2026 IL App (1st) 260484-U

FIRST DIVISION June 15, 2026

Nos. 1-26-0484B and 1-26-0530B, Consolidated

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) Nos. 24 CR 10251 ) 26 CR 01239 ) MICHAEL HARRIS, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s orders denying defendant’s motion for relief from (a) the court’s order revoking defendant’s pretrial release for possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and (b) continuing defendant’s pretrial detention for unlawful possession of a weapon. The State established by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combinations of conditions could reasonably prevent defendant from being charged with another offense or mitigate the real and present threat defendant poses to the community.

¶2 Defendant, Michael Harris, was on pretrial release on a charge of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, a class 3 felony (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2024)). The State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s pretrial release after defendant was charged with unlawful

possession of a loaded weapon/machine gun (UPW), a class X felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(7)(i), (b) (West 2024)). The State also filed a motion to deny pretrial release on the UPW charge. The 1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. trial court revoked defendant’s pretrial release on the cannabis charge and denied defendant pretrial release on the UPW charge. Defendant filed a combined motion for relief from pretrial

detention on both charges. The circuit court of Cook County denied defendant’s motion. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 In July 2024, the State charged defendant, Michael Harris, with possession with intent to deliver more than 30 grams but less than 500 grams of a substance containing cannabis. On July

20, 2024, the trial court ordered defendant released from custody with conditions.

¶5 On January 16, 2026, the State filed a Petition for Pretrial Detention Hearing in a new case. The State’s petition stated that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the detention-eligible offense of unlawful possession of a weapon/machine

gun and that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case. (The State also charged defendant with multiple counts of aggravated unlawful possession of a weapon and resisting a peace officer arising from the same incident.) The petition stated that police officers observed defendant walking “with his arm clamped tightly against his body.” When officers approached defendant he fled to a porch where a physical confrontation ensued. During that confrontation

defendant kicked an officer in the stomach, and after “scuffling with officers for a long period of time” police placed defendant into custody. Police recovered a firearm from defendant’s

waistband. The State’s petition described the firearm as “equipped with a laser sight attachment, automatic switch, a loaded extended magazine, a live round in the chamber.” The petition stated

260485

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. defendant does not have a Firearm Owners’ Identification (FOID) card or a Concealed Carry

License (CCL).

¶6 The trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition for pretrial detention on the UPW charge. The court found that the petition alleged a detention-eligible offense and that defendant posed a real and present threat to any person(s) or the community, and that no conditions can mitigate that risk. The Pretrial Officer informed the court that defendant had a new criminal activity score of three, a failure to appear score of four, and that his assessment coincides with supervision level one.

¶7 The State proffered the statements in the petition and added that when defendant became aware of the officers’ presence, he “became wide-eyed,” changed direction, and continued to

look over his shoulder. When officers asked defendant if he had a valid FOID or CCL card, defendant fled. The police officers initiated a foot chase during which defendant’s movements continued to indicate to the officers that defendant was armed: the officers observed defendant manipulating something with his right hand under his left arm. The officers caught up to

defendant when defendant was trying to enter a residence. The officers grabbed defendant and felt an object they knew to be a firearm. A scuffle ensued during which defendant continued to try to grab the firearm despite orders to stop. A second person became involved and momentarily grabbed the gun. The State proffered that this person pushed a different officer down the stairs outside the residence.

¶8 Defendant eventually got his hand on the gun and the officers ordered him to let go. The officers struck defendant about the head and face to get him to release the firearm. The officers thought that defendant was going to cause great bodily harm to himself and/or the officers on the 260486

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons.

scene based on the way defendant’s hand was on the firearm. Defendant kicked another officer in the midsection but that officer was able to retrieve the gun from defendant. The officers who

initiated the foot pursuit suffered minor contusions and lacerations to their hands and knees. The officers later determined that the gun was stolen.

¶9 The State also proffered defendant’s criminal history, including the pending cannabis charge, one misdemeanor, and a 2023 reckless conduct with bodily harm conviction for which the trial court sentenced defendant to six months’ supervision, which defendant terminated satisfactorily. The State added that in the reckless conduct case there had been a judgment on a bond forfeiture that was vacated prior to the sentence of supervision. Defendant had no juvenile adjudications.

¶ 10 After its proffer, the State argued that the proof was evident and the presumption was great that defendant committed an eligible offense and that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community at large. The State argued that the acts leading to the UPW charge occurred on a weekday at approximately 6:00 p.m. (the trial court later stated the offense occurred at approximately 8:00 p.m.), “[s]o it’s prime time;” and defendant was on the public way. The State argued that defendant’s flight shows that he was not willing to comply with

authorities in that moment. The State contended that defendant kicked open the front door of the residence he was trying to enter. The State argued that defendant’s act of repeatedly reaching for the gun was a danger to the officers and to himself because the gun could have gone off, and at

least two officers received injuries during defendant’s arrest. The State argued that the fact the gun had a switch to make it automatic, or essentially a machine gun, made the gun “unbelievably dangerous” because it could fire bullets at a high rate of speed and it was difficult to control

260487

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons.

where those bullets go. The State argued that the laser sight made the gun even more dangerous, and because of the extended magazine the gun could inflict “more carnage than a regular firearm

does.” The State also argued that, not only did defendant not have any licensure to carry the firearm, his FOID card was actually denied.

¶ 11 The State argued that no conditions could mitigate the risk defendant posed to the community at large. The State argued that defendant was charged with UPW while already on pretrial release, showing that defendant could not follow orders. The State also argued that defendant’s 2023 offense “went into judgment on bond forfeiture status before the judge granted

[d]efendant six months’ supervision,” showing that defendant cannot comply with orders to come to court. The State argued that the two days of movement allowed under electronic

monitoring would “allow him to acquire dangerous firearms,” as defendant did in this case. The State asked the court to detain defendant.

¶ 12 The defense argued that “there will be fourth amendment issues with this case down the line.” The defense argued that police never testified they saw defendant doing anything illegal, a weapon, or a weapon-shaped bulge; and based on what they observed, police had no reason to chase defendant. The defense argued that at the point police engaged defendant he “was free to go wherever he pleased.” The defense argued that the residence defendant fled to was his home

and defendant had opened the door to his residence when police “escalated the interaction.” The defense contended that there were at least seven officers on the scene and at least three of them used closed fists to strike defendant about the head and face. The defense pointed out defendant’s

visible injuries to the trial court. The defense also argued that there was a discrepancy in the officers’ accounts in that when police saw defendant walking, they believed defendant had a gun

260488

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. in his armpit area but the gun was recovered from defendant’s waistband. The defense argued that the State would “have a hard time addressing these issues down the line” but the defense only noted them at the time “for the record” and stated that it would be “pursuing these arguments at trial.”

¶ 13 The defense argued that as for being a threat to the community defendant never displayed or discharged the weapon. The interaction did not begin with a crime being reported or a report of a person with a gun. The defense acknowledged defendant’s charges for resisting but argued that it was police who “escalated what should have and could have been a completely nonviolent interaction.” The defense also contended that, according to the arrest report, the officers received

“no injuries, no hospitalizations.” The defense argued that defendant’s cannabis charge was not violent in nature and did not involve weapons, and that defendant had no felony or violent

convictions. The defense argued that defendant “has never before been accused of possession of a weapon, [or] convicted of possession of a weapon, or accused or convicted of any violent

offense.” The defense also argued that with regard to defendant’s reckless conduct conviction, the complaint indicated that defendant was charged with performing an act that could cause

bodily harm, not that he did cause bodily harm. The defense argued there was nothing in defendant’s background “to show that he is a real and present threat to anybody specific or to the community.” The defense argued that defendant did not have a significant amount of criminal activity in his background and noted his pretrial services assessments.

¶ 14 As for conditions of release, the defense requested release on supervision level one, and argued that the State had not “proffered violations of probation or parole or some significant history of failures to appear.” The defense stated that defendant had one failure to appear warrant

260489

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. on the cannabis charge in February 2025, but he “has appeared on that case on every single other court date.” The defense argued that one failure to appear was due to a miscommunication, and it was quashed. The defense argued defendant had not been arrested (until the UPW) or had any

violations in the year-and-a-half defendant was on pretrial release on the cannabis charge. The defense argued that the State did not have “any evidence *** to show that [defendant] would not be compliant with conditions ***.”

¶ 15 In mitigation the defense argued that defendant was 23 years old, a lifelong resident of Cook County, and had lived with his family at a stable address for ten years. Defendant was a high school graduate, attended church, and was employed. The defense argued that defendant

had family support including from his mother, who was the second individual who came onto the porch and allegedly temporarily grabbed the firearm. The defense asked the trial court to deny the State’s petition and order defendant’s pretrial release.

¶ 16 In reply, the State argued that the fact defendant fled police resulting in the reckless conduct charge “just further shows that this defendant cannot comply with the authorities’ orders.” (The reckless conduct charge arose from an incident in which police attempted to stop a vehicle and the occupants, including defendant, fled on foot.) The State asked the trial court to grant its petition.

¶ 17 The trial court found that it was reasonable to believe that the object defendant was manipulating in his armpit as he fled police made its way somewhere into his waistband where it was ultimately found. The court stated that the facts told the court that defendant knew he had to obtain a FOID card and chose to disobey the rules. The court stated that it took note of the fourth amendment issues the defense raised because they are “important for the Court to take note of.”

260490

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons.

Regardless, “it’s not going to be fully litigated [here] based on the fact that police do ultimately

*** find that the defendant is in possession of this firearm. I’m going to say proof evident.” The court also relied on the fact defendant did not have a FOID or CCL, was on pretrial release, and the firearm was fully automatic. The court found the State met its burden on the first prong.

¶ 18 The court also found that “it’s undeniable that this defendant poses a threat to the community and to the police” based on the confrontation with police. The court specifically noted that defendant “wouldn’t let go of this terrifyingly dangerous weapon knowing full well at that point, especially when he is on the ground holding it, he’s caught. They’re going to get it from him. And arguably, that’s where the dangerousness prong comes in.” The trial court stated that defendant could have been compliant but continued “fighting tooth and nail” even “when his mother gets involved, he still continues to attempt to conceal this weapon.” The trial court also noted the dangerousness of the fully automatic firearm and that defendant possessed it “while not having the credentials to own any sort of firearm whatsoever.” The court also found that the fact the gun was stolen and not traceable to defendant “adds to the dangerousness prong.” The trial court concluded that based on all of the facts the State met its burden to establish that defendant was a danger to the community.

¶ 19 Finally, as to conditions, the trial court found that defendant had “at least twice, maybe three times,” shown “that he is not really a rule follower.” The court stated that electronic monitoring “is reserved for people who demonstrate nonviolence and an ability to adhere to strict conditions.” The court found that there was no “evidence of such an ability in [defendant’s]

background.” The court found that defendant’s reckless conduct charge for fleeing police, defendant’s judgment on bond forfeiture that was vacated, his extended flight and fighting with

260491

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. police in this case while on pretrial release for a pending felony, and that defendant committed several new violations of the law, “inspires no confidence in the court that if defendant were to be placed back again on conditions of pretrial release, that he would be able to comply with them.” The court found that under the circumstances, “with this extreme behavior,” there are no conditions that can mitigate the risk defendant posed. The court granted the State’s petition for pretrial detention.

¶ 20 On January 16, 2026, the State also filed a Petition for Revocation of Pretrial Release on defendant’s cannabis charge. The January 2026 petition for revocation alleged that while on pretrial release on the cannabis charge, defendant was charged with a new felony, unlawful

possession of a weapon/machine gun, and that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.

¶ 21 On January 16, 2026, the trial court granted the petition and ordered defendant detained on the cannabis charge.

¶ 22 On February 13, 2026, defendant filed a petition for pretrial release on both the cannabis

charge and the UPW charge. Defendant’s petition described the circumstances of his arrest for UPW similarly to the State’s petition. Defendant’s petition stated that the officers only observed

defendant “walking *** with one of his arms not swinging freely.” The defense argued that in the struggle with defendant the officers claim to have received “abrasions to their hands, and one

to their hands and knees,” while defendant suffered “facial lacerations, abrasions to his hands, and a black eye.” Defendant’s petition stated that defendant was released on pretrial monitoring, and upon information and belief “no pretrial non-compliance reports [were] ever *** filed.”

260492

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons.

¶ 23 Defendant’s petition argued that the trial court is not required to revoke a defendant’s

pretrial release based on an arrest for a new charge but may instead release the defendant with or without modifications to their pretrial release conditions. Defendant argued that he is a lifelong

resident of Cook County, had been employed fulltime for five months prior to his UPW arrest, and had no criminal background. Defendant noted that his pretrial services assessment placed

him at a three on the new criminal activity scale and a four on the failure to appear scale and “recommended that he be released on pretrial supervision level 1.” Defendant also argued that his UPW arrest “stems only from a lucky guess by the officers when they profiled [defendant] as he was walking.” Defendant argued that the trial court “can absolutely fashion conditions that

would allow him to fight these cases outside the confines of the Cook County Department of Corrections.” Defendant asked the court to review his current detention on the UPW charge, conduct a hearing on the State’s petition to revoke pretrial release on his cannabis charge, “and find that there are lesser restrictions than detention and order that he be released, on both cases, with whatever pretrial conditions [the] Court deems fit.”

¶ 24 On the same day, February 13, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s petition. The defense proffered that defendant was supported by his mother and stepfather who were in court. The defense attached photographs of defendant taken at defendant’s first appearance after his arrest on the UPW charge which the defense stated showed “blood vessels in his eyes that are broke, he has a black eye, scratches to his face.” The defense further stated that defendant “sustained a number of bruises and scratches throughout not only his face, but down his arms, his neck, the back of his neck.” The defense again argued defendant’s minimal criminal background and the fact the weapon seized from defendant was not displayed or used, - 10 -

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. and that this was defendant’s first weapons related offense. The defense argued that defendant’s home is “eligible for curfew or electronic monitoring if the court believes that some restrictions

need to be on [defendant.”] The defense stated defendant’s personal background and asked the trial court to release defendant on both charges.

¶ 25 At the February 13 hearing the State argued that as officers pursued defendant they would not have known if the residence defendant approached was his residence or not; “it just would have been running towards a residence and pushing the front door open as the officers caught up to him.” The State argued that the weapon seized “can be used to cause harm to the community,”

that defendant had been released on conditions and was in possession of the firearm, and that the officers suffered injuries resulting in the resisting charges. The State argued that defendant had

“demonstrated that he’s a flight risk by, again, running away from officers, trying to get into a building at that time while in possession of that firearm.” The State argued that the “prongs have been met” as to the UPW charge and asked that defendant’s detention status not be disturbed.

¶ 26 As for the revocation of pretrial release on the cannabis charge, the State argued that defendant committed a felony while on conditions of release and that defendant’s detention should remain as to that matter as well. The defense responded that defendant’s flight from police was not the “willful flight” referenced by the Pretrial Fairness Act.

¶ 27 The trial court addressed the revocation of defendant’s pretrial release on the cannabis charge first and found, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions would reasonably

prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or class A misdemeanor. The court stated that it was “not concerned about the flight,” but the issue is the gun case. The court revoked defendant’s pretrial release. The court also stated that with regard to the UPW charge

- 11 -

1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. that “defendant should remain detained based on what’s presented to the court at this time.” On

February 13, 2026, the trial court entered a written “Order After Revocation Hearing.”

¶ 28 On March 5, 2026, defendant filed a Motion for Relief Under the Pretrial Fairness Act pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) that asked the trial court to review its February 13, 2026 decision to revoke defendant’s release on the cannabis charge and to continue his detention on the UPW charge. Defendant’s Rule 604 motion again argued that the trial court is not obligated to revoke pretrial release when a defendant is charged with a subsequent offense but may simply increase the conditions of release. The Rule 604 motion argued that defendant had been on pretrial release for two years prior to being charged with

UPW “without any pretrial non-compliance issues, without new arrests, and without any

sanctions.” Defendant asked the court to consider his “ability to abide by court orders and conditions, aside from the 2026 [UPW] arrest,” reconsider the revocation, and release him with conditions.

¶ 29 Defendant’s Rule 604(h) motion also argued that with regard to the UPW charge the State failed to meet its initial burden, and the February 13th continuation of defendant’s pretrial

detention was error. Defendant’s motion argued that he was not a danger to the community and there were conditions that could be imposed to ensure he is not charged with additional offenses.

Defendant noted that his charge is for possession with no allegations that the weapon was used or displayed; thus, there were no specific articulable facts demonstrating that defendant was a threat to anyone. Defendant also argued that he was “profiled.” Defendant asked the trial court to reconsider his continued detention on the UPW charge.

- 12 - 1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. ¶ 30 On March 5, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s Rule 604 motion. As in prior hearings, the defense argued that, other than one failure to appear for which a warrant was issued then quashed with no sanction imposed, defendant was compliant with his release on the cannabis charge until he was arrested for UPW. The defense recounted the events leading to defendant’s arrest and made similar arguments as in prior hearings that police only saw defendant walking with his left arm not swinging freely, the officers acted on a "hunch," defendant suffered injuries during the arrest, and police recovered the gun from defendant’s waistband and not under his arm. The defense argued that defendant “has demonstrated the fact that he’s able to abide by the conditions of pretrial release” other than the new arrest, and the court could “fashion conditions that would allow him to fight these cases on the outside as opposed to within the confines of the Cook County Department of Corrections.” The defense repeated defendant’s personal history and pretrial services assessments. The defense requested pretrial release with conditions. ¶ 31 The State argued that with regard to the revocation of pretrial release on the cannabis charge, there was clear and convincing evidence that no conditions could reasonably ensure that defendant is not charged with another offense. As for defendant’s continued detention on the UPW charge, the State argued that detention should continue because the proof is evident and the presumption great that (1) defendant committed detention eligible offenses, (2) defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person(s) in the community based on the specific facts of the case, and (3) no condition(s) can ensure defendant’s compliance. The State further argued that despite the defense’s argument that defendant had no issues with his pretrial release until the arrest for UPW, defendant “did the one thing that is most egregious while on pretrial - 13 - 1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. release, which is to pick up a new case, and the case he picked up is a class X nonprobationable felony offense.” ¶ 32 The State argued that as the police officers continued to try to subdue defendant outside the residence, defendant “continued to try to pull away” and “chose to remove a firearm from his person and then display that firearm in the officer’s presence.” Defendant did not comply with officers’ commands to release the firearm. The State proffered information it reviewed on the firearm worksheet the State had received in this case. The State believed the information had not previously been proffered. The State proffered that when the gun was recovered there were 29 rounds in the extended magazine with one additional “live round.” Based on defendant’s actions on the day of his arrest “and his failure to comply with officers’ commands and his failure to comply with this court’s conditions,” the State asked that defendant continue to be detained and argued that no condition(s) can mitigate defendant’s risk of “picking up a new case and rearming himself with another weapon.” ¶ 33 The defense conceded that its “arguments *** in response to that would be more appropriate for a fourth amendment motion.” Nonetheless, the defense argued that “there is no reason to have to comply with officers that are approaching you for no reason and then chasing you up your front steps for no reason.” The defense repeated that the officers were acting on a “hunch” and that the weapon was recovered from defendant’s waistband. ¶ 34 The trial court stated that it would not be determining the legality of the officers’ actions in approaching defendant because there was “no fourth amendment or Article I section 6 violation that’s alleged, at least formally.” The court found the proffers inconsistent as to whether the gun “had to be removed off the defendant [or] whether or not he pulled it out and - 14 - 1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. displayed it.” But the court noted that “it does appear that this is a fully automatic weapon with 29 live rounds.” The court found that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense. ¶ 35 The trial court found that a condition of defendant’s pretrial release for the cannabis charge would have been not to possess any firearms or commit any new offenses but it is alleged that he did so. The court found that it believed defendant “has in fact committed a felony offense while he was released.” The court found that the fact defendant armed himself with this weapon despite being unable to do so with the proper licenses and being prohibited from possessing any weapons legally while on pretrial release “indicates to me that he is in fact a danger to the community in general.” The court found that no condition(s) could mitigate the threat to the public. The court denied the motion for relief as to both charges. ¶ 36 On March 5, 2026, defendant filed a notice of appeal. “The motion for relief will serve as the argument of the appellant on appeal. The appellant may file, but is not required to file, a memorandum ***. Issues raised in the motion for relief are before the appellate court regardless of whether the optional memorandum is filed.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). On May 5, 2025, defendant filed a Notice in Lieu of Rule 604(h) Memorandum stating that defendant elected to stand on the arguments in the motion for relief filed in the trial court. On May 8, 2026, this court granted the State’s motion for leave to file its memorandum in response to defendant’s appeal instanter. - 15 - 1-26-0484B) 1-26-0530B) Cons. ¶ 37 This appeal followed. ^[1] ¶ 38 ANALYSIS ¶ 39 This is an appeal from the denial of a motion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) for relief from a revocation of pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2024)) and for relief from continued pretrial detention pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)). Where, as in this case, the proceedings on a revocation of pretrial release involve only the parties’ proffers and documentary evidence, our review is de novo. People v. Rios, 2025 IL App (1st) 250950, ¶ 25 (citing People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51). Similarly, in an appeal from a denial of pretrial release upon review of a pretrial detention order pursuant to section 110-6.1(i- 5) that is based on the parties’ proffers and documentary evidence with no live testimony, our review is de novo. People v. Phelps, 2025 IL App (1st) 251777-U, ¶ 24 (citing Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54). ¶ 40 1. Legal Standards ¶ 41 A petition to revoke pretrial release requires the State to prove different elements than a petition to deny or continue the denial of pretrial release. See People v. Hill, 2025 IL App (4th) 250010, ¶ 23. In pretrial detention proceedings, initially, “[t]he State must file a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. [Citation.] The State then has the burden of proving by clear and