Wilma I. Thorne v. Richard Schweiker, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 694 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
Wilma I. Thorne v. Richard Schweiker, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 694 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Canfield v. Commissioner of Social Security (idd, 2025-09-08)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Canfield v. Commissioner of Social Security
D. Idaho · 2025 · confidence medium
Cal. 2012) (“the existence of some pain does not constitute a disability if it does not prevent Plaintiff from working”) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by the statute.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. O'Malley
D. Idaho · 2025 · confidence medium
Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (“the existence of some pain does not constitute a disability if it does not prevent Plaintiff from working”) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by the statute.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hilary Ann Stensen v. Carolyn Colvin
C.D. Cal. · 2025 · confidence medium
Idaho Aug. 12, 2024) 20 (emphasis in original) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 21 1982) and Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wayment v. O'Malley (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Idaho · 2025 · confidence medium
Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (“the existence of some pain does not constitute a disability if it does not prevent Plaintiff from working”) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by the statute.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roe v. Commissioner of Social Security
D. Idaho · 2022 · confidence medium
Cal. 2012) (“[T]he existence of some pain does not constitute a disability if it does not prevent Plaintiff from working.”) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by the statute.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Siler v. Commissioner of Social Security
D. Idaho · 2022 · confidence medium
Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (“the existence of some pain does not constitute a disability if it does not prevent Plaintiff from working”) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by the statute.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wheeler v. Kijakazi
D. Idaho · 2022 · confidence medium
Cal. Jan. 10, 2012) (“the existence of some pain does not constitute a disability if it does not prevent Plaintiff from working”) (citing Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by the statute.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Sullivan
W.D. Mo. · 1991 · confidence medium
Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James WINN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant, Appellee
1st Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See e.g., Reinhart v. Secretary, Health and Human Services, 733 F.2d 571, 572-573 (8th Cir.1984) (diagnosis of psychological disorder that transforms emotions into pain); Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir.1982) (diagnosis of arthritis in 1977 is relevant to complaint of pain in 1975); Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir.1982) (diagnosis of arthritis and heart disease); Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d 412, 415 (3rd Cir.1981) (diagnoses of numerous ailments); Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092, 1096-1097 (7th Cir.1974) (diagnosis of scleroderma); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 …
discussed Cited "see" Jewett v. Commissioner of Social Security
D. Idaho · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1982) (where evidence establishes that a claimant has a medical condition that causes chronic pain or fatigue, this fact alone does not answer the question of whether a claimant is disabled; the ALJ must consider the severity of the claimant’s pain or other limitations); see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (the social security program is “intended to provide benefits to people who are unable to work; awarding benefits in cases of nondisabling pain would expand the class of recipients far beyond that contemplated by …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mary M. MAGALLANES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (Vincent); see also Thorne v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 170, 172 (8th Cir.1982) (“It is for the AU to resolve ... ambiguities in the evidence.”); Weber v. Harris, 640 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir.1981) (same).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Wilma I. THORNE, Appellant,
v.
Richard SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee
82-1112.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Dec 7, 1982.
694 F.2d 170
Robert Van Norman, Asst. Regional Atty., Dept, of Health and Human Services, Kansas City, Mo., for appellee., Richard H. Hoch, Hoch & Steinheider, Nebraska City, Neb., for appellant.
Bright, Gibson.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Wilma I. Thorne appeals from an order of the district court [1] sustaining the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying her application for social security disability benefits. Appellant has osteoarthritis of the spine, [2] and there appears to be no disagreement that her current condition renders her disabled. The crucial issue, however, is whether appellant was disabled as of June 30, 1975, the last date on which she met the special earnings requirements of the Social Security Act. We affirm the decision of the district court.

Appellant’s case has been before this court previously. On the first appeal, the court remanded the case so that the Admin[*171] istrative Law Judge (ALJ) could more fully develop the evidence of appellant’s disability as of 1975, and in particular so that the ALJ could hear the views of appellant’s treating physician on this issue. See: Thorne v. Galifano, 607 F.2d 218 (8th Cir.1979).

Appellant was employed as a nurse’s aide until May 1975, when she quit her job. Appellant contends that she was forced to stop working because of severe and disabling back pain caused by her spinal osteoarthritis. At the time appellant stopped working she was 55 years old. She has only a tenth grade education, and has spent most of her working life as either a nurse’s aide or a production line worker at a food plant.

To establish that she was disabled as of June 30,1975, appellant needed to prove that she had (1) a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that could be expected to result in death or which had lasted or could be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; (2) that she was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity; and (3) that this inability was a result of her impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1); Camp v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 1325, 1332 (8th Cir.1981). A showing that appellant had a back ailment alone would not support a finding that she was disabled unless the limitations imposed by the back ailment prevented her from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Roberts v. Schweiker, 682 F.2d 743, 744 (8th Cir.1982).

On remand, the ALJ heard testimony from appellant’s treating physician, Dr. Rodney Koerber, who stated that appellant was suffering from arthritis in 1977. He had no objective evidence of appellant’s having had trouble with her back before that time, although he felt she could have had back problems at the time she quit working. He could not testify with certainty that her condition was disabling in 1975. [3]

Because of the lack of objective medical evidence regarding appellant’s condition in 1975, the ALJ had to rely primarily on the testimony of appellant herself. The ALJ was obligated to give serious consideration to appellant’s testimony about the severity of her pain even though it was not fully corroborated by objective examination. Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523, 525-26 (8th Cir.1980). It is clear from the record that the ALJ did so consider appellant’s testimony, but found it not credible for several reasons.

Appellant contended that her arthritis pain was so severe that her husband had to drive her to and from work during the last several months she was employed. She also testified, however, that once she arrived at work she performed fairly strenuous activities, sometimes including lifting patients. Appellant further testified that after she quit her job she continued to do two or three hours of housework daily and still pursued her gardening. In addition, appellant did not seriously seek medical help for her back pain until approximately 1977, even though she contends that it was so severe in 1975 that it prevented her from working. Because of these inconsistencies, the ALJ concluded that appellant’s testimony lacked credibility.

The ALJ concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to show that appellant had “experienced pain of such intensity, frequency, or duration, as would have prevented her from performing substantial gainful activity in June, 1975.” Opinion of Administrative Law Judge at 12. He determined that as of June 1975 claimant could have continued her former work “at least at light and sedentary levels of exertion” and that she therefore was not disabled.

The decision to deny appellant disability benefits must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Weber v. Harris, 640[*172] F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir.1981). It is for the ALJ to resolve conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence. Id. Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.’ ” Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d at 527, quoting from Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456, 467 (1951).

We conclude that the decision to deny appellant disability benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

2

. Appellant also has diabetes and hypertension. These conditions are under control, however, and appellant does not contend that they were disabling in 1975.

3

. The ALJ also heard the testimony of a vocational expert, who stated in response to a hypothetical question that Mrs. Thorne could return to her former work at light and sedentary levels of exertion if it was determined that her back pain in 1975 was not so severe as she contended.