In Re Jacoby-bender, Inc., Debtor. City of New York, Appellant, v. Jacoby-bender, Inc., Appellee, 758 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
In Re Jacoby-bender, Inc., Debtor. City of New York, Appellant, v. Jacoby-bender, Inc., Appellee, 758 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
129 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
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At page 841 Facilitating reorganization through tax relief under section 114621 citing casesholding the failure of a confirmed plan to include details regarding an actual transfer and authority for same did not preclude application of § 1146(c) to postconfirmation sale of real property where the bankruptcy court found the plan’s consummation depended almost entirely on the sale1 citing court put it this way · 19 listed here
  • The Benaroya Co. LLC v. Lewis Cnty., No. 25-04023 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2025). 2 cites
    Finally, in Jacoby-Bender, the Second 10 Circuit Court of Appeals declined to read the statute as “require[ing] that the 11 reorganization plan include specifics,” and instead asked whether the transfer is 12 “necessary to the consummation…
  • Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33 (2008).published 2 cites
    In Piccadilly's view, any ambiguity in the statutory text is overshadowed by § 1146(a)'s obvious purpose: to facilitate the Chapter 11 process "through giving tax relief." In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (C.A.2 1985).
  • State of Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In Re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.), 484 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2007).published
    “plan did not mention any instrument of transfer and did not give the debtor the authority to make the specific sale”
  • Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In Re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.), 379 B.R. 215 (S.D. Fla. 2006).published
    Statutory Construction Courts that have refused to impose strict temporal requirements have stressed that “Congress’s apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief.” Jaco-by-Bender, 7…
  • In Re Webster Classic Auctions, Inc., 318 B.R. 216 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004).published 2 cites
    (holding the failure of a confirmed plan to include details regarding an actual transfer and authority for same did not preclude application of § 1146(c) to postconfirmation sale of real property where the bankruptcy cou…)
  • In Re Beulah Chruch of God in Chirst Jesus, Inc., 316 B.R. 41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).published 3 cites
    In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added). 13 Given the Second Circuit’s emphasis on cause and effect, id. at 841, 842 , it is not hard to see why later decisions by district and bankruptcy courts in this Circuit held that tran…
  • Baltimore Cnty. v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In Re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, Inc.), 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003).published 4 cites
    As the Second Circuit in Jacoby-Bender noted, "Congress's apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief.” In re Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985).
  • T.H. Orlando, Ltd. v. Florida (In Re T.H. Orlando, Ltd.), 319 B.R. 241 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).published
    In order to prevail the claimant must show the consummation of the plan depended on the transaction, See In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 758 F.2d 840, 841 (2d Cir.1985), was made pursuant to a confirmed bankruptcy plan, See In re Amsterdam Aven…
  • NVR Homes Inc v. Circuit Court Clerks, No. 98-2211 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999).published
    Holding that § 1146(c) extended to the property sale, the court noted that it was irrelevant whether the plan "empower[ed] the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed." Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
  • In Re: Nvr, Lp, Debtor, 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999).published
    Holding that § 1146(c) extended to the property sale, the court noted that it was irrelevant whether the plan "empower[ed] the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed." Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
Show 9 more citing cases
At page 842 Interpreting the scope of "transfer" in bankruptcy law9 citing cases“where, as here, a transfer, and hence an instrument of transfer, is necessary to the consummation of a plan, the plan seems implicitly to have 'dealt with' the transfer instrument.”3 citing courts quote it
At page 840 “because the plan did not mention any instrument of transfer and did not give the debtor the authority to make the specific sale.”0 citing cases5 citing courts quote it
    Other citing cases4 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
    Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
    Bankr. L. Rep. P 70,357 in Re Jacoby-Bender, Inc., Debtor. City of New York
    v.
    Jacoby-Bender, Inc.
    791, Docket 84-5091.
    Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
    Mar 27, 1985.
    Published opinion
    758 F.2d 840
    1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30294
    Arnold Fox, New York City (Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Cornelius F. Roche, Corp. Counsel, New York City, of counsel), for appellant., Neal S. Barlia, New York City (Howard Graff, Bloch, Graff, Danzig, Jelline & Man-del, New York City, of counsel), for appel-lee.
    Oakes, Meskill, Pierce.
    Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
    2 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
    Pinpoint authority: bottom 85%
    Citer courts: S.D. New York (2)
    OAKES, Circuit Judge:

    The City of New York appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Frank X. Altimari, Judge, affirming a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court, Robert J. Hall, Bankruptcy Judge, exempting the debtor, Jacoby-Bender, Inc., in a Chapter 11 reorganization, from payment of the New York City Real Property Transfer Tax, New York, N.Y., Admin.Code § 1146-2.0 (1984), on the delivery of a deed transferring a building to The Hearst Corporation. 40 B.R. 10. The bankruptcy court held that the delivery occurred under a confirmed reorganization plan and was thus exempt from all stamp taxes or similar taxes pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (1982). We affirm.

    The City advances two arguments. First, it argues that the delivery was not “under” the plan as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) because the plan did not mention any instrument of transfer and did not give the debtor the authority to make the specific sale. Because the debtor sought separate court approval for the sale, the City contends that the debtor made the transfer not under the plan but under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), which permits the trustee in bankruptcy to sell property of the estate after notice and hearing. We disagree. The statute does not require that the reorganization plan include specifics. The City articulates no policy reason why Congress would have required specifics; indeed, Congress’s apparent purpose in enacting section 1146 was to facilitate reorganizations through giving tax relief, a purpose served equally well when the reorganization plan leaves details to be settled in the future. Here, as the bankruptcy court found, “the plan’s consummation depended almost entirely upon the sale of the building,” the sale in turn depending upon the delivery of the deed. That the plan did not empower the debtor to make a specific sale or deliver a specific deed is. irrelevant to our determination that the delivery of the deed took place “under” the plan within the meaning of section 1146(c).

    Nor is this conclusion changed by the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. The Report of the House Judiciary Committee stated:

    Another provision that affects the method of taxation in bankruptcy applies only in chapter 11. Section 1146(c) of title 11 is modeled after section 267 of the Bankruptcy Act which exempts any security or transfer instrument dealt with under a confirmed chapter X plan from any State or Federal stamp tax. Section 1146(c) of title 11 broadens the exemption to any stamp tax or similar[*842] tax on a security or a transfer instrument dealt with under the consolidated chapter 11. No opposition has been voiced with respect to this section.

    H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6238. The City urges that a transfer instrument is not “dealt with” under a plan unless the plan mentions the instrument in so many words. On the contrary, where, as here, a transfer, and hence an instrument of transfer, is necessary to the consummation of a plan, the plan seems implicitly to have “dealt with” the transfer instrument.

    Second, the City argues that section 1146(c) exempts only transfers either to a reorganized debtor or to a corporation specially organized under the debtor’s plan, not to an unrelated third party. To support this argument, the City traces a multi-step analytical path through the statute. Proposing that “transfer” must have the same meaning in section 1146 that it has in section 1123, the section illustrating the different means of executing a reorganization plan, the City notes that section 1123(a)(5)(B) refers only to transfers made “to one or more entities, whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan,” and that section 1123(a)(6) requires corporate entities referred to in section 1123(a)(5)(B) to include certain restrictions in their charters, thus implicitly proving that section 1123(a)(5)(B) encompasses only transfers made to corporations chartered during reorganization proceedings, not to preexistent third-party corporations. According to the City, section 1123(a)(6) clarifies that the phrase “whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan” in section 1123(a)(5)(B) serves to limit the kinds of entities to which a “transfer” can be made. Ergo, the argument runs, Congress also intended to limit section 1146(c) transfers to those made to either the reorganized corporation or a corporation organized under the debtor’s plan.

    We cannot accept this convoluted statutory interpretation. The City’s argument that section 1123 narrows the meaning of “transfer” is fundamentally flawed. Far from narrowing the meaning, section 1123(a)(5)(B) evidences Congress’s understanding that “transfer” is a word of broad meaning: in order to specify a certain type of transfer, Congress there added the limiting phrase “to one or more entities, whether organized before or after the confirmation of such plan.” In the absence of a similar phrase restricting the types of transfers to which section 1146(c) refers, we believe that Congress intended the word “transfer” there to have its ordinary meaning.

    Nor can it be said that because section 1123(a)(5)(B) refers to a “transfer” and subparagraph (D) refers to a “sale” (of all or part of the property of the estate), the term “transfer” in section 1146 does not relate to a sale. Quite clearly, 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code relates back, so far as state and local taxes are concerned, to section 267 of Chapter X of the old Bankruptcy Act. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6377; see also 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1146.01, at 1146-2 to 1146-4 (15th ed. 1984). Old section 267, as is made clear by its statutory derivations, 6A Collier on Bankruptcy 1115.08, at 836-40 (14th ed. 1977), related to transactions, in the treatise’s words, “which serve to execute or make effective a plan confirmed under Chapter X.” Id. at 840. A sale in general, following on confirmation of a plan, serves to make the plan effective. At the least, this sale did.

    Order affirmed.