2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U No. 2-24-0405 Order filed October 3, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20-CF-2301 ) GETZURI ARELLANO, ) Honorable ) David P. Kliment, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We reverse defendant’s conviction, following a bench trial, of first degree murder (knowledge of a strong probability of death or great bodily harm) for fatally strangling his girlfriend. The trial court committed plain error in basing the conviction on its knowledge of prior court cases involving strangulation, and the evidence was closely balanced on whether defendant acted with the requisite knowledge.

¶2 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Getzuri Arellano, was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2018)) and sentenced to a

29-year prison term. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) relying on personal knowledge not based on the evidence presented at trial and (2) refusing to consider

2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication. Because we agree with the first argument, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of first degree murder. Count I

charged defendant with intentional first degree murder (intentional murder) (id. § 9-1(a)(1)), and count II charged him with knowing first degree murder (knowing murder) (id. § 9-1(a)(2)).

Specifically, count I alleged that defendant, with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to Natalie

Jimenez, strangled her, causing her death. Count II likewise alleged that defendant strangled

Jimenez, causing her death, but that he did so knowing that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.

¶5 The State filed a pretrial motion in limine to bar defendant from presenting evidence of his voluntary intoxication. The State contended that defendant planned to elicit testimony that he was intoxicated the night Jimenez was killed. According to the State, defendant was trying to “back

door” a voluntary intoxication defense, which the State claimed was barred by section 6-3 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/6-3 (West 2022)). At the hearing on the motion, the State conceded that under our supreme court’s decision in People v. Grayer, 2023 IL 128871, evidence of voluntary intoxication is potentially admissible in a prosecution for a specific-intent

crime. However, the State contended that such evidence was inadmissible in prosecutions for general-intent crimes. The State took no firm position on whether intentional murder is a specific-

intent crime. However, the State maintained that knowing murder is a general-intent crime for which evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible. Defendant did not dispute the State’s position that evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible in prosecutions for general-intent

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2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U crimes. Defendant instead maintained that intentional murder is a specific-intent crime for which evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible.

¶6 The trial court concluded that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible in a

prosecution for intentional murder because it is a specific-intent crime. The court drew the opposite conclusion regarding knowing murder. However, because the State had charged both intentional murder and knowing murder and defendant had demanded a jury trial, the court added:

“I believe there will have to be [a jury] instruction that any evidence of voluntary intoxication does not apply to the verdict in [c]ount [II] [charging knowing murder], and we’ll have to make sure that the jury verdict forms read appropriately.” The court’s written order on the motion in limine did not specifically bar any evidence. It merely recited the court’s conclusion that intentional murder, as charged in count I, was a specific-intent crime, whereas knowing murder, as charged in count II, was a general-intent crime.

¶7 Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial, and the State elected to proceed

only on count II, charging knowing murder. During his opening statement, defense counsel stated, without objection, that defendant “smoke[d] a couple of blunts” a few hours before Jimenez was killed.

¶8 In the State’s case, Zachary Kavcar testified that on December 9, 2020, he was an officer

with the Aurora Police Department. At 4:14 a.m. on that date, Kavcar and his field training officer, Cory McCue, were dispatched to a residence on Indian Avenue to assist with an ambulance call.

Once there, he encountered defendant, who was distraught and crying. Defendant kept saying.

“ ‘It’s all my fault.’ ” Kavcar looked in the bathroom and saw Jimenez on the floor of the shower.

She was unresponsive. At some point, Officer Jesus Macias and Officer Murphy (first name not given) arrived. Kavcar, McCue, and Murphy proceeded to administer life-saving measures, but

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Jimenez did not respond. Members of the Aurora Fire Department took over the task of trying to revive Jimenez. She was transported to a hospital, where she later died.

¶9 According to Kavcar, defendant reported that he and Jimenez “got into an argument and then she fell.” Kavcar asked defendant why Jimenez fell. Kavcar stated that he had grabbed

Jimenez by the neck and she fell when she tried to pull away from him. McCue and Macias also testified, as did yet another officer dispatched to the scene. Their testimony was generally consistent with Kavcar’s.

¶ 10 Forensic pathologist Dr. Mitra Kalelkar testified that she performed an autopsy on Jimenez and concluded that Jimenez died as a result of strangulation (her autopsy report was not admitted into evidence). Kalelkar reviewed the results of a CT scan that was performed on Jimenez on

December 9, 2020, at the hospital where she had been transported. The scan revealed cerebral

edema, which was consistent with oxygen deprivation due to asphyxia from strangulation. In addition, a blood flow study conducted at the hospital showed insufficient blood flow to Jimenez’s brain.

¶ 11 Kalelkar also testified to the results of her physical examination of Jimenez. She noted petechial hemorrhages on Jimenez’s face and in her eyes. Kalelkar explained that petechial

hemorrhages are “pinpoint or dot-like hemorrhages” that occur “when there is a lot of pressure, like a neck compression, that enlarges the tiny capillaries which burst and that causes the hemorrhage.” Petechial hemorrhages are “usually a sign of asphyxia,” which in turn can be caused by, inter alia, compression of the neck. In Jimenez’s case, according to Kalelkar, asphyxia was caused by compression of her neck.

¶ 12 Kalelkar also observed abrasions and contusions on Jimenez’s neck that she opined were caused by human fingers pressed against Jimenez’s neck. There were no injuries to the trachea or 240408

2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U the hyoid bone. Kalelkar testified that it takes one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half minutes for a person to lose consciousness as a result of consistent neck pressure. Whether a person becomes unconscious during that time depends on the amount of pressure. Kalelkar stated that there was no way to know how much pressure was applied to Jimenez’s neck.

¶ 13 Kalelkar’s internal examination, conducted after Jimenez’s scalp was retracted, revealed no injury to her head or scalp. Kalelkar saw no indication that Jimenez had fallen and hit her head.

¶ 14 The State admitted into evidence numerous photographs of Jimenez taken either while she received treatment or after her death.

¶ 15 Forensic pathologist Dr. Larry Blum testified for the defense. He reviewed, inter alia, various reports generated in connection with Jimenez’s death, including the autopsy report prepared by Kalelkar. Blum also prepared a report of his own (which was admitted into evidence) concerning Jimenez’s death. Blum testified consistently with his report. Blum agreed with

Kalelkar that strangulation was the cause of Jimenez’s death. In his report, he noted contusions, which he described as “faint,” on the left side of Jimenez’s neck. He noted that “[a] faint contusion might indicate a lessor [sic] force than a larger, more deeper [sic] bruise for instance.” He further noted an area of hemorrhaging that appeared to be associated with emergency medical treatment.

Blum observed no damage to the trachea or larynx, and he explained the significance of that

“absence of trauma”:

“[I]f one is to assess the degree of force used in a particular manual strangulation, one of the ways that one can assess the amount of force is to see how much blunt trauma is done

to the neck area, and if there is [sic] no fractures there, that would point the needle in the direction of lesser force than more force, so it’s significant in that role.

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A person can certainly be asphyxiated without having their windpipe crushed

because that takes about 33 pounds of pressure, whereas to occlude the thin wall veins in the side of the neck takes about 4.4 pounds of pressure. ***.

*** [S]o to assess the amount of force with any one particular case, one assesses the bruises, the abrasions, which are described in this case as superficial, the bruise was faint, there were no fractures and the hammering of the neck was localized and small to one spot by the hyoid and thyroid ***.”

Blum did not quantify the amount of force used to strangle Jimenez, but he opined that, on the spectrum of “lesser” to “greater” force, a lesser force was applied.

¶ 16 Based on his estimate of the amount of force used, Blum opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it would take anywhere from 9 to 13 seconds for Jimenez to lose consciousness under such force. According to Blum:

“If the edema, swelling, hemorrhage, if all these processes that are initiated by

causing the person to go unconscious, if that continues, even without holding onto the neck, even without the pressure applied, if these continue to interfere with the body’s oxygen

supply, the second thing that can happen is respiratory arrest and that happens when the lungs quit functioning, ***.” (Emphases added.)

According to Blum, Jimenez “did suffer a respiratory arrest at some point during [the] event.”

¶ 17 On cross-examination, Blum was asked about the following portion of his report:

“The time interval from the application of force (to the neck) to loss of consciousness, can be as little as nine (9) seconds per the forensic medical literature.

Usually, this interval does not exceed thirteen (13) seconds. If the applied neck pressure is released upon the victim’s loss of consciousness, recovery is expected. If, however, the 240410

2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U

pressure is maintained for an indeterminate amount of time, either knowingly or unknowingly, brain function can deteriorate leading to respiratory arrest. Generally, this takes from one and one half to two- and one-half minutes (1.5 to 2.5 minutes from the start of the strangulation process), however, the pressure need not be applied for the entire time.”

¶ 18 Blum denied that his report stated that it takes one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half minutes of pressure for death by strangulation to occur. He clarified that it takes one-and-a-half to two-and- a-half minutes for respiratory arrest to occur. However, this “does not mean that the hands ha[ve] to be on there that long.” Blum explained:

“The initial injury to the neck, compression of the veins, compression of the nerves in the neck include the *** carotid sinus nerves, along with the edema, the swelling and the bleeding that we saw in the neck area, can all combine to keep oxygen from going into the body that can result in respiratory arrest. It does not mean that the person has to stand there for a minute and a half to two and a half minutes squeezing the neck, absolutely not.”

¶ 19 Asked if constant pressure might have been applied to Jimenez’s neck for one or two minutes, Blum responded:

“Any time you give it is possible. What I am saying is it doesn’t take that much time to go. ***.

If you apply pressure, external pressure, on someone’s neck, in other words, compress the neck, that’s unpredictable and the outcomes may be unexpected and unintentional.”

¶ 20 Blum later explained:

“The outcome here was death. *** [Y]ou can have various outcomes from the application of hands on somebody’s neck. It could be nothing, they might not even loose [sic]

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consciousness, they could loose [sic] consciousness, they could go into respiratory arrest, they can go into cardiac arrest, it could be lethal, ***.”

Blum acknowledged that “[e]verything else being equal,” “the longer pressure is applied, the more likely it is to result in respiratory failure[.]”

¶ 21 Defendant testified that he and Jimenez were in a romantic relationship and had a son. In 2017, while Jimenez was pregnant, she moved in with defendant and his mother. When Jimenez gave birth, she and defendant moved to a new home. Defendant’s brother Johnny also resided with defendant and Jimenez except for six to eight months while he was in a “military program.”

Defendant testified that he and Jimenez smoked marijuana regularly.

¶ 22 On December 8, 2020, after dinner, defendant and Jimenez smoked marijuana together.

Jimenez took a shower and went to the bedroom. Defendant testified that he gave Jimenez’s phone to their son to watch videos. At that point, Jimenez was asleep. After retrieving the phone from their son, defendant noticed that an internet browsing app was open and displaying translated text that he found disturbing. Confused about the situation, he went outside and smoked several blunts and did “did a few dabs” with “THC oil, stronger than marijuana.”

¶ 23 When defendant went back inside, he left Jimenez’s phone on her nightstand with the app open so that she would know what he had seen. He then got into bed with Jimenez. Defendant woke up when Jimenez shoved his shoulder and asked him why he had been on her phone.

Defendant told her that they would talk about it later, but Jimenez started hitting him on the side of the head. She then went into the bathroom. Defendant followed her and tried to persuade her to smoke some marijuana to calm down. Defendant left the bathroom but returned to offer to take

Jimenez to work. At that point, she shoved defendant into the shower area. Jimenez started insulting defendant and threatening to leave with their son. Defendant then began showing her the 240412

2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U concerning material he found on her phone. She responded by hitting his head with her fist.

Defendant brought his hands up to his face, at which point Jimenez kicked his testicles and he fell

back toward the sink. He then put his right hand on Jimenez’s neck and pushed her toward the corner of the shower. He used his elbow to restrain her arm against the shower wall and used the side of his legs to keep her from kicking him. Defendant testified:

“The next thing I know, that’s when her arm eased. I felt, like, her arm ease, and I let go and she slipped out—she was slipping out of my—she was just slipping, and I tried to catch her body. And while I was trying to catch her body, like, I felt her back—her head—the back of her head went sideways and back, and hit the shower area. ***.”

¶ 24 Defendant tried to revive Jimenez and then went to Johnny’s bedroom to get help.

Defendant attempted to perform CPR and had Johnny call 911. Defendant recalled that, when police officers arrived, he told them it was “all [his] fault.” He was “banging on the walls and *** crying.”

¶ 25 Before closing arguments, the trial court ruled that it would permit defendant to argue

(1) self-defense and (2) second degree murder based on a mitigating factor. During defendant’s

closing argument, counsel’s description of the events preceding the incident included mention of defendant’s and Jimenez’s marijuana use. About the incident itself, counsel argued as follows.

When Jimenez started striking, shoving, and kicking defendant, defendant “in an effort to restrain her from further blows, put[ ] his hands around her neck” and “she [went] limp.” The absence of damage to the hyoid bone, the esophagus, or the cartilage surrounding the larynx indicated that

defendant did not apply the 33 pounds of pressure necessary to inflict such damage and, thus, suggested that defendant was unaware of a strong probability that placing his hand on Jimenez’s neck would cause her death or great bodily harm. According to counsel, “If [defendant] didn’t

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2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U know that he was going to cause death or great bodily harm, all he was doing was defending himself from [Jimenez’s] repeated blows and *** kicking.” Counsel further argued:

“Now, if indeed *** this case has failed in the [c]ourt’s findings as to first degree murder, [Y]our Honor—and this is not a lesser included offense. It is a mitigating aspect

of first degree murder. When one is found guilty of murder, of first degree murder at the time of the killing, [defendant] is acting under a sudden and intense passion that results from a serious provocation.”

¶ 26 In finding defendant guilty, the trial court determined that there was no dispute that defendant caused Jimenez’s death and that the cause was strangulation. The court further found that defendant did not act in self-defense. First, the court noted that defendant “had no evidence on his person that he was in any type of struggle.” Second, the court rejected defendant’s testimony that he grabbed Jimenez’s neck only after she kicked him in the groin. The court reasoned that

“[t]hat is not generally the reaction one has to being kicked in the groin.” The court concluded that defendant was the “pursuer” and the “aggressor.”

¶ 27 The trial court then turned to the question of whether defendant acted with knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. The court noted that Blum

described certain injuries to Jimenez as “faint.” The court disagreed, observing that the photographs in evidence showed bruises and petechiae on Jimenez that were not faint even after several days. The court added:

“Another thing to note is the extent of the petechiae. I am allowed to use my common sense and experience when I decide these matters, and I have participated in cases where strangulation was an issue? [sic] And I have seen cases where there have been petechiae in the eyes.

- 10 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U I don’t recall a case where there’s been petechiae so extensive down the entire face and neck. To me, that means that the act of strangulation was longer rather than shorter in duration because the pressure buildup which causes the petechiae must have been immense. There’s testimony that it takes, I think, 9 to 30 seconds for someone to lose—or 9 to 15 seconds, I don’t recall, to lose consciousness. But longer than that, causes respiratory failure. In this case, had *** defendant released his grip in those 9 to 15 seconds or 9 to 30 seconds after *** [Jimenez] lost consciousness, there’s *** a high likelihood that she would recover. The testimony was of that nature. That is, of course, not what happened here. She never recovered. He applied pressure to her neck for such a duration of time that she went limp in his arms, and then he, by his testimony, let her down to the floor. The fact that he kept pressure on her neck long enough to accomplish that and to cause the extensive petechiae in her face and eyes and neck, show [sic] that this was an event of longer rather than shorter duration. In addition, the nature of the fingerprints on her neck, the bruising on her neck, it shows—There was some testimony about the amount of pressure used. Dr. Blum said it was a lesser amount of pressure. Dr. Kalelkar, if I recall correctly, said it could not be determined how much pressure was used, but he [sic] did agree on the amount of pressure it would take, for instance, to crush the trachea. But in this case, the trachea was not the site with the most trauma. *** The arteries were compressed, not the trachea, and the blood flow was cut off, not the air supply. *** So, again, this is something that lasted longer rather than shorter.” - 11 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U Finally, the court rejected the argument that defendant was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. The court explained that the only “applicable” provocation would be mutual combat, of which the court found no evidence. ¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 29 Defendant first argues that, in finding him guilty, the trial court improperly relied on evidence from other cases it presided over. The State responds that defendant forfeited the issue by failing to both (1) contemporaneously object to the trial court’s reference to the purportedly improper evidence and (2) raise the issue in his posttrial motion. Defendant responds that he had no opportunity to raise a contemporary objection because it occurred during the “verdict.” Defendant maintains that he adequately raised the issue in his posttrial motion, even though he did so in connection with his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. He alternatively claims that the issue is reviewable under the plain error rule. We find the issue forfeited but nonetheless reach it under the plain error rule. ¶ 30 The plain error rule allows appellate review of a forfeited error when “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). ¶ 31 We first consider whether a clear or obvious error occurred. As noted, in finding defendant guilty, the trial court specifically referred to its experience in other cases involving strangulation, noting that it had never seen petechiae on the face and neck as extensive as those in this case. The - 12 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U court concluded that “the act of strangulation was longer rather than shorter in duration because the pressure buildup which causes the petechiae must have been immense.” The only arguable support for the court’s assertion that the extent of petechiae correlates with the amount of pressure applied was Dr. Kalelkar’s statements that “petechia happens from an increased pressure” and “petechial hemorrhages occur “when there is a lot of pressure, like a neck compression, that enlarges the tiny capillaries which burst and that causes the hemorrhage.” However, Dr. Kalelkar’s most pertinent testimony on the point in question contradicted the court’s conclusion that the pressure must have been “immense” based on the extent of petechiae here: “Q You don't have any idea as to what degree of pressure was applied to the neck? A No, it is impossible to measure the degree of pressure in a human being.” ¶ 32 Even if a medical expert deemed reasonable the scientific opinion that the extent of petechiae indicates the amount of pressure applied to a victim, to be admissible, such an opinion would require expert testimony to that conclusion. No such expert testimony was elicited; the scientific opinion was supplied not by a witness, but by the trial court. The court’s conclusion was not only unsupported by evidence in the record, it was well outside the ambit of common sense or experience, and it was supported only by the court’s recollection of evidence presented in other cases. As such, the court impermissibly relied on evidence not presented at defendant’s trial or subject to investigation or cross-examination. ¶ 33 A case cited by defendant, People v. Jackson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 631 (2011), is instructive. Following a bench trial, the defendant, who was charged with first degree murder, was found guilty but mentally ill. Id. at 632. The trial court rejected the defendant’s defense of insanity, which was supported by the testimony of an expert in forensic psychology. Id. at 634, 645. The Jackson court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial before a different judge. Id. at - 13 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240405-U 650. The court did so, in part, because the trial court “relied on matters outside the trial record” in rejecting the opinion of the defendant’s expert. Id. at 649-50. Notably, the trial court relied on its own understanding of the “ ‘DSM IV’ ” 1 and did not permit the defendant’s expert to testify about that publication. Id. at 638-39. The trial court also discounted the significance of antipsychotic medication that had been prescribed for the defendant, asserting, without evidence, that such medication was administered proactively for people in custodial settings. Id. at 637. The trial court also discounted evidence of the defendant’s IQ, stating that it found the evidence to be “ ‘a total canard.’ ” Id. at 645. Forsaking evidence for its experience in unrelated cases, the trial court proclaimed that “ ‘[m]ental acuity is constantly misrepresented in the circumstances of the testimony that I hear from the witness stand in this building.’ ” Id. at 650. ¶ 34 The State cites People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (4th) 220201, ¶ 59, for the proposition that, “[i]n a bench trial, the trial court is permitted to consider its own life and experience in ruling on the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In contrast, “[a] determination made by the trial judge based upon a private investigation by the court or based upon private knowledge of the court, untested by cross-examination, or any of the rules of evidence constitutes a denial of due process of law.” People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill. 2d 350, 354 (1962). In Johnson, the trial court relied on its life experience in raising children to conclude how a child might communicate about being sexually assaulted. Johnson, 2023 IL App (4th) 220201, ¶ 15. While acknowledging that “[t]he line between permissibly relying on one’s own life experience versus improperly relying on