Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:
(a)Voluntary—upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
(b)Involuntary—in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. This subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle.
(c)Vehicular—
(1)Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 191.5, driving a
vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(2)Driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(3)Driving a vehicle in connection with a violation of paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 550, where the vehicular collision or vehicular accident was knowingly caused for financial gain and proximately resulted in the death of any person. This paragraph does not prevent prosecution of a defendant for
the crime of murder.
(d)This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in the driving of a vehicle punishable that is not a proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner.
(e)(1)“Gross negligence,” as used in this section, does not prohibit or preclude a charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to support a finding of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice, consistent with the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290.
(2)“Gross negligence,” as used in
this section, may include, based on the totality of the circumstances, any of the following:
(A)Participating in a sideshow pursuant to subparagraph (A) of subparagraph (2) of subdivision (i) of Section 23109 of the
Vehicle Code.
(B)Engaging in a motor vehicle speed contest pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 23109 of the Vehicle Code.
(C)Speeding over 100 miles per hour.
(f)(1)For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or heat of passion pursuant to subdivision (a), the provocation was not objectively reasonable if it resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual
relationship. Nothing in this section shall preclude the jury from considering all relevant facts to determine whether the defendant was in fact provoked for purposes of establishing subjective provocation.
(2)For purposes of this subdivision, “gender” includes a person’s gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior regardless of whether that appearance or behavior is associated with the person’s gender as determined at birth.
Notes of Decisions
United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008).
· cites it 29× “CaLPenal Code § 192. The district court found that Gomez was convicted under subsection (c)(3), which defined the crime as Driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, [i.”
People v. Moye, 213 P.3d 652 (Cal. 2009).
· cites it 8× “Defendant's testimony that Urrutia attacked him with a baseball bat, hitting him several times, and that defendant "wasn't, like, in the right state of mind" as he wrested the bat from Urrutia and struck the fatal blows, arguably would have permitted a rational juror to find…”
People v. Christian S., 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994).
· cites it 10× “Code, § 197) and heat of passion or provocation (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), and contended the doctrine of imperfect self-defense negated malice, thereby reducing his offense to voluntary manslaughter.”
People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1981).
· cites it 8× “The fact that the Legislature adopted a vehicular manslaughter statute (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 3), indicates that the Legislature intended that statute to cover these situations.”
People v. Blakeley, 999 P.2d 675 (Cal. 2000).
· cites it 10× “" (Pen. Code, § 192.) It is "[voluntary" when it is perpetrated "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion" ( id.”
People v. Lee, 971 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1999).
· cites it 8× “kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," including killing by specified means, or if it is "committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate," specified felonies. ( Id., § 189.) Murder is "of the second degree" if it is not of the first ( ibid.”
Safeco Ins. of Am. v. Robert S., 28 P.3d 889 (Cal. 2001).
· cites it 6× “A petition alleging Kelly's commission of involuntary manslaughter, a felony (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)), was filed in juvenile court (Welf.”
People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094 (Cal. 1998).
· cites it 4× “In doing so, it instructed on voluntary manslaughter via the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense," but not, in statutory terms, "upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion" (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. (a)). It instructed as well on personal use of a firearm.”
People v. Najera, 2006 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 4× “Najera contends the conviction for second degree murder should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) on several grounds.”
People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1974).
· cites it 6× “Defendant also contends that the court should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter committed in the heat of passion (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 1) and involuntary manslaughter as a nonmalicious homicide committed by a person lacking the mental capacity to form either…”
People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926 (Cal. 1955).
· cites it 9× “without due caution and circumspection. ’ In order to constitute this kind of manslaughter the act may be lawful but it must be one which might produce death, and which does produce death, and it must be committed without due caution and circumspection.”
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(1) — 1 case
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(2) — 3 cases
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(a) — 16 cases
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(b) — 8 cases
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(c) — 3 cases
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(c)(1) — 3 cases
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(c)(2) — 2 cases
— Cal. Penal Code § 192(c)(3) — 5 cases
United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008).
“CaLPenal Code § 192. The district court found that Gomez was convicted under subsection (c)(3), which defined the crime as Driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, [i.”
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