In re Wright, 422 P.2d 998 (Cal. 1967). · Go Syfert
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In re Wright, 422 P.2d 998 (Cal. 1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
534 citation events (54 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Vargas CA4/1 (calctapp, 2024-09-12) · Strongest negative: People v. Umana (calctapp, 2006-04-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1967 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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examined Cited "but see" People v. Umana (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: but see · confidence high
Thus, in Beggs , the court concluded, “the threats made by defendant to prosecute [the employee] therefor unless he paid the value of said goods . . . constitutes the crime of extortion.” (Beggs, supra, at p. 84 , italics added; but see People v. Anderson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 365, 374-375 [ 242 P. 906 ] [finding insufficient evidence to support a conviction for extortion where criminal charges had already been filed against the victims], disapproved on other grounds in In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650 , 654 & fn. 3 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) Because extortion is a specific intent…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Vargas CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
That is a determination for the trial court to make in the first instance.13 But we do conclude remand is warranted to afford the trial court an opportunity to consider the rule and arrive at its own conclusion as to whether one of the sentences should be stayed. irrelevant to the question of whether multiple current convictions are sentenced concurrently or consecutively. [T]he question of whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive is separate from the question of whether section 654 prohibits multiple punishment.”]; cf. In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655 [“multiple sentenc…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Thomas CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Porter, in contrast, seems to suggest that the timing of the defendant’s intent is critical.” (Smith, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198 , fn. omitted.) 33. supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 630–631; People v. Barrios, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 177–178; Smith, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1194–1195; Porter, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 36– 37), or because the crimes committed against multiple victims resulted in multiple convictions for the same offense (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 519 ; People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d at pp. 177–178). “‘The multiple victim exception, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Alford
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
(See In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ] (Wright); People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 434 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 ].) For this reason, the imposition of concurrent terms is treated as an implied finding that the defendant bore multiple intents or objectives, that is, as a rejection of the applicability of section 654.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Centers
Cal. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Apparently the trial court felt Penal Code section 654 applied (or might apply) to these charges; however, rather than stay execution of the sentences on them (see generally, In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]), it thought the “safest way” was to dismiss them.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Morante
Cal. · 1999 · confidence medium
(People v. Harper (1945) 25 Cal. 2d 862, 871 [ 156 P.2d 249 ]; People v. Benenato (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 356 [ 175 P.2d 296 ], disapproved on another ground in In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-666 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Stoddard (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 86, 89 [ 119 P.2d 160 ].) Thus, “[i]t is not necessary that a party to a conspiracy shall be present and personally participate with his co-conspirators in all or in any of the overt acts.” (People v. Benenato, supra, 77 Cal.App.2d at p. 356 .) It is well established that one may become criminally liable for pos…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Deloza (2×)
Cal. · 1998 · confidence medium
(In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ] [trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences for two convictions for which section 654 prohibited multiple punishment].) Section 654 does not, however, preclude multiple punishment when the defendant’s violent act injures different victims.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Meagan R.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
(See People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 806-807 [ 197 P.2d 734 ]; Matter of Application of Kantrowitz (1914) 24 Cal.App. 203 [ 140 P. 1078 ] [while husband was not legally capable of raping his own wife, he was liable as an aider and abettor]; People v. Anderson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 365 [ 242 P. 906 ], disapproved on other grounds in In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ] [person was not an executive officer found guilty of aiding and abetting offense that defined perpetrators as executive officers]; People v. Fronk (1927) 82 Cal.App. 465, 468-469 [ 25…
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Douglas
Cal. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
(See In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [56 Cal.Rptr, 110, 422 P.2d 998 ].) E.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rush
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
It does not prohibit double convictions. ( People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820, 823 [ 248 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 755 P.2d 294 ]; People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d 351, 359 ; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 653 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 762 [ 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Tideman, supra, 57 Cal.2d 574, 586 ; People v. Smith, supra, 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 .) This "distinction between multiple convictions and multiple punishments has often been blurred." ( People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal. App.3d 942, 946 [ 286 Cal. Rptr. 13 ].) A…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rush
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
(People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820, 823 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 755 P.2d 294 ]; People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d 351, 359 ; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 653 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 762 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; People v. Tideman, supra, 57 Cal.2d 574, 586 ; People v. Smith, supra, 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 .) This “distinction between multiple convictions and multiple punishments has often been blurred.” (People v. Watterson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 946 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 13 ].) As Justice Mosk observed: “This court has l…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Clark (2×)
Cal. · 1990 · confidence medium
Accordingly, section 654 mandates that execution of the term imposed for arson be stayed pending not only service of the term imposed for the murder, but also the terms for attempted murder. ( People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639-640 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 681 , 504 P.2d 905 ]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 653-656 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) Because the commission of arson is an act of violence that is likely to cause harm to more than one person, however, section 654 does not prohibit punishment for each of the attempted murders and the murder. ( Neal v. State of California (1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Davis
Cal. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
(People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 888 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ]; People v. Diaz (1967) 66 Cal.2d 801, 807 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 427 P.2d 505 ]; In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.2d 685, 688-689 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 561 , 427 P.2d 161 ]; In re Pratt (1967) 66 Cal.2d 154, 156-157 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 895 , 424 P.2d 335 ], vacated on another ground by In re Pratt (1971) 5 Cal.3d 46 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 11 , 484 P.2d 1355 ]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Cole (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 41, 53 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 242 ]; People v. Flowers (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 5…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Siko (2×)
Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
(Id., at pp. 359-361; People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 762-763 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) Thus if a person rapes a 13-year-old, he can be convicted of both rape and lewd conduct with a child on the basis of that single act, but he cannot be punished for both offenses; execution of the sentence for one of the offenses must be stayed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Masters (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
At page 886 in Millerthe Supreme Court pointedly observed that “the victim of the robbery as alleged, proved and found to be true was John Keating” and that the “burglary [as] alleged [under sections 459 and 461], proved and found to be true is a crime of violence committed against Burk.” (See also In re Ford (1967) 66 Cal.2d 183, 184 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 424 P.2d 681 ] [section 654’s prohibition against dual punishment did not apply “because the People alleged and proved and the jury found that he kidnaped victims A, B, and C for the purpose of robbery (count I) as well as robbing…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., §§ 1203, 1203.1, 1203.2, 1203.3; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 433, 435.) While at one time the terms may have been used indiscriminately (see, e.g., In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655, fn. 4 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]), they have developed into terms of art.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Superior Court
Cal. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., §§ 1203, 1203.1, 1203.2, 1203.3; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 433, 435.) While at one time the terms may have been used indiscriminately (see, e.g., In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655, fn. 4 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]), they have developed into terms of art.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Thomas
Cal. · 1986 · confidence medium
The defect in the pleading, however, is one of uncertainty only, and is waived by defendant’s failure to demur. (§ 1012; see People v. Ellenwood (1897) 119 Cal. 166, 168 [ 51 P. 553 ]; People v. Guernsey (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 463, 466 [ 180 P.2d 27 ]; People v. Benenato (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 363 [ 175 P.2d 296 ] [disapproved on other grounds in In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655 ( 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 )]; People v. Burness (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 214, 218 [ 127 P.2d 623 ].) Two examples will illustrate this point.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Burns
Cal. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
(Id., at pp. 636-637.) In formulating this rule, the Adams court relied on In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 657 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ], in which the court stated that “the appropriate procedure at the appellate level [in remedying section 654 error] is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone is concerned.” (Id., at p. 656.) Wright , in turn, relied on People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473 , 376 P.2d 449 ], In McFarland , the Supreme Court made it clear that since section 654 proscribes …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Burns
Cal. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
In re Adams was apparently the first case to outline the specific remedy of staying the punishment for the lower term such stay to become permanent when the sentence imposed for the greater offense is complete. ( Id., at pp. 636-637.) In formulating this rule, the Adams court relied on In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 657 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ], in which the court stated that "the appropriate procedure at the appellate level [in remedying section 654 error] is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone is concerne…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Billy M.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Although unstayed and concurrent sentencing under these circumstances involves multiple punishment because the defendant is subjected to the term of both sentences even though served simultaneously (People v. Miller, supra, 18 Cal.3d 873, 887 ), this treatment has not been shown to affect the duration of the juvenile’s confinement. 2 Unlike In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ], where the Supreme Court held imposition of concurrent adult sentences may potentially result in “detrimental operation of other statutes that govern punishment” (see Wright, s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Masten
Cal. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
(In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Isenor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 336 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 746 ].) The purpose of that section is to prevent harassment of a defendant by cumulative sentencing not commensurate to actual culpability.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ratcliffe
Cal. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
(People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 886 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ]; People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639-640 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 504 P.2d 905 ]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) In the instant case appellant’s contention regarding the applicability of Penal Code section 654 was considered by the lower court just before appellant was resentenced.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ratcliffe
Cal. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Appellant was approximately 27 years old. [4] Technically, under Penal Code section 654 the imposition of sentence upon offenses that fall within the provisions of section 654 is correct, but the execution of the sentence on the offense which carries a less severe punishment, must be stayed with the stay becoming permanent upon the completion of the sentence on the offense which carries the more severe punishment. ( People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 886 [ 135 Cal. Rptr. 654 , 558 P.2d 552 ]; People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639-640 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 681 , 504 P.2d 905 ]; In re Wright …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Jones
Cal. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Ordinarily, multiple sentences imposed in contravention of section 654 impose punishment beyond the power of the court (In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Isenor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 336 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 746 ].) However, the protection afforded by that section is. to prevent harrassment of a defendant by cumulative sentencing not commensurate to actual culpability.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Spangler
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
(In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].)
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Murphy
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
(See People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) In People v. Murphy (Apr. 16, 1979) 4 Crim. 8798 (unpub. opn.), we struck the great bodily injury finding in count six (People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 587 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 ]), and remanded to the trial court for resentencing on count two.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Martinez
Cal. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Cal.Rptr. 11]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655, fn. 4 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) III The question of entitlement to good time/work time credits has now been decided by the Supreme Court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Montano
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
(In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 655-656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ], fn. 4; People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ]; People v. Cooper, 256 Cal.App.2d 500, 502 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 282 ].)” People v. Johnson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 380 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 476 ], in a comparable fact situation, reached a contrary result.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gardner
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
(See In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655-656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) 8 The judgment as to defendant Gardner is reversed as to counts II, III and IV with directions to the trial court to strike such convictions and *51 dismiss same and to rearraign said defendant for resentencing on count I, the remaining valid felony conviction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Guevara
Cal. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
(In re Ford, 66 Cal.2d *91 183 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 424 P.2d 681 ]; In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Johnson, 38 Cal.App.3d 1, 9 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 834 ].) While the crime of simple escape is not a crime of violence, yet the same rationale that authorizes separate punishment for separate crimes of violence upholds the multiple sentence where a nonviolent offense is committed, completed and followed by a violent offense against a different victim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Miller (2×)
Cal. · 1977 · confidence medium
The divisibility of a course of conduct depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than one." ( People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 376 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 357 , 461 P.2d 637 , 37 A.L.R.3d 1398 ].) In People v. Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d 625 , we stated that section 654 is applicable to "limit punishment for multiple convictions arising out of either an act or omission or a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time in those instances wherein the accused entertai…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1976 · confidence medium
(See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.3d 113, 123 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 , 528 P.2d 1148 ]; People v. Benenato, 77 Cal. App.2d 350, 360-361 [ 175 P.2d 296 ] [disapproved on other grounds in In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655 ( 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 )].) Consequently, the expert's testimony concerning defects in the towmotor must be considered in determining whether plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to overcome the motion for nonsuit. (4a) Kreiner's testimony concerning the defects made out a prima facie case on that element of plaintiff's cause of action and defendan…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Kelso
Cal. Ct. App. · 1976 · confidence medium
The sentencing of Kelso and Evans on count III must be set aside, (In re McGrew (1967) 66 Cal.2d 685, 688-689 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 561 , 427 P.2d 161 ]; In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]) since, otherwise, there is a violation of Penal Code section 654 regarding the kidnaping and murder of O’Hara.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Kubler
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
“If the evidence supports the verdict [or conviction] as to a greater offense, the *807 conviction of that offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed.” (People v. Moran, 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 411 , 463 P.2d 763 ].) The error is not tempered by the fact that the sentences ran concurrently with each other; such sentences, when improper, are reasonably calculated to place the defendant at a disadvantage “when the Adult Authority considers] the fixing of his term and parole date.” (In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 653 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Witt
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
(People v. Kynette (1940) 15 Cal.2d 731, 759 [ 104 P.2d 794 ] (cert. den., 312 U.S. 703 [ 85 L.Ed. 1136 , 61 S.Ct. 806 ]; overruled on other grounds in People v. Snyder (1958) 50 Cal.2d 190, 197 [ 324 P.2d 1 ]; disapproved on other grounds in People v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, 301 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 516 , 524 P.2d 1300 ] and In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-653 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]); Feagles v. Superior Court (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 735, 738 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 197 ]; People v. Cancimilla (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 242, 252 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 498 ].) The additional overt act, alleging in su…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Adams
Cal. · 1975 · confidence medium
Although each conviction may be allowed to stand, for section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, not multiple convictions ( People v. Tideman, 57 Cal.2d 574, 586-587 [ 21 Cal. Rptr. 207 , 370 P.2d 1007 ]), the section's proscription extends to include both concurrent and consecutive sentences, since even concurrent sentences may work a disadvantage to petitioner in the fixing of his term and parole date by the Adult Authority. ( In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-654 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) The proper procedure for remedying a violation of section 654 is to "eliminate the effect o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Adams
Cal. · 1975 · confidence medium
(In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 652-654 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) The proper procedure for remedying a violation of section 654 is to “eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone is concerned.” (Id., p. 656.) In the case before us, each of the transportation counts, as well as the sale count, carries a term of five years to life imprisonment, with a minimum of three years to be served in prison without parole.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Guerrero
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
(See In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 655-656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].)
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Taylor
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
The likely purpose of the trial court’s action was to follow the procedure approved in People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749 . 755-756 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ] (see In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 655-656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]), but such action was at best unnecessary, since in view of the existence of separate victims, state prison sentences on all counts, whether concurrent or consecutive, would not have violated Penal Code section 654.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Lowe
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
(Neal v. State of California, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20-21 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ]; In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) That result is accomplished in the trial court by staying execution of the sentence on the lesser crime with the stay to become permanent when the judgment on the greater offense is satisfied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ault v. International Harvester Co. (2×)
Cal. · 1974 · confidence medium
(People v. Benenato (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 360-361 [ 175 P.2d 296 ], disapproved on other grounds in In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ].) Defendant asserts that it deliberately failed to make the motion because the evidence of Beckett’s opinion was too prejudicial to be corrected by a motion to strike and an admonition to the jury would have served only to recall the testimony to the jury’s mind.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Allen
Cal. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
The People, citing In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 655 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; 6 People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756 [39 CalRptr. 11], argue that since the sentences were stayed, defendant was not subjected to double punishment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Mitten
Cal. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
Penal Code section 792 provides: “The jurisdiction of a criminal action against a principal in the commission of a public offense, when such principal is not present at the commission of the offense is in the same court it would be under this code if he were so present and aiding and abetting therein.” (And see People v. Benenato, 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 364-365 [ 175 P.2d 296 ] [disapproved on unrelated ground, In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 654-655, fn. 3 ( 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 )]; People v. Descant, 51 Cal.App.2d 343, 347-348 [ 124 P.2d 864 ]; People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal.App.2d 748…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Schueren (2×)
Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
Should a defendant be convicted on both counts thus separately pleaded Penal Code section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act, and normally in order to prevent multiple punishment the lesser penalty is stayed in the manner set forth in People v. Niles, 227 Cal. App.2d 749, 754-756 [ 39 Cal. Rptr. 11 ] (see also In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 655-656, fn. 4 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]). (7) Under Penal Code section 1260 this court may "reduce ... the punishment imposed." Although no authority has been found construing the section to permit us to reduce the penalty outside …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Milan
Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
(See People v. Beamon, supra . ) (10) The attempted murder of Robert and the robbery of Lester constituted crimes of violence against persons other than Burney and therefore are proper subjects of separate sentences. ( In re Ford, 66 Cal.2d 183, 184 [ 57 Cal. Rptr. 129 , 424 P.2d 681 ]; In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal. Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671, 678 [ 47 Cal. Rptr. 796 , 408 P.2d 124 ]; Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 ; see People v. Bauer, 1 Cal.3d 368, 377-378 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 357 , 461 P.2d 637 , 37 A.L.R.3d 1398 ].) Conclusion…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Milan
Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
(In re Ford, 66 Cal.2d 183, 184 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 424 P.2d 681 ]; In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ]; People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671, 678 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 408 P.2d 124 ]; Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 ; see People v. Bauer, 1 Cal.3d 368, 377-378 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 357 , 461 P.2d 637 , 37 A.L.R.3d 1398 ].) Conclusion The judgment is modified to provide a punishment of life imprisonment on the murder count.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Beamon (2×)
Cal. · 1973 · confidence medium
(See In re Wright, supra, 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 ; People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 763 .) The judgment is modified (1) by fixing the degree of the robbery as in the second degree; (2) by striking therefrom the finding “that the victim was subjected by defendant to bodily harm as charged in Count 2”; (3) by striking the finding that “the Court fixed the penalty at life imprisonment without possibility of parole” and substituting therefore a finding that “the Court fixed the penalty at life imprisonment”; (4) by striking that portion of the judgment in its entirety wherein the…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Guerin
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
(In re Ford, 66 Cal.2d 183 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 424 P.2d 681 ] [kidnaping for purposes of robbery and robbery]; In re Wright, 65 Cal.2d 650, 656 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ] [robbery and kidnaping]; People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671, 678 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 408 P.2d 124 ] [robbery and assault]; Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 21 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ] [attempted murder of two victims]; People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d 175, 189 [ 217 P.2d 1 ] [two kidnapings]; People v. Brannon, 7, 0 Cal.App. 225 , 235 [ 233 P. 88 ] [murder and assault with a deadly weapon…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Preston
Cal. Ct. App. · 1971 · confidence medium
Jefferson, Acting P. J., and Dunn, J., concurred. 1 We point out that, subsequent to Curtis , the Supreme Court indicated in In re Wright (1967) 65 Cal.2d 650, 655, fn. 4 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 422 P.2d 998 ], that the preferred procedure in such a situation is that approved in People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 ].
In re WILFORD WRIGHT, on Habeas Corpus
Crim. No. 10409.
California Supreme Court.
Jan 31, 1967.
422 P.2d 998
Wilford Wright and Irving Jackson, in pro. per., and Arthur D. Dempsey, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioners., Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Gloria F. DeHart and Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents.
Traynor.
Cited by 167 opinions  |  Published
. TRAYNOR, C. J.

Petitioners were convicted of kidnaping Linn Bayliss for the purpose of robbery, first degree, robbery of Bayliss,. and first degree robbery of Joseph Brody A The superior court imposed concurrent sentences. Petitioner Wright appealed, and the judgment against him was affirmed.. (People v. Wright (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 866 [31 Cal.Rptr. 432].)

Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the convictions rest upon evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure incident to an unlawful arrest. The writ is not available to attack a final judgment on this ground. (In re Lessard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 497, 503 [42 Cal.Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39]; In re Sterling (1965) 63 Cal.2d 486, 487 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205,407 P.2d5].)

The opinion on Wright’s appeal (216 Cal.App.2d 866) reveals, however, that the kidnaping of Bayliss was part of an, indivisible course of conduct directed to the objective of robbing him. The Attorney General concedes that under Penal Code section 654[1] petitioners cannot be punished for both the kidnaping and the robbery of Bayliss (In re Ward (1966) 64 Cal.2d 672, 677 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400]; In re Ponce (1966) ante, pp. 341, 342-343 [54 Cal.Rptr. 752, 420 P.2d 224]) but contends that the concurrent sentences for those offenses do not inflict double punishment forbidden by section 654. In support of this contention the Attorney General invokes People v. Kynette (1940) 15 Cal.2d 731, 762 [104 P.2d 794], in which this court, in answer to the contention that consecutive sentences based on one act violated section 654, modified the judgment to make the sentences concurrent.

The rule that concurrent sentences for crimes based on one act or indivisible transaction do not constitute multiple punishment (People v. Kynette, supra, 15 Cal.2d at p. 762; People v. Sigel (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 279, 285 [130 P.2d 763]) has been rejected by many decisions, commencing as early as People v. Craig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 458 [110 P.2d 403], that modify judgments or reverse them in part to remove the effect of such concurrent sentences. (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 189 [217 P.2d 1] ; People v, Logan (1953) 41 Cal.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 20]; other such[*653] decisions are cited later herein and in Deering’s and West’s Annotations to Penal Code section 654.) People v. Quinn (1964) 61 Cal.2d 551, 555 [39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705], explicitly declares that such sentences constitute double punishment. Any effect of Kynette and Sigel as authority to the contrary must therefore be deemed to have been dissipated. (See People v. Niles (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 756 [39 Cal.Rptr. 11].)

Many eases have held that correction of judgments imposing concurrent sentences in violation of section 654 was necessary to preclude the possibility that the multiple senténces would work a disadvantage to the defendant when the Adult Authority considered the fixing of his term and parole date. (E.g., People v. Craig, supra, 17 Cal.2d 453, 458; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 321]; People v. Nor Woods (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584, 586 [233 P.2d 897]; People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577, 593 [320 P.2d 5]; In re Ponce, supra, ante, pp. 341, 342-343; In re Henry (1966) ante, pp. 330, 331-332 [54 Cal.Rptr. 633, 420 P.2d 97] ; People v. Branch (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 490, 496 [260 P.2d 27] ; People v. Hawkins (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 832, 839 [17 Cal.Rptr. 66]; Adams v. Heinze (1962) 205 Cal.App. 2d 53, 55 [22 Cal.Rptr. 814].) The Attorney General contends that this concern with possible prejudice is unnecessary in a ease such as the one before us because of the Adult Authority’s policy of basing terms and parole dates not on the number of concurrent sentences the prisoner is serving but on the total circumstances of the offense and the offender, including the possibility of his rehabilitation. (See Comments of Mr. Fred R. Dickson, Chairman, Adult Authority, First Sentencing Institute for Superior Court Judges (1965) 45 Cal.Rptr. Appendix 99, 101-102, 114-115; People v. Denne (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 499, 507 [297 P.2d 451] ; People v. Logan (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 795, 798 [53 Cal.Rptr. 549].) The argument that violation of the proscription against double punishment may not .prejudice a defendant in a particular case, however, is not a convincing ground for overruling scores of cases holding that the dual sentences should not be allowed to stand.

Section 654 forbids multiple punishment by imposition of the proscribed multiple sentences, but not multiple convictions. (People v. Tideman, (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 586 [21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007]; People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 762 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449].) Whether[*654] the erroneously sentenced defendant actually suffers excessive punishment cannot be the factor that determines whether the section is applicable. In some situations concurrent sentences violating section 654 would result in detrimental operation of other statutes that govern punishment.[2] In other situations, particularly misdemeanor convictions, section 654 is applied although considerations of possible disadvantage to the defendant from the operation of erroneous concurrent sentences cannot be predicted. (See People v. Vargas (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863 [3 Cal.Rptr. 925]; People v. Williams (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d Supp. 912, 919 [24 Cal.Rptr. 922].) Only in cases of improper multiple sentences for felonies that include a valid sentence of death can it be said that no useful purpose would be served by modifying the judgment. (People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166, 193 [238 P.2d 1001]; People v. Smith (1950) 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 [224 P.2d 719]; People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 409 [326 P.2d 457] ; People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal.2d 425, 435 [341 P.2d 303]; People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467, 496 [341 P.2d 679].)

The eases cited in the margin,[3] however, suggest or hold that concurrent sentences violating section 654 can be[*655] upheld as working no prejudice. Those suggestions and holdings are disapproved as inconsistent with our decisions that multiple sentences forbidden by section 654, whether consecutive or concurrent, impose excessive punishment beyond the power of the sentencing court and can be corrected on habeas corpus. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839]; In re Cruz (1966) 64 Cal.2d 178,181 [49 Cal.Rptr. 289, 410 P.2d 825]; In re Ward, supra, 64 Cal.2d 672; In re Romano (1966) 64 Cal.2d 826 [51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798]; In re Ponce, supra, ante, p. 341; In re Henry, supra, ante, p. 330.)

The Attorney General further states that our decisions are in conflict as to the proper procedure to be followed by appellate courts to correct multiple sentences violative of section 654. He urges that if we refuse to uphold the sentences here on either ground advanced by him (that concurrent sentences do not inflict double punishment or that they are not prejudicial) then we should suspend execution of one sentence by a procedure similar to that of the sentencing court approved in People v. Niles, supra, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 755-756.[4]

[*656] Since People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 763, however, it has been settled that the appropriate procedure at the appellate level is to eliminate the effect of the judgment as to the less severely punishable offense insofar as penalty alone is concerned.[5]

Of the two sentences imposed on each petitioner for the one course of criminal conduct against Bayliss, that for the robbery should be eliminated because it is less severe than that for the kidnaping. The robbery of Brody, although committed in the course of the same criminal enterprise, was an offense against a person other than the victim of the kidnaping and therefore is a proper subject of a separate sentence. (Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 People v. Ridley (1965) 3 Cal.2d 671, 678 [47 Cal.Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124].)

[*657] As to each petitioner the sentence for robbery of Bayliss is set aside. Petitioners are not entitled to release since they are held under other valid judgments of conviction. The order to show cause is therefore discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Schauer, J.,* and Peek J.,* concurred.

1

Penal Code, section 654: “An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be pimished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished' under more than one, ’’

2

For example, erroneous concurrent sentences for first degree robbery, with a minimum term of five years and a maximum of life (Pen. Code, §§ 213, 671), and for burglary with explosives, with a minimum term of 10 years and a maximum of 40 years (Pen. Code, § 464), would prejudice defendant by requiring him to serve the longer minimum term for the burglary and also permitting the Authority to exact service of the longer maximum term for the robbery.

Under the habitual criminal statute (Pen. Code, i 644) defendant would be prejudiced by erroneous concurrent sentences for an offense subject to a lesser penalty but available to support a determination of habitual criminality (e.g., grand theft, with a maximum of 10 years [Pen. Code, § 489]) and an offense subject to a greater penalty but not listed in the habitual criminal statute (e.g., issuing a cheek without sufficient funds, with a maximum term of 14 years [Pen. Code, § 476a] ).

Erroneous concurrent sentences for petty theft, with a maximum term of six months in jail (Pen. Code, § 490), and issuing a cheek not exceeding $100 without sufficient funds, with a maximum term of one year in jail (Pen. Code, §476a), would be detrimental to a defendant who suffered a subsequent conviction because he would be subject to the increased minimum punishments provided by Penal Code section 666 for one who has been previously convicted of petty theft and “served a term therefor in any penal institution. ’ ’

3

People v. Anderson (1925) 75 Cal.App. 365, 371 [242 P. 906] ; People v. Pearson (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 614, 618 [107 P.2d 463]; People v. Dallas (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 596, 604 [109 P.2d 409]; People v. Benenato (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 350, 367 [175 P.2d 296]; People v. McWilliams (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 550, 552 [197 P.2d 216]; People v. Thompson (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 4, 10 [284 P.2d 39].

To the same effect were People v. Bean (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 34, 41[*655] [198 P.2d 379] (disapproved in People v. Kehoe, supra, 33 Cal.2d 711, 715), and People v. Sharp (1922) 58 Cal.App. 637, 639 [209 P. 266] (disapproved in People v. McFarland, supra, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762).

4

Defendant in the Niles ease was convicted of burglary and of a felonious assault committed as an incident to his sole objective of burglary. The trial judge sentenced him on both counts but stayed execution on the assault count pending any appeal and during service of any term fixed by the Adult Authority on the burglary count, the stay to become permanent at the completion of service of any sentence for the burglary. This procedure was upheld by the appellate court. (Accord, People v. Rosenfield (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 60, 62 [52 Cal.Rptr. 101]; People v. Johnson (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 870, 877 [52 Cal.Rptr. 38]; People v. Jenkins (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 928, 934-935[42 Cal.Rptr. 373].) People v. Hernandez (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 351, 358-359, 361-362 [51 Cal. Rptr. 385], questioned the propriety of the procedure in Niles on the ground that the express legislative recognition of the trial court’s power to stay execution in certain situations justifies the inference that the Legislature meant to limit that power to those situations. (In re Collins (1908) 8 Cal.App. 367, 369 [97 P. 188].) The Hernandez opinion (242 Cal.App.2d at pp. 358-359, fn. 1) suggests that the trial court can stay execution of sentence in only two situations, i.e., when probation is granted (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.1, 1203a) and when an appeal is taken (Pen. Code, §§ 1243, 1467). Suspension of execution of sentence is also authorized by statute, however, in the special statutory proceedings for those convicted of crime who may be mentally disordered sex offenders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5500.5, 5501, subd. (a).)

It is true that a number of California eases declare that "A court has no power to suspend a sentence except as an incident to granting probation.” (Oster v. Municipal Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 134, 139 [287 P.2d 755] ; People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 287 [42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391]; see also the other eases cited in the Hernandez opinion; Fricke, Cal. Criminal Procedure (6th ed. 1962) p. 509; 29 Cal.Jur.2d,[*656] Judgments, § 345.) ThoSe cases, however, were concerned with suspension of sentence as an act of lenience. The essence of their reasoning is that since the Legislature has prescribed the method for exercise of such lenience in the probation statutes, the trial court cannot suspend sentence as an act of grace under some inherent or common law power (see Ex parte Slattery (1912) 163 Cal. 176 [124 P. 856]; People v. O’Donnell (1918) 37 Cal.App. 192, 197 [174 P. 102]; In re Collins, supra, 8 Cal. App. .367, 369; but see People v. Patrick (1897) 118 Cal. 332 [50 P. 425]) and that in a probation situation the court’s order suspending its sentence must either be interpreted as a grant of probation, however informal, or if the suspension cannot be so interpreted (as where the court denies probation and nevertheless purports to suspend sentence) then the order of suspension is void and the sentence is valid. (Oster v. Municipal Court, supra, 45 Cal.2d 134, 139.)

Although the Legislature has not expressly provided for a stay of execution of sentence in the Niles situation, the power to proceed as the trial court did in that ease is within the fair import of section 654. As the appellate court there explained (227 Cal.App.2d at p. 756) that procedure reasonably reconciles the policies involved in applying section 654 to protect the rights of both the state and the defendant.

5

Accord: People v. Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 74 [27 Cal.Rptr. 429] ; People v. Frye (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 799, 803 [32 Cal.Rptr. 699] ; People v. Bynes (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 268, 272, 274 [35 Cal.Rptr. 633] ; People v. Rainey (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 93, 102 [36 Cal.Rptr. 291] ; People v. Bailey (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 440, 442, 443 [38 Cal.Rptr. 718] ; People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 707, 715 '[39 Cal.Rptr. 874]; People v. Gay (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 102, 105 [40 Cal.Rptr. 778]; People V. Buice (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 324, 347 [40 Cal.Rptr. 877]; People v. Alvarado (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 789, 795 [42 Cal.Rptr. 310]; In re Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Nelson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [43 Cal.Rptr. 626]; People v. Sipult (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [44 Cal.Rptr. 846]; In re Allen (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 23, 25 [48 Cal.Rptr. 345]; People v. Thomsen (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 84, 97, 98 [48 Cal.Rptr. 455]; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 [50 Cal.Rptr. 215]; People v. Bromley (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Helms (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [51 Cal.Rptr. 484]; People v. Remme (1966.) 243 Cal.App.2d 618, 621 [52 Cal.Rptr. 665].

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.