Sadeh v. Biggs, 374 F. App'x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2010). · Go Syfert
Search
Sadeh v. Biggs, 374 F. App'x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
2 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Solar Somohano v. Coca-Cola Company (cafc, 2021-09-16)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#4 37 C.F.R. § 2.127 cited 1× in this case · 11 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Solar Somohano v. Coca-Cola Company
Fed. Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
In proceedings before the Board, “[w]hen a party fails to file a brief in response to a motion, the Board may treat the motion as conceded.” Sadeh v. Biggs, 374 F. App’x 996, 997 (Fed.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Danniel SADEH, Appellant,
v.
W. Joseph BIGGS, Appellee
2010-1026.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
May 12, 2010.
374 F. App'x 996
Danniel Sadeh, of Panama City Beach, Florida, pro se., Ryan T. Santurri, Allen, Dyer, Doppelt, Milbrath & Gilchrist, P.A., of Orlando, Florida, for appellee.
Mayer, Schall, Dyk.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Unpublished
PER CURIAM.

Danniel Sadeh appeals the order of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissing his opposition to the trademark application filed by W. Joseph Biggs. See Sadeh v. Biggs, No. 91190283 (TTAB Aug. 11, 2009). We affirm.

On May 19, 2009, Sadeh filed an opposition against Biggs’ application to register the mark PANAMA CITY BEACH BIKE WEEK. On June 29, 2009, Biggs filed a motion to dismiss Sadeh’s opposition. Sa-deh did not respond to this motion. On August 11, 2009, the board granted Biggs’ motion as conceded and dismissed Sadeh’s opposition with prejudice. Sadeh filed a motion for reconsideration with the board, but that motion was denied on March 31, 2010.

“When a party fails to file a brief in response to a motion, the Board may treat the motion as conceded.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(a). Sadeh does not argue that there were extenuating circumstances justifying his failure to respond to Biggs’ motion to dismiss. Instead, he asserts that he was not obliged to respond to the motion since his “notice of opposition was bullet proof as far as being able to withstand any motion to dismiss because of its legal sufficiency.”

In proceedings before the board, “[ljiti-gation is run by rules designed to assure orderly conduct of the proceedings.” Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 618 F.2d 776, 780 (CCPA 1980). One such rule is that a party must submit a timely response to a motion from an opposing party. Id. Because Sadeh failed to respond to Biggs’ motion to dismiss and has proffered no adequate explanation for his failure to do so, the board did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his opposition. See id. (affirming a decision to treat a motion for summary judgment as conceded when the non-moving party failed to file a brief in response to the motion); Central Mfg. Inc. v. Third Millennium Tech., Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210 (TTAB 2001) (treating a motion to dismiss as conceded where no response to the motion was filed); see also Lacavera v. Dudas, 441 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed.Cir.2006) (emphasizing that the Patent and Trademark Office “has broad authority to govern the conduct of proceedings before it”).