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Unknown, 74 F.3d 91. Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we do not imply that high blood pressure in general can never be a "disability,' as defined by the statute. we hold only that oswalt failed to provide any evidence that his high blood pressure substantially limited a major life activity.”
80 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 39 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Fletcher v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (lamd, 2019-07-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Fletcher v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
M.D. La. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we do not imply that high blood pressure in general can never be a "disability,' as defined by the statute. we hold only that oswalt failed to provide any evidence that his high blood pressure substantially limited a major life activity.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Datar v. National Oilwell Varco, L.P.
Tex. App. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
igh blood pressure alone, without any evidence that it substantially affects one or more major life activities, is insufficient to bring an employee within the protection of the ada.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Carrillo v. National Council of the Churches of the Christ in U.S.A.
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the fmla is not a shield to protect employees from legitimate disciplinary action by their employers if then-performance is lacking in some manner unrelated to their fmla leave.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fletcher v. LA Dept of Trans
5th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
EEOC regulations and caselaw recognized that hypertension, if severe enough, could have qualified as a disability under the original ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2); id. § 1630.2(h)(1) (defining “physical impairment” as a “physiological disorder” affecting, among other vital bodily functions, the “cardiovascular” system); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing whether a hypertensive disability was “substantially limiting,” but not doubting that it could generally qualify as an impairment).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lee v. Government of the District of Columbia
D.D.C. · 2014 · confidence medium
Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clementine Newman v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Memphis Light, Gas, and Water
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
However, it is well settled that an employee’s absence for an illness is not protected under the FMLA unless it constitutes a “serious medical condition.” As that term is defined under the FMLA, a “serious medical condition” renders the employee “unable to perform the functions of his [or her] position.” Austin v. Shelby County Government, 3 S.W. 3d 474, 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996); 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Houston v. Shayn A. Proler
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Waldrip, 325 F.3d at 656 (holding that evidence of temporary effects of pancreatitis did not amount to proof of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305 , 315–18 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding 5 evidence was insufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether plaintiff’s alcoholism was an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity); Foreman v. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., (holding employee’s heart condition with surgically implanted pacemaker did not substantially limit the major life activity of working); Robinson v. …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Houston v. Shayn A. Proler
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Waldrip, 325 F.3d at 656 (holding that evidence of temporary effects of pancreatitis did not amount to proof of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315-18 (5th Cir.1997) (holding evidence was insufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether plaintiffs alcoholism was an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity); Foreman v. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., (holding employee’s heart condition with surgically implanted pacemaker did not substantially limit the major life activity of working); Robinson v. Global Ma…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garner v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co.
S.D. Tex. · 2011 · confidence medium
In the first category, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(D) of the FMLA permits individuals who work for covered employers 5 to take temporary leave, up to twelve weeks during any twelve-month period, for a “serious medical condition” that makes them “unable to perform the functions of [their] position.” A “serious medical condition” requires “either inpatient care in a medical care facility or continuing treatment by a health care provider.” Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996), citing 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (11); McArdle v. Dell Products, L.P., 293 Fed.Appx. 331, 334 (5t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co.
S.D. Tex. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2) (l)-(iii)); Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1050 ; Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 ; Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 ; see also Deas, 152 F.3d at 480 . “ ‘[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.’” Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630 , App., § 1630.2(j)); see Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1051 ; Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Stark County Board of County Commissioners
6th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
E.g., Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Laird v. Chamber of Commerce for New Orleans & the River Region, No. 97-2813, 1998 WL 240401 , at * 1 (E.D.La.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eber v. Harris County Hospital District
S.D. Tex. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2)(i)-(iii)); Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1050 ; Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 ; Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 ; see also Deas, 152 F.3d at 480 . “ ‘[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.’ ” Pryor, 138 F.3d at 1026 (quoting 29 C.F.R. part 1630, App., § 1630.2(j)); see Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1051 ; Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Strass v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. · 2000 · confidence medium
Thus, even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton , in which the Court gave the term “disability” a substantially narrower construction than it had previously been accorded by the EEOC and by eight of nine federal appellate courts, see Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the federal authorities uniformly supported Kaiser’s position that “blood pressure alone, without any evidence that it substantially affects one or more major life activities, is insufficient to bring an employee within the protection of the ADA.” Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. United Parcel Service
S.D. Tex. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that a leg deformity which caused moderate difficulty in walking and a limp resulting in walking at a “significantly slower pace than the average person” were not substantial limitations in the major life activity of walking); Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 , 117 S.Ct. 770 , 136 L.Ed.2d 715 (1997) (hemophilia that excluded plaintiff from his chosen occupational field of firefighter is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of workin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Austin v. Shelby County Government (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tenn. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
As we see it, the determinative issue in this case is whether the record contains evidence to support Austin’s claim that he was entitled to FMLA leave because he suffered from a “serious health condition.” In order to be entitled to FMLA leave based upon this provision, the plaintiff must suffer from a serious health condition which makes him “unable to perform the functions of [his] position.” Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)). *478 In defending an action brought pursuant to the FMLA, therefore, an employer will be entitled t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amos v. Wheelabrator Coal Services, Inc.
N.D. Tex. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Foreman v. The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir.1997) (employee's heart condition with surgically implanted pacemaker did not substantially limit the major life activity of working); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., USA, Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir.1997) (diagnosed “carpal tunnel syndrome” did not substantially limit the major life activity of working); Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1997) (employee’s chronic depressive disorder did not substantially limit the assumed major life activity of "get[ting] along with others”); Robinson v. Global …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. Boehringer Mannheim Corp.
S.D. Ind. · 1998 · confidence medium
Id. at 196; see also Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 , 1318— 19 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that employee under a twenty-pound lifting restriction who also suffered from angina, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease failed to present evidence that the conditions placed a significant restriction on his ability to perform any major life activity); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that employee failed to provide evidence that his high blood pressure or side effects from medication substantially limited, his job).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dupré v. Harris County Hospital District
S.D. Tex. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1050 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630 , App., § 1630.20)); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 ; Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chmielewski v. Xermac, Inc (2×)
Mich. · 1998 · confidence medium
In fact, the EEOC specifically notes that courts must analyze the individual's condition case by case. [15] See Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (C.A.9, 1996), where, even without the consideration of mitigating measures, the plaintiff failed to show that he was substantially limited from any major life activity; Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (C.A.5, 1996), which held that high blood pressure alone does not establish a substantial limitation; Roth v. Lutheran General Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454-1455 (C.A.7, 1995), which held that mitigating measures should not be consid…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.
S.D. Tex. · 1997 · confidence medium
In fact, Plaintiffs claim that her migraine headaches constitute a “disability” for ADA purposes, without a shred of evidence that she was thereby restricted in any major life activity, is ridiculous and absurd in light of Fifth Circuit case law establishing that even serious impairments do not necessarily rise to the level of a “disability.” See, e.g., Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir.1996), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 770 , 136 L.Ed.2d 715 (1997) (hemophilia that excluded plaintiff from his chosen occupational field of firefighter is not a substantial lim…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ingles v. Neiman Marcus Group
S.D. Tex. · 1997 · confidence medium
Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2)); see Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 ; Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerina v. Richardson Automotive, Inc.
N.D. Tex. · 1997 · confidence medium
B Jerina must demonstrate that Michael is a person with a “disability.” See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonsalves v. JF Fredericks Tool Co., Inc.
D. Conn. · 1997 · confidence medium
Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff failed to present evidence that high blood pressure limited any major life activity); Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 1002, 1013 (D.Kan.1996) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKey v. Occidental Chemical Corp.
S.D. Tex. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 770 , — L.Ed.2d -(1997) (hemophilia that excluded plaintiff from his chosen occupational field of firefighter is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working); Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir.1996) (chronic ankle problems including gout, bone spurs, and ligament damage that required plaintiff to miss more than one year of work was not severe enough or chronic enough to qualify as a disability); Ellison v. Software Spectrum…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Munoz v. H & M WHOLESALE, INC.
S.D. Tex. · 1996 · confidence medium
Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630 , App., § 1630.2(j)); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726; Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 ; Washington, 906 F.Supp. at 390 .
cited Cited "see" Hayduk v. City of Johnstown
W.D. Pa. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 93 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that since high blood pressure involved continuing treatment it “could be considered a ‘serious health condition’ ”).
discussed Cited "see" O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Board of Education
S.D. Ohio · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir.1997), Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F.Supp. 253 -259 (N.D.Miss.1995), aff'd, 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.1996) (applying Title VII proof pattern for claims of retaliation under the FMLA); Dodgens v. Kent Mfg.
discussed Cited "see" Stubl v. T.A. Systems, Inc.
E.D. Mich. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See. e.g., Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F.Supp. 253, 259 (N.D.Miss.1995), aff'd, 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996); Day v. Excel Corp., 1996 WL 294341 , *12-13 (D.Kan.1996) (unpublished); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (D.C.Cir.1993); Lempres v. CBS Inc., 916 F.Supp. 15, 23 (D.D.C.1996); Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 1996 WL 535236 , *9 (N.D.Ill.
discussed Cited "see" Caruthers v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co.
D. Kan. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 93 (5th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“Any leave taken prior to the effective date is not protected by the FMLA.”); 29 C.F.R. § 825.103 (a) (1996) (“An eligible employee’s right to take FMLA leave began on the date that the Act went into effect for the employer.”).
cited Cited "see" McIntosh v. Brookdale Hospital Medical Center
E.D.N.Y · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir.1996) (per curiam). 7 .
discussed Cited "see" Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.
D. Kan. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F.Supp. 253, 259 (N.D.Miss.1995), aff 'd, 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.1996); McCown v. UOP, Inc., No. 94 C 2179, 1995 WL 519818 , at *6 (N.D.Ill.1995). 10 .See 29 C.F.R. § 825.112 (c) (1995) (An expectant mother may take FMLA leave prior to the birth of her child, if it is required for prenatal care or because her condition makes her unable to work.) 11 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Greene v. YRC, Inc.
D. Maryland · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 93 (5th Cir.1996) (High Blood Pressure— “The high blood pressure, however, did apparently involve continued treatment and therefore could be considered a ‘serious health condition.’ ”); Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F.Supp.2d 429, 466 (W.D.Pa.2008) (High Blood Pressure—“His high blood pressure certainly qualifies [as a chronic serious health condition]; he has been diagnosed since at least 2001, visits his cardiologist once or twice a year for follow[-]up evaluations, and takes prescription medications to control it.”); Young …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Nowak v. EGW Home Care, Inc.
W.D.N.Y. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91, 92-93 (5th Cir.1996) (plaintiff failed to produce evidence to show that either high blood pressure or alleged side effects from medication substantially limited his ability to work); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 946 F.Supp. 872, 881 (D.Kan.1996) (plaintiff failed to produce competent medical evidence to show that her high blood pressure substantially limited one or more of her major life activities), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1185 , 1998 WL 105933 (10th Cir.1998), aff'd, 527 U.S. 516 , 119 S.Ct. 2133 , 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999); Deghand v. Wal-Mart…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Kaylor v. Fannin Regional Hospital, Inc.
N.D. Ga. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F.Supp. 253, 259 (D.Miss.1995), aff'd, 74 F.3d 91 (1996); McCown v. UOP, Inc., 2 Wage & Hour Cases 2d (BNA) 1669, 1995 WL 519818 (N.D.Ill.1995).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Anonymous v. Legal Services Corp. of Puerto Rico
D.P.R. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See e.g., Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.1996) (wrongful discharge claim based on ADA).
74 F.3d 91
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (1)
PER CURIAM:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kevin Oswalt, an employee of Bryan Foods, Inc., brought this action against the defendant alleging claims of wrongful discharge in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on both claims. A full recital of the pertinent facts is included in the lower court’s opinion. See Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F.Supp. 253, 255 (N.D.Miss.1995).

II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.1991). Whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact is determined by whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

1. ADA Claim,:

To sustain a claim of wrongful discharge under the ADA, Oswalt must be a person with a “disability.” The statutory definition of “disability” includes “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). According to Oswalt, his physical impairment was his high blood pressure, and this impairment substantially limited a major life activity when his doctor authorized him to miss work while he adjusted to medication.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has set forth factors that should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. These include (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration of the impairment; and (3) the long term impact of the impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).

In this case, Oswalt has provided no evidence to show that either the high blood pressure or the alleged side effects from the medication substantially limited his job. We agree with the district court that “[h]igh blood pressure alone, without any evidence that it substantially affects one or more major life activities, is insufficient to bring an employee within the protection of the ADA.” Oswalt, 889 F.Supp. at 258. We do not imply that high blood pressure in general can never be a “disability,” as defined by the statute. We hold only that Oswalt failed to provide any evidence that his high blood pressure substantially limited a major life activity.

2. FMLA Claim:

The FMLA provides that an eligible employee shall be entitled to leave from work when he has a “serious health condition” that makes him “unable to perform the functions of the position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). “Serious health condition” involves either inpatient care in a medical care facility or continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11).

According to Oswalt, his serious health condition included both his high blood pressure and an unrelated case of food poisoning. The food poisoning required neither inpatient care nor continued medical treatment and was therefore not a “serious health condi[*93] tion” within the meaning of the statute. The high blood pressure, however, did apparently involve continued treatment and therefore could be considered a “serious health condition.”

Nevertheless, the period of work Oswalt missed allegedly due to his high blood pressure medication was in July of 1993. The FMLA did not go into effect until August 5, 1993. 29 C.F.R. § 825.102. Any leave taken prior to the effective date is not protected by the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.103(a).

The district court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore AFFIRMED as to both the ADA and the FMLA claims.