UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
 ____________________

 No. 92-2052

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Appellee,

 v.

 DANIEL D. TAVARES,

 Defendant, Appellant.


 ____________________

 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

 [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste,* U.S. District Judge]
 ___________________

 ____________________

 Before

 Breyer, Chief Judge, Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges,
 ___________ _____________________
 Torruella, Selya, Cyr, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. 
 ______________

 ____________________

 Owen S. Walker with whom Peter B. Krupp was on brief for
 ________________ ________________
 appellant.
 Michael J. Pelgro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Donald K.
 __________________ _________
 Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
 _____

 ____________________

 OPINION EN BANC
 ____________________


 ____________________

 April 12, 1994
 ____________________


 
 ____________________

 *Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.














 COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. A jury found defendant Daniel
 ____________________

 Tavares guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm in

 violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The statute makes it a crime

 for any person "who has been convicted in any court of a crime

 punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to

 . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or

 ammunition."1 At trial, defendant offered to stipulate to the

 fact that he had such a prior conviction. The prosecutor refused

 to accept the stipulation. On the basis of our decisions in

 United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1989), and
 ______________ _________

 United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1990), the court
 _____________ ______

 allowed the prosecutor to introduce, in addition to the fact of

 the prior conviction, evidence of its nature -- larceny of a

 firearm. 

 A panel of this court, two members concluding that under

 Collamore and Donlon the district court did not err in allowing
 _________ ______

 the government to reject the stipulation and one member

 concluding the contrary, unanimously agreed that "the precise

 issue in our case was not the subject of a focused discussion in

 the prior decisions, that the issue is an important and recurring

 one, and that en banc consideration of the issue is appropriate."

 The full court accordingly granted rehearing and entertained

 further briefing and argument. We now conclude that the district



 
 ____________________

 1Although the predicate crime may not be a felony, the common
 reference which we adopt is a "felon-in-possession" offense.

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 court abused its discretion in permitting the government to

 reject the offered stipulation.

 We set forth only the facts essential for understanding the

 basic issue that concerns us. The government's evidence at trial

 indicated that the defendant was involved in three escalating

 confrontations, culminating with a shooting incident, on the

 night of August 28-29, 1991, at a Mashpee, Massachusetts

 apartment complex. The first two confrontations involved

 acrimonious discussions in which Tavares was accused of stealing

 a car radio. The government also alleged that Tavares was

 involved in a third incident, in which he accosted with a gun

 another acquaintance who had engaged in a discussion with him

 about the radio theft, and then fired at the outside of this

 individual's apartment building. Damage was done to two

 automobiles. 

 Tavares was shortly thereafter seen running in a wooded area

 and arrested. An officer assisted by a police tracking dog

 subsequently located a shotgun and rifle in nearby woods.

 Forensic evidence showed that the shotgun had fired shells found

 near the damaged cars. Tavares was convicted following a three-

 day trial. As noted earlier, the prosecutor was allowed to

 introduce evidence that Tavares had been convicted of a prior

 crime, larceny of a firearm, and had received a two-year

 sentence. 

 Our first task is to reexamine our two cases on which the

 district court relied, Collamore and Donlon, to determine whether
 _________ ______


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 they remain compelling authority. As we have indicated, the

 district court determined that it was constrained under these

 cases to accord the government the absolute right to reject the

 defendant's proffered stipulation.2 

 In Donlon, our more recent opinion, we dealt at length with
 ______

 the defendant's claim that grand jury testimony had been

 unlawfully admitted at trial. Then, as to a number of secondary

 issues, we briefly indicated their disposition and our reasoning.

 On the issue of the government's right to introduce evidence of

 the nature of the predicate crime, we merely cited Collamore. In
 _________

 Collamore, decided a year earlier, the question before us was
 _________

 whether the court could bifurcate a felon-in-possession trial by

 requiring the government to prove the possession element of the

 charge before presenting to the jury proof of the defendant's

 criminal record. We held that a court may not do so and

 reversed. We observed that barring the government from

 presenting any evidence of a prior felony in a felon-in-

 possession case effectively "eliminated an essential element of

 the government's case," 868 F.2d at 27, and thus improperly

 deprived the government of a jury trial on the crime as charged,

 id. at 28. In support of our conclusion, we added by way of
 ___

 dictum that "even in the face of an offer to stipulate, the

 
 ____________________

 2 We note that the court endeavored to minimize any prejudice.
 It received into evidence a certified copy of Tavares' 1988
 conviction, but did not permit the government to read the
 document to the jury. The court also repeatedly instructed the
 jury that the evidence was relevant only as proof of the prior
 felony element of the charge.

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 government may choose to present evidence on the one felony

 necessary to prove the crime charged," id. at 28. 
 ___

 Although we stand by and reaffirm the proposition central in

 Collamore, that a defendant may not use a stipulation or any
 _________

 other procedural device, including bifurcation, to remove from

 his felon-in-possession prosecution the fact of his prior
 ____

 conviction, we now realize upon reconsideration that our dictum

 rested on a shaky foundation. In Collamore, we relied on three
 _________

 cases, two from the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Blackburn,
 _____________ _________

 592 F.2d 300, 301 (6th Cir. 1979); and United States v. Burkhart,
 _____________ ________

 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1976); and one from the Eighth Circuit,

 United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 1981), which
 _____________ ______

 in turn ultimately relied upon United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d
 _____________ _______

 680, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1970).3 The question in Brickey was
 _______

 whether, in proving the crime giving rise to the instant

 prosecution, the government may be forced to accept a stipulation

 ("a naked admission") in lieu of presenting a full picture of the

 events and mind sets in question. The defendant in Brickey
 _______

 had been indicted for mail fraud and sought to stipulate to the

 fact that he had diverted funds so as to exclude evidence about

 his personal use of the money. The Brickey panel found no abuse
 _______

 of discretion in the trial court's refusal to require the

 government to accept the stipulation, and quoted the following



 
 ____________________

 3 Burkhart and Bruton actually cited United States v. Smith, 520
 ________ ______ _____________ _____
 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1975), which, in turn, relied upon Brickey.
 _______

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 passage from Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir.
 ____ _____________

 1958):

 "It is a general rule that `A party is not required to
 accept a judicial admission of his adversary, but may
 insist on proving the fact.' 31 C.J.S. Evidence 299,
 p. 1068. The reason for the rule is to permit a party
 `to present to the jury a picture of the events relied
 upon. To substitute for such picture a naked admission
 might have the effect to rob the evidence of much of
 its fair and legitimate weight.'"

 426 F.2d at 686.

 Brickey, the sole underpinning of the cases on which we
 _______

 relied in Collamore, is critically different from the case before
 _________

 us. While the stipulation there concerned facts directly

 relevant to the instant crime, the case before us involves a

 stipulation to facts establishing only the defendant's status.

 This difference is so significant that we no longer deem

 Collamore's dictum to be compelling in cases such as this.
 _________

 As we now reconsider the issue fully, we begin our analysis

 by reiterating its limited scope. A decision to honor a

 stipulation concerning the predicate crime in a felon-in-

 possession case in no way trenches upon the right of the

 prosecution to make a full presentation of the crime currently

 charged. We fully concede the government's "right to `present to

 the jury a picture of the events relied upon,'" United States v.
 _____________

 Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass. 1987), aff'd in part and
 _______ _________________

 rev'd in part, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989), including proof of
 ______________

 all elements of the crime for which the defendant has been

 brought to trial. The prosecution ordinarily may not be forced

 to eliminate gruesome details of a killing, the quantity of

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 drugs, or the degree of malevolence exhibited by the defendant

 through a defense-proffered stipulation.

 This well-established right of the government to present its

 case as it sees fit is in no fashion weakened by requiring a

 stipulation to establish the defendant's status as a felon. The

 status element is a discrete and independent component of the

 crime, a requirement reflecting a Congressional policy that

 possession of a firearm is categorically prohibited for those

 individuals who have been convicted of a wide assortment of

 crimes calling for a punishment of over a year's imprisonment. A

 defendant falls within the category simply by virtue of past

 conviction for any crime ranging from possession of short

 lobsters, see 16 U.S.C. 3372, to the most aggravated murder.
 ___

 The predicate crime is significant only to demonstrate status,

 and a full picture of that offense is -- even if not prejudicial

 -- beside the point.

 This is not a situation in which there is only one way to

 prove this status, e.g., by the full record conviction including

 the nature of the offense. Other ways include a redacted record,

 testimony by a clerk, stipulation, a defendant's affidavit, or

 even, in the absence of controversy, judicial notice of the prior

 conviction. None of these alternatives is tainted by the

 inclusion of the prejudicial information.

 The government suggests that, beyond establishing status,

 the predicate crime serves to crystallize the culpability of the

 defendant as a serious offender. It asserts that knowledge of


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 the nature of the predicate crime in this way bears on the jury's

 ability to evaluate the defendant's guilt on the felon-in-

 possession charge, and thus is relevant to its deliberations.

 We fail to see this connection. Relevant evidence, we are

 told by Federal Rule of Evidence 401, "means evidence having any

 tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

 to the determination of the action more probable or less probable

 than it would be without the evidence." The fact concerning

 defendant's prior criminal record that 922(g)(1) explicitly

 makes "of consequence" is whether it includes a crime carrying a

 penalty of more than a year's imprisonment. It does not embrace

 additional facts such as a particular kind of felony. Congress

 required no gradation for seriousness, numerosity or recency,

 although such distinctions have in other contexts been given

 significance. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (penalizing use of
 ___ ____

 firearm in connection with crime of violence or drug trafficking

 crime); 924(e)(1) (increasing firearms possession penalty for

 defendant convicted of multiple violent felonies or "serious"

 drug offenses).

 In effect, we understand the government to claim relevance

 in revelation of a crime that is particularly egregious (murder),

 socially opprobrious (pornography), systemically dangerous

 (organized crime), or similar to the crime occasioning the

 present prosecution (possession of firearms). It is, of course,

 highly likely that such evidence would influence the jury's

 perception of the defendant, suggesting that he is a sufficient


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 threat to society to warrant additional incarceration. Such

 information, however, has no tendency to make more or less

 probable the existence of the fact of a prior conviction, which
 ________

 is the only information that Congress has deemed of consequence

 concerning the defendant's criminal record. And it is precisely

 the tendency of such evidence to prejudice the jury's

 deliberations that makes it suspect.

 Moreover, the government's right to introduce the nature of

 a particularly prejudicial prior felony would have to be matched

 by the defendant's right to introduce evidence that his prior

 conviction was for a technical, nonviolent or white collar crime.

 In such a case, the jury might tend to minimize the defendant's

 culpability and be less inclined to impose the severe penalty

 associated with a felon-in-possession conviction. This would be

 no more appropriate than the reverse tendency. Either way,

 Congressional policy would be subverted. The neutral role

 intended to be played by the prior felony element of 922(g)(1)

 would be replaced by a two-tier system of guilt determination.

 Additionally, because the nature of the predicate felony is

 wholly unrelated to the crime for which the defendant is on

 trial, excluding the extraneous information concerning its nature

 should create no burden for either the court or the government.

 The defendant's unadorned stipulation could be read to the jury

 or, if the government preferred, a redacted judgment of

 conviction could be introduced into evidence. Severing the




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 admissible evidence from the inadmissible thus would require

 neither sensitive nor difficult judgments.

 We have focused here only on the kind of case represented at

 bar, where there exists no reason, other than the government's

 desire to color the jury's perception of the defendant's

 character, for revealing the nature of the defendant's prior

 felony. Although we cannot now conceive of circumstances in

 which the probativeness of the facts surrounding the prior

 conviction would outweigh the prejudice to the defendant from

 admission of those details, there may be permutations that

 presently escape our vision. We therefore do not announce a per

 se rule of exclusion. Even in such unusual circumstances,

 however, evidence beyond the fact of the prior conviction is

 inadmissible absent adequate trial court findings that its

 noncumulative relevance is sufficiently compelling to survive the

 balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403. ("[E]vidence may be excluded

 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger

 of unfair prejudice . . . ."). 

 Our conclusion on this issue is supported by a considerable

 number, though not all, of the other circuits. The Eleventh

 Circuit applies the same abuse of discretion standard that we

 adopt today. See United States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1516-17
 ___ _____________ ______

 (11th Cir. 1984). The D.C. Circuit also has held in a felon-in-

 possession case that "the Government's right to introduce its

 proof is always subject to the trial court's responsibility under

 Fed. R. Evid. 403 to limit unduly prejudicial or cumulative


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 evidence." See United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C.
 ___ _____________ _______

 Cir. 1992). And the Fifth and Tenth Circuits similarly have

 recognized the district court's authority to decide on the

 admissibility of prior crimes evidence. See United States v.
 ___ _____________

 Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1977) (case involving
 ________

 interstate transportation of explosives by a convicted felon);

 United States v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950, 955-56 (5th Cir. 1976)
 _____________ ________

 (case involving escape).

 The Second and Fourth Circuits affirmatively reject

 admission of evidence concerning the nature of the prior crime,

 see United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1993);
 ___ _____________ _______

 United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 41-43 (4th Cir. 1979), while
 _____________ _____

 panels in both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have signalled that

 it is within a court's discretion to accept a defense stipulation

 to the fact of a prior felony conviction, see United States v.
 ___ _____________

 Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (underlying facts of
 ______

 prior conviction irrelevant); United States v. Pirovolos, 844
 ______________ _________

 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1988) (defense's proffered stipulation to

 prior felony sufficient). But see United States v. Breitkreutz,
 ___ ___ _____________ ___________

 8 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting stipulation as an

 alternative form of proof and noting "the rule that the

 prosecution has a right to refuse a stipulation").4 On the



 
 ____________________

 4 In concurring in Breitkreutz, Judge Norris noted that the
 ___________
 majority's assumption that the nature of the past conviction is
 relevant in a 922(g) prosecution conflicted with Barker. 8
 ______
 F.3d at 693.

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 other side, as noted earlier, are the Sixth and Eighth

 Circuits.5 

 We want to be crystal clear about what we are not saying.

 First, we are not saying that the fact of the prior predicate
 ____

 felony can be kept from the jury. Second, the prosecution

 ordinarily cannot be forced to accept a stipulation if it prefers

 to introduce a judgment of conviction properly redacted. The

 trial court would retain the discretion, however, to exclude this

 document if the nature or number of redactions would invest it

 with prejudicial overtones. In some circumstances, where

 documentary evidence is unavailable, properly circumscribed oral

 testimony would be permissible. 

 Third, in response to the government's apprehension that a

 defendant might, in closing argument or otherwise, insinuate that

 the prior felony conviction was benign, we note the

 inappropriateness of limiting our options based upon a concern

 that counsel irresponsibly would contrive to abuse our chosen

 procedure. We add that any such conduct would be subject to the

 trial court's sanctioning power. We have every confidence in the

 court's ability to convey in neutral fashion both Congress's

 determination that any prior felony provides a sufficient basis

 for subsequent punishment for possession of firearms, and the
 
 ____________________

 5 The decision of the Third Circuit in United States v. Williams,
 _____________ ________
 612 F.2d 735, 740 (3d Cir. 1979), also facially supports the
 government's position. The stipulation at issue there, however,
 concerned the fact of the prior conviction, and the decision
 ____
 therefore simply may reflect agreement with our conclusion in
 Collamore that a defendant may not modify a statute by
 _________
 eliminating one of its elements from the jury's consideration.

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 jury's obligation to accept that judgment and not speculate on

 the nature of the earlier crime.

 Fourth, we acknowledge that in some cases evidence

 concerning the nature of the prior conviction will be admissible

 for impeachment or other reasons, despite its lack of probative

 value on the prior conviction element of the crime. See O'Shea,
 ___ ______

 724 F.2d at 1516-17.

 Finally, we reject the notion that the course we set here is

 a risky one, setting the stage for similar reasoning to be

 applied in contexts where greater hazards might lie. In the

 first place, a stipulation to a defendant's status as a felon is

 easily and obviously distinguishable from those relating to his

 actions or state of mind in committing the crime. In the second

 place, the evidence we exclude has no legitimate claim to

 relevance. In the third place, the unnecessary risk of unfair

 prejudice looms as clear and likely in this context. Finally,

 our holding allows the trial court to recognize and articulate

 any special circumstances justifying admission of evidence of the

 nature of the predicate offense.

 In this case, the government has added the claim that

 admitting evidence of the nature of the predicate crime, if

 error, was harmless. We cannot agree. The government's case

 rested heavily on the testimony of two witnesses, Blake and Hunt,

 who identified Tavares as the gun-wielding assailant. Tavares's

 defense strategy relied on challenging the credibility of these

 witnesses and suggesting that the actual perpetrators were


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 connected to Blake's drug dealing. The fact that defendant's

 prior conviction involved the unlawful acquisition of a firearm

 could not help but influence the jurors' attitude toward his

 claim that, this time, someone else had the gun. See United
 ___ ______

 States v. Torres, 610 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (in
 ______ ______

 felon-in-possession case, evidence of prior convictions for

 manslaughter with a gun and illegal possession of a gun "would

 surely prejudice almost any jury, no matter how conscientious").

 Adding to our conviction that the error was harmful is the

 fact that two close evidentiary points were resolved against the

 defendant, resulting in admission of other prejudicial facts

 about his criminal disposition. Over defendant's objection, the

 court allowed testimony from a witness who claimed to have seen

 defendant steal the car radio and testimony about defendant's

 destructive behavior at the police station after his arrest.

 Whether or not this evidence was properly allowed,6 there

 is little doubt that the inadmissible testimony concerning

 Tavares's prior felony added fuel to an already brewing fire and

 increased the risk that the jury drew upon defendant's

 disposition in reaching its verdict. In these circumstances, we

 cannot say that "it is `"highly probable"' that the error did not

 
 ____________________

 6 Both the eyewitness testimony explicitly identifying Tavares as
 the radio thief and the testimony about defendant's police
 station behavior create some risk of injecting unfair prejudice
 for the defendant without adding significant weight to the
 prosecution's case. If the government seeks to re-introduce this
 evidence in a new trial, we urge the district court to "remain
 vigilant" as to whether it survives the Rule 403 balancing, see
 ___
 United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 638 (1st Cir. 1993).
 _____________ ________

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 contribute to the verdict," United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d
 _____________ ________

 1446, 1455 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

 The judgment of conviction is therefore VACATED, and the
 ____________________________________________________________

 case remanded to the district court for a new trial.
 ____________________________________________________

 Concurrence follows.












































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 SELYA, Circuit Judge, with whom Campbell, Senior Circuit
 _____________ _______________

 Judge, joins (concurring). I write separately, not because I
 _____

 harbor reservations about the result reached in this case, but

 because I fear that the court's opinion may be read by some to

 recalibrate the balance that Fed. R. Evid. 403 demands. I have

 three qualms.

 First: I think that the court, in endeavoring to
 First:
 _____

 distinguish between the fact of a prior conviction and the basic

 facts necessary to give that conviction content, suggests an

 uncomfortably cramped and somewhat artificial definition of

 relevance. In my view, the disputed evidence is relevant 

 albeit perhaps marginally so but nonetheless inadmissible under

 a proper application of Rule 403.

 Second: I question the court's approach to Rule 403 in this
 Second:
 ______

 situation. The rule does not state, nor should it be construed

 to mean, that prejudicial evidence may be admitted at trial only

 if its harmful effect is substantially outweighed by its

 relevance. Rather, the presumption works the other way,

 mandating the admissibility of relevant evidence unless good

 reason appears for its exclusion. See United States v. Foley,
 ___ ______________ _____

 871 F.2d 235, 238 (1st Cir. 1989). The court here seems to

 reverse this presumption, see, e.g., ante at 8, 10, thereby
 ___ ____ ____

 putting the shoe on the wrong foot.

 Third: I fervently believe that the Rule 403 balance is
 Third:
 _____

 best struck on a case by case basis, and that, in almost all

 instances, the strikers of the balance should be the district


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 courts as opposed to the court of appeals. See, e.g., Freeman v.
 ___ ____ _______

 Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Only
 _________________

 rarely and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances will

 we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district

 court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of

 probative value and unfair effect."). I worry that today's

 opinion undervalues this discretion and that the court's words,

 though correct in the context of the case before us, may be taken

 by some as a command that will prompt the district courts to

 micro-manage trials and thereby dispense justice of a superficial

 variety (which is to say, dispense injustice). In the last

 analysis, a trial is not an exercise in computer science, but,

 rather, a recreation of flesh-and-blood events for the

 edification of the factfinder. The law is not so fastidious as

 to demand that all taste be squeezed from a piece of evidence

 before a jury can chew on it. To the contrary, although "[a]

 controlled environment for the reception of proof is essential, .

 . . an artificially sterile environment is neither necessary nor

 desirable." Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 217 (1st Cir.
 _________ _____

 1987).

 In sum, while I agree that this is the rare situation in

 which evidence, though relevant, is unfairly prejudicial and must

 be excluded, and while I share many of Judge Coffin's sentiments,

 I think the district courts would be well advised to avoid any

 attempt to extrapolate a general rule from the court's case-

 specific holding.


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