Sotomayor v. Burns, 13 P.3d 1198 (Ariz. 2000). · Go Syfert
Sotomayor v. Burns, 13 P.3d 1198 (Ariz. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
84 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Arizona Libertarian Party v. Reagan (azd, 2016-05-27)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Arizona Libertarian Party v. Reagan (5×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule)
D. Ariz. · 2016 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we repeat our caution that litigants and lawyers in election cases must be keenly aware of the need to bring such cases with all deliberate speed or else the quality of judicial decision making is seriously compromised.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miles L. Kaufman v. John Halikowski, Director, Arizona Department of Transportation
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
He argues that ADOT unreasonably failed to act on those points until after his release from prison, and that ADOT is therefore barred from imposing the suspension by the doctrine of laches. ¶11 Kaufman cites the general principle that laches will “bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lehman v. Washburn (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Id. at 83, ¶ 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Secura v. Sudhoff
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
“Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556, 558, ¶ 6 (2009) (quoting Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 (2000)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sw Fabrication v. Phoenix
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Id. at 83, ¶ 6 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sw Fabrication v. Phoenix
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Id. at 83, ¶ 6 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kasson v. Burgener
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
It “will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 (2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kimball v. Perkins
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 (2000); French v. French, 125 Ariz. 12, 15 (App. 1980) (addressing laches in the context of a constructive trust claim).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Manicom v. Citimortgage, Inc.
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party’ even where the applicable statute of limitations has not yet expired.” In re Indenture of Trust Dated January 13, 1964, 235 Ariz. 40, ¶22 , 326 P.3d 307, 315 (App.2014), quoting Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State ex rel. Darwin v. Arnett (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Generally, laches will “bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556, 558, ¶6 , 201 P.3d 517, 519 (2009) (alteration in original) (citing Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Weinstein v. Weinstein
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Laches is the “equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct.” Sotomayor v. Bums, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Indenture of Trust Dated January 13, 1964
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Laches is the “equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct.” Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rash v. Town of Mammoth
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
That doctrine “will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing a lawsuit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Sotomayor v. Bums, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rep Andrew Tobin v. Hon Rea
Ariz. · 2013 · confidence medium
CGM, 199 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 6, 13 P.3d at 1189 . ¶ 19 Although the Council is not statutorily required to include “background information” in its analysis, A.R.S. § 19-124(B), omission of significant contextual information may be misleading and thus violate the statute, CGM, 199 Ariz. at 73 ¶ 10, 13 P.3d at 1190 ; Healthy Ariz. Initiative PAC v. Groscost, 199 Ariz. 75 , 77 ¶ 4, 13 P.3d 1192, 1194 (2000); Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81 , 82 ¶¶ 4-5, 13 P.3d 1198, 1199 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. UNKEFER (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Although we do not suggest a defendant can rely on this doctrine to object to entry of a CRO, 9 the doctrine provides useful guidance in determining when delay becomes unreasonable. ¶ 22 “Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 82-83, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE EX REL. AZ. REG. OF CONT. v. Johnston (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] We cite the current version of the applicable statutes because no revisions material to this decision have since occurred. [2] Although the superior court's ruling also appears to reflect considerations that are typically associated with laches, see Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (2000) (stating laches "is an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations" and "will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party"), the parties do not argue, and we do not decide, whether the doctrine of lac…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State ex rel. Arizona Registrar of Contractors v. Johnston (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Although the superior court’s ruling also appears to reflect considerations that are typically associated with laches, see Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (2000) (stating laches "is an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations” and "will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party”), the parties do not argue, and we do not decide, whether the doctrine of laches is applicable against the Registrar here. .
examined Cited as authority (rule) League of Ariz. Cities and Towns v. Martin (10×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ariz. · 2009 · confidence medium
Although the Governor frames the issue as a jurisdictional challenge, we analyze it under our laches jurisprudence because it does not implicate our authority to decide the case; rather, it relates to our exercise of discretion whether to take the case. ¶ 6 "Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party." Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE MOVING ARIZONA'S ECONOMY v. Brewer
Ariz. · 2008 · confidence medium
Sotomayor v. Bums, 199 Ariz. 81 , 83 ¶ 8, 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000). ¶34 In the case before us, TIME was aware of the Secretary’s reasoning for the § 19-121.01(A) disqualifications by July 24, yet did not file suit until August 13, after the county recorders had completed their § 19— 121.02 certifications.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Transportation Infrastructure v. Brewer
Ariz. · 2008 · confidence medium
Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81 , 83 ¶ 8, 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000). ¶34 In the case before us, TIME was aware of the Secretary’s reasoning for the § 19-121.01(A) disqualifications by July 24, yet did not file suit until August 13, after the county recorders had completed their § 19-121.02 certifications.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Highland Village Partners, LLC v. BRADBURY & STAMM CONSTRUCTION CO. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Sotomayor v. Bums, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Browne v. Bayless (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
LACHES ¶6 The Secretary of State argues that Browne’s challenge is barred by laches because he waited until August 17, 2000 to file his petitions when he knew the statutory *263 deadline was June 14. “[Laches] is an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct. [It] will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Sotomayor v. Burns, 336 Ariz. Adv.
discussed Cited "see" Az Public Integrity v. Adrian Fontes
Ariz. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556 , 558 ¶ 6 (2009) (“Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay [in filing suit] is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party.” (quoting Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81 , 83 ¶ 6 (2000))).
discussed Cited "see" State of Arizona v. John David Franklin, Sr. & John David Franklin, Jr. (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000) (laches bars claim when delay unreasonable and results in prejudice).
examined Cited "see" State v. Lee (4×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 6 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000) (laches bars claim when delay unreasonable and results in prejudice).
discussed Cited "see" Mayer Unified School District v. Winkleman (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 9 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000) (two-month delay barred claims because litigants in election cases must pursue such eases with all deliberate speed to preserve quality of judicial decision making); Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, ¶¶ 17-18 , 973 P.2d 1166, 1169-70 (1998) (finding unreasonable six-week delay even though claim filed within statutory limitations period); Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456 , 851 P.2d 81 (1993) (finding laches applied where plaintiff delayed more than one year after petitions circulated and claims litigated twenty-four hours…
discussed Cited "see" Mayer Unified School and Gadsen Elementary School v. Winkleman, Az State Land Dept... (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sotomayer v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, ¶ 9 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000) (two-month delay barred claims because litigants in election cases must pursue such cases with all deliberate speed to preserve quality of judicial decision making); Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, ¶¶ 17-18 , 973 P.2d 1166, 1169-70 (1998) (finding unreasonable six-week delay even though claim filed within statutory limitations period); Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456 , 851 P.2d 81 (1993) (finding laches applied where plaintiff delayed more than one year after petitions circulated and claims litigated twenty-four hours…
discussed Cited "see" Yes for Az!/col River Indian v. Rep Jim Wiers (2×)
Ariz. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 8 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2000) (no prejudice to Legislative Council when simply required to delete language that is partial).
examined Cited "see" Citizens for Growth Management v. Groscost (4×)
Ariz. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sotomayor v. Burns, 199 Ariz. 81, 82 , 13 P.3d 1198, 1199 (2000); Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 414 , 973 P.2d 1166, 1171 (1998).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Alejandra SOTOMAYOR and Salvador Gabaldon, Petitioners,
v.
Brenda BURNS, President of the Arizona Senate and Co-Chair of the Legislative Council; Jeff Groscost, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives and Chair of the Legislative Council; Representative Lori Daniels, Member of the Legislative Council; Representative Herschella Horton, Member of the Legislative Council; Representative Marilyn Jarrett, Member of the Legislative Council; Representative John Loredo, Member of the Legislative Council; Representative Robert McLendon, Member of the Legislative Council; Representative Jim Weiers, Member of the Legislative Council; Senator Russell Bowers, Member of the Legislative Council; Senator Jack Brown, Member of the Legislative Council; Senator Chris Cummiskey, Member of the Legislative Council; Senator Ann Day, Member of the Legislative Council; Senator Darden Hamilton, Member of the Legislative Council; Senator Peter Rios, Member of the Legislative Council; Betsey Bayless, Secretary of State; All in Their Official Capacities, Respondents-Real Parties in Interest
CV-00-0305-SA.
Arizona Supreme Court.
Dec 8, 2000.
13 P.3d 1198
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund by Vibiana Andrade, Thomas A. Saenz, Hector O. Villagra, Los Angeles, Attorneys for Petitioners., Janet A. Napolitano, Attorney General by W. Scott Bales, Joseph A. Kanefield, Phoenix, Attorneys for Respondent Bayless., Gallagher & Kennedy by John E. Lundin, Jeffrey D. Gross, Phoenix, Attorneys for Respondents Burns and Groscost., Arizona State Senate by Glenn M. Davis, Phoenix, Attorney for Respondents Rios, Cummiskey, Loredo, and Horton.
Zlaket, Jones, Feldman.
Cited by 35 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 60%
Citer courts: D. Arizona (1)

OPINION

ZLAKET, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 This special action challenges the Arizona Legislative Council’s written analysis of Proposition 203, “English Language Education for Children in Public Schools,” for inclusion in the state’s voter information pamphlet. Petitioners claim that the Council violated the impartiality requirement of Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 19-124(B) (West Supp.1999) by misstating current bilingual education law; overstating parental rights to apply for waivers under the initiative; and exaggerating parental ability to obtain alternative programs. We considered the case without oral argument and issued our decision accepting jurisdiction and granting relief on August 18, 2000. We decided that the first paragraph of the Council’s analysis had to either be deleted or revised to provide an impartial description of existing law, free of argument or advocacy. We further determined that the petitioners’ remaining claims were untimely.

¶ 2 The jurisdictional basis and legislative background for this type of challenge are set forth in Citizens for Growth Management v. Groscost, 199 Ariz. 71, 13 P.3d 1188 (2000). The question presented is whether the Legislative Council fulfilled its responsibility to “prepare and file ... an impartial analysis ... of each ballot proposal of a measure or proposed amendment.” Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 19-124(B).

¶ 3 The Council completed a draft analysis of Proposition 203 and made it available to the public on June 15, 2000. Open hearings were held on June 27 and July 6. At the July meeting, the Council adopted final language which was transmitted to the Secretary of State on July 13, 2000. Petitioners first objected by sending a letter to Council Chairman Groscost dated August 1, 2000. They then filed a special action in this court on August 14. Respondents received copies of the pleadings on August 15. That same day, the Secretary of State was required to provide the printing company with a camera-ready copy of the publicity pamphlet. Due to this special action, the printing deadline was extended to August 24, 2000. We expedited the matter, ordering that responses be filed by August 17, and issued our decision the next day. Our order indicated that this opinion would follow.

¶ 4 The first paragraph of the disputed analysis states: “The existing laws of this state require that public schools provide bilingual education instruction to every pupil who is not fluent in English, without a specific time limit on services.” This is misleading because it suggests that English and Spanish instruction must be given in all classes. However, state law requires schools to “provide a bilingual program or English as a second language [ESL] program for ... limited English proficient pupils.” Ariz.Rev. Stat. § 15-754(A) (1991) (emphasis added). ESL instruction is performed entirely in English, and therefore is not bilingual. In Arizona, over 67% of limited English proficient students attend English-taught ESL classes. Lisa Graham Keegan, English Acquisition Services: A Summary of Bilingual and English as a Second Language Programs 6 (Jan.2000).

¶ 5 To comply -with Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 19-124(B), the Council’s analysis must be impartial; this means that the “language ‘must not mislead.’” Citizens for Growth Management, 199 Ariz. at 73, 13 P.3d at 1190 (quoting Arizona Legislative Council v. Howe, 192 Ariz. 378, 383, 965 P.2d 770, 775 (1998)). Thus, on August 18 we ordered that the first paragraph be stricken or revised to meet this statutory requirement.

¶ 6 The defense of laches is available in election challenges. Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409, 412, 973 P.2d 1166, 1169 (1998); Mathieu v. Mahoney, 174 Adz. 456, 458-59, 851 P.2d 81, 83-84 (1993). This doc[*83] trine is an equitable counterpart to the statute of limitations, designed to discourage dilatory conduct. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 410 n. 2, 973 P.2d at 1167 n. 2. Laches will generally bar a claim when the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice to the opposing party. Id. at 412, 973 P.2d at 1169.

¶ 7 In this case, the late filing defies explanation. The Legislative Council’s analysis was first made available on June 15, 2000, but the petitioners took no action at that time. Hearings were held and public comment was received in June and July. The petitioners again failed to act. In August, they wrote and faxed a letter containing their objections to two of the sixteen respondents. Petitioners finally filed this special action on August 14, acknowledging therein that the publicity pamphlet was “to be printed on or about August 15, 2000.” This delay is plainly unreasonable.

¶ 8 A laches defense, however, cannot stand on unreasonable conduct alone. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 412, 973 P.2d at 1169. A showing of prejudice is also required. Id.; Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 459, 851 P.2d at 84. The first paragraph of the Legislative Council’s analysis, regarding the current state of Arizona bilingual education, consists of a single sentence. That paragraph can easily be deleted or revised to conform with the language of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 15-754(A). The same is not true with respect to the petitioners’ other criticisms which, if upheld, would require an extensive rewriting of the analysis. To insist on major revisions at such a late date is not fair to either the Secretary of State or the Council. Thus, we conclude that these claims are barred by laches, and do not reach their merits. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 410, 973 P.2d at 1167; Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 456, 851 P.2d at 81.

¶ 9 The real prejudice caused by delay in election cases is to the quality of decision making in matters of great public importance. Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 460, 851 P.2d at 85. The effects of such delay extend far beyond the interests of the parties. Waiting until the last minute to file an election challenge “places the court in a position of having to steamroll through the delicate legal issues in order to meet the deadline for measures to be placed on the ballot.” Id. at 459, 851 P.2d at 84 (quoting State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or. 711, 688 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1984)). We repeat our caution that litigants and lawyers in election cases “must be keenly aware of the need to bring such cases with all deliberate speed or else the quality of judicial decision making is seriously compromised.” Id. at 460, 851 P.2d at 85. Late filings “deprive judges of the ability to fairly and reasonably process and consider the issues ... and rush appellate review, leaving little time for reflection and wise decision making.” Id . at 461, 851 P.2d at 86. It is imperative that we consider fairness not only to those who challenge a ballot initiative, but also to the sponsors who place a measure on the ballot, the citizens who sign petitions, the election officials, and the voters of Arizona. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 414, 973 P.2d at 1171.

¶ 10 As stated in our order, the first paragraph of the Legislative Council’s analysis must be deleted or revised. Petitioners’ other claims are barred by laches.

CONCURRING: CHARLES E. JONES, Vice Chief Justice, STANLEY G. FELDMAN, Justice.