Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 116 P.2d 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). · Go Syfert
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Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 116 P.2d 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
36 citation events (1 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Castleview Home Loans v. Home Loan Center CA4/3 (calctapp, 2013-12-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1943 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1943 1984 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castleview Home Loans v. Home Loan Center CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(See Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 238 ; Augustine v. Trucco (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 229, 246 ; cf. Little v. Amber Hotel Co. ( 2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 288-289 [defendant’s misrepresentations and under- the-table payment disrupted attorney-client contract]; Woods v. Fox Broadcasting Sub., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 344, 356 [defendant’s actions to lower value of stock options could support interference cause of action]; Campbell v. Veith (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 729, 732 [landlord threatened to evict tenant unless tenant evicted subtenant]; Remillard-Dan…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.
Cal. · 1990 · confidence medium
(See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, supra, 18 Cal.2d 33 ; Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 680 [ 116 P.2d 641 ]; Heavener, Ogier Services v. R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allen v. Powell
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 202, 207 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 294 , 363 P.2d 310 ] ; see Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier (1941) 18 Cal.2d 33, 39 [ 112 P.2d 631 ] ; Roberts v. Wachter (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 281, 290 [ 231 P.2d 540 ].) It was sufficient in Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 679 [ 116 P.2d 641 ], that the plaintiff there alleged that the defendant went to certain of the plaintiff’s creditors to induce them to cease dealing with the plaintiff, as a result of which the plaintiff was unable to procure necessary materials.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kiang v. Strycula
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
(See Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33 [ 112 P.2d 631 ] ; Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34 [ 172 P.2d 867 ]; Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 680 [ 116 P.2d 641 ].) The essential elements of such a cause of action and the matters which must ordinarily be alleged are set forth in Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 [ 331 P.2d 689 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Uptown Enterprises v. Strand
Cal. Ct. App. · 1961 · confidence medium
Such right existing, the commission of an actionable wrong is established against any one who is shown to have intentionally interfered with it, without justifiable cause or excuse.” (Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 546 [ 145 P.2d 305 ], Compare analogous principles applied to interference with contract relations as considered in Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., supra, 47 Cal.2d 875, 883 ; Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 39 [172 P.2d 867]; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 35 [ 112 P.2d 631 ]; Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc., 165 Cal.App.2d 186, 188 [331 P.2d 6…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freed v. Manchester Service, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1958 · confidence medium
Specifically, plaintiff must allege the existence of a valid contract (Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal.2d 875, 883 [ 306 P.2d 783 ]; 28 Cal. Jur.2d 431; see 84 A.L.R. 1 ; 2 Witkin, California Procedure, p. 1362); that the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the contract and intended to induce a breach thereof (Collins v. Vickter, supra, p. 883 ; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, supra, p. 37 ; Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal.App.2d 229, 246 [ 268 P.2d 780 ] ; Romano v. Wilbur Ellis & Co., supra, p. 674; see Roberts v. Wachter, 104 Cal.App.2d 281, 289 [ 231 P.2d 540 ]) ; that the contrac…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guillory v. Godfrey
Cal. Ct. App. · 1955 · confidence medium
(Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal.2d 161 [ 217 P.2d 19 ] ; Masoni v. Board of Trade of San Francisco, 119 Cal.App.2d 738, 741-742 [260 P.2d 205]; Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 680 [ 116 P.2d 641 ]; California Grape Control Board v. California Produce Corp., 4 Cal.App.2d 242, 244 [ 40 P.2d 846 ]; see also Restatement of Torts, §766, p. 49; 62 C.J. §53, p. 1137.) The evidence amply supports a finding of malicious disruption of plaintiffs’ business by defendants and damage proximately flowing therefrom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Augustine v. Trucco
Cal. Ct. App. · 1954 · confidence medium
It is necessary to prove that they intentionally and actively induced the breach.” (Italics added.) (See also Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 39-40 [ 172 P.2d 867 ]; Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 680 [ 116 P.2d 641 ]; H.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campbell v. Veith
Cal. Ct. App. · 1953 · confidence medium
(Remillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 680 [ 116 P.2d 641 ]; Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33 [ 112 P.2d 631 ]; Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34 [ 172 P.2d 867 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Masoni v. Board of Trade of SF
Cal. Ct. App. · 1953 · confidence medium
(Restatement, Torts, § 766 (a) and (b).) We quoted this section of the Restatement in full in Bemillard-Dandini Co. v. Dandini, 46 Cal.App.2d 678, 680 [ 116 P.2d 641 ], in which case we held that a cause of action was stated *742 in a complaint which alleged that defendant for the purpose of destroying plaintiff's business not only induced creditors of plaintiff to breach their contracts with plaintiff but also caused them to demand immediate payment of plaintiff’s accounts and to refuse to sell further to plaintiff on credit, so that plaintiff had to pay cash.
REMILLARD-DANDINI COMPANY (A Corporation), Appellant,
v.
LILLIAN R. DANDINI Et Al., Respondents
Civ. 11537.
California Court of Appeal.
Sep 3, 1941.
116 P.2d 641
George P. Tobin for Appellant., Johnson. & Harmon for Bespondents.
Noubse, Sturtevant, Spence.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
NOUBSE, P. J.-

The plaintiff sued for damages for interference with its business. Before a ruling was had on the defendants’ demurrer it was stricken from the files and they filed their answer. They thereafter made a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted upon the sole ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The appeal is taken on the judgment roll and presents the single question whether a cause of action in tort is stated where plaintiff sues for the defendants’ “intentional interference with contractual rights and relationships of plaintiff. ’ ’ Before consideration of the appeal it should be stated that the plaintiff does not defend any of the other allegations of damage and that the ruling of the trial court as to those allegations was sound. For this reason they should be eliminated from the complaint, by amendment or motion, before the cause goes to trial upon the merits.

The pertinent allegations of damage, which we hold to be sufficient, relate to the acts charged to the defendants tending to induce third parties to break their contractual obligations and relationships with the plaintiff. These are in part: that the defendant Lillian B. Dandini “called upon a number of the creditors of plaintiff and sought to and did induce such creditors of plaintiff to break the contractual relationships which existed between such creditors and plaintiff, all of which was done for the purpose and with the intention of bringing about the destruction and failure of plaintiff as a business and going concern’’; also, “That by reason of the foregoing acts, statements and conduct of defendants, plaintiff has sustained damage in the following manner and amounts: That by reason of the interference by defendants in the relationships between plaintiff and its creditors, materials, supplies and services which had been contracted for by plaintiff were not delivered or supplied by such creditors and suppliers in accordance with the terms which had originally been arranged between such creditors and suppliers and plaintiff, and as a direct result of which plaintiff’s plants were damaged and the operation of plaintiff’s plants, and of its trucks, were curtailed, as a direct result of which plaintiff has sustained damage in the sum of not less than one thou[*680] sand ninety five ($1095.00) dollars; that the credit theretofore extended to plaintiff was curtailed and creditors of plaintiff demanded immediate payment of their accounts and refused to furnish further or other materials, supplies or services on credit as they had done previously, and plaintiff was required to pay cash therefor.”

That a third party’s unjustifiable interference with contractual relations is actionable is now the settled law in this state. This court so held in California Grape Control Board v. California Produce Corporation, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 242 [40 Pac. (2d) 846]. The holding was approved in Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. (2d) 33 [112 Pac. (2d) 631], Both of these eases involved the question whether the plaintiff had a cause of action for injunctive relief where monetary damages would not afford an adequate remedy. Here the appellant sues in tort for damages, and no suggestion is made that the damage is not provable, or that the damages would not be adequate. But it would seem to follow necessarily that if the acts complained of may be restrained because damage would result, recovery may likewise be had for the injuries suffered. The legal duty of the party to refrain can be no greater than his legal liability for the acts already accomplished. This appears to be the view expressed in vol. 4, Bestatement of the Law of Torts, section 766, where it is stated: “Except as stated in Section 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.” The exception in section 698 is not pertinent.

Since the portions of the complaint relating to alleged interference with appellant’s contractual rights and relationships were sufficient to raise the issue of respondents ’ liability for the acts complained of, it must follow that some cause of action was pleaded and the cause should therefore go to trial upon the merits of that issue.

The judgment is reversed.

Sturtevant, J., and Spence, J., concurred.