Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005). · Go Syfert
Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 (2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
Quick Summary

The government may offset Social Security benefits to collect debt owed on federally reinsured student loans despite statutory time limitations (notwithstanding any other provision of statute).

The petitioner, a former student, challenged the government's offset of his Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that was more than ten years old. The central question is whether later statutes authorizing the offset and eliminating time limits for student loans supersede the Social Security Act's anti-attachment provision, which requires an express reference for modification. The court applies the rule that when the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference. The court holds that the later statutes effectively repealed the relevant limitations and authorized the offset, thereby affirming the lower court's judgment.

259 citation events (259 in the last 25 years) across 46 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Cited for
At page 149 Determining when later statute overrides earlier statute14 citing cases“when the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other 'magical password.”7 citing courts quote it · 13 listed here
  • Dale Michael v. Malcolm Futhey, Jr., No. 08-3932, 2009 WL 4981688 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2009).unpublished 2 cites
    (When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs[.])
  • Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservati v. Usdoi, 173 F.4th 1012 (9th Cir. 2026).published 3 cites
    “When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other ‘magical password.’” Lock…
  • United Therapeutics Corp., No. 10210-21 (T.C. May 17, 2023).published
    See Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (“Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible.”); see also id. (discussing the standard for implied repeals); Lockhart v. Unite…
  • Vista Hill Investments, LLC, Bobby A. Branch, Tax Matters Partner, No. 17380-19 (T.C. Nov. 9, 2022).published 6 cites
    The Supreme Court has likewise emphasized that “[e]xemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in [ 5 U.S.C. § 559 ] that modifications must be express.” Marcello v.…
  • Ctr. for Investigative Rptg. v. DOJ, 14 F.4th 916 (9th Cir. 2021).published
    As Justice Scalia observed, “[w]hen the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or o…
  • Everytown v. ATF, No. 19-3438 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2020).published 2 cites
    In the event of a conflict, “the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference.” Id. (quoting Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 149 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)…
  • Ctr. for Investigative Rptg. v. DOJ, 982 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2020).published
    As Justice Scalia observed, “[w]hen the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or o…
  • United States v. Cotto-Flores, 970 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2020).published
    Per our higher-ups, statutes that require Congress to use such "express references" or "magical passwords" really create "less demanding interpretive requirement[s]" because they can't compel courts to "disregard [ ] the will of a later Co…
  • Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012).published 6 cites
    One Member of the Court has said we should determine whether “the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute,” and, if so, “the later enactment governs, regardless of its compli- ance with any earlier-enacte…
  • Green Rock LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 2:21-cv-01320 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 2, 2023). 2 cites
    But “[e]xemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed.” Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310 ; see Lockhart, 546 U.S. at 149 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[R]epeals by implication are not favored.
Show 3 more citing cases
At page 148 Legislative power to exempt itself from statutory requirements9 citing cases8 listed here
  • Vista Hill Investments, LLC, Bobby A. Branch, Tax Matters Partner, No. 17380-19 (T.C. Nov. 9, 2022).published 6 cites
    The Supreme Court has likewise emphasized that “[e]xemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in [ 5 U.S.C. § 559 ] that modifications must be express.” Marcello v.…
  • Garey v. Langley, No. 2:17-cv-00117 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 13, 2021).
    In Millbrook, the Supreme Court said that “the FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers.” 154 The Supreme Court explained that the law-enforcement proviso “extend…
  • English v. Trump, No. 2017-2534 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2018).published 2 cites
    Indeed, under those circumstances, a “subsequent Congress . . . may exempt itself . . . by ‘fair implication’—that is, without an express statement.” Lockhart, 546 U.S. at 148 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (citing Warden v. M…
  • United States v. Carmelina Vera Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2011).published 2 cites
    A subsequent Congress . . . may exempt itself from [express-provision] requirements by ‘fair implication.’” Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
  • Hewitt v. Helix Engy Solutions Grp, 15 F.4th 289 (5th Cir. 2021).published
    See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) 21 (Scalia, J., concurring) (collecting cases holding that “Congress . . . may [enact] exempt[ions] . . . by ‘fair implication’—that is, without an express statement”) (emphasi…
  • Michael Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Grp., 983 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 2020).published
    See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (collecting cases holding that “Congress . . . may [enact] exempt[ions] . . . by ‘fair implication’—that is, without an express statement”) (emphasis a…
  • D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).published
  • D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. Jan. 20, 2014).published
At page 145 Determining when social security benefits become subject to offset7 citing cases[T]he Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security benefits subject to offset.1 citing court put it this way
  • Duronio v. Parker, No. 2:23-cv-01446 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2024).unpublished
    ([T]he Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security benefits subject to offset.)
  • John W Davis, No. 23-10921 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 24, 2024).
    To exercise setoff rights, the “fund against which the right of set-off is to be exercised must be in existence as of the commencement of the case.” Rowan, 15 B.R. at 840 . 17 In Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 145 (2005), the Sup…
  • Emrit v. United States Dep't of Educ., No. 1:20-cv-00035 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2020).
    (stating that Social Security benefits are subject to government withholding to offset defaulted student loans)
  • Bright v. United States Dep't of Treasury, No. 6:18-cv-03090, 2018 WL 4926307 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2018).
    (holding that the previous 10-year limit in the Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (e)(1), did not bar offsetting Social Security benefits to repay federally-reinsured student loans)
  • United States v. Carmelina Vera Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2011).published 2 cites
    A subsequent Congress . . . may exempt itself from [express-provision] requirements by ‘fair implication.’” Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
  • Green Rock LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv., 104 F.4th 220 (11th Cir. 2024).published
    (evaluating whether Congress “clearly” departed from the Act’s baseline rule)
  • Mann Constr., Inc. v. United States, 27 F.4th 1138 (6th Cir. 2022).published
    See Lockhart, 546 U.S. at 145-46.
At page 144 Limiting offsets against social security benefits and debt collection5 citing cases“The availability of offsets against Social Security benefits is limited, as the Social Security Act . . . makes Social Security benefits, in general, not ‘subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process”1 citing court quotes it
  • Booth v. DeVos, No. 6:20-cv-01433 (D. Or. July 9, 2024).
    “The availability of offsets against Social Security benefits is limited, as the Social Security Act . . . makes Social Security benefits, in general, not ‘subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other le…”
  • Ceasar v. Vets. Admin. Med. Ctr. of New Orleans, No. 2:19-cv-12812 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2020).
    “The Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended, provides that, after pursuing the debt collection channels set out in 31 U.S.C. § 3711 (a), an agency head can collect an outstanding debt ‘by administrative offset”
  • Clark v. Student Loan Fin. Corp., No. 1:18-cv-09354 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019).
    Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 144 (2005) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (a)).
  • Coast Prof'l, Inc. v. United States, No. 15-207 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 14, 2018).published
  • Cbe Grp., Inc. v. United States, No. 17-1970 (Fed. Cl. May 22, 2018).published
At page 146 Interpreting statutory time limits and offset authority5 citing casesThe fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” (quoting Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991))2 citing courts put it this way
  • Tyson Sr. v. Dep't of Labor, No. 2020-0147 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021).published 2 cites
    (The Debt Collection Improvement Act . . . add[ed] offset authority against Social Security benefits . . . .)
  • Jesus Gonzalez v. State of Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2012).published 4 cites
    “the fact that congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.”
  • Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. SEC. Admin., No. 22-1191 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2025).published
    (The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” (quoting Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 15…)
  • Raymond v. Arcadia Recovery Bureau, LLC, 556 F. Supp. 3d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).published
    See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005) 8 (citation omitted) (“The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plai…
  • Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 413 F. Supp. 3d 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).published
    See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005). * * * Having found that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the threshold requirements for both primary liability under § 2333(a) and secondary conspiracy liability under § 2…
126 S. Ct. at 703 Binding effect of prior congressional statements on future acts2 citing cases
  • James M. Robinette v. Comm'r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).published
    Whether or not the Congress of 1946 may bind the Congress of 1998 to make an “express” statement permitting the Tax Court to consider evidence outside the administrative record, see Lockhart v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 699, 703 (2005) (Sc…
  • United States v. Raymond P. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).published 4 cites
    See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142 , 126 S.Ct. 699, 703-04 , 163 L.Ed.2d 557 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Supreme Court case law dictates that statutory express statement requirements are invalid). .
163 L. Ed. 2d at 560 Approving offset of social security benefits for student loans1 citing caseapproving the offset of social security benefits to collect a delinquent student loan1 citing court put it this way
  • Lozner v. Lozner, 909 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).published
    (approving the offset of social security benefits to collect a delinquent student loan)
At page 142 Considering offset of social security benefits for student debt1 citing caseJustice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether the United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt…opening of page *142 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Levy v. Luo, No. 1:23-cv-00653 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2025).
    However, as set forth above, Janus holds that the maker of a statement is the one with “ultimate authority” over the statement. 546 U.S. at 142.
At page 143 Offsetting social security payments for federal debt repayment1 citing casedescribing how a portion of plaintiff’s Social Security payments were withheld under the TOP to offset his delinquent student loans1 citing court put it this way
  • Ojo v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-04882 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2020).
    (describing how a portion of plaintiff’s Social Security payments were withheld under the TOP to offset his delinquent student loans)
At page 147 Inferring legislative intent from failed bills2 citing casesWe can rarely determine from the failure of the 20 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Legislature to pass a particular bill what the intent of the Legislature is with respect to existing law.1 citing court put it this way · 1 listed here
  • State v. Dunbar, 383 P.3d 112 (Haw. App. 2016).published 4 cites
    (We can rarely determine from the failure of the 20 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Legislature to pass a particular bill what the intent of the Legislature is with respect to existing law…)
Other citing cases10 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lockhart
v.
United States Et Al.
04-881.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 7, 2005.
Published opinion
546 U.S. 142
2005 U.S. LEXIS 9233
Brian Wolfman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Scott L. Nelson., Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hun-gar, Barbara C. Biddle, Kent D. Talbert, and Arnold I. Havens*
Scalia, O'Connor, Scaua.
Cited by 103 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 76%
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (3) · Hawaii Intermediate Court of A… (3) · N.D. Texas (3)

Lead Opinion

Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether the United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years.

I

A

Petitioner James Lockhart failed to repay federally rein-sured student loans that he had incurred between 1984 and 1989 under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. These loans were eventually reassigned to the Department of Education, which certified the debt to the Department of the Treasury through the Treasury Offset Program. In 2002, the Government began withholding a portion of petitioner’s Social Security payments to offset his debt, some of which was more than 10 years delinquent.

[*144] Petitioner sued in Federal District Court, alleging that under the Debt Collection Act’s 10-year statute of limitations, the offset was time barred. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 376 F. 3d 1027 (2004). We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 998 (2005), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, see Lee v. Paige, 376 F. 3d 1179 (CA8 2004), and now affirm.

B

The Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended, provides that, after pursuing the debt collection channels set out in 31 U. S. C. § 3711(a), an agency head can collect an outstanding debt “by administrative offset.” § 3716(a). The availability of offsets against Social Security benefits is limited, as the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, makes Social Security benefits, in general, not “subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” 42 U. S. C. § 407(a). The Social Security Act purports to protect this anti-attachment rule with an express-reference provision: “No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.” § 407(b).

Moreover, the Debt Collection Act’s offset provisions generally do not authorize the collection of claims which, like petitioner’s debts at issue here, are over 10 years old. 31 U. S. C. § 3716(e)(1). In 1991, however, the Higher Education Technical Amendments, 105 Stat. 123, sweepingly eliminated time limitations as to certain loans: “Notwithstanding any other provision of statute ... no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or taken,” 20 U. S. C. § 1091a(a)(2), for the repay[*145]ment of various student loans, including the loans at issue here, § 1091a(a)(2)(D).

The Higher Education Technical Amendments, by their terms, did not make Social Security benefits subject to offset; these were still protected by the Social Security Act’s anti-attachment rule. Only in 1996 did the Debt Collection Improvement Act — in amending and recodifying the Debt Collection Act — provide that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including [§407] . . .),” with a limited exception not relevant here, “all payment due an individual under ... the Social Security Act . . . shall be subject to offset under this section.” 31 U. S. C. § 3716(e)(3)(A)(i).

II

The Government does not contend that the “notwithstanding” clauses in both the Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt Collection Improvement Act trump the Social Security Act’s express-reference provision. Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from the terms of the . . . Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement . . . that modifications must be express[.] But.. . [u]nless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the ... Act, we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the .. . provisions of that Act”); Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908).

We need not decide the effect of express-reference provisions such as § 407(b) to resolve this case. Because the Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security benefits subject to offset, it provides exactly the sort of express reference that the Social Security Act says is necessary to supersede the anti-attachment provision.

It is clear that the Higher Education Technical Amendments remove the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar offsetting petitioner’s Social Security benefits to pay off his student loan debt. Petitioner argues that Congress could[*146] not have intended in 1991 to repeal the Debt Collection Act’s statute of limitations as to offsets against Social Security benefits — since debt collection by Social Security offset was not authorized until five years later. Therefore, petitioner continues, the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time limits in 1991 only applies to then-valid means of debt collection. We disagree. “The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 158 (1991).

Petitioner points out that the Higher Education Technical Amendments, unlike the Debt Collection Improvement Act, do not explicitly mention §407. But § 407(b) only requires an express reference to authorize attachment in the first place — which the Debt Collection Improvement Act has already provided.

III

Nor does the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 1996 re-codification of the Debt Collection Act help petitioner. The Debt Collection Improvement Act, in addition to adding offset authority against Social Security benefits, retained the Debt Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on offset authority. But the mere retention of this previously enacted time bar does not make the time bar apply in all contexts — a result that would extend far beyond Social Security benefits, since it would imply that the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time limits was now a dead letter as to any kind of administrative offset. Rather, the Higher Education Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan context.

Finally, we decline to read any meaning into the failed 2004 effort to amend the Debt Collection Act to explicitly authorize offset of debts over 10 years old. See H. R. 5025, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 8, 2004); S. 2806, 108th[*147] Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 15, 2004). “[F]ailed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’” United States v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990)). In any event, it is unclear what meaning we could read into this effort even if we were inclined to do so, as the failed amendment — which was not limited to offsets against Social Security benefits — would have had a different effect than the interpretation we advance today.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Concurrence

Justice Scalia,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that, even if the express-reference requirement in § 207(b) of the Social Security Act is binding, it has been met here; and I join the opinion of the Court because it does not imply that the requirement is binding. I would go further, however, and say that it is not.

“[Ojne legislature,” Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crunch 87, 135 (1810). “The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation,” he asserted, “can never be controverted.” Ibid. See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (unlike the Constitution, a legislative Act is “alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it”); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 90 (1765) (“Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not”); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 125-126 (1868) (reprint 1987). Our cases have uniformly endorsed this principle. See, e. g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular Congress ... does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding, years”); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 487 (1905); Newton v.[*148] Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 559 (1880) (in cases involving “public interests” and “public laws,” “there can be ... no irrepealable law”); see generally 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 2-3, p. 125, n. 1 (3d ed. 2000).

Among the powers of a legislature that a prior legislature cannot abridge is, of course, the power to make its . will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate — including the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply and clearly contradicting them. Thus, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302 (1955), we interpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act as impliedly exempting deportation hearings from the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), despite the requirement in § 12 of the APA that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly,” 60 Stat. 244. The Court refused “to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act.” 349 U. S., at 310. We have made clear in other cases as well, that an express-reference or express-statement provision cannot nullify the unambiguous import of a subsequent statute. In Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908), we said of an express-statement requirement that “[a]s the section ... in question has only the force of a statute, its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary implication in a subsequent enactment.” (Emphasis added.) A subsequent Congress, we have said, may exempt itself from such requirements by “fair implication” — that is, without an express statement. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U. S. 653, 659-660, n. 10 (1974). See also Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 218 (1910).

To be sure, legislative express-reference or express-statement requirements may function as background canons of interpretation of which Congress is presumptively aware. For example, we have asserted that exemptions from the[*149] APA are “not lightly to be presumed” in light of its express-reference requirement, Marcello, supra, at 310; see also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48, 51 (1955). That assertion may add little or nothing to our already-powerful presumption against implied repeals.

“We have repeatedly stated . . . that absent a clearly established congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs, regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other “magical password.”

For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, in the Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt Collection Improvement Act, Congress unambiguously authorized, without exception, the collection of 10-year-old student-loan debt by administrative offset of Government payments. In doing so, it flatly contradicted, and thereby effectively repealed, part of § 207(a) of the Social Security Act. This repeal is effective, regardless of whether the express-reference requirement of § 207(b) is fulfilled.

Despite our jurisprudence on this subject, it is regrettably not uncommon for Congress to attempt, to burden the future exercise of legislative power with express-reference and express-statement requirements. See, e. g., 1 U. S. C. § 109; 5 U. S. C. §559; 25 U. S. C. § 1735(b); 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-3(b); 50 U. S. C. §§ 1547(a)(1), 1621(b). In the present case, it might seem more respectful of Congress to refrain from de-[*150]daring the invalidity of the express-reference provision. I suppose that would depend upon which Congress one has in mind: the prior one that enacted the provision, or the current one whose clearly expressed legislative intent it is designed to frustrate. In any event, I think it does no favor to the Members of Congress, and to those who assist in drafting their legislation, to keep secret the fact that such express-reference provisions are ineffective.