R. Taylor Keys, of Sardis, for appellant. For more than a hundred years it has been the settled policy of this state that a common carrier is responsible for all loss and damage to property intrusted to it for transportation, except such as results from the act of God, or the public enemy. Gilmore et al. v. Carman, 1 Smedes M. (9 Miss.), 279; Powell et al. v. Mills, 30 Miss. 231 . A common carrier cannot enter into an arbitrary contract, on one of its printed contract forms, limiting the value of goods intrusted to it for transportation, in intrastate commerce, and lost or destroyed through the negligence of the common carrier. Southern Express Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822 ; Mobile O.R. Co. v. Franks, 41 Miss. 494 ; Southern Express Co. v. Seide, 67 Miss. 609 , 7 So. 547; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Wells, 82 Miss. 733 , 35 So. 190; Mobile O.R. Co. v. Weiner, 49 Miss. 725 ; New Orleans, St. L. C.R. Co. v. Faler, 58 Miss. 911 ; Chicago, St. L. N.O.R. Co. v. Moss, 60 Miss. 1003 ; Southeastern Express Co. v. Namie, 182 Miss. 447 , 181 So. 515 ; 5 R.C.L., Sec. 818. There was no contract between the appellant and the appellee bus company. There was no meeting of the minds of the appellant and the appellee and consequently the baggage check did not constitute a contract. Posted and public tariff rules and regulations do not constitute a contract between the passenger and the common carrier. Van Noy Interstate Co. v. Tucker, 125 Miss. 260 , 87 So. 643; Pierce v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 189 F. 561. Contracts between shipper and common carrier must receive strict construction as against the common carrier. Lasky v. Southern Express Co., 92 Miss. 268 , 45 So. 869; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 79 Miss. 114 , 30 So. 43; Yazoo M.V.R. Co. v. G.W. Bent Co., 94 Miss. 681 , 47 So. 805; 5 R.C.L., Sec. 820, Carriers, Posted or Public Notices. A passenger is entitled to recover actual damages for inconvenience suffered by him and the loss of the use of his clothes during the delay in search of his baggage. Mobile O.R. Co. v. Flannagan, 141 Miss. 7 , 105 So. 749 . Stevens Stevens, for Jackson, and McClure Fant, of Sardis, for appellee. We submit to the court that the tariff regulation relied upon as a defense in this case, being the same tariff regulation filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and applicable to interstate shipments, is reasonable, complies with the statutory directions that the Public Service Commission follow as closely as practicable the rules, regulations, etc., of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is a valid regulation of the carrier, which should be upheld by the court. Boston Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 , 34 S.Ct. 526, 58 L.Ed. 868, L.R.A. 1915B, 450; Galveston, Harrisburg San Antonio Ry. Corp. v. Woodbury, 254 U.S. 357 , 41 S.Ct. 114, 65 L.Ed. 301; Hartzberg v. New York Central R. Co., 41 N.Y. Supp. 2d 345; Knight v. Carolina Coach Co., 201 N.C. 261 ; 159 S.E. 311 ; Levett v. Draper, 194 App. Div. 632 , 185 N.Y. Supp. 851; Myers v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, 52 Ga. App. 698 , 184 S.W. 414; Code of 1930, Secs. 7115-7130; Laws of 1926, Ch. 128; Laws of 1938, Ch. 142, Sec. 6 (c) (Code of 1942, Sec. 7637); Laws of 1938, Ch. 142, Sec. 15 (Code of 1942, Sec. 7666); United States Code, Annotated, Sec. 317, Title 49; 10 Am. Jur. 434, 441; 13 C.J.S. 1674, 1683, 1689. Counsel for appellant has filed herein a splendid brief on the common law liability of carriers, but has ignored the defense pleaded, that is, the limitation of liability by tariff regulation. Counsel seeks to justify his argument on the ground that no acceptance by the passenger was shown, and that no contract resulted whereby the appellant agreed to be bound by the amount of the limitation of liability. There can be no exception made to the antiquity of the common law rule that a common carrier is liable as an insurer, as held in the cases cited by appellant, most of which involved shipments of freight, rather than the transportation of baggage. In the case of Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Wells, 82 Miss. 733 , 35 So. 190, the court was dealing with liability of a telegraph company for error in transcribing a message. The court there said that a common carrier cannot by regulation or stipulation exempt itself from liability for negligence. There has been no qualification or abandonment of that rule, and the defense interposed in this case does not touch on liability, but on the measure of recovery, accepting the liability to be that of an insurer. No general issue plea was filed, and no general denial interposed. The defendant admitted the loss of the baggage and that it was worth more than $25 and accepted the liability and tendered the amount into court. Its rates are established for the transportation of the passenger and his baggage within the limit of 150 pounds and $25 value, for which no additional charge is made. In other words, the passenger with baggage pays the same rate as the passenger without baggage, within the limits of the free baggage allowance. Beyond the free baggage allowance, added compensation is required, to cover the value of the transportation and liability for loss assumed by the carrier. Appellant contends next that there was no meeting of the minds, and therefore no contract. In the case of Pierce v. Wells Fargo Express Company, 189 F. 561, the court holds that stipulations giving an agreed value will be sustained but limitations of value would be unenforceable. An arbitrary limitation would, of course, be unenforceable, but an agreed limitation, where the passenger has the choice and election of declaring a higher value and paying a higher rate, is universally held to be enforceable. The arbitrary feature which avoids the former limitation is not present in the latter. The limitation of liability is only valid and enforceable where the passenger has the right and opportunity under the regulations to declare a higher value and receive a higher rate. The case of Van Noy Interstate Co. v. Tucker, 125 Miss. 260 , 87 So. 643, cited by appellant as being directly in point, is, in fact, wholly immaterial, for the Interstate Company was merely a parcel checking service, not a carrier; its liability was that of a bailee for hire; it was not under any regulation or supervision of any governmental authority, and was free to charge whatever it could collect for its service. In other words, not being a carrier, the Interstate Company could charge one patron ten cents and the next patron twenty-five cents, for the same service, and could refuse altogether to accept any parcel or item of baggage which it did not choose to accept. The quotation from Healey v. N.Y.C. H.R.R. Co., 138 N.Y. Supp. 287, 153 App. Div. 516 , demonstrates the fact that the court was dealing with a clear case of bailment, and not with the liability of a common carrier for baggage, for the court refers to the plaintiff as \bailor.\"

Griffith.