Trenmor Coffin, A. E. Cheney, M. A. Murphy, Samuel Platt, E. D. Vanderlieth and O. J. Smith, for Relator: I. The proceeding in quo warranto may be in the name of the state, without the attorney-general, upon the relation of a private citizen, or upon the relation of one claiming the office in question, upon leave of court. (State Const., art. VI, sec. 4; State v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202 ; O'Neale v. McClinton, 5 Nev. 329 ; State v. Ruhe, 52 Pac. Rep. 274 ; People v. Regents, 49 Pac. Rep. (Col.) 286-88; Gen. Stats. 1780; High, Extr. Leg. Rem. 606; State v. Brown, 5 R. I. 1 , 6 ; Meacham on Pub. Off., secs. 483 and 484; Vroman v. Michie, 69 Mich. 42 ; State v. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438 ; State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 690 ; State v. Lynn, 31 Neb. 772 .) Quo warranto lies to oust the incumbent of the office of governor upon the relation of the rival claimant to the office and to try relator's right to the office and to put him into the office, without the attorney-general joining in the proceeding. ( State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 690 .) II. Quo warranto is the proper proceeding. In this proceeding the qualifications of voters, conduct of election officers, counting of ballots, canvass of returns, and all steps leading up to the taking of the office may be inquired into. (High, Extr. Leg. Rem. sec. 638, and authorities cited; McCrary, Elect. 468; Spell. Extr. Rel., sec. 1776, p. 1447; People v. Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; People v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 45 ; 84 Am. Dec. 242, and notes and authorities; State v. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438 ; Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., vol. 10, pp. 798-9, and notes and authorities; vol. 19, 1st ed., 673, notes 3 and 4.) Ballots may be inspected and recounted. ( State v. Shay, 101 Ind. 36 , 38 ; Jennet v. Owens, 63 Tex. 262 , authorities on 270; De Berry v. Nicholson, 102 N. C. 469 ; Hudson v. Solomon, 19 Kan. 177 ; State v. Meilike. 81 Wis. 574 .) The court may canvass the returns and count the ballots, if they have not been counted or canvassed. ( Dean v. State, 88 Tex. 291 .) III. Statutes providing for an election contest are no bar to proceedings in quo warranto, but afford a concurrent and cumulative remedy. (McCrary, Elect. 360; People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123 ; Greely v. Holland, 14 Nev. 320 ; State v. Adams, 65 Ind. 396-7 ; State v. Shay, 101 Ind. 36 , 38 : State v. Fransham, 19 Mont. 273 , 279 , et seq., and authorities cited; State v. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438 , 456-7 ; Spell. Extr. Rel. 1776; High, Extr. Leg. Rem. 624; People v. Londoner, 13 Colo. 303 ; Snowball v. People, 147 Ill. 260 ; State v. McKinnon, 8 Or. 493 ; McAllen v. Rhodes, 65 Tex. 348 ; People v. Hall, 80 N.Y. 117 ; 23 South. Rep. (Ala.) 124.) IV. Upon quo warranto the court will determine the right of relator as well as that of the respondent to the office, and, if the determination is in favor of the relator, will oust the respondent and put the relator in possession of the office. (Gen. Stats. 3343-5; C. C. P. of Cal. 804-6; State v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 565 , 572 ; People v. Banvard, 27 Cal. 470 ; People v. Fleming, 100 Cal. 537 ; Jennet v. Owens, 63 Tex. 262 ; McAlien v. Rhodes, 65 Tex. 348 ; Hudson v. Solomon , 19 Kan. 177-8 ; Tarbox v. Sughrue, 36 Kan. 225 ; State v. Frazier, 28 Neb. 438 ; State v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 690 ; State v. Lynn, 31 Neb. 772-4 Lindsay v. Attorney-General, 33 Miss. 508 , 525 ; Newsome v. Cooke, 44 Miss. 352 ; Griebel v. State, Ill Ind. 272-3, and authorities cited; State v. Wright, 10 Heisk (Tenn.) 238, 260-62; State v. McGeary, 69 Vt. 461 , 468 .) V. The fact that all of the inspectors or clerks at a given precinct were of the same political party with respondent is material to be, considered in connection with other facts alleged in the information, and more especially when in any precinct all of both inspectors and clerks were of the same political party as respondent. ( Sandens v. Lacks, 43 S. W. (Mo.) 653, 655; 142 Mo. 256 , 264-5 ; Dial v. Hollandsworth, 39 W. Va. 1 , 3 , also dissenting opinion and authorities cited, pp. 6 to 17.) VI. The acts alleged in the information of intoxication and riotous conduct on the part of the inspectors and electors of certain precincts, and acts in violation of the secrecy of the ballot, constitute such malconduct within the meaning of the statute as should reject the entire vote of those precincts. (McCrary, Elect. 207; Tebbe v. Smith, 108 Cal. 110-12 ; Attorney-Genl. v. Stillson, 108 Mich. 419 ; Russell v. McDowell, 83 Cal. 70 , 77 ; Ex Parte Arnold, 128 Mo. 260-61 ; People v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 81 ; Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., vol. 10, p. 585, note 4, pp. 698-9, and note 1.) VII. The right of relator cannot be reached by respondent's demurrer. Respondent's interest in the case ends with the determination of his right to the office. If the allegations of the information are sufficient to oust respondent, he cannot complain at any determination the court may make as to relator's rights. ( Flynn v. Abbott, 16 Cal. 365 ; People v. Fleming, 100 Cal. 541 .) VIII. There is no question involved here concerning the form of ballots, or manner of voting. The allegations of the information, confessed by the demurrer, are that the members of the cavalry troop voted according to law, which includes the Australian law and all other laws in force. The question as argued by respondent's counsel was mainly the return and canvass of the vote. Section 3, article II of the constitution vests an absolute right of suffrage in such citizens as are enlisted in the military or naval service of the United States without compliance with the registration laws. The last clause of this section contains a reference to other provisions of the constitution upon this subject. These provisions are found in the election ordinance in the latter part of the constitution. Section 3 of article II, together with the election ordinance of the constitution, are self-executing. (Cooley, Const. Lim, pp. 99, 100.) Section XIV of the ordinance continued all of the provisions of the ordinance which relate to the soldiers' vote in force until the legislature should substitute other provisions concerning the taking and canvassing of this vote. A statute passed in 1866 (Stats. 1866, p. 210), concerning elections, made provision for the soldiers' vote. This statute doubtless suspended and took the place of the election ordinance of the constitution. This act of 1866 provided that the soldiers' vote should be returned to the secretary of state and that the state board of canvassers should meet at the office of the secretary of state and open and canvass the votes. (Stats. 1866, pp. 215 to 217.) A later act concerning elections passed in 1873 (Stats. 1873, p. 197) apparently attempted to repeal the act of 1866 (repealing clause, 1873, p. 215) without making any new provision concerning the soldiers' vote. The apparent attempt, even if it was Intended to be real, to repeal the entire act of 1866 cannot be held to have been effectual, for the reason that the repealing clause of the act of 1873 (p. 215, sec. 95) fails to properly or correctly refer to the act of 1866 attempted to be repealed. The title of the act of 1866 is not properly set out. The words \election returns and canvassing the same\" are