Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731 (2019). · Go Syfert
Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731 (2019). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Watkins, Ralph Dewayne (texcrimapp, 2021-03-03)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Watkins, Ralph Dewayne
Tex. Crim. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
App. 2018) (Yeary, J., dissenting) (“I continue to believe WATKINS ― 3 that, if the literal language and structure of a statute render it of sufficient clarity that its proper construction cannot be reasonably doubted, it would improperly encroach upon the Legislative Department for this Court to engage in further construction of it.”); Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731, 739 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" NAVARRO, JEREMIAH v. the State of Texas
Tex. Crim. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex NAVARRO – 2 parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731, 739 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Juan Jose Zarate Sanchez v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
App. 2001); see Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731 , 731 n.1 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Lawrence Herald v. the State of Texas
Tex. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
App. 2001); see Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731 , 731 n. 1 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Ex Parte Cynthia Dianne Noble
Tex. App. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited "see" Pointer, Jeffrey Shawn
Tex. Crim. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ex parte Westerman, 570 S.W.3d 731 , 732–35 (Tex. Crim.
EX PARTE John Dewayne WESTERMAN, Applicant
Apr 10, 2019.
570 S.W.3d 731
It appears there is no limit on how long a defendant can wait before bringing an unverified claim that his counsel was ineffective. Even twenty-eight years later, even after his counsel has died and can no longer respond, even if plausible arguments can be made about how counsel's actions may not amount to ineffective assistance, there is no bar to pursuing-and obtaining-relief. Instead of prohibiting Applicant from litigating his claims under the doctrine of laches, the Court permits a great expenditure of judicial resources in order to deliver Applicant the relief he seeks, all while casting aside a plausible argument for trial counsel's alleged misconduct,1 Applicant's tremendous delay in bringing his claim, and the impossibility of ascertaining trial counsel's account of what transpired. The Court grants Applicant relief from his 1990 aggravated robbery conviction based on his claim that his plea was involuntary because of an impermissible enhancement paragraph that increased the minimum number of years he faced in prison. I would deny Applicant relief on the basis of laches. For these and other reasons, I respectfully dissent to the Court's granting of relief., In 1984, Applicant was charged with burglary of a building, pled guilty, and was sentenced to confinement for eight years., Applicant's shock probation for burglary was not revoked prior to the filing of his 1990 aggravated robbery charge.2 Nevertheless, the State used the 1984 burglary conviction to enhance Applicant's range of punishment in his robbery case from a minimum of five years to a minimum of fifteen years. Applicant ultimately accepted a thirty-year offer and pled guilty to the 1990 robbery offense. Now, nearly twenty-nine years later, Applicant claims that he would not have pled guilty and accepted the State's thirty-year offer had he known that the punishment range actually should have been a minimum of five years instead of a minimum of fifteen years., The Court today holds that, because Applicant's shock probation was not revoked until after Applicant pled guilty to the robbery charge, his punishment range for the robbery charge was improperly enhanced, making his plea involuntary. Because of the unique posture of this case, and because of the timing of its presentation, I do not agree with the Court's disposition., However, a defense lawyer's failure to recognize that a sentence is being improperly enhanced-because, for example, the enhancing offense was not final-may present an applicant with grounds to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim or an involuntary plea claim on post-conviction habeas corpus. See Ex parte Lilly , 656 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (\It is fundamental that an attorney must have a firm command of the facts of the case as well as the law before he can render reasonably effective assistance of counsel.\").
an argument could be made that Applicant's trial counsel should have discovered-with even \"the most cursory investigation\"-that Applicant was placed on shock probation for the 1984 burglary offense  |  Just two years after Applicant pled guilty to the 1990 aggravated robbery offense
Pinpoint authority: bottom 29%

3 At the habeas hearing, before habeas counsel asked Applicant about conversations Applicant had with his 1990 trial counsel, the following exchange occurred:

Q [Habeas Counsel]: Okay. Now, here is where only you can testify to this because you're the only one that was involved back in 1990 who is still here. You understand there is a different prosecuting attorney; I'm a different defense attorney. We weren't part of those negotiations. Okay. Do you understand that?
A [Applicant]: Yes, sir.

4 See Maddox v. State , 591 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (concluding from an examination of the Texas Legal Directory that an attorney named George I. Middaugh had a listed address in Cuero, DeWitt County).

5 Articles 1014 and 1015 of the 1895 Penal Code read:

Article 1014. If it be shown on the trial of a misdemeanor that the defendant has been once before convicted of the same offense, he shall, on a second conviction, receive double the punishment prescribed for such offense in ordinary cases, and upon a third, or any subsequent conviction for the same offense, the punishment shall be increased, so as not to exceed four times the penalty in ordinary cases.
Art. 1015. If it be shown, on the trial of a felony less than capital, that the defendant has been before convicted of the same offense, or one of the same nature, the punishment on such second or other subsequent conviction shall be the highest which is affixed to the commission of such offenses in ordinary cases.
P.C. arts. 1014 & 1015 (1895).

6 The requirement that a conviction must become final before it may be used as an enhancing conviction was not conceived through legislative enactment until 1974 for Section 12.42(d) (the habitual enhancement provision), and not until 2011 for Section 12.42(c) (the repeat-offender enhancement provision). See Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399 § 1, sec. 12.42(d), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 908 (showing enactment of the 1974 Penal Code); Act of May 25, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 834 § 3, sec. 12.42(c)(1), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2104, 2105 (showing the 2011 amendment adding the finality of conviction language to Section 12.42(c) ). Nonetheless, this Court has read-despite the former absence of such language in the statute indicating this was the Legislature's intent-a finality requirement, through the statute's use of the word "conviction," for enhancement purposes. See Arbuckle v. State , 132 Tex.Crim. 371, 105 S.W.2d 219, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 1937) ("Before a prior conviction may be relied on to enhance the punishment in a subsequent case such prior conviction must be final.") (citing Brittian v. State , 214 S.W.351, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919) (holding that convictions used to enhance "must be legal[,] and finally dispose of the case under which such convictions were secured") ).

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