ACCEPTED 15-25-00072-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/3/2025 10:25 AM No. 15-25-00072-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 15th COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/3/2025 10:25:47 AM AT AUSTIN CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON, Appellant, v. VERNON LEUSCHNER, ROBERT LEE SPANOS, CHRISTOPHER BLAKE SPANOS, KATHRYN NICOLE LAWRIE, AND KATHERINE LEUSCHNER, Appellees.

On Interlocutory Appeal from the 414th District Court of McLennan County, Texas, Cause No. 2024-3035-5

REPLY BRIEF Kirk L. Pittard Craig D. Cherry State Bar No. 24010313 State Bar No. 24012419 [email protected] [email protected] Rick Thompson Ryan C. Johnson State Bar No. 00788537 State Bar No. 24048574 [email protected] [email protected] DURHAM, PITTARD & SPALDING, LLP Scott H. James P.O. Box 224626 State Bar No. 24037848 Dallas, Texas 75222 [email protected] (214) 946-8000 CHERRY JOHNSON SIEGMUND JAMES, PLLC (214) 946-8433 (fax) 7901 Fish Pond Road, 2nd Floor Waco, Texas 76710 (254) 732-2242 (866) 627-3509 (fax)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s) Table of Authorities .............................................................................................. iv Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1

I. The County Court at Law’s Orders Are Void and the District Court Abused Its Discretion by Enforcing Aspects of the Void Orders in the Order Appointing the Receiver ..................... 1

A. Fran May “Collaterally Attack” the County Court’s Orders ................................................................................................... 2

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the County Court’s Jurisdiction to Issue the Order Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor ............................................. 3

C. The Order Appointing the Receiver Implicitly, Indirectly, or Silently Incorporates and Gives Effect to the County Court’s Void Rulings ................................................ 4

D. The County Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Issue the Orders Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor................................................................................................. 8 Law No. 1’s orders appointing Judge Stem as receiver, which are void for want of jurisdiction. See App’t Br. at 13-26. Thus, the Order Appointing Receiver constitutes an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. See App’t Br. at 12. Appellees respond by misstating the rules for jurisdictional review.

A. Fran May “Collaterally Attack” the County Court’s Orders.

Appellees maintain that Fran’s collateral attacks on the county court’s orders are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction in this appeal. See Resp. Br. at xix, 12, 14, 16, 19, 32, 34. Appellees are wrong.^[2]

The county court’s orders that were related to the Trust and were issued following the end of the temporary administration of Ms. Spanos’s estate are void for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See App’t Br. at 12-25. However, this argument is not, as Appellees claim, a stand-alone challenge to the county court at law’s orders. Rather, the Court’s determination that the county court’s orders are void is simply a necessary step to resolve

2 Appellees state that they do not challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief, see Resp. Br. at xix; however, they repeatedly argue that Fran presents arguments that go beyond the Court’s limited jurisdiction to review the order on interlocutory appeal. Appellees effectively argue that Fran cannot attack, and the Court cannot review, the validity of the void orders issued by the county court at law via interlocutory appeal. This is effectively a jurisdictional challenge to the Court’s ability to review issues that could require the Court to grant mandamus relief. This is one example of the types of arguments that Fran had hoped to avoid by filing her motion to consolidate the appeal and mandamus into a single case.

whether the Order Appointing Receiver enforces void orders. See App’t Br. at 12-26. Fran still appeals the Order Appointing Receiver.

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the County Court’s Jurisdiction to Issue the Orders Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor.

Appellees blithely argue that this Court “need not analyze whether the County Court at Law had jurisdiction to issue any orders, especially agreed orders, more than three years ago, that Appellant failed to timely appeal.” Resp. Br. at 32. Appellees are again wrong.

This interlocutory appeal vests the Court with jurisdiction to address the order appointing the receiver as well as “those issues subsumed within it.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 51.014(a)(1); Peters v. Blockbuster, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.); see Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2022) (“[P]ermissive appeals are resolved according to the same principles as any other appeal, including addressing all fairly included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues pertinent to resolving the controlling legal issue.”). This Court cannot determine whether the Order Appointing Receiver improperly gives effect to the county court’s void rulings without determining whether the county court’s orders are, in fact, void. Thus, the issues related to the county court’s jurisdiction to issue the order appointing Judge Stem to serve as trust advisor are fairly included within this interlocutory appeal of the Order Appointing Receiver, and this Court has jurisdiction to review those issues.

C. The Order Appointing the Receiver Implicitly, Indirectly, or Silently Incorporates and Gives Effect to the County Court’s Void Rulings.

Appellees state as “fact” that the Order Appointing Receiver does not “mirror” or “refer to any prior orders, nor does it enforce any of Judge Stem’s prior acts taken as Trust Advisor.” See Resp. Br. at 14, 16-17, 29. Appellees are correct; however, their hyper-technical fixation on the literal text of the order ignores the effect of the orders and the fact that the text of the Order Appointing Receiver enforces the existence, and assumes the validity, of the county court’s prior void rulings, thereby rendering the Order Appointing Receiver itself void.

The following aspects of the Order Appointing Receiver give effect to the county court’s void orders: (1) the district court noted his reliance on the hearing testimony of the “Trust Advisor, Judge Robert Stem,” whose appointment as trust advisor was improperly extended by the void order of the county court at law long after the close of Ms. Spanos’s estate, CR 1292; and (2) the district court’s order expressly accepts that Judge Stem is the proper Trust Advisor, CR 1292, 1295-96. Though the Order Appointing Receiver does not state that it is adopting, enforcing, or incorporating aspects of the county court’s void orders, it clearly, albeit silently, adopts the county court’s extension of Judge Stem’s appointment as trust advisor. This aspect of the district court’s order is particularly troubling given the district court’s evident deference to Judge Stem at the motions hearing.^[3]

Nevertheless, Appellees argue that the district court’s order is distinct from the county court’s previous rulings and that this case is akin to the facts of Estate of Hoskins. Resp. Br. at 31-32. In Hoskins, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals reviewed whether a probate court’s order appointing a receiver was a simple confirmation of an arbitrator’s previous appointment of a receiver or was a distinct, stand-alone order appointing a receiver. See 501 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016, no pet.). In considering whether the party defending the appointment of the receiver filed a timely notice of appeal, the court of appeals ruled that the district court did not

3 Appellees are quite bothered by Fran’s argument that the Order Appointing Receiver “silently incorporates” aspects of the county court’s void orders, going so far as to label it “specious.” See Resp. Br. at 16, 29. But the silent, indirect, or implicit incorporation of the terms from one document, contract, or statute into another is a common legal principle. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY Imply (12th ed. 2024); id. Implied (12th ed. 2024).

confirm the arbitrator’s appointment of the receiver, but rather made an independent determination to appoint the same receiver:

Rather than ratifying or approving any of the responsibilities which the arbitrator had previously granted to Rogers, the probate court’s order assigned Rogers with a new and distinct set of responsibilities. . . . Rather than confirming the receiver and his previously ordered duties, the probate court’s order signifies a new and separate appointment. Id. at 303-04.

The differences between this case and Hoskins are stark, indeed. First, Fran has not argued that the district court’s order was a confirmation of the county court’s appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor. The district court’s order appointing a receiver and the county court’s orders appointing the trust advisor are two separate rulings. The district court’s order simply recognizes the existence and validity of the county court’s void orders and gives credence to, and gives effect to, the county court’s earlier void orders appointing the trust advisor.

Second, although the district court had jurisdiction to confirm the appointment of Judge Stem or appoint Judge Stem anew to serve as trust advisor, it did not do so. (Nor should the district court do so in light of Judge Stem’s bias against Fran as evidenced by his impassioned and partisan testimony at the motions hearing.^[4]) Although Appellees are correct that the Order Appointing Receiver was a new and independent ruling, the order gives effect to and necessarily relies on the county court’s void orders appointing Judge Stem as trust advisor, thereby rendering the district court’s order itself void.5

The impact of the district court’s acceptance of the appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor cannot be understated. Judge Stem was the only witness at the hearing on the motion to appoint a receiver. See 2 RR 77-137. Thus, the court’s findings in support of its appointment were based on the testimony of Judge Stem. As a former judge and the purported trust advisor, Judge Stem was permitted by the district court, over objection, to testify as a legal expert on questions of law and the legal effect of the Trust document

4 For example, during the hearing, Judge Stem admonished Fran and her attorneys for filing the suit to remove his colleague, Mr. Malone, as Trustee, which he considered to be “ridiculous, baseless, [and] spiteful lawsuit conduct.” 2 RR 101. 5 Appellees criticize the cases that Fran cites to support her argument that any orders enforcing prior void orders are likewise void because the cases involve the enforcement of orders “issuing sanctions for failing to comply[] or requiring a payment of attorneys’ fees in connection with a void order.” Resp. Br. at 30-31. It is true that the two cases that Fran cites in her opening brief involve the enforcement of void orders imposing sanctions and ordering the payment of attorney’s fees. This should not be surprising. Enforcement cases are the most obvious place for this rule to be applied. However, Appellees do not explain to the Court or Fran why this rule of law should not control here.

itself, the propriety of the county court’s jurisdiction to appoint him as trust advisor, the merits of Fran’s claims, and whether Fran’s attorneys violated professional ethics. See 2 RR 79, 93-95.

The district court’s Order Appointing Receiver clearly accepts and validates the county court at law’s orders appointing Judge Stem as trust advisor as well as his decision to remove Fran as trustee of the Trust. This was improper and renders the Order Appointing Receiver void.

D. The County Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Issue the Orders Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor.

Appellees argue that the county court at law had jurisdiction over the administration of the Trust under its original probate jurisdiction and its ancillary jurisdiction. See Resp. Br. at 18, 36-39. Appellees are wrong, and in the process, largely fail to address the arguments in Fran’s opening brief.

On March 8, 2022, the county court entered the first order appointing Judge Stem as temporary administrator of Ms. Spanos’s estate and as the trust advisor of the Trust. See CR 817-19. Judge Stem’s term as trust advisor was set to expire on September 5, 2022. See CR 817. On May 18, 2022, the county court at law discharged Judge Stem as the temporary administrator and terminated the estate administration. CR 821-23. Notwithstanding the end of the administration and any proceedings related to the estate, the county court signed an order extending the appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor until he “either determines that there no longer exists a necessity for a Trust Advisor, by agreement of the Parties, or if the Court, in the best interest of the Trust, determines cause exists for the removal of the Trust Advisor.” See CR 827-28.

Thus, in March 2022, when the county court at law issued its original order appointing Judge Stem to serve as trust administrator, the court properly exercised its original probate jurisdiction over probate proceedings and matters related to probate proceedings. Although the county court at law properly exercised its jurisdiction to create a temporary administration of Ms. Spanos’s estate and properly appointed Judge Stem as the estate administrator, the court did not have jurisdiction to appoint Judge Stem as a temporary administrator of the Trust. That issue is not a probate proceeding and is not a “matter related to a probate proceeding.” See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(a); § 31.002(a), (b).7 (Because Ms. Spanos’s will was not admitted to probate, the county court had no jurisdiction over the administration of Ms. Spanos’s inter vivos trust. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(b)(3).)8

(7) the interpretation and administration of a testamentary trust if the will creating the trust has been admitted to probate in the court; and (8) the interpretation and administration of an inter vivos trust created by a decedent whose will has been admitted to probate in the court.

7 Ms. Leuschner’s claims that Fran allegedly wasted estate assets, for example, was a claim within the county court’s original probate jurisdiction because it was a matter related to the probate proceeding. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(a)(1); CR 806-07.

8 In her opening brief, Fran argued that one of the many reasons that the county court at law had no jurisdiction over Ms. Leuschner’s claims regarding the administration of the Trust was that the amount in controversy at issue here exceeded the limits of the county court at law’s amount-in-controversy jurisdiction. See App’t Br. at 16-18. Appellees responded that Fran failed to prove the amount in controversy. See Resp. Br. at 40-

decree of final distribution” and the county court at law’s order ending the temporary administration of the estate “expressly contemplated collection of assets or debts, and a possible future need to probate the will of [Ms.] Spanos.” Resp. Br. at 42 (quoting TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(d)). This argument is off base.

First, on March 8, 2022, the county court at law ordered a temporary administration of Ms. Spanos’s estate and appointed Judge Stem to serve as temporary administrator. CR 817-19; see TEX. ESTATES CODE § 452.051(a). A little over two months later, the court ended the temporary administration and discharged Judge Stem as estate administrator. CR 821-23. The order ending the administration reflects that Fran and Ms. Leuschner represented to the county court “that based on their investigation to date it appears there is no necessity of administration at this time and that [Fran] and [Ms.] Leuschner, in their respective capacities, should be authorized to transfer title to any titled assets via an Affidavit of Heirship or other legal means.” CR 821. Based on this representation, the county court discharged Judge Stem as administrator and terminated the temporary administration. CR 823. Thus, in May 2022, the administration of the estate was ended as wholly unnecessary.

No proceedings or filings related to the estate were filed by either party until this month—i.e., over three years later—when Vernon Leuschner, on behalf of Ms. Leuschner, filed an application to probate Ms. Spanos’s pour- over will and for the appointment of another temporary administrator. See Tab A.10 This improper filing demonstrates that Appellees are well aware that the probate proceeding and the estate were closed.

Second, courts exercising original probate jurisdiction may exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction only when a “close relationship exists between the non-probate claims and the matter pending in the probate court” and doing so “will aid in the efficient administration of a matter pending in the probate court.” Schuchmann v. Schuchmann, 193 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); see In re Estate of Hallmark, 629 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.). A close relationship between probate and non-probate proceedings exists, for example, when the matters involve the same parties, the same causes of action, and the same underlying facts. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Chapa, No. 13-22-00537-CV, 2024 WL

10Appellees represent to this Court that they “believe there is at least one asset that will have to be dealt with through probate.” See Resp. Br. at 18 n.69. However, Ms. Leuschner does not identify any assets allegedly requiring administration. CR 802-03.

2197216, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 16, 2024, pet. denied).

The County Court at Law No. 1’s exercise of jurisdiction over the trust claims did not and could not have “aid[ed] in the efficient administration of” any estate claims. (Nor would jurisdiction over Trust claims aid that court in administering the one unidentified asset in Ms. Leuschner’s new motion to probate the will.) As the parties and Judge Stem recognized a little over two months after the creation of the temporary administration, there was no need for an administration of Ms. Spanos’s pour-over will or estate. The county court’s improper exercise of jurisdiction over the Trust thus did not aid in the county court at law’s brief administration of the estate.

Third, even if the county court could have exercised any pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over the Trust, the court lost the authority to exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction no later than May 18, 2022—i.e., the date the county court at law terminated the administration of Ms. Spanos’s estate. Thereafter, there were no pending probate claims for any Trust issues to be pendent or ancillary to. See, e.g., Lawton v. Lawton, No. 01–12–00932–CV, 2014 WL 3408699, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 10, 2014, no pet.); Barton v. Buchanan, Nos. 03–02–00596–CV, 03–02–00632–CV, 2003 WL 21939725, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2003, no pet.); Goodman v. Summit at West Rim, Ltd., 952 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.).11

The county court at law terminated the temporary administration and discharged Judge Stem as the temporary administrator of the estate on May 18, 2022. CR 821-24. On that date, the probate proceeding ended, and the county court at law lost any alleged pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over any claims. See Goodman, 952 S.W.2d at 933; Lawton, 2014 WL 3408699, at *2. Thus, the county court’s September 1, 2022, order extending the purported appointment of Judge Stem as the trust advisor is not justified by the county court’s exercise of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. And Judge Stem’s

11 In their brief, Appellees attempt to undermine Fran’s reliance on the Goodman ruling by pointing out that Goodman interpreted the predecessor to Section 32.001 and because the court erroneously “noted that in Federal cases jurisdiction was supposedly lost over pendent claims if the underlying Federal jurisdiction bases is lost.” Resp. Br. at 42-43. Even ignoring the other cases cited by Fran to support this argument, Appellees’ arguments distinguishing Goodman are incorrect for at least two reasons. First, the language of the ancillary jurisdiction provision in former Probate Code Section 5A is identical to the current language of the ancillary jurisdiction provision in Section 32.001 of the Estates Code. See Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Tex. 2011) (characterizing holdings interpretating identical, predecessor statutes as “instructive regarding our application” of current statute). Second, Goodman’s discussion of a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction is dicta. Moreover, a federal district court’s exercise of its statutory supplemental jurisdiction is totally unrelated to a county court at law’s exercise of pendent jurisdiction when the court is asserting its original probate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

continued service as the purported trust advisor, and his actions taken with respect to the Trust after May 18, 2022, are void. See CR 827-28, 923.

Because the county court at law could not exercise jurisdiction over Ms. Leuschner’s trust claims and, regardless, certainly could not exercise pendent jurisdiction after May 18, 2022, its order extending the appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor, and the district court’s order approving and enforcing the county court’s rulings and Judge Stem’s decisions made after May 18, 2022, are likewise void. Thus, the district court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion that must be reversed.

II. THE COUNTY COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID, NOT VOIDABLE, BECAUSE THE COURT HAD NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS RELATED TO THE TRUST.

Appellees brazenly state to this Court that the county court at law’s orders were not void, but rather voidable; therefore, Appellees conclude that Fran was required to directly appeal those rulings and cannot challenge their validity here. See Resp. Br. at 17, 32, 34-36, 45. Appellees are wrong once again.

It is true that voidable orders, unlike void orders, must be challenged in a direct appeal. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010). However, Appellees ignore an important corollary of that rule, which controls here: If a Texas court with “no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act” issues an order, it is void, not voidable. Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). A void order, unlike a voidable order, is subject to attack in a new lawsuit. See Joachim, 315 S.W.3d at 863.

As previously explained, the county court had no jurisdiction over the Trust and no jurisdiction to appoint Judge Stem to serve as trust advisor in the first place. See App’t Br. at 13-25. Nevertheless, citing Parsons v. Parsons, 648 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied) and In re D.L.S., No. 05-08-00173-CV, 2009 WL 1875579, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2009, orig. proceeding), Appellees contend that the county court’s orders are not “void on their face” as required to collaterally challenge an order and must therefore be presumed valid because the county court recited that it had jurisdiction in its orders. See Resp. Br. at 34-36. But Appellees are wrong for at least two reasons: (1) jurisdictional recitations in an order issued by a court of general jurisdiction are presumed valid and cannot be collaterally attacked if the court that issued them had subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) the county court’s order extending the appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor, which was issued after the end of the temporary administration, does not contain a jurisdictional recital.

First, Appellees correctly cite several cases reciting the general rule that judgments with jurisdictional recitations that are issued by courts of general jurisdiction are presumed valid and that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to establish otherwise. But unlike here, those cases do not involve challenges to a court’s authority to act or its subject matter jurisdiction.

A party may collaterally attack an order issued by a court with no subject-matter jurisdiction. See Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985). The rule regarding the inherent validity of jurisdictional recitations only applies when the court issuing the challenged order or judgment has general jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Here, Fran challenges the county court at law’s jurisdiction to issue any orders related to the administration of the Trust, specifically arguing that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction to administer the Trust. The cases cited by Appellees do not involve questions of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction or authority to issue an order.

In Parsons, for example, the court of appeals expressly noted that the parties had not challenged the issuing court’s jurisdiction. See 648 S.W.3d at 357; Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); see also In re D.L.S., 2009 WL 1875579, at *2 (appellant could not collaterally attack default child support order issued by court of general jurisdiction given the orders jurisdictional recitations). Such cases do not involve a collateral attack on a void order.

Second, although Appellees contend that the county court at law’s orders are not “void on their face” because the court recited in its orders that it possessed jurisdiction, see Resp. Br. at 34-36, not all of the county court at law’s orders regarding the administration of the Trust so state. One order that is attacked in this appeal that does not include a jurisdictional recitation is the county court’s September 1, 2022, order extending the term of Judge Stem’s service as trust advisor. CR 827-28. Pursuant to that order, Judge Stem purports to act as the trust advisor, and his authority to act as such was recognized and accepted by the district court. CR 1292.

In sum, while Appellees state the correct jurisdictional-recitation rule, that rule does not apply when the court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the case. In such cases, the court’s order is void as a matter of law and constitutes a reversable abuse of discretion.

III. FRAN DID NOT WAIVE AND IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THAT THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW AND DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID.

Citing In the Interest of R.V., Jr., 977 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) and For the Protection of S.M., 658 S.W.3d 876, 877 (Tex. App.— El Paso 2022, no pet.), Appellees contend that Fran waived and is estopped from arguing that the county court or district court’s orders are void because she did not object to Judge Stem testifying at the motions hearing and agreed to the county court’s orders appointing Judge Stem as trust advisor. See Resp. Br. at 30, 45-46. Appellees are wrong, and their reliance on R.V. and S.M. is misplaced.

Subject matter jurisdiction “is never presumed and cannot be waived.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). And the two cases relied upon by Appellees do not involve challenges to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

In R.V., the father of a minor child waived any error arising from the trial court’s pretrial ruling that he would have to assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis during trial because the father failed to object to the trial court’s ruling and failed to get a ruling from the court on his objection. See R.V., 977 S.W.2d at 780. R.V.

did not involve a challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction. There was no claim that the ruling of the district court, a court of general jurisdiction, was void.

In S.M., a family member collaterally attacked an agreed protective order, arguing that the district court that granted the protective order did not have jurisdiction because it failed to make mandatory findings required by the Code of Criminal Conduct and could not enter an agreed protective order. See S.M., 658 S.W.3d at 879. However, the S.M. court did not address the “jurisdictional” issue because the court of appeals determined that the agreed protective order was not void. Id. at 880. The court held that the version of the Code of Criminal Conduct then in effect permitted an agreed protective order in family cases. Id. In so ruling, the S.M. court did reiterate that a person cannot agree to a protective order, thereby doing away with the need for proof at a hearing, and later attempt to avoid the consequences of the protective order by relying on the alleged lack of proof. Id. The court did not hold that a party collaterally attacking an agreed order waives any challenge to a void agreed order issued by a court without subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 879.

IV. THE ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE.

Appellees contend that the Order Appointing Receiver was supported by evidence of Fran’s past breaches of trust, the need to “resolve ongoing litigation,” and conflict regarding the administration of the Trust. See Resp. Br. at 15, 19-25. Appellees are incorrect.12

A. No Evidence Supports the Appointment of the Receiver Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001(a)(6).

The district court cited Section 64.001 as one basis for appointing the receiver to sell the Front 45 Acres. Appellees only attempt to justify the ruling under Section 64.001(a)(6). This section permits the appointment of a receiver “in any case in which a Receiver may be appointed under the rules of equity.” Resp. Br. at 23.

As Fran explained in her opening brief, (1) a court may appoint a receiver under Section 64.001(a)(6) only in “instances beyond” the five subsections justifying the appointment of a receiver in Section 64.001(a)— i.e., that subsection does not permit the appointment of an receiver in cases

12 Although legal and factually sufficiency challenges are not independent grounds for reversal for abuse of discretion, it is a relevant factor in determining whether the court abused its discretion. See Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); In re Estate of Martinez, No. 01-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 1442100, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. ^[2], 2019, no pet.).

that would ordinarily be governed by one of the five preceding subsections; and (2) this situation would ordinarily be controlled by Section 64.001(a)(3), thereby precluding any appointment under Section 64.001(a)(6). See App’t Br. at 33-35. Appellees wholly failed to respond to this argument or address the supporting cases cited in Fran’s brief. See Resp. Br. at 23-25.13

B. There Was No Evidence Supporting the Appointment of a Receiver Under Texas Property Code § 114.008(a)(5).

Appellees also argue that Section 114.008 of the Property Code justifies the appointment of a receiver “where a breach of trust has occurred or might occur,” which permitted the trial court to appoint the receiver. Resp. Br. at

21 (emphasis in original). Appellees contend that there is “ample evidence establishing that Appellant committed or threatened numerous breaches.” Id.

Similarly, the district court made the following two findings and conclusions:

13 Appellees point out that the cases cited in Fran’s brief interpret a former version of Section 64.001(a)(6) and argue that those cases are therefore inapplicable. See Resp. Br. at 34 & n.91. But when the Legislature amends a statute with language that is substantially the same, the new version conveys the same intent and meaning. See Walker v. Money, 120 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. 1938). The former version of Section 64.001(a)(6) is identical to the current version of Section 64.001(a)(7). See Tab B. In addition, the new amendments to Section 64.001(a) took effect after the district court issued its Order Appointing Receiver. See Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 73 (S.B. 2034), § 1, eff. May 19, 2025; Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 956 (S.B. 17), § 2, eff. Sept. ^[1], 2025.

• [A] Receiver is necessary and appropriate for the purpose of securing and selling the Front 45 Acres, along with granting any easement(s) pertaining to the Front 45 Acres, so as to minimize harm to the Trust, Trust property, and beneficiaries of the Trust, and to effectuate the terms of the Trust in an efficient and expeditious manner . . . .

• Irreparable damage will ensue to the beneficiaries of the Trust unless there is an immediate sale of the Front 45 Acres pursuant to the terms of the Trust. CR 1292 (emphasis added). Both the Appellees and the trial court are incorrect; there is no evidence to support a finding of a potential breach of trust or the two findings and conclusions.

No evidence demonstrated a threat of any potential harm to the Trust, Trust property, or the beneficiaries of the Trust absent an immediate sale of the Front 45 acres. Although Judge Stem speculated wildly (and incorrectly) that, as a result of this litigation, there would be nothing left in the Trust to distribute to the beneficiaries, he later admitted that he was personally unaware of the Trust’s financial condition. See 2 RR 101, 119-20.

Moreover, Section 114.008 actually provides that a court may appoint a receiver “[t]o remedy a breach of trust that has occurred or might occur.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 114.008(a) (emphasis added). Appellees allege, and Judge Stem testified, that Fran allegedly breached her duty of trust when she served as trustee. See Resp. Br. at 21-23; 2 RR 705-06.14 However, there was no evidence suggesting that the appointment of a receiver to sell the Front

45 Acres was necessary to remedy any past or potential breaches of trust by Fran.

Fran is not currently recognized as trustee of the Trust. There is no evidence that she might now somehow breach a duty of trust. How could she? She is no longer in a position to do so since she is not currently recognized as trustee of the Trust. There was no evidence that the appointment of a receiver was necessary “to remedy” her alleged, past breaches of trust. (Or Appellees have failed to point out any such evidence to Fran or the Court in their brief.) The most that Appellees have alleged is

14 In reality, Appellees’ allegations of wrongdoing are rhetoric at best. Appellees cite to allegations of wrongdoing set forth in their petition in intervention and Ms. Leuschner’s application for the appointment of a temporary administrator and trust advisor as well as an email from their attorney to Mr. Malone as the “evidence” supporting the appointment of the receiver under the property code. See Resp. Br. at 21 & notes 80-85. That is not evidence. Appellees do cite Judge Stem’s characterization of Fran’s actions as trustee as “inappropriate” and his testimony that Fran was removed as trustee after allegedly committing a “multitude” of breaches of trust. Fran recognizes that the trial court could have believed Judge Stem. However, it must be noted that later in the hearing, Judge Stem admitted that his hearing testimony directly conflicted with prior statements that he made to Fran and her attorney (before she sought to remove his hand- chosen colleague as trustee) and that, during those statements, he blamed Appellees for Fran’s difficulty in administering the Trust. See 2 RR 103, 112. As for the allegation that Fran failed to disclose the existence of funds in a bank account to Mr. Malone, it is undisputed that the bank account at issue is set forth in Schedule A to the Trust itself. See 2 RR 134; CR 551.

that Fran’s “Motion to Re-Affirm itself is evidence that Fran intends to contravene the Interested Trustee provision in the Trust in order to reach the result she desires, which does not align with the Trust and would be a future breach of trust.” Resp. Br. at 21-22. Of course, this is argument and speculation and constitutes no evidence. See Fieldtech Avionics & Instruments, Inc. v. Component Control.Com, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 164 (Tex. 2004)).

C. There Was No Evidence Supporting the Appointment of a Receiver Under the General Rules of Equity.

Appellees also argue that an equitable receivership was needed “to resolve years long litigation and dispute[s] over the management of probate property.” Resp. Br. at 23. The district court noted that there was an “extraordinary controversy” surrounding the sale of the Front 45 Acres and concluded that the appointment of a receiver was justified by that and the “material risk of harm, injury, damage and/or loss to the Property and/or Trust funds, as well as the various beneficiaries.” CR 1292.

As discussed above, there is no evidence to support the district court’s finding of a material risk of any harm to Trust property, funds, or the various beneficiaries. Moreover, as discussed in Fran’s opening brief, a court should not appoint an equitable receiver unless evidence reflects “a threat of serious injury to the applicant.” Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see App’t Br. at 37. Appellees’ brief ignores this legal argument and the cited authorities.

“When a court appoints a receiver, the court has determined that property should no longer be under the control of the parties but instead within the custody of the court.” Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). If the passage of time alone or a protracted disagreement between trust beneficiaries were sufficient to justify the appointment of an equitable receiver, then the reality will be that every sizeable or complex trust is likely to soon be under the supervision of a Texas court. This result would transmute an equitable receivership from the “harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy” it is intended to be into an everyday occurrence. See Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

V. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER IS OVERLY BROAD AND VIOLATES FRAN’S RIGHTS.

Appellees reject Fran’s argument regarding the overly broad scope of the Order Appointing Receiver for two reasons. First, Appellees contend that the Court should disregard Fran’s argument that the order technically enjoins her from even filing this interlocutory appeal. Why? Because Appellees have not yet challenged Fran’s right to do so in this Court. See Resp. Br. at 26-27; CR 1296. It cannot be disputed, however, that the order currently enjoins Fran from taking any action that indirectly hinders the Receiver’s sale of the property, which would include this appeal.15

Second, Appellees reject Fran’s complaint that the order currently requires her to pay the expenses incurred by the Trust in the ordinary course of business—even though Fran is not currently recognized as trustee and is not currently a signatory to the Trust’s bank accounts. According to Appellees, “the Order only contemplates an efficient payment mechanism to pay Trust expenses with Trust funds,” and they “proposed a

15 Appellees also disingenuously contend that “Fran admits the Order is not an anti-suit injunction[] and does not preclude the filing of any litigation.” Resp. Br. at 27 & n.103. This is dead wrong. Fran explained that the district court’s order was “not technically an anti-suit injunction because [it] was not issued by a separate court”; however, Fran immediately observed that “the effect is the same” and the order “would bar Fran’s right to prosecute her appeal.“ App’t Br. at 44.

supplemental order to Judge Luna to modify the Order (if necessary) such that the provision requiring Appellant to pay the Trust’s expenses from Trust funds be modified to moot this issue.” Resp. Br. at 28. The fact remains that the district court has not signed a supplemental order, and the order currently requires Fran to pay the Trust’s bills even though she has no access to Trust funds. If the Waco Court had not stayed the effect of the order pending this appeal, the order would require Fran to pay Trust expenses from her personal funds.

Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Rick Thompson Kirk L. Pittard State Bar No. 24010313 Rick Thompson State Bar No. 00788537 [email protected] DURHAM, PITTARD & SPALDING, LLP P.O. Box 224626 Dallas, Texas 75222 (214) 946-8000 (214) 946-8433 (fax) Craig D. Cherry State Bar No. 24012419 [email protected] Ryan C. Johnson State Bar No. 24048574 [email protected] Scott H. James State Bar No. 24037848 [email protected] CHERRY JOHNSON SIEGMUND JAMES, PLLC 7901 Fish Pond Road, 2nd Floor Waco, Texas 76710 (254) 732-2242 (866) 627-3509 (fax) COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i)(2)(D) because it contains 6,952 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). /s/ Rick Thompson Rick Thompson CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 3, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing brief was served on the following counsel of record via electronic service, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jim Dunnam Andy McSwain [email protected] [email protected] Andrea Mehta Mark E. Firmin [email protected] [email protected] Mason Vance Dunnam BEARD KULTGEN BROPHY BOSTWICK [email protected] & DICKSON PLLC DUNNAM & DUNNAM LLP 220 South 4th Street 4125 West Waco Drive Waco, Texas 76701 Waco, Texas 76710 Attorneys for Intervenors/Appellees Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellee Robert Spanos, Chrisopher Spanos, Vernon Leuschner and Nicole Spanos /s/ Rick Thompson Rick Thompson No. 15-25-00072-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT AT AUSTIN FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON, Appellant, v. VERNON LEUSCHNER, ROBERT LEE SPANOS, CHRISTOPHER BLAKE SPANOS, KATHRYN NICOLE LAWRIE, AND KATHERINE LEUSCHNER, Appellees.

On Interlocutory Appeal from the 414th District Court of McLennan County, Texas, Cause No. 2024-3035-5

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF REPLY BRIEF

Tab A Application to Probate Will and for Appointment of a Temporary Administrator; Frances Spanos Shelton’s Response and Opposition to Applicant’s Application to Probate Wil and for Appointment of Temporary Administrator Tab B Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 64.001 (current & former versions)

TAB A

Filed 9/26/2025 2:55 PM J.A. (Andy) Harwell County Clerk McLennan County, Texas By Cynthia Cunningham CAUSE NO. 20220135PR1 Deputy IN THE ESTATE OF § IN THE COUNTY COURT DOROTHY J. SPANOS, § AT LAW NO. 1 DECEASED § MCLENNAN COUNTY, TEXAS FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON’S RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICANT’S APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, Frances Spanos Shelton (“Shelton”) and files this Response and Opposition to Applicant Vernon Leuschner’s (“Applicant”), as durable power of attorney for Katherine Leuschner (“Mrs. Leuschner”), Application to Probate Will and for Appointment of a Temporary Administrator (“Application”), and in furtherance thereof would respectfully show unto the Court as follows: I. SUMMARY OF RESPONSE The undisputed facts and well-founded caselaw clearly demonstrate that Applicant’s Application should be denied in its entirety, rejecting both his request to probate the will of Dorothy Spanos (“Decedent’s Will”) and his request to appoint a temporary administrator. The Application to Probate Will should be denied for multiple reasons: 1) The Court has lacked jurisdiction over Decedent’s estate since May 18, 2022, when it discharged the temporary administrator and concluded that no further administration was required; 2) Mrs. Leuschner indisputably waived her right to probate the Will on May 18, 2022, when she agreed that Shelton would offer Decedent’s Will for probate only if subsequent events made it necessary; and RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 1 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased 3) Applicant has failed to satisfy the stringent requirements for probating a will under Texas law. Likewise, Applicant’s request to appoint a temporary administrator should be refused for several reasons: 1) Applicant failed to follow requirements under Texas law in seeking a temporary administration; 2) A temporary administration is unnecessary for Decedent’s estate; and 3) Applicant’s requested powers for a temporary administration are impermissibly overbroad. As a result, and consistent with the facts and law, Shelton asks the Court to wholly deny Applicant’s Application. II. BACKGROUND Applicant filed his Application amid significant family conflict and omitted pertinent and material details in a manner calculated to secure a favorable ruling. To summarize the procedural history, Mrs. Leuschner, as an heir of Decedent, filed an application for Appointment of Temporary Administrator and Trust Advisor on March 2, 2022, in the County Court at Law of McLennan County, Texas, requesting the Court to appoint Retired Judge Robert Stem (“Judge Stem”) as the Temporary Administrator of Decedent’s estate and Trust Advisor of Decedent’s Living Trust (“Trust”). 1 See Exhibit A (Application for Appointment of a Temporary Administrator and of a Trust Advisor). On March 8, 2022, this Court entered an order appointing