MEMORANDUM OPINION

Former State Department employee George Russell Reiff, Jr. challenges the government’s handling of his application for retirement benefits and its eventual calculation of his deferred annuity payments. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction over Reiff’s claims, the Court will grant the government’s motion to dismiss.

I. Background

This case involves two federal government retirement systems: the Civil Service

Retirement System (“CSRS”) and the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System

(“FSRDS”). Civilian federal employees who entered covered service before January 1, 1987, are eligible to participate in the CSRS. 5 U.S.C. § 8331. 1 The FSRDS is reserved for retirees from the foreign service. 22 U.S.C. § 4043.

Plaintiff George Russell Reiff, Jr. retired from the State Department after a 15-year career. Compl. ¶ 34. Upon his retirement, a State Department representative informed him that he could apply for retirement benefits under either the CSRS or the FSRDS. Id. He chose the dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), . . . the court must first examine the Rule

12(b)(1) challenges because ‘if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections . . . do not need to be determined.’”

Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2011) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.”). In evaluating whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, the Court “must construe the complaint liberally, accept all uncontroverted, well-pleaded facts as true, and attribute all reasonable inferences to the plaintiff[].” Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D.D.C. 2001). If there is no subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court “cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Hancock v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

B. Pro Se Pleading Standards

While a court must “construe a pro se plaintiff’s filings liberally,” Schnitzler v. United

States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014), a pro se litigant “cannot generally be permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts, nor to avoid the risks of failure that attend his decision to forego expert assistance,” Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir.

1983) (Scalia, J.). Accordingly, “although a court will read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, a pro se complaint . . . must present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.”

Adams v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 564 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2008) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Reiff brings his claims under the FTCA and District of Columbia common law. As explained below, they are barred under both. And even if he had pursued his claims through mechanisms available under the CSRS or the FRSDS, the Court would be powerless to hear them.

A. Reiff cannot bring a claim under the FTCA

Reiff cannot bring a claim under the FTCA because both retirement systems at issue offer participants exclusive procedures for challenging benefit determinations.

The procedures available to CSRS participants are set forth in the Civil Service

Retirement Act (“CSRA”). 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331 et seq. The Office of Personnel Management

(“OPM”) “adjudicate[s] all claims” related to CSRS benefits. Id. § 8347(b). Any

“administrative action or order affecting the rights or interests of an individual” participant may then “be appealed” to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). Id. § 8347(d)(1). If a

participant receives an adverse decision from the MSPB, he may then appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

As for the FRSDS, its dispute-resolution procedures are laid out in the Foreign Service

Act. Under the scheme, a “former member of the [Foreign] Service . . . may file a grievance”

based on an “alleged denial of an allowance, premium pay, or other financial benefit to which the member claims entitlement under applicable laws or regulations.” 22 U.S.C. §§ 4132, 4131(a)(1)(G). A grievance must first be filed with the State Department. See id. § 4134(b). If

the Department does not resolve the issue, the grievant may then lodge an appeal with the Foreign Service Grievance Board. Id. §§ 4134(b), 4137. And if the Board comes to an adverse

decision, the grievant may obtain “judicial review of a final action . . . in the district courts of the United States under the standards set forth in” the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 4140(a).

Where statutes lay out “narrowly tailored” judicial review schemes like these, litigants generally may not use the FTCA as a “means of circumventing” them. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO v. USPS, 940 F.2d 704, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere have applied this general principle to bar FTCA claims contesting

agency actions related to schemes applying to the civil service with similar processes to the CSRA. See, e.g., id. at 708–09 (prohibiting a FTCA claim under the Postal Service

Reorganization Act, which includes appeal to the MSPB with review by the Federal Circuit); see also Premachandra v. United States, 739 F.2d 392, 394 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Had Congress intended for such decisions to be reviewable in district courts in the context of actions under the Federal

Tort Claims Act, it would not have so precisely defined the civil service remedy.”).

The same reasoning applies to claims pertaining to annuity determinations under the FRSDS, which offers a similarly comprehensive review process. See U.S. Inf. Agency v. Krc, 989 F.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (the Foreign Service Act “provides a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action[s] taken against federal employees”). Reiff’s FTCA claim is therefore precluded by both statutory review schemes.

Reiff nonetheless insists that there is “no FTCA preclusion” because he is “not challenging an actual agency decision concerning CSRS eligibility determinations for former employee retirement benefits under the CSRA.” See Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ Ia(1). But Reiff is very much

contesting an agency determination concerning his retirement benefits, be it under the CSRA or the FRSDS. As noted above, he expressly claims that the State Department and OMB’s actions resulted in a “hybrid retirement solution[,] the benefits of which were less than those which should have transpired under Plaintiff’s original FSRDS deferred annuity application package[.]” Compl. ¶ C. And challenges to individual benefits determinations may not be brought under the FTCA. ^[2]

The cases Reiff cites in contesting FTCA preclusion are unhelpful to him in any event.

For example, in Fornaro v. James, 416 F.3d 63 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which is not a FTCA case, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge by retired law enforcement officers and firefighters to their disability benefits

determinations. The court explained that a district court ruling on the matter would “erode the primacy of the MSPB for resolution of administrative disputes” and undermine the CSRA’s

purpose to “replace the haphazard arrangements for administrative and judicial review of personnel action.” Fornaro, 416 F.3d at 67, 69 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988)). In Price v. United States, where the plaintiff

challenged the Department of Veterans Affairs’ decision not to reimburse him for certain medical expenses, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over a FTCA claim because exercising jurisdiction would “require the court to intrude upon the VA’s exclusive jurisdiction.” 228 F.3d 420, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2000). And in Monk v. United

States, No. 22-cv-1503 (SRU), 2024 WL 1344712 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2024), a court in another district found that the VA’s administrative review scheme did not preclude an FTCA claim brought by an African-American veteran. But that claim involved allegations of systemic

discrimination by the VA in administrating benefits claims from Black veterans rather than the “the individual decisions of VA officials who granted or denied any particular application.” Id.

at *5. Reiff makes no such systemic challenge; his claims focus entirely on the handling of his own application.

B. Sovereign immunity prohibits Reiff’s D.C. tort claims

Reiff also appears to bring independent claims for negligence, negligent supervision, and breach of fiduciary duty under District of Columbia law. See Compl. ¶¶ 72, 79, 84. But to the extent he does, District of Columbia law does not provide an independent cause of action for his claims because “suits for damages against the United States under the common law must be

brought pursuant to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA[.]” Benoit v. USDA, 608 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2010). As explained above, relief through the FTCA is unavailable here. The Court will therefore dismiss Reiff’s common-law tort claims.

C. The Court would lack jurisdiction over any challenge to Reiff’s CSRS benefits determination brought under the CSRA

Even if Reiff had challenged his annuity determination directly under the CSRA, the Court would be powerless to entertain it. As noted above, OPM adjudicates all claims regarding

CSRS benefits. See 5 U.S.C. § 8347(a)–(b). OPM’s decisions may be appealed to the MSPB, with further review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 U.S.C. §

8347(d)(1). “Review by OPM/MSPB/Federal Circuit is the exclusive remedy for claims regarding retirement benefits of federal workers” under the CSRA. Eisenbeiser v. Chertoff, 448

F. Supp. 2d 106, 111–12 (D.D.C. 2006) (collecting cases).

Reiff resists the statute’s clear mandate, arguing that OPM’s failure to make a final

determination of his claim within six months means that OPM effectively denied the claim, thereby giving this Court subject-matter jurisdiction. See Compl. ¶ 6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675).

Not so. Even if the OPM decision were final, Reiff would have to appeal it to the MSPB. See 5

U.S.C. § 8347(a)–(b). And even if Reiff received a decision from the MSPB, any appeal of the MSPB’s determination would have to be brought in the Federal Circuit. In other words, the “CSRA’s statutory scheme essentially leaves no room for federal district court review of MSPB decisions[.]” Hisler v. Gallaudet Univ., 344 F. Supp. 2d 29, 42 (D.D.C. 2004).

D. Any challenge to Reiff’s FRSDS benefits determination would be premature at this stage

By contrast, the Foreign Service Act would channel jurisdiction to this court over a challenge to Reiff’s FSRDS benefits determination, but only after Reiff exhausted his administrative remedies and filed suit. It is a “long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S.

41, 50–51 (1938). A rigorous exhaustion requirement preserves the “autonomy of the administrative agency . . . to exercise its expertise and discretion on appropriate matters,”

Randolph–Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1986), while

“promot[ing] effective and efficient judicial review by ensuring that such review is of a fully developed factual record, and undertaken with the benefit of the agency’s exercise of discretion or application of expertise,” Convertino v. DOJ, 393 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2005) (citation omitted).

Before Reiff could challenge his benefits determination via the Foreign Service Act, he would have to follow the applicable statutory requirements. If the State Department did not address his grievance, he could then file an appeal with the Foreign Service Grievance Board.

See 22 U.S.C. §§ 4134–39. Once the Board came to a decision on appeal, the decision would be final and, at that point, subject to judicial review by the district court under the “standards set forth” in the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 4140(a). Sitting here today, however, Reiff apparently has not completed any of those steps, and so this Court cannot hear his claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. A separate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge DATE: December 4, 2025