J. S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stove Works, 73 S.W. 800 (1903).
J. S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stove Works, 73 S.W. 800 (1903). Book View Copy Cite
J.S. Brown Hardware Company
v.
Indiana Stove Works.
L.E. Trezevant and Frank M. Spencer, for plaintiff in error. — 1. The court erred in holding that the act of appellee as alleged and complained of by appellant as its cause of action is not an actionable wrong for which appellee is liable in damages. And the court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. 2. The court erred in holding that the act of collusion alleged to have been resorted to and carried out by and between appellee and Theo. Nash was not, in the eye of the court, the same as a fraud upon appellant. 3. The court erred in holding that the act of enticement alleged to have been resorted to and accomplished by appellee is not such an act as suppresses competition in trade and is not morally and legally a wrongful act for which appellee is liable in damages. 4. The court erred in not recognizing the law and the fact to be, that at common law, and uncontrolled by a local statute, such right of action by a master or employer is not denied by any court in the United States or in England, and the court erred in being the first and only court in the United States in denying the right of a master to an action at common law for knowingly interrupting the relation subsisting between him and his servant, or one who owes him an exclusive personal service, by enticing such servant or employer from performing his duty during the existence of such relation, whereby the master or employer is injured, and the court erred in announcing such new doctrine as the law of this case. 5. The court erred in holding that malice is not inferred from the act of enticement as alleged by appellant, and the court erred in holding that malice was not found in the act of enticement with notice or knowledge on the part of appellee of the relationship alleged to have been existing between appellant and Theo. Nash. 6. The court erred in holding that the doctrine as extended in Lumley v. Gye to include a prima donna employed to sing songs, \is inconsistent with the free institutions of this country
Gaines.
as tending to hold a servant in bondage to the master and prevent him from bettering his condition
GAINES, Chief Justice.

This suit was brought by the J. S. Brown Hardware Company against the Indiana Stove Works. The petition alleged, in substance, that the plaintiff is a corporation chartered under the laws of Texas, and that it is and has been engaged for many years in the business of selling stoves, stove fixtures and attachments, and other hardware by wholesale throughout the State; that it had employed one Hash as a traveling salesman to sell its wares and that Hash had agreed to serve it exclusively; that while he was so engaged, the defendant, the Indiana Stove Works, also a corporation and [*457] engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling stoves and stove attachments, and knowing Nash’s contract with the plaintiff, induced him to enter its service, and that the said Nash, while under contract with plaintiff and engaged in its employment, did, without plaintiff’s knowledge, engage in the" sale of the defendant’s products and so continued for the term of five years. The plaintiff further alleges in effect that by reason of the conduct of the defendant it lost trade and was damaged many thousand dollars.

A demurrer to the1 petition was sustained, and on appeal the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.

In the case of Raymond v. Yarrington, this day decided, we have held, that to induce a party to a contract to break it to the damage of the other party thereto is an actionable wrong. That ruling is decisive of the question in the present case. It was in our opinion error to sustain the demurrer to the petition.

The judgment of the "District Court and that of the Court of Civil Appeals are therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.