v.
Dshs State Of Washington
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Dependency of M.N. ) No. 71124-5-1 STATE OF WASHINGTON, CO
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND ) DIVISION ONE HEALTH SERVICES, cr. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINIO^! \ CO Respondent, o RACHEL NIEHAUS, re Appellant. ) FILED: July 28, 2014 Appelwick, J. — Rachel Niehaus appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, M.N. Niehaus argues that the trial court erred in determining that all necessary and reasonably available services were provided to her under RCW 13.34.180(d). She also contends that the trial court improperly found that termination was in M.N.'s best interests. We affirm. FACTS Rachel Niehaus is the biological mother of M.N., born December 22, 2000. Niehaus also has a biological son, A.N. (DOB 5/11/92), and two other biological daughters, C.W. (DOB 1/3/95), and A.L. (DOB 11/11/08). Both A.N. and C.W. were removed from Niehaus's care when they were young. M.N. and A.L. remained in Niehaus's care until July 2011 On July 3, 2011, Niehaus walked in on A.L.'s father, Charles Lee,1 raping M.N. Niehaus took M.N. away from their apartment to talk to her about what happened, but left A.L. behind with Lee, because she did not believe Lee would harm his own daughter.
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[*10]Nor did any of the witnesses—who included multiple social workers, a psychologist, and Niehaus's therapist—address or recommend PTSD medication. At least one witness, Dr. Tobey, was aware that Niehaus suffered from PTSD and was taking Prozac. However, after evaluating Niehaus and being in the best position to recommend a necessary service, he did not suggest an assessment of or change in her medication. Niehaus does not dispute that the issue of PTSD medication was not raised below. Instead, Niehaus argues for the first time on appeal that DSHS had reason to know that PTSD medication might be a necessary service. As support, she notes that a "basic internet search" reveals that medication is available and often necessary to treat PTSD. This evidence is outside the record on review. RAP 9.1(a) (record on review may contain report of proceedings, clerk's papers, exhibits, and administrative record). Our review is limited to issues contained in the record. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). We decline to take additional evidence on appeal. RAP9.11. The record does not establish that a psychiatric evaluation of Niehaus's PTSD medication was a necessary service. The trial court did not err infinding that all necessary and reasonably available services were provided to Niehaus.[6] I. Child's Best Interests Niehaus challenges the trial court's finding that termination was in M.N.'s best interests. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in a child's best interests. RCW 13.34.190(1 )(b); In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wn.
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App. 562, 571, 815 P.2d 277 (1991). Whether termination is in a child's best interests is case-specific and must be decided on the facts and circumstances at hand. In reA.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 572. The dominant concern is the child's moral, intellectual, and material welfare. In re Adoption of Lvbbert. 75 Wn.2d 671, 674, 453 P.2d 650 (1969). Niehaus first notes that she and M.N. shared a strong bond. Multiple witnesses testified to this fact. However, the testimony also showed that the bond was unhealthy and negatively impacted M.N. Camphouse identified their bond as one that resembled sisters or friends, causing M.N. to prematurely assume a parental role. Travaille testified that M.N. was unable to move on from her past traumas due to her relationship with Niehaus. And, Warren stated that M.N. was strongly affected by Niehaus's emotions, which prevented her from emotionally healing. In this way, the strength of the parent- child bond was actually detrimental to M.N., rather than beneficial. Niehaus further argues that termination is not in M.N.'s best interests, because M.N. did not have any adoptive prospects and was not capable of integrating into a permanent home in the near future. While multiple witnesses testified that M.N. is adoptable, she does not have a prospective adoptive family at this time. And, it is clear that her road to recovery will be a challenging one. But, this difficult future is a significant reason why professionals concluded that termination was the right outcome. Camphouse testified that M.N.'s unstable emotional state leaves her at high risk for revictimization, meaning that she needs a caregiver with the decision making abilities to ensure that M.N. is safe. Niehaus has consistently demonstrated that she is unable to do so, instead continually exposing M.N. to dangerous people and emotionally jarring situations.
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Finally, Niehaus argues that it was unclear whether M.N. would be helped or harmed by the termination. Several witnesses acknowledged that termination may be difficult for M.N. However, Niehaus has significant and chronic parental deficits. She has exposed her children to dangerous men on multiple occasions. DSHS has been involved in her parenting since her oldest child was young, and the State has offered her numerous services including classes and therapy. Niehaus testified that she made progress as a result of the State-offered services she was offered. Both Strauss, Niehaus's therapist, and Julie Larsen, a family therapist who worked with Niehaus and A.L., stated that they had seen some improvement in Niehaus's parenting. But, the testimony overwhelmingly indicates that this progress is not enough to meet M.N.'s needs. While Niehaus clearly loves M.N., she does not consistently treat M.N. with the discipline and affection of a parent. Instead, she often demonstrates an inability to understand or empathize with M.N.'s emotional state. For example, she was either unaware or indifferent that M.N. would react poorly to seeing A.N., whom M.N. had identified as a sexual abuser. And, she has repeatedly expressed in M.N.'s presence that she cannot or does not want to maintain her role as M.N.'s parental figure. It is undisputed that M.N. is a high needs child. The testimony shows that she requires a dedicated, skilled caregiver, which Niehaus has not demonstrated herself to be. Moreover, several witnesses testified that M.N. cannot progress in her treatment due to her relationship with Niehaus and Niehaus's uncertain legal status. We respect the gravity of this conclusion and recognize the love that Niehaus has for M.N. We note that the court left open the possibility that Niehaus could remain in M.N.'s life, should M.N.'s mental health care providers determine that it is in her No. 71124-5-1/14
[*13]therapeutic interest. However, in light of Niehaus's inability to provide adequate care for M.N., we find no error in the trial court's termination of her parental rights.[7] We affirm. WE CONCUR:
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