In Re Jacoby-bender, Inc., Debtor. City of New York, Appellant, v. Jacoby-bender, Inc., Appellee, 758 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
In Re Jacoby-bender, Inc., Debtor. City of New York, Appellant, v. Jacoby-bender, Inc., Appellee, 758 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
129 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: The Benaroya Company LLC v. Lewis County (wawb, 2025-09-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 31 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Benaroya Company LLC v. Lewis County (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. W.D. Wash. · 2025 · confidence medium
Finally, in Jacoby-Bender, the Second 10 Circuit Court of Appeals declined to read the statute as “require[ing] that the 11 reorganization plan include specifics,” and instead asked whether the transfer is 12 “necessary to the consummation of the plan.” 758 F.2d at 841-42 (2d.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (2×)
SCOTUS · 2008 · confidence medium
In Piccadilly's view, any ambiguity in the statutory text is overshadowed by § 1146(a)'s obvious purpose: to facilitate the Chapter 11 process "through giving tax relief." In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (C.A.2 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In Re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.)
11th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
The Second Circuit also addressed an analogous issue in In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., where the question presented was whether a property transfer that occurred post-confirmation was exempt under § 1146(c) even though the “plan did not mention any instrument of transfer and did not give the debtor the authority to make the specific sale.” 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Complete Retreats, LLC
Bankr. D. Conn. · 2006 · confidence medium
Id. at 842 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In Re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.)
S.D. Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Statutory Construction Courts that have refused to impose strict temporal requirements have stressed that “Congress’s apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief.” Jaco-by-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Webster Classic Auctions, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
The seeds of a better reasoned approach are found in the Second Circuit case of City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d 840, 841-2 (2nd Cir.1985) (holding the failure of a confirmed plan to include details regarding an actual transfer and authority for same did not preclude application of § 1146(c) to postconfirmation sale of real property where the bankruptcy court found the plan’s consummation depended almost entirely on the sale).
examined Cited as authority (rule) In Re Beulah Chruch of God in Chirst Jesus, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2004 · confidence medium
In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added). 13 Given the Second Circuit’s emphasis on cause and effect, id. at 841, 842 , it is not hard to see why later decisions by district and bankruptcy courts in this Circuit held that transfers integral to the confirmation of a plan should be as exempt under section 1146(c) as transfers necessary for the *49 plan’s consummation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Hechinger Investment Company of Delaware, Inc., Debtor Baltimore County, Maryland Montgomery County, Maryland Prince George's County, Maryland State of Maryland v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust Patricia A. Staiano, Trustee State of Maryland, Baltimore County, Maryland, Montgomery County, Maryland, and Prince George's County, Maryland
3rd Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
As the Second Circuit in Jacoby-Bender noted, "Congress's apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief." In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In Re Hechinger Investment Co. of Delaware, Inc.) (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
As the Second Circuit in Jacoby Bender noted, “Congress’s apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief.” In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust
3rd Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
As the Second Circuit in Jacoby-Bender noted, "Congress's apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief.” In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.H. Orlando, Ltd. v. Florida (In Re T.H. Orlando, Ltd.)
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
In order to prevail the claimant must show the consummation of the plan depended on the transaction, See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985), was made pursuant to a confirmed bankruptcy plan, See In re Amsterdam Avenue Development Associates, 103 B.R. 454 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1989), 8 and the transaction was an essential component of the plan confirmation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Linc Capital, Inc. (2×)
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2002 · confidence medium
The reasoning in In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 40 B.R. 10 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984), and the affirming opinion by a Second Circuit panel at 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2nd Cir.1985), is more persuasive.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NVR Homes Inc v. Circuit Court Clerks
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Holding that § 1146(c) extended to the property sale, the court noted that it was irrelevant whether the plan "empower[ed] the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed." Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Nvr, Lp, Debtor
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Holding that § 1146(c) extended to the property sale, the court noted that it was irrelevant whether the plan "empower[ed] the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed." Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts for Anne Arundel County
4th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
Holding that § 1146(c) extended to the property sale, the court noted that it was irrelevant whether the plan “empowered] the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed.” Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Lopez Development, Inc.
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 1993 · confidence medium
Assoc., L.P., 963 F.2d 503, 510 (2nd Cir.1992); In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2nd Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New York City Department of Finance v. 1515 Broadway Associates, L.P. (In Re 1515 Broadway Associates, L.P.)
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
Congress’s apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganization through giving tax relief, a purpose served equally well when the reorganization plan leaves details to be settled in the future.” In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P. v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance (In Re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P.)
S.D.N.Y. · 1991 · confidence medium
The controversy in this action concerns that portion of section 1146(c) which limits exemptions under the Bankruptcy Code to a “stamp or similar tax.” At issue is the definition and parameter of a “stamp or similar tax.” 10 While the Second Circuit has considered the statutory meaning of certain portions of section 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, including the legal effect of a “transfer under a plan,” it has never reached the question of whether the Gains Tax is a “stamp or similar tax.” See City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841-42 (2d Cir.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mensh v. Eastern Stainless Corp. (In re Eastmet Corp.)
D. Maryland · 1989 · confidence medium
(Trial Transcript, at 19); In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Director of Revenue, Delaware v. CCA Partnership (In Re CCA Partnership)
D. Del. · 1987 · confidence medium
In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2nd Cir.1985); In re Cantrup, 53 B.R. 104, 106 (Bankr.D.Col.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of New York v. Smoss Enterprises Corp. (In Re Smoss Enterprises Corp.)
E.D.N.Y · 1985 · confidence medium
In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited "see" Upper Hanover Township v. T.H. Properties, LP (In re T.H. Properties, LP) (2×)
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841-842 (2d Cir.1985).
cited Cited "see" In Re New 118th, Inc.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d at 841 .
discussed Cited "see" Florida, Department of Revenue v. T.H. Orlando Ltd. (In Re T.H. Orlando Ltd.)
11th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.1985) (“[W]here, as here, a transfer, and hence an instrument of transfer, is necessary to the consummation of a plan, the plan seems implicitly to have ‘dealt with’ the transfer instrument.”) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited "see" Baltimore County v. Hechinger Investment Co. of Delaware, Inc. (In Re Hechinger Investment Co. of Delaware, Inc.)
D. Del. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that, where a transfer is necessary to the consummation of a plan, the transfer is “under a plan”) 5 ; In re NVR Homes, Inc., 189 F.3d 442, 457 (4th Cir.1999) (holding that “under a plan confirmed” requires plan confirmation as a precondition to eligibility for the exemption).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Kerner Printing Co., Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841-42 (2d Cir.1985).
examined Cited "see" City of New York v. Baldwin League of Independent Schools (In Re Baldwin League of Independent Schools) (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 841-42 (2d Cir.1985) (Congress intended to enlarge this exemption when it replaced the Bankruptcy Act *127 with the Code and added the “similar tax” language).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Permar Provisions, Inc.
Bankr. E.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: accord · confidence high
The preconfirmation sale in this case is factually akin to Smoss, although the same legal standard exists in Smoss and Jacoby-Bender: whether the sale of “property is essential to the confirmation of the plan.” Smoss, 54 B.R. at 951 : accord Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 .
cited Cited "see" CCA Partnership v. Director of Revenue, State of Delaware (In Re CCA Partnership)
Bankr. D. Del. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 40 B.R. 10 , 10 C.B.C.2d 626 (E.D.N.Y.1984), aff'd., 758 F.2d 840 (2nd Cir.1985).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In re Sanders
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See e.g., City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Williams
E.D.N.Y · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
In determining that the Gains Tax was not a transfer tax under the N.Y.EDPL 702(A)(1), the Heller court found that the Gains Tax is “in the nature of an income tax.” Heller, 180 A.D.2d at 301 , 585 N.Y.S.2d at 581 ; see also In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 40 B.R. 10, 15 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984), aff’d, 758 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.1985) (interpreting Gains tax statute and recognizing that [c]apital gains taxes ... are income taxes), citing, 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation § 557 (1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Bankr. L. Rep. P 70,357 in Re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., Debtor. City of New York
v.
Jacoby-Bender, Inc.
791, Docket 84-5091.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 27, 1985.
758 F.2d 840
Arnold Fox, New York City (Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Cornelius F. Roche, Corp. Counsel, New York City, of counsel), for appellant., Neal S. Barlia, New York City (Howard Graff, Bloch, Graff, Danzig, Jelline & Man-del, New York City, of counsel), for appel-lee.
Oakes, Meskill, Pierce.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 85%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (2)
OAKES, Circuit Judge:

The City of New York appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Frank X. Altimari, Judge, affirming a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court, Robert J. Hall, Bankruptcy Judge, exempting the debtor, Jacoby-Bender, Inc., in a Chapter 11 reorganization, from payment of the New York City Real Property Transfer Tax, New York, N.Y., Admin.Code § 1146-2.0 (1984), on the delivery of a deed transferring a building to The Hearst Corporation. 40 B.R. 10. The bankruptcy court held that the delivery occurred under a confirmed reorganization plan and was thus exempt from all stamp taxes or similar taxes pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (1982). We affirm.

The City advances two arguments. First, it argues that the delivery was not “under” the plan as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) because the plan did not mention any instrument of transfer and did not give the debtor the authority to make the specific sale. Because the debtor sought separate court approval for the sale, the City contends that the debtor made the transfer not under the plan but under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), which permits the trustee in bankruptcy to sell property of the estate after notice and hearing. We disagree. The statute does not require that the reorganization plan include specifics. The City articulates no policy reason why Congress would have required specifics; indeed, Congress’s apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief, a purpose served equally well when the reorganization plan leaves details to be settled in the future. Here, as the bankruptcy court found, “the plan’s consummation depended almost entirely upon the sale of the building,” the sale in turn depending upon the delivery of the deed. That the plan did not empower the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed is. irrelevant to our determination that the delivery of the deed took place “under” the plan within the meaning of section 1146(c).

Nor is this conclusion changed by the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. The Report of the House Judiciary Committee stated:

Another provision that affects the method of taxation in bankruptcy applies only in chapter 11. Section 1146(c) of title 11 is modeled after section 267 of the Bankruptcy Act which exempts any security or transfer instrument dealt with under a confirmed chapter X plan from any State or Federal stamp tax. Section 1146(c) of title 11 broadens the exemption to any stamp tax or similar[*842] tax on a security or a transfer instrument dealt with under the consolidated chapter 11. No opposition has been voiced with respect to this section.

H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6238. The City urges that a transfer instrument is not “dealt with” under a plan unless the plan mentions the instrument in so many words. On the contrary, where, as here, a transfer, and hence an instrument of transfer, is necessary to the consummation of a plan, the plan seems implicitly to have “dealt with” the transfer instrument.

Second, the City argues that section 1146(c) exempts only transfers either to a reorganized debtor or to a corporation specially organized under the debtor’s plan, not to an unrelated third party. To support this argument, the City traces a multi-step analytical path through the statute. Proposing that “transfer” must have the same meaning in section 1146 that it has in section 1123, the section illustrating the different means of executing a reorganization plan, the City notes that section 1123(a)(5)(B) refers only to transfers made “to one or more entities, whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan,” and that section 1123(a)(6) requires corporate entities referred to in section 1123(a)(5)(B) to include certain restrictions in their charters, thus implicitly proving that section 1123(a)(5)(B) encompasses only transfers made to corporations chartered during reorganization proceedings, not to preexistent third-party corporations. According to the City, section 1123(a)(6) clarifies that the phrase “whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan” in section 1123(a)(5)(B) serves to limit the kinds of entities to which a “transfer” can be made. Ergo, the argument runs, Congress also intended to limit section 1146(c) transfers to those made to either the reorganized corporation or a corporation organized under the debtor’s plan.

We cannot accept this convoluted statutory interpretation. The City’s argument that section 1123 narrows the meaning of “transfer” is fundamentally flawed. Far from narrowing the meaning, section 1123(a)(5)(B) evidences Congress’s understanding that “transfer” is a word of broad meaning: in order to specify a certain type of transfer, Congress there added the limiting phrase “to one or more entities, whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan.” In the absence of a similar phrase restricting the types of transfers to which section 1146(c) refers, we believe that Congress intended the word “transfer” there to have its ordinary meaning.

Nor can it be said that because section 1123(a)(5)(B) refers to a “transfer” and subparagraph (D) refers to a “sale” (of all or part of the property of the estate), the term “transfer” in section 1146 does not relate to a sale. Quite clearly, 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code relates back, so far as state and local taxes are concerned, to section 267 of Chapter X of the old Bankruptcy Act. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6377; see also 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1146.01, at 1146-2 to 1146-4 (15th ed. 1984). Old section 267, as is made clear by its statutory derivations, 6A Collier on Bankruptcy 1115.08, at 836-40 (14th ed. 1977), related to transactions, in the treatise’s words, “which serve to execute or make effective a plan confirmed under Chapter X.” Id. at 840. A sale in general, following on confirmation of a plan, serves to make the plan effective. At the least, this sale did.

Order affirmed.