions.

The constitutional plan and the enabling legislation clearly connote that qualified measures shall go on the ballot at the next succeeding general election, and if a measure does not qualify, that the entire procedure may be instituted anew. A subsequent similar or identical bill may be proposed either by the proponents of the prior lapsed measure or by different proponents. Any possible imposition upon the public officials which might result from too numerous demands for titles and summaries for successive similar measures is met by the provision requiring payment of an adequate fee for this service (Elec. Code, § 1401).

The attorney general in his return challenges the good faith of petitioners in demanding a title and summary for the proposed measure and contends that he has the right to exercise a discretion in determining the validity of the proposed enactment before preparing a title and summary therefor.[*631] We think it is clear that the duties of the attorney general in this respect are purely ministerial. No showing has been made to justify his refusal to prepare a title and summary for the proposed measure, and since it is in proper form and was submitted to him in accordance with the constitutional and statutory requirements as to procedure, petitioners are entitled to have furnished to them a title and summary therefor.

Let a peremptory writ issue forthwith.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.