green
Positive treatment
9.9 score
Treatment trajectory · 1937 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1937
1981
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers.
cited
Cited "but see"
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v. United States
But see Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. 2d 405 , 57 P2d. 1323 (1936) ; Trigg v. Industrial Comm., 364 Ill. 581 , 5 N.E. 2d 394 (1936).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
City of Fillmore v. Board of Equalization
(Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ] (Heap); Olive Proration, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 209; Humbert, supra, 214 Cal.App.2d at pp. 8-10; Gutierrez v. Board of Retirement (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 745, 749, fn. 3 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 837 ] (Gutierrez).) In Heap, supra, 6 Cal.2d 405 , a city employee applied to a civil service commission to review his discharge.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bonnell v. Medical Bd. of California
(Olive Proration etc. Com. v. Agri. etc. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 204, 209 [ 109 P.2d 918 ]; Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407-408 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ].) Section 11521(a) was enacted in 1945 (Stats. 1945, ch. 867, § 1, p. 1634) and amended in 1953 to add the final segment of the second sentence, which provides for a stay of “not to exceed 30 days which the agency may grant for the purpose of filing an application for reconsideration” (Stats. 1953, ch. 964, § 1, p. 2340).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gutierrez v. Board of Retirement
(Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [57 P.2d 1323]; Olive Proration etc. Com. v. Agri. etc. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 204, 209 [ 109 P.2d 918 ].) 4 We summarily reject Mrs. Gutierrez’s contention that she should be permitted to apply for survivor’s benefits under the authority of section 31787 (which provides an annual death allowance for the survivors of nonretired members).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Career Serv. Rev. Bd. v. UTAH DEPT. OF CORR.
As pointed out in Heap v. Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405 , 57 P.2d 1323, 1324 (1936), if a commission can reopen a final order and make a new order, how many times can the commission do so, and within what time limits?
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections
As pointed out in Heap v. Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405 , 57 P.2d 1323, 1324 (1936), if a commission can reopen a final order and make a new order, how many times can the commission do so, and within what time limits?
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Azadigian v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
(Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ]; Chas.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Talmo v. Civil Service Commission
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
(Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ].) There being no express authority for the commission to set aside a final order, an attempt to do so is beyond the commission’s jurisdiction and void.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Ex Parte Baldwin County Com'n
Several of our questions may be found in Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405 , 57 P.2d 1323, 1324 (1936).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Baldwin County Commission v. Alabama Environmental Management Commission
Several of our questions may be found in Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405 , 57 P.2d 1323, 1324 (1936).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Griffis v. County of Mono
(See Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407-408 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ]; 59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 123 (1976); Annot., Power of Administrative Agency to Reopen and Reconsider Final Decision as Affected by Lack of Specific Statutory Authority (1960) 73 A.L.R.2d 939 ; cf. Aylward v. State Board etc. Examiners (1948) 31 Cal.2d 833, 838-839 [ 192 P.2d 929 ].) 17 Section 66452.6, subdivision (e) also provides in pertinent part, “If the advisory agency denies a subdivider’s application for extension, the subdivider may appeal to the legislative body within 15 days after the advisory agency has…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chavez v. Civil Service Commission
(Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ]; Cook v. Civil Service Commission (1911) 160 Cal. 598, 600 [ 117 P. 662 ]; Wheeler v. City of Santa Ana (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 811, 816 [ 185 P.2d 373 ].) The rules promulgated by the Commission, within the scope of their application, have the force and dignity of law, provided they are within the authority contemplated by the Charter.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. City and County of San Francisco
(McGinn v. Board of Health (1931) 113 Cal.App. 228, 231 [ 298 P.2d 118 ]; Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405,407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ]; Hoerthorn v. Sullivan (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 151 [ 153 P.2d 367 ]; Humbert v. Castro Valley County Fire Protection Dist. (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 1, 8-10 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 158 ].) Nor may we, unless the commission did not act within its jurisdiction and within the powers conferred upon it (Aylward v. State Board etc. Examiners (1948) 31 Cal.2d 833, 839 [ 192 P.2d 929 ]) or unless the hearing provided in the first instance by the discharging officer was unfair …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chas. L. Harney, Inc. v. State of California
(Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ]; Olive Proration etc. Committee v. Agricultural Prorate Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 204 [ 109 P.2d 918 ]; see generally 73 A.L.R.2d 939 .) In Heap it was held that a civil service commission had no power to vacate its order discharging an employee made pursuant to a charter provision specifying such an order as “final and conclusive.” In the absence of an express grant of power the commission possessed no inherent *98 power to entertain a motion for new trial nr rehearing or to. review or set aside its order; ■' Stating that the…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DeWitt v. Board of Supervisors
(Olive Proration etc. Com. v. Agricultural etc. Com., 17 Cal.2d 204, 209 [ 109 P.2d 918 ]; Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ] ; Vernon v. Board of Supervisors, 142 Cal. 513, 516 [ 76 P. 253 ] ; Williams v. Bergin, 108 Cal. 166, 170 [ 41 P. 287 ] ; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 166 Cal.App.2d 519, 531 [ 333 P.2d 378 ].) The Board admits the existence and validity of this rule, but contends that it is inapplicable here because its action under section 1793 of the Education Code was not quasi judicial but administrative in nature.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Board of Supervisors
(Williams v. Bergin, 108 Cal. 166 at 170 [ 41 P. 287 ]; see also Olive Proration etc. Committee v. Agricultural etc. Com., 17 Cal.2d 204 at 209 [ 109 P.2d 918 ]; Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405 at 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ]; Vernon v. Board of Supervisors, 142 Cal. 513 at 516 [ 76 P. 253 ].) The only judicial power conferred upon the board which it might exercise after the completion of the annexation was the power to act upon a petition to withdraw property from the district and if it found as a fact that the territory sought to be withdrawn would not benefit by remaining in the district …
discussed
Cited "see"
Bichsel v. Carver
(2×)
Accord, Heap v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405 , 57 P.2d 1323 ; City of Fort Wayne v. Bishop, 228 Ind. 304 , 92 N.E.2d 544 .
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hunt v. County of Shasta
(2×)
No act of the board shall be valid or binding unless a majority of all the members concur therein.” 7 See footnote 1, ante. 8 Although the two-to-one vote is final for purposes of judicial review, it is not binding on the merits of the controversy and does not preclude the Board from considering new applications for certificates of compliance for the same parcels. (§ 25005 [no act of a board of supervisors is binding unless a majority of all the members concur therein]; see also Heap v. City of Los Angeles (1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407 [ 57 P.2d 1323 ] [a “final and conclusive” decision on t…
GEORGE A. HEAP, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES (A Municipal Corporation) Et Al., Respondents
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES (A Municipal Corporation) Et Al., Respondents
L. A. 15470.
California Supreme Court.
May 21, 1936.
Leo V. Youngworth and J. Harold Decker for Appellant., Bay L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader, Assistant City Attorney, and Thatcher J. Kemp and Jerrell Babb, Deputies City Attorney, for Respondents.
Cited by 37 opinions | Published
THE COURT.
A hearing was granted in this case after decision by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One. After further consideration, we adopt the following opinion of said court as part of the opinion of this court:
“Respondents’ demurrer to appellant’s petition for a writ of mandate was sustained without leave to amend, and the appeal is from the judgment subsequently entered against petitioner. The petition alleges that the appellant, a civil service employee in the bureau of engineering of respondent city, was discharged from his position, and that he thereupon made written application to the civil service commission for an investigation of the grounds for such discharge and hearing thereon. A certified copy of the findings of the commission, the statutory name of which is ‘Board of Civil Service Commissioners’, is made a part of the petition. This shows that on November 13, 1931, ‘a motion was adopted rescinding the action of the Civil Service Commission on October 20, 1931, sustaining said discharge’, and that a second motion was then adopted, finding that the grounds stated for the discharge of the appellant were not sustained and ordering him restored to duty. The only question presented on this appeal is whether or not the civil service commission, after having passed upon the question submitted to it, could thereafter vacate its findings and make another and contrary order. Respondent contends that when the commission acted on the matter it exhausted its jurisdiction, and that the subsequent resolution is void.
“The charter of the respondent city provides that a discharged employee may file an application with the board of civil service commissioners for an investigation of the grounds for his discharge. It further provides: ‘If after such investigation said board finds, in writing, that the grounds stated for such removal, discharge or suspension were insufficient or were not sustained, and also finds in writing that the person[*407] removed, discharged or suspended is a fit and suitable person to fill the position from which he was removed, discharged or suspended, said board shall order said person . . to be reinstated or restored to duty. The order of said board with respect to such removal, discharge or suspension shall be forthwith certified to the appointing board or officer, and shall be final and conclusive; . . . ’ (Sec. 112 [a], Stats. 1925, pp. 1024, 1067.)
1 ‘ The jurisdiction of the commission is a special and limited one. (Peterson v. Civil Service Board, 67 Cal. App. 70 [227 Pac. 238].) The required procedure was followed, and the question of appellant's discharge was determined by the commission when it adopted'the first resolution. Its action sustaining his discharge was ‘final and conclusive’. (Krohn v. Board of Water & Power Commissioners, 95 Cal. App. 289, 296 [272 Pac. 757].) It had no jurisdiction to retry the question and make a different finding at a later time. The charter gives no such grant of power, and it may not be implied. ‘A civil service commission has no inherent power after entering a final order dismissing an officer from the service to entertain a motion for new trial or rehearing and review and set aside its prior order.’ (43 Cor. Jur. 682. See, also, Cook v. Civil Service Commission, 160 Cal. 598, 600 [117 Pac. 662].)”
Petitioner urges that the case of Lane v. United States, 241 U. S. 201 [36 Sup. Ct. 599, 60 L. Ed. 956], sustains his position. It was therein held that the secretary of the interior had power to reconsider a prior administrative order as to which persons were heirs of an Indian allottee of land, despite the fact that his order was, under the statute, “final and conclusive”. A reading of the opinion, however, discloses that at the time the redetermination was made, title to the land was still in the United States and under the administrative control of the land department. There were undoubtedly several grounds, both of policy and statutory interpretation, for holding that in such a case a high executive officer had power to reconsider his orders.
But the rule stated above, that a civil service commission has no such power in the absence of express authorization, is sound and practical. If the power were admitted, what procedure would govern its exercise? Within what time would it have to be exercised; how many times could it be[*408] exercised ? Could a subsequent commission reopen and reconsider an order of a prior commission ? And if the commission could reconsider an order sustaining a discharge, could it reconsider an order having the opposite effect, thus retroactively holding a person unfit for his position? These and many other possible questions which might be raised demonstrate how unsafe and impracticable would be the view that a commission might upset its final orders at its pleasure, without limitations of time, or methods of procedure. Seemingly in recognition of this, the Los Angeles charter expressly provides a procedure for reconsidering orders of suspension or removal of policemen or firemen by a board of inquiry, within, three years after the making of an order; but no such procedure is provided in the case of the civil service commission.
Petitioner finally suggests that the petition does not affirmatively allege a prior order of the commission of October 20, 1931, certified to the board of public works, and that therefore it was improper to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. There is no merit in this point, for the exhibit to the petition, which is the order of November 17th, expressly refers to the prior action of October 20, 1931, and purports to rescind it. The fact of a prior order is thus definitely established, and the demurrer was properly sustained.
The judgment is affirmed.