IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of: THE BERNICE K. ) No. 79328-4-I (Consolidated PRICE-CAMERON TRUST, ) with No. 79329-2-I ) MARCUS E. PRICE, Co-Trustee of ) DIVISION ONE the Bernice K. Price-Cameron Trust, ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) ANTOINETTE S. PRICE, Co-Trustee ) of the Bernice K. Price-Cameron ) Trust and in her representative ) capacity as Attorney-in-Fact for ) Bernice K. Price-Cameron, ) ) Respondent. ) )

HAZELRIGG, J. — Marcus Price seeks reversal of a vulnerable adult

protection order (VAPO) protecting his mother, Bernice Price-Cameron, and reversal of an order removing him as co-trustee of her revocable living trust, requiring him to provide an accounting of trust income and assets, and imposing damages under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA).1 He argues

that the court exceeded the permissible scope of relief at the initial hearing on the TEDRA petition and that the findings and conclusions on both the VAPO and the TEDRA orders were not supported by the record. Because the record contains No. 79328-4-I/3

In February 2007, Bernice executed an amendment to the trust in which she modified the article naming successor trustees. After the amendment, the trust

provided that Antoinette and Marcus would serve as co-trustees in the event of Bernice’s death, incapacity, or resignation. In June 2007, Bernice was determined to have severe cognitive impairment.

In 2016, damage from a fire in Bernice’s home forced Bernice and Marcus to move out of the residence. Marcus moved into a house that he had purchased in September 2015. Bernice first moved in with Antoinette in California and then into an assisted living community nearby. In 2017, Bernice’s doctors believed that she had dementia, that she lacked mental capacity, and that she was unable to care for herself or make decisions unassisted.

Antoinette requested accountings and information about the trust properties from Marcus over a period of several years leading up to the summer of 2018, but he did not provide the information. On June 1, 2018, Antoinette’s attorney sent a letter to Marcus’ attorney demanding copies of the keys, lease agreements, tenant deposits, mortgage statements, insurance policy, and laundry account information for Price Catalina Apartments. Later that month, under her authority as Bernice’s attorney-in-fact, Antoinette closed all of the bank accounts that Bernice held jointly with Marcus and in the name of the Price Catalina Apartments. The total amount in those accounts when they were closed was less than $30,000.

Marcus’ attorney responded that Antoinette was improperly interfering in the administration of the trust, of which Marcus was co-trustee, and threatened legal action if she continued. Antoinette had not been provided a copy of the 2007 No. 79328-4-I/4 amendment and did not know that Marcus had been substituted as co-trustee. She responded through counsel that she was still entitled to an accounting as co- trustee and requested information about rental income from the Price Catalina

Apartments. Marcus did not respond.

On August 5, 2018, Antoinette filed a petition for a VAPO under King County

Superior Court case number 18-2-19648-5 SEA seeking to restrain Marcus from

physically or financially abusing Bernice, contacting her, or visiting her home. The petition also sought an accounting of Bernice’s income or other resources. The court granted a temporary restraining order imposing the temporary relief

requested and requiring Marcus to provide Antoinette with an accounting of the rental income from Price Catalina Apartments from January 1, 2018 to July 31, 2018 by the date of the hearing on the petition. Marcus did not file any responsive pleading before the hearing.

At the first VAPO hearing, Marcus appeared pro se and indicated he had

not yet been able to retain legal counsel. The court placed Marcus under oath and questioned him about the apartment building’s expenses. Marcus testified that the gross receivables for the apartment building were about $15,000 to $18,000 per month. He indicated that the net revenue was about $8,000 per month after paying

approximately $2,000 for utilities, $800 for insurance, $2,800 in property taxes, and $600 toward the mortgage. The court pointed out that if the building was bringing

in $9,000 to $12,000 per month, then the building should have over $1,000,000 in revenue from the previous ten years. Marcus responded that rents and property taxes had not been consistent over the past ten years and that he had performed No. 79328-4-I/5

significant upgrades and repairs on the building.3 The court reissued the temporary restraining order and required Marcus to provide tenant information, leases, a list of expenses for the building, and Beatrice’s tax returns to Antoinette’s attorney within ten days of the order.

About three weeks later, the day before the next hearing, Antoinette’s

counsel filed a declaration stating that Marcus had provided the list of tenants and leases but had not provided the list of expenses or the accounting required by the previous order. Marcus had indicated to her through counsel that he was still in the process of compiling the accounting. At the hearing, he argued that he was struggling to put together an accounting because the Bank of America account that

had been closed contained his notes regarding the purpose of the transfers and because many of his records were at Bernice’s house, which the temporary order prevented him from entering. Antoinette requested that Marcus be temporarily removed as co-trustee because the conflict between the parties was impacting

Beatrice.

The court reissued the temporary VAPO and ordered Marcus to provide a list of expenses for the apartment building and copies of Bernice’s tax returns to

Antoinette’s attorney. The temporary VAPO was modified to allow Marcus access

to Bernice’s residence for the purposes of retrieving this documentation. The reissuance also allowed Marcus visitation with Bernice twice per week. The court declined to remove Marcus as co-trustee but suspended his powers until further

order of the court, explaining that he would not “have the power to act anymore, 3The transcript of the hearing provided to this court as part of the record on appeal is incomplete and ends after this response.

No. 79328-4-I/6 but . . . would have . . . the right to receive information.” The order set a new deadline for the accounting three days before the next hearing.

On October 10, 2018, Marcus filed a declaration with 200 pages of attached

exhibits including bank statements, receipts, invoices, bills, copies of checks, and other documentation. He stated that he had been the caregiver for Bernice and for his brother Keith since 2005. He also began taking care of his brother Justin in 2014. Marcus asserted that Bernice’s properties were heavily mortgaged on unreasonable terms when he began helping her with her finances in the mid-

1990s. He stated that he had “always strongly believed [his] mom’s mortgages needed to be paid down” and had “done so regularly on all properties, including the Price Catalina Apartments.” His siblings disagreed with this idea because

“[t]hey all feel the income that has been used to pay down debt should actually be distributed to the siblings.”

Marcus stated that the $75,000 withdrawal in July 2017 was used for a

$55,000 payment to the general contractor rebuilding Bernice’s house after the fire, and the remaining $20,000 was paid to Washington Federal Credit Union as part of the refinance of a mortgage that would otherwise have ballooned that summer. He asserted that Antoinette had decided to make unnecessary upgrades to the house while the fire damage was being repaired that were not covered by insurance and cost approximately $40,000. He also stated that Antoinette had put

Bernice in an unsatisfactory care facility in California when the family believed that

Bernice was staying at Antoinette’s home and that she paid for the facility using about $15,000 of “funds that were meant for the rebuild.”

No. 79328-4-I/7

Marcus asserted that he had responded to Antoinette’s requests for an accounting by telling her that “getting together all of the books would have to wait

until the house rebuild was finished because that was such a time consuming and constantly changing issue” and he “was already overwhelmed and couldn’t handle another task.” When Antoinette closed or removed his access to his mother’s

accounts, he had to front payments on his credit card and reimburse himself for “necessary purchases for the rebuild and apartments.” He asserted that “[t]his also made it extremely difficult to try to put together a coherent accounting of the past year” because his notes on the transactions in the online accounts were lost when the accounts were closed.

Marcus also stated that he had reason to believe that Antoinette should not serve as the sole trustee. He asserted that the trust had also contained a third property at one point, but Antoinette had quit claimed the property to herself without any compensation to the trust, collected rent from the property for a few years, and then sold the property without returning the proceeds to the trust. He

attached a deed conveying a property from the trust to Antoinette Dickson for $10, apparently signed by Bernice and notarized on November 25, 2002.

Marcus stated in his declaration that, I categorically deny the allegations being made by my sister. She has nothing supporting her claims other than her self-serving suspicions. I was put in a very difficult position where I had to manage the apartment building, I had to deal with a complicated and very time consuming fire claim, and I had to deal with a balloon payment on my mom’s house mortgage, all while I was being the sole caretaker of my two disabled brothers who still live with me.

No. 79328-4-I/8

On October 12, 2018, Antoinette filed a separate petition against Marcus under King County Superior Court case number 18-4-06062-9 SEA seeking relief under TEDRA. She sought permanent removal of Marcus as co-trustee, an order requiring Marcus to provide “a full and complete inventory, forensic accounting completed by a certified forensic accountant, and report for all activities performed as Co-Trustee of the Trust.” The petition also requested an order “permitting

limited discovery, and setting a schedule for completion of limited discovery and that, following limited discovery, the Court issue an order for mediation.” The petition indicated that, “[i]f mediation is unsuccessful,” Antoinette would ask that the matter be set for trial and seek additional relief. This additional relief included an order permitting full discovery, an order finding that Marcus had breached his fiduciary duty to the trust and assessing damages as a result of the breach, and an award of attorney fees and costs.

The same day, the parties appeared in court for another hearing on the VAPO petition. The court reissued the temporary VAPO with the condition that

Marcus hire a forensic accountant. Antoinette also informed the court that she had filed the TEDRA petition and asked the court to retain jurisdiction on that matter.

The court agreed to do so. A hearing on both matters was set for November 9, 2018.

A week before the scheduled hearing, Marcus filed a motion to stay the proceedings under both case numbers. He argued that the court should grant a stay to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the Seattle Police Department was investigating his management of the trust.

No. 79328-4-I/9

Antoinette opposed the stay. Her attorney filed a declaration asserting that she had spoken with a detective who indicated that there were no pending criminal charges against Marcus. The detective stated that a prosecutor had advised her to wait for the completion of the accounting before conducting any further investigation in the criminal matter. Antoinette requested that the court (1) deny the stay, (2) find that Marcus had breached his fiduciary duties by failing to account for trust assets valued at $313,307.79, (3) find that Marcus had committed financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, (4) enter judgment removing Marcus as co- trustee, (5) impose damages in the amount of $313,307.79, (6) order Marcus to

pay Antoinette’s reasonable attorney fees, and (7) order Marcus to account for and deliver any trust assets in his possession or control to Antoinette. Marcus did not file any other answer or responsive pleading to the TEDRA petition or VAPO petition.

The court heard both matters on November 9, 2018. It considered the VAPO petition first. Through counsel, Marcus indicated that he had retained a

bookkeeper to prepare documents to be provided to a forensic accountant, but the forensic accountant had not been hired and the process was “still ongoing.” The court heard argument on the motion for a stay of proceedings, considered the King v. Olympic Pipeline Co.4 factors on the record, and made the following ruling:

I’ve read through all the materials on the VPO. I think that the petitioner has readily met her burden in this matter and I don’t think, as I’ve just gone through the Olympic [Pipeline] factors, that a stay is warranted in the VPO. So I’m going to enter the order for protection in the VPO matter.

4 104 Wn. App. 338, 16 P.3d 45 (2000).

No. 79328-4-I/10

The court found “[b]y clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” that Marcus

had “committed acts of abandonment, abuse, personal exploitation, neglect, and financial exploitation of the vulnerable adult.” The VAPO restrained Marcus from

acts or threats of harm or abuse against Bernice, excluded him from her residence, and required him to provide a forensic accounting. The VAPO also limited Marcus’ contact with Bernice to three-hour visits twice per week.

The court conducted the hearing on the TEDRA petition that afternoon. It first considered whether it was able to grant relief under TEDRA at the initial

hearing. The court noted that, if a party had asked for mediation, it would “kick the whole thing out and say ‘go mediate.’” It stated its impression that Antoinette’s reference to mediation in her petition was “forward thinking” because she was

“saying she’s going to [ask for mediation] after limited discovery is done.” The court asked Antoinette to clarify whether she was “actually making the request now for mediation” and she responded that she was not. Marcus indicated that he would ask for mediation if the court denied his request for a stay, and the court

responded, And he’d have that right, but he has that right—I mean, he can—he can file his notice for mediation immediately. . . . [W]e are still going to talk about whether or not . . . she’s entitled to the relief that she’s seeking at this initial hearing . . . because, as both sides have acknowledged, that was not otherwise requested. So the default is I decide everything.

After considering the Olympic Pipeline factors as they applied to the TEDRA case, the court denied Marcus’ request for a stay and indicated that it would

“protect Mr. Price’s Fifth Amendment rights by ensuring that there is no discovery personally as to him.” Marcus then made an oral request for mediation. The court

- 10 - No. 79328-4-I/11 responded that the applicable statute required a party to request mediation three days before a hearing, “but if you haven’t raised that issue until the hearing itself, then we don’t just suddenly stop the hearing . . . and do that, but tomorrow he can file a notice and off you go to mediate.” The court then turned to the merits of the TEDRA petition. It acknowledged that there had not been a “written opposition” to the petition but that it would “hear from counsel and he can tell me what he opposes orally.” Marcus argued that the court should not provide the requested relief because he was still attempting to compile the requested documentation. The court noted that Marcus had been ordered to turn over his documentation to a forensic accountant but instead chose to hire a bookkeeper. Marcus next argued that Antoinette had not provided full documentation of all of the funds she claimed were missing. After hearing argument on the appropriate amount of damages, the court ruled: I’m resolving the issues of two things: [o]ne[,] this $45,450.91 unaccounted for in regards to the Farmers Insurance proceeds; two, the documentary evidence right now shows that there is $129,276.38 in rental income that I don’t think has been accounted for. I’m changing the $313,307.79 to $174,727.29. Now, I want to make clear to both parties because this cuts both ways. This is not resolving all the funds that the co-trustee thinks he took. This is also not accounting for all the funds that he thinks he can explain where he spent. The court entered an order removing Marcus as co-trustee, awarding $174,727.29 in damages to Antoinette in her representative capacity as trustee, requiring Marcus to turn over all trust documents and property, making Marcus responsible for the costs of obtaining an accounting in an amount to be approved - 11 - No. 79328-4-I/12 by the court, and awarding Antoinette reasonable attorney fees and costs. The order was corrected and refiled on November 13, 2018. On November 26, 2018, Marcus filed a pro se motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the order under CR 52, 59, and 60 in the TEDRA case. His memorandum in support of the motion argued that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence, his removal as co-trustee was not justified because he did not breach his fiduciary duty, the monetary award was excessive, attorney fees were unwarranted, and the court erred in entering the VAPO. He also filed the same declaration and exhibits that he had filed in the VAPO action. On December 27, 2018, he filed a second memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration after again retaining counsel. The memorandum included an explanation that most of the insurance proceeds had been disbursed directly to vendors rather than to Marcus and a summary of the documents in his previously-filed declaration showing the disposition of the rental income. He also filed a supplemental declaration explaining the charges in the summary. The court found that Marcus had not shown that any of the documents filed in support of his motion “constituted newly discovered evidence which with reasonable diligence he could not have discovered and produced at or prior to the November 9, 2018 hearing.” The court concluded that Marcus had not established grounds for reconsideration of the order and denied the motion. Marcus appealed. - 12 - No. 79328-4-I/13 ANALYSIS I. Vulnerable Adult Protection Order Marcus argues that the court erred in finding that he had committed acts of abandonment, abuse, personal exploitation, neglect, and financial exploitation of Bernice and in entering the VAPO. Appellate courts review a superior court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for a vulnerable adult protection order for abuse of discretion. In re Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 936, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014). A court abuses its discretion when its exercise of discretion is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Knight, 178 Wn. App. at 936. Substantial evidence is that which is “sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true.” Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). “We defer to the trier of fact on the persuasiveness of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting testimony.” Knight, 178 Wn. App. at 937. In enacting the “Abuse of Vulnerable Adults Act” (AVA), the legislature found that “[s]ome adults are vulnerable and may be subjected to abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or abandonment by a family member, care provider, or other person who has a relationship with the vulnerable adult.” RCW 74.34.005. A vulnerable adult or an interested person on their behalf may seek relief from such “abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect, or the threat thereof,” by petitioning for a protection order. RCW 74.34.110(1). The petition must allege that - 13 - No. 79328-4-I/14 “the petitioner, or person on whose behalf the petition is brought, is a vulnerable adult” and that the allegedly vulnerable adult “has been abandoned, abused, financially exploited, or neglected, or is threatened with abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect by respondent.” RCW 74.34.110(2). The court is empowered to order relief “as it deems necessary for the protection of the vulnerable adult.” RCW 74.34.130. The definition of “vulnerable adult” includes a person who is 60 years of age or older and has the functional, mental, or physical inability to care for themselves. RCW 74.34.020(22)(a). The AVA does not state the standard of proof required to enter a VAPO. Knight, 178 Wn. App. at 938. When the vulnerable adult opposes the petition, the court must find both that the adult is vulnerable and that the VAPO is needed by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Id. at 937, 940. However, in most other instances, “[t]he proper standard of proof involving abuse of a vulnerable adult under chapter 74.34 RCW is a preponderance of the evidence.” Kraft v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 145 Wn. App. 708, 716, 187 P.3d 798 (2008). The VAPO contains the finding that Marcus had “committed acts of abandonment, abuse, personal exploitation, neglect, and financial exploitation of the vulnerable adult.” The statutory definition of “financial exploitation” is as follows: (7) “Financial exploitation” means the illegal or improper use, control over, or withholding of the property, income, resources, or trust funds of the vulnerable adult by any person or entity for any person’s or entity’s profit or advantage other than for the vulnerable adult’s profit or advantage. “Financial exploitation” includes, but is not limited to: (a) The use of deception, intimidation, or undue influence by a person or entity in a position of trust and confidence with a vulnerable - 14 - No. 79328-4-I/15 adult to obtain or use the property, income, resources, or trust funds of the vulnerable adult for the benefit of a person or entity other than the vulnerable adult; (b) The breach of a fiduciary duty, including, but not limited to, the misuse of a power of attorney, trust, or a guardianship appointment, that results in the unauthorized appropriation, sale, or transfer of the property, income, resources, or trust funds of the vulnerable adult for the benefit of a person or entity other than the vulnerable adult; or (c) Obtaining or using a vulnerable adult’s property, income, resources, or trust funds without lawful authority, by a person or entity who knows or clearly should know that the vulnerable adult lacks the capacity to consent to the release or use of his or her property, income, resources, or trust funds. RCW 74.34.020. There is substantial evidence in the record to support this finding. Marcus was co-trustee and the manager of Bernice’s apartment building, and he managed her day-to-day finances. The record showed a lack of funds in Bernice’s accounts despite consistent income from the apartment building and a sizeable insurance payout. The record supports a conclusion that Marcus did not provide an adequate explanation of how those funds had been disposed. Antoinette asserted that Marcus had purchased vehicles, travel, and real estate in the past several years when his only job was managing the apartment building. The evidence in the record is sufficient to show that Marcus mismanaged trust funds and assets for his own benefit, which supports a finding of financial exploitation. The AVA authorizes imposition of a VAPO if the court finds that the vulnerable adult requires protection from “abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect, or the threat thereof.” RCW 74.34.110(1). The statutory scheme allows the court to impose the VAPO if any one of these circumstances is present and does not require evidence of every form of mistreatment listed. Because there was substantial evidence supporting the finding of financial - 15 - No. 79328-4-I/16 exploitation and this finding supports the conclusion of law that the relief ordered was necessary for Bernice’s protection, we affirm the imposition of the VAPO. Marcus also argues that, even if we find that there was substantial evidence of financial exploitation, the finding does not support imposition of restraints limiting his contact with Bernice. He contends that these restraints were not necessary for Bernice’s physical protection and therefore the court abused its discretion. If a court finds that abuse, neglect, or exploitation has occurred, the court may order relief “as it deems necessary for the protection of the vulnerable adult.” RCW 74.34.130. That relief is designed to protect against “abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect, or the threat thereof.” RCW 74.34.110(1). Marcus contends that the restraints were not necessary because “there are no allegations or evidence that Ms. Price-Cameron is in any danger or peril from having contact with Marcus.” However, a reasonable reading of the relevant statutes suggests that the superior court may order relief as it deems necessary to protect the vulnerable adult not only from physical danger, but from any abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect, or the threat thereof. As noted above, there is substantial evidence for the court’s finding that Marcus committed financial exploitation of Bernice. The court did not abuse its discretion in deeming limited contact with Marcus necessary for Bernice’s protection from further financial exploitation, especially in light of Marcus’ failure to oppose the scope of the VAPO below. - 16 - No. 79328-4-I/17 II. TEDRA Proceeding A. Scope of Relief Marcus contends that the court exceeded the permissible scope of relief in entering the order in the TEDRA action. Marcus argues that the court lacked statutory authority to enter the money judgment at the initial TEDRA hearing because Antoinette had not requested the award in her petition. We review questions of law and statutory construction de novo. In re Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8–9, 93 P.3d 147 (2004). When determining the meaning of a statute, the appellate court’s objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9– 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). “When possible, the court derives legislative intent from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 188 Wn.2d 421, 432, 395 P.3d 1031 (2017). The legislature’s stated intent in enacting TEDRA was to provide the courts with “full and ample power and authority” to administer and settle all trust matters. RCW 11.96A.020. If TEDRA is “inapplicable, insufficient, or doubtful with reference to the administration and settlement” of trust matters, “the court nevertheless has full power and authority to proceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered and settled by the court.” - 17 - No. 79328-4-I/18 RCW 11.96A.020(2). The initial hearing on a TEDRA petition “must be a hearing on the merits to resolve all issues of fact and all issues of law” unless a party “requested otherwise” in a petition or answer. RCW 11.96A.100(8). Marcus contends that the court should have ordered the parties to participate in mediation rather than resolving the issues on the merits because Antoinette requested mediation in her petition. A party to a TEDRA proceeding may “cause the matter to be subject to mediation by service of a written notice of mediation on all parties.” RCW 11.96A.300. When a hearing has already been set, the statute detailing mediation procedures under TEDRA requires that the notice of mediation be served at least three days before the hearing in substantially the following form: NOTICE OF MEDIATION UNDER RCW 11.96A.300 To: (Parties) Notice is hereby given that the following matter shall be resolved by mediation under RCW 11.96A.300: (State nature of matter) This matter must be resolved using the mediation procedures of RCW 11.96A.300 unless the court determines at the hearing set for . . . o’clock on . . . . . , (identify place of already set hearing), that mediation shall not apply pursuant to RCW 11.96A.300(3). If the court determines that mediation shall not apply, the court may decide the matter at the hearing, require arbitration, or direct other judicial proceedings. (Optional: Our list of acceptable mediators is as follows:) DATED: . . . . . . .... (Party or party’s legal representative) RCW 11.96A.300(1)(b). Division Two of this court found no substantial compliance with this form where a notice of mediation did not include language advising the opposing party that the matter must be resolved using mediation procedures of RCW 11.96A.300(1)(a) unless the party objected, that the party could object, how - 18 - No. 79328-4-I/19 to object, or how to nominate proposed mediators if he did not object. In re Estate of Harder, 185 Wn. App. 378, 383–84, 341 P.3d 342 (2015). Here, neither party served a notice of mediation at least three days before the hearing that substantially complied with the form mandated by TEDRA. Despite the reference to potential mediation in Antoinette’s amended petition, it did not contain a present notice of mediation when stating that, “[u]pon the completion of limited discovery, Petitioner will request that the court order mediation pursuant to a notice for mediation that will be filed under RCW 11.96A.300.” Although it contemplated a future notice of mediation, this document did not purport to be a notice of mediation nor did it contain essential portions of such a notice. The court did not err in determining that neither party had properly requested mediation at the time of the hearing. Antoinette did not include in her petition a request for mediation that substantially complied with the form mandated by TEDRA. She also reiterated at the hearing that she had not requested mediation. However, her petition did include all the relief she sought. The court did not err in exercising its broad discretion under TEDRA to settle all issues of fact and law expeditiously, especially in light of Marcus’ failure to raise a specific objection to such resolution in a responsive pleading or at the hearing. B. Findings of Fact Marcus challenges multiple parts of the court’s order on the TEDRA petition. To analyze whether the court erred in entering the provisions of the order, we first consider whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact that form the basis of the court’s conclusions and orders. Bartlett v. Betlach, 136 Wn. - 19 - No. 79328-4-I/20 App. 8, 17–18, 146 P.3d 1235 (2006). Then, we determine whether the findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Id. at 18.