BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

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2 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA In August 2018, petitioner Ariel R. Rodriguez was re- moved from his position with the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 714. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld his removal. We reverse and remand. I Prior to his removal, Mr. Rodriguez was employed as a Supervisory Consumer Affairs Specialist with the Patient Advocate’s Office at the DVA’s Bay Pines, Florida, facility. On March 13, 2018, a veteran patient visited the Patient Advocate’s Office seeking assistance regarding a co-pay- ment on a medical bill. Mr. Rodriguez and the patient en- gaged in a confrontation that escalated to the point that Mr. Rodriguez summoned VA Police Service officers. Dur- ing the confrontation, Mr. Rodriguez yelled at the patient and used profanity. After the police officers arrived, they directed Mr. Rodriguez to leave the reception area and ul- timately had to escort him back to his office. However, Mr. Rodriguez subsequently returned to the reception area, where he again confronted the patient. The DVA initiated an investigation of the incident, dur- ing which Mr. Rodriguez was temporarily relieved of his supervisory responsibilities in the Patient Advocate’s Of- fice. During his suspension, Mr. Rodriguez contacted Car- rie Adams, one of his subordinates, and asked her to modify the witness statement she had submitted regarding Mr. Rodriguez’s confrontation with the patient. The DVA investigation was directed to allegations of verbal abuse, a code of conduct violation, and lack of candor by Mr. Rodriguez in connection with the March 13, 2018, incident. As part of the investigation, Mr. Rodriguez sub- mitted a voluntary witness statement. He was later given an opportunity to amend that statement but declined to do so. Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 3 Filed: 08/12/2021 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 3 The DVA investigator made a series of findings. First, he found that Mr. Rodriguez engaged in patient abuse by yelling and using profanity directed at the patient and leaning over an office desk toward the patient in a threat- ening manner. Second, he found that Mr. Rodriguez vio- lated the DVA Code of Conduct through his disruptive behavior with the patient and with the police officers who were summoned to deal with the incident. In particular, the investigator found that Mr. Rodriguez failed to follow the lead officer’s instruction to return to his office, that the police had to escort Mr. Rodriguez to his office, and that Mr. Rodriguez returned to the reception area in order to re- engage with the patient. Third, the investigator found un- substantiated the allegation that Mr. Rodriguez had at- tempted to coerce one of the police officers into changing his account of the incident. Fourth, the investigator found substantiated the allegation that Mr. Rodriguez had at- tempted to coerce Ms. Adams into changing her account of the incident. Specifically, the investigator found that Mr. Rodriguez had made statements to Ms. Adams that left her in fear of retaliation if she did not change her testimony. Fifth, the investigator found that Mr. Rodriguez had dis- played a lack of candor in his written and verbal accounts of the incident and in denying that he had made the state- ments reported by Ms. Adams, including the statement that no harm would come to her if she helped him. The investigator consulted the table of penalties in the DVA handbook and concluded that in light of the nature of the offenses and the presence of aggravating factors, the appropriate penalty was removal. The investigator identi- fied the following aggravating factors: (1) Mr. Rodriguez was a supervisor; (2) his position as an advocate for pa- tients was a sensitive one, and his conduct had the effect of compromising the trust associated with that position; (3) he had previously been disciplined for job-related miscon- duct; (4) he was a member of the Director’s Office and was responsible for ensuring that his conduct was beyond Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 4 Filed: 08/12/2021 4 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA reproach; and (5) he was given two opportunities during the incident to de-escalate the situation but failed to do so. On June 18, 2018, Teresa E. Kumar, the Associate Di- rector of Patient Services at the Bay Pines facility, pro- vided Mr. Rodriguez with a Notice of Proposed Removal based on three charges: (1) disruptive behavior toward a veteran patient; (2) conduct unbecoming a federal supervi- sor, consisting of his attempt to influence Ms. Adams’s tes- timony regarding the incident; and (3) lack of candor, based on the fact that Mr. Rodriguez’s account of the altercation deviated substantially from the accounts of the other wit- nesses to the incident. Ms. Kumar stated in the Notice of Proposed Removal that she had determined that Mr. Rodriguez’s conduct war- ranted removal “because the Agency cannot tolerate abu- sive conduct toward any patient and not only were you inappropriate with a Veteran patient but after others in- tervened to de-escalate the conflict you escalated it a sec- ond time.” J.A. 38. She added that there was a substantial nexus between Mr. Rodriguez’s misconduct and his job re- sponsibilities as an advocate for veterans. In addition, she noted that in his role as a supervisor Mr. Rodriguez was expected “to model the highest level of professional con- duct” and that as a member of the Director’s Office staff he was “held to even a higher standard of proper conduct and professionalism.” Id. Finally, she noted that in December 2017, Mr. Rodriguez had been disciplined for a separate vi- olation in connection with his employment. On August 24, 2018, after Mr. Rodriguez was given an opportunity to reply to the Notice of Proposed Removal, Su- zanne M. Klinker, the Director of the DVA’s Bay Pines Healthcare System, issued a decision removing Mr. Rodri- guez effective August 30, 2018. Ms. Klinker sustained all three charges against Mr. Rodriguez, finding that they were all “supported by substantial evidence.” J.A. 263. She added that in making her decision she had “reviewed the Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 5 Filed: 08/12/2021 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 5 reasons and analysis the proposing official provided in par- agraph 2 of the Notice of Proposed Removal” regarding the justifications for the level of discipline set forth in the pro- posed removal, and that she “agree[d] with” and “adopt[ed]” the reasoning of the proposing official in reach- ing her decision that Mr. Rodriguez should be removed. Id. Mr. Rodriguez appealed his removal to the Merit Sys- tems Protection Board. Following a hearing in March 2019, the administrative judge who was assigned to the case upheld the removal action. The administrative judge stated that in order to sustain an adverse decision before the Board under 38 U.S.C. § 714, the DVA “must establish by substantial evidence that there is a factual basis for the charged conduct.” J.A. ^[2]. In addition, the administrative judge noted that in a proceeding under section 714, the Merit Systems Protection Board cannot mitigate the pen- alty imposed by the DVA, an authority that the Board en- joys under the general disciplinary procedures set forth in chapter 75 of Title 5. J.A. ^[2]; see 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(B). The administrative judge analyzed the three charges against Mr. Rodriguez and found that all three were sup- ported by substantial evidence. J.A. 2–8. Mr. Rodriguez argued to the administrative judge that 38 U.S.C. § 714 vi- olates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution be- cause it deprives a Board administrative judge of the opportunity to remedy improper decisionmaking by the agency. The administrative judge declined to address that issue, however, on the ground that the Merit Systems Pro- tection Board may not consider whether a statute is uncon- stitutional. J.A. 8–9. The administrative judge rejected Mr. Rodriguez’s claim that he was denied due process because the DVA’s deciding official “only skimmed portions” of his written re- sponse to the charges levied against him. J.A. ^[9] (altera- tions omitted). Mr. Rodriguez’s contention in that regard was based on the deciding official’s poor recollection of Mr. Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 6 Filed: 08/12/2021 6 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA Rodriguez’s written reply arguments during her deposition several months after Mr. Rodriguez’s removal. The admin- istrative judge noted that the deciding official testified that she had read the entirety of Mr. Rodriguez’s written reply, and he found that “any gaps in her memory concerning its contents long afterward do not constitute a sufficient basis to conclude that statutory and constitutional due process requirements were not met.” J.A. 9–10. Finally, the administrative judge addressed two proce- dural arguments made by Mr. Rodriguez. First, Mr. Rodri- guez argued that the DVA had misapplied section 714 by concluding that the statute authorized the DVA to disci- pline an employee as long as substantial evidence supports a finding of misconduct. While recognizing that the sub- stantial evidence standard governs the Board’s review of the DVA’s actions under section 714, Mr. Rodriguez pointed out that the statute requires that the DVA itself must “determine[] the performance or misconduct of the covered individual warrants . . . removal, demotion or sus- pension.” 38 U.S.C. § 714(a)(1). That standard, Mr. Rodri- guez argued, requires the DVA to find that the misconduct in question was proved by at least a preponderance of the evidence. The administrative judge rejected that argument and concluded instead that the DVA was entitled to apply the “substantial evidence” test in deciding to remove an employee, “the same evidentiary standard . . . as pertains to the Board in adjudicating such appeals.” J.A. 14. Mr. Rodriguez’s second asserted procedural error was that the DVA failed to consider what are referred to as the Douglas factors when sustaining Mr. Rodriguez’s removal. See Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1980). The administrative judge concluded that because section 714 provides that the Board may not mitigate the penalty selected by the DVA, it would not make sense to require the agency official to “consider factors in mitigation under Douglas.” J.A. 15. In a footnote, the administrative judge stated that even if he were to conclude that the Board may Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 7 Filed: 08/12/2021 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 7 consider the reasonableness of the agency’s penalty, he “would find that the removal penalty in the present case is not ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the sustained misconduct.” J.A. 15 n.7. Mr. Rodriguez petitioned this court to review the ad- ministrative judge’s decision. 1 II Mr. Rodriguez lists eleven issues in the “Issues Pre- sented” section of his brief, but in the argument section of his brief he has failed to present arguments regarding sev- eral of those issues. Because issues not addressed in the argument section of a party’s opening brief are considered waived, see Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006), we will address only the issues Mr. Rodriguez has presented in the argument section of his brief. A We first address Mr. Rodriguez’s argument that the ad- ministrative judge misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. § 714 when he ruled that “substantial evidence” is the proper standard for the DVA to apply in determining whether an employee has engaged in misconduct that justifies discipline. On that is- sue, we agree with Mr. Rodriguez. Section 714 was enacted in 2017 to provide an expe- dited set of procedures by which the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may remove, demote, or suspend DVA employees “if 1 At the time of the administrative judge’s decision, the Merit Systems Protection Board lacked a quorum of at least two of its three members. Mr. Rodriguez elected to petition for review by this court directly from the adminis- trative judge’s decision rather than first seeking review of the administrative judge’s decision by the Board. Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 8 Filed: 08/12/2021 8 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA the Secretary determines the performance or misconduct of the covered individual” warrants such measures. 38 U.S.C. § 714(a)(1); see Brenner v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 990 F.3d 1313, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Section 714 made several changes to the procedures previously applied in disciplinary actions taken against DVA employees. First, section 714 provides for expedited review of disciplinary actions covered by the statute. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(1), (d)(4). Second, it provides that on any appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the admin- istrative judge and the Board will review the Secretary’s action under the “substantial evidence” standard; in cases covered by section 714, the DVA is not required to prove its case before the Board by a preponderance of the evidence, as is the case for employee disciplinary actions brought un- der chapter 75 of Title 5. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(A), (d)(3)(B), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513, 7701(c)(1)(B). 2 Third, sec- tion 714 removes from the Board’s administrative judges and the Board itself the authority to mitigate the penalties imposed by the Secretary. 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(B), (d)(3)(C); see Sayers v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 954 F.3d 1370, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The government argues that the references to “sub- stantial evidence” in section 714 are not limited to the standard of review to be employed by administrative judges and the Board in reviewing section 714 disciplinary decisions. Instead, the government contends that the “sub- stantial evidence” standard also defines the burden of proof 1. Mr. Rodriguez contends that he was denied due pro- cess because of the manner in which his case was handled within the DVA. To the extent he claims that the DVA’s use of the substantial evidence standard of proof consti- tuted a due process violation, that claim is moot, as we have held that substantial evidence may not be used as the standard of proof in disciplinary actions under section 714. Mr. Rodriguez next contends that he was effectively de- nied a right to reply to the charges against him because the deciding official, Ms. Klinker, merely “skimmed” his writ- ten response to those charges. Petitioner’s Br. 46–48. Mr. Rodriguez bases his contention on Ms. Klinker’s inability to recall details of Mr. Rodriguez’s response while she tes- tified before the administrative judge. The administrative judge addressed that issue and found that “any gaps in her memory concerning [the response’s] contents long after- ward do not constitute a sufficient basis to conclude that statutory and constitutional due process requirements were not met.” J.A. ^[10]. The administrative judge presided over the videocon- ference hearing and had an opportunity to assess Ms. Klinker’s credibility both generally and as to this issue. Be- cause the administrative judge was far better situated than we are to assess Ms. Klinker’s testimony, we decline to sec- ond-guess the administrative judge’s finding that the gaps in Ms. Klinker’s memory concerning the contents of Mr. Ro- driguez’s written response do not support his claim that Ms. Klinker failed to consider his written response and that he was therefore effectively denied the right to re- spond to the charges against him.

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RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 21 Mr. Rodriguez also argues that Ms. Klinker’s written decision was not sufficiently detailed to satisfy due process requirements. While the substantive portion of Ms. Klinker’s removal decision was short, it referenced and adopted the pertinent provisions of the notice of proposed removal, which contained substantial detail regarding the charges against Mr. Rodriguez and the justifications for re- moving him. See J.A. 263 (referencing J.A. 37–39). The materials generated by the DVA and provided to Mr. Ro- driguez were sufficient both to give him notice of the charges against him and to explain the decision to remove him. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Rodriguez’s due process claims predicated on alleged flaws in the proceedings be- fore the DVA. ^[2]. Mr. Rodriguez next argues that the delegation of the Secretary’s removal and disciplinary authority to Ms. Klinker was improper because, “if the Board has been stripped of their ability to mitigate a severe penalty or overturn decisions they believe incorrect on a preponder- ance standard, then it forces the members of the Board— who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate—to rubber stamp decisions by mere employees and/or inferior officers that they believe are wrongly decided.” Petitioner’s Br. 31. On its face, that argument appears to be an objection to the delegation of authority from the Secretary of Veter- ans Affairs to Ms. Klinker, the Director of the Bay Pines VA Medical Center. The implication of the argument is that if the Secretary had personally fired Mr. Rodriguez in- stead of delegating that task to Ms. Klinker, the limits on the Board’s reviewing authority would not be unlawful. Contrary to Mr. Rodriguez’s argument, however, the Con- stitution permits principal officers to delegate duties and functions to other officers and employees, see Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 169 (1991), and the Secretary’s delegation of removal and disciplinary authority to the head of a DVA medical center is a lawful delegation, see 38 Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 22 Filed: 08/12/2021 22 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA U.S.C. § 512(a). 6 Thus, there is no merit to Mr. Rodriguez’s contention that it is somehow improper for the Board to de- fer (by dint of the substantial evidence standard) to re- moval decisions by agency employees other than the Secretary. Embedded within Mr. Rodriguez’s one-sentence objec- tion to the delegation of authority to Director Klinker is the suggestion that by making the Board’s review of the DVA’s adverse actions subject to the substantial evidence stand- ard, instead of the preponderance-of-the-evidence stand- ard, section 714 has impermissibly limited the Board’s role in removal proceedings. See Petitioner’s Br. 31. 7 That 6 See also VA Directive/Handbook 5021, § I-3.5.a (Apr. 15, 2002) (“[F]ield facility directors are responsible for: . . . . (2) Delegating to supervisors appropriate author- ity for the direction and discipline of employees under their jurisdiction and assuring proper supervisory training.”); id. at § I-3.6.b(5)(b) (“The official who may issue a letter of de- cision must be at a higher level than the proposing official, and at or above the director level in a field facility . . . . The Secretary or designee retains the authority to make the fi- nal decision on adverse actions involving employees occu- pying positions centralized to the Secretary.”). 7 As part of his contention that the Board’s use of substantial evidence review forces the Board to “rubber stamp” decisions of the DVA’s deciding official, Mr. Rodri- guez separately complains that employees are “only given the constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses after the removal decision is effectively final because the Board must uphold the deciding official’s conclusion even though it was made on an incomplete record.” Petitioner’s Br. 35. To the extent that sentence constitutes a constitutional ob- jection to the limits on the post-termination proceeding be- fore the Board, it is undeveloped. Indeed, that claim is not Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 23 Filed: 08/12/2021 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 23 suggestion, however, is not supported by authority or fur- ther developed as an argument in Mr. Rodriguez’s brief. An issue that is merely alluded to and not developed as an argument in a party’s brief is deemed waived. See Aru- nachalam v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 989 F.3d 988, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2021); CardSoft v. Verifone, Inc., 769 F.3d 1114, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2014); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In this case, Mr. Rodriguez’s passing complaints about the substantial evidence standard of review in section 714 are insuffi- ciently developed as a constitutional claim and are unsup- ported by the citation to any authority. That claim is therefore waived. In any event, there are problems with the challenge to the Board’s use of the substantial evidence standard to which Mr. Rodriguez has not provided answers. Although Mr. Rodriguez suggests that there was a flaw in the pro- ceedings before the Board, the post-termination hearing held before the administrative judge was a full adversarial hearing at which Mr. Rodriguez was given an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses. Mr. Rodriguez offers no explanation for why such a post-termination hearing is constitutionally invalid simply because the governing stat- ute requires the decisionmaker to apply substantial evi- dence as the standard for reviewing the agency’s action. Mr. Rodriguez also does not explain why his objection to section 714’s substantial evidence standard would not be equally applicable to the substantial evidence standard ap- plied in proceedings under chapter 43 of Title 5. While the preponderance standard applies to post-termination hear- ings in adverse action appeals under chapter 75, see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B), that standard does not apply to even among the eleven issues listed in the “Statement of the Issues” portion of Mr. Rodriguez’s brief. See id. at 1–3. Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 24 Filed: 08/12/2021 24 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA appeals under chapter 43, which deals with adverse actions based on unacceptable performance. Chapter 43 appeals, like appeals under section 714, are expressly made subject to substantial evidence review in proceedings before the Board, see id. § 7701(c)(1)(A); 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(2)(A), (d)(3)(B). If the use of the substantial evidence standard in post-termination proceedings violates due process, then the constitutionality of chapter 43 would also be called into doubt. In Sayers, we acknowledged that chapter 43 offers em- ployees pre-termination protections, in the form of a warn- ing and an opportunity to improve, that are not afforded under section 714. For that reason, among others, we held in Sayers that section 714 requires the Board to review “the entirety of the VA’s removal decision—including the pen- alty—rather than merely confirming that the record con- tains substantial evidence that the alleged conduct leading to the adverse action actually occurred.” 954 F.3d at 1379. We did not, however, suggest that the Board’s use of the substantial evidence standard in either chapter 43 or sec- tion 714 proceedings was constitutionally suspect. To the contrary, we concluded that Board review of section 714 penalty determinations, even under a substantial evidence standard, was sufficient to put to rest the petitioner’s due process concerns regarding section 714. Sayers, 954 F.3d at 1379; 8 see also Brenner, 990 F.3d at 1324–25.

Mr. Rodriguez next raises a series of challenges to his removal that are based on the Appointments Clause of Ar- ticle II of the Constitution. 1. Mr. Rodriguez first argues that this case is governed by Helman v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 856 F.3d 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017), in which we held a prior version of 38 U.S.C. § 713 unconstitutional. In that statute, Congress had provided that DVA Senior Executive Service

in that case; the court did not suggest that the use of the substantial evidence standard of review was problematic. See Sayers, 954 F.3d at 1379.

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26 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA employees could obtain review of adverse agency actions by administrative judges, but not thereafter by either the Board or a court. We held that limiting review of such agency actions to administrative judges violated the Ap- pointments Clause. Helman, 856 F.3d at 929. Congress subsequently amended section 713 to provide for review of such agency actions by the Board and by this court. See Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whis- tleblower Protection Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862. Unlike the version of section 713 that was struck down in Helman, section 714 does not restrict review by the Board or this court. The rationale of Helman therefore lends no support to Mr. Rodriguez’s Appointments Clause claim. See Helman, 856 F.3d at 929 (“By contrast, § 713 prohibits any review of the administrative judge’s decision, thereby vesting this authority entirely in an administra- tive judge. . . . This is unconstitutional under the Appoint- ments Clause.”). Pointing to our reference in Helman to “the authority to render a final decision overturning another officer’s de- cision,” 856 F.3d at 929, Mr. Rodriguez argues that the au- thority to affirm or overturn a removal decision by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs can be granted only to officers of the United States, i.e., the members of the Merit Sys- tems Protection Board. He argues that section 714 violates that principle by imposing a “substantial evidence” stand- ard of review on the Board and stripping the Board of its authority to review agency penalty decisions, thereby mak- ing the deciding official’s decision effectively unreviewable. The result, he contends, is that members of the Board, who are principal officers of the United States, are forced “to rubber stamp decisions by mere employees and/or inferior officers that they believe are wrongly decided.” Petitioner’s Br. 31. Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 27 Filed: 08/12/2021 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 27 There are four problems with that argument. First and foremost, Mr. Rodriguez’s argument misapprehends the purpose underlying the Appointments Clause. That Clause is designed to prevent unappointed officials from wielding too much authority. See United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (2021) (The power exercised by officers of the United States “acquires its legitimacy and accountability to the public through a clear and effective chain of command down from the President, on whom all the people vote.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1657 (2020) (“[T]he Appointments Clause helps to preserve democratic accountability.”). The Clause was not intended to protect appointed officials from congres- sionally mandated changes to their statutory responsibili- ties (particularly in a case such as this one involving responsibilities that Congress conferred on the Board in the first place). Congress’s decision to alter the standard of review of adverse actions by the DVA does not violate the Appointments Clause unless it results in an unappointed official, such as the administrative judge in Helman, exer- cising powers that may be exercised only by officers of the United States. In this case, there was no unappointed official exercis- ing such powers. While Ms. Klinker was not appointed by the President and thus is not a principal officer, she exer- cises authority to discipline DVA employees, such as Mr. Rodriguez, pursuant to her delegation from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, as noted above. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“When a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdele- gation to a subordinate federal officer or agency is pre- sumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent.”). Deciding officials such as Ms. Klinker routinely exer- cise delegated authority to make disciplinary decisions in individual cases, regardless of their status as officers or Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 28 Filed: 08/12/2021 28 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA employees, without being found to have acted in violation of the Appointments Clause. See, e.g., Hardy v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 13 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hubbard v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 542, 543 (1980); Monahan v. United States, 354 F.2d 306 (Ct. Cl. 1966). The authority to issue instructions to subordinates and to discipline subordinates for failing to follow those instructions is inherent in the role of any supervisor. Mr. Rodriguez cites no authority and makes no argument as to why the imposition of discipli- nary sanctions against individual employees constitutes the exercise of authority that may be wielded only by a principal or inferior officer of the United States, and we de- cline to so hold. Second, Mr. Rodriguez overstates the extent to which section 714 reduces the Board’s authority in reviewing dis- ciplinary actions. As we initially stated in Sayers and reit- erate today, while section 714 withdraws from the Board the authority to mitigate penalties by substituting penal- ties for those chosen by the agency, it does not prevent the Board from reviewing penalty decisions and requiring the agency to reconsider penalty decisions in appropriate cases. Third, the limitations on the scope of review exercised by the Board do not leave deciding officials with unchecked authority to make disciplinary decisions. As noted above, the substantial evidence test has long been applied by the Board when reviewing decisions of agency deciding officials under chapter 43 of Title 5. Yet that standard of review has never been considered to create an Appointments Clause issue in those cases. Fourth, Mr. Rodriguez has made no showing in this case as to whether Ms. Klinker, the deciding official, was appointed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or instead by some subordinate official. If she was appointed by the Secretary, her appointment would qualify her to serve as an inferior officer under the Appointments Clause. By Case: 19-2025 Document: 58 Page: 29 Filed: 08/12/2021 RODRIGUEZ v. DVA 29 statute, the director of a DVA medical center is appointed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 38 U.S.C. § 7401(4). That is relevant because Mr. Rodriguez does not argue that disciplinary actions can be imposed only by principal offic- ers of the United States, and he does not argue that Ms. Klinker fails to qualify as an inferior officer. There is therefore no record before us on which we could find an Appointments Clause violation in this case even if we were to assume that disciplinary authority may be exercised only by principal or inferior officers of the United States. ^[2]. Citing Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), Mr. Ro- driguez makes a passing reference to the question whether the Board’s administrative judges have been properly ap- pointed for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Before the administrative judge, Mr. Rodriguez alluded to that question, but he did not argue that the administrative judge should take any action based on that claim. See J.A. 1601 n.4. And even in this court, Mr. Rodriguez merely states that “if [the court] finds the Administrative Judge was not properly appointed,” “it must remand the case.” Petitioner’s Br. 32. But Mr. Rodriguez has not made a record that enables us to determine whether the authority exercised by the Board’s administrative judges violates the Appointments Clause. In particular, Mr. Rodriguez failed to offer evi- dence as to how the Board’s administrative judges gener- ally, and the administrative judge in this case in particular, were appointed. ^[9] Moreover, Mr. Rodriguez has