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Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997
2011
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 37 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Carlos Jennis v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Giovanni DePalma v. State of Florida
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3)(A) (providing to file a second or successive § 2254 petition, a petitioner must first get approval from this Court); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (ex- plaining without our authorization, the district court lacks jurisdic- tion to consider a second or successive petition).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mackey v. United States
In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1293 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal prisoners who want to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence must move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the second or successive motion.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3)(A))); Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive [motion to vacate].” (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997))).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
James, Jr. v. Marshall
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203 (1997) (holding that the § 1983 action was the “functional equivalent” of a habeas petition and subject to the law of successive habeas petitions, which caused the court to lack jurisdiction because the inmate had not applied for permission to file second habeas petition).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Brown v. Gordy
Appx. 157, 159 (11th Cir. 2007) (“A district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a “second or successive’ habeas petition that has not been previously authorized by an appellate court.”) (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McConico v. Noe
“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.” Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
James Andrew Starkey v. United States Department of the Treasury
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3)(A).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Anthony F. Morris v. State of Florida Department of Corrections
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Smith v. United States
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Darling v. State
(2×)
See Nelson v. Campbell, 347 F.3d 910, 912 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Fugate, 301 F.3d at 1288); Fugate v. Dep’t of Corrections, 301 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2002) (citing Hill, 112 F.3d at 1089); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1088-89 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Felker, 101 F.3d at 96 ) rev’d, 541 U.S. 637 , 124 S.Ct. 2117 , 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Scott v. Florida Department of Corrections
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Andrew Levert v. United States
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Joseph O. McCallum v. Secretary, DOC
Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997). 3 Because “[t]he phrase ‘second or successive’ is not self-defining,” its meaning is derived from judicial interpretation in decisions that both predate and postdate the AEDPA.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Robinson v. Crosby
Fugate, 301 F.3d at 1288 , cert. denied, 536 U.S. 980 , 123 S.Ct. 15 , 153 L.Ed.2d 878 (2002); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203 , 117 S.Ct. 1571 , 137 L.Ed.2d 714 (1997); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 96 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 989 , 117 S.Ct. 450 , 136 L.Ed.2d 345 (1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
David Larry Nelson v. Donal Campbell
We affirm. 2 As we stated in Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1088-89 (11th Cir.1997), "a prisoner may not circumvent the rules regarding second or successive habeas petitions by filing a § 1983 claim." See also Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95 (11th Cir.1996); Spivey v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir.2002). 3 The full procedural history of this case prior to the instant § 1983 claim is set out in detail in Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir.2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nelson v. Campbell
As we stated in Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1088-89 (11th Cir.1997), “a prisoner may not circumvent the rules regarding second or successive habeas petitions by filing a § 1983 claim.” See also Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95 (11th Cir.1996); Spivey v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir.2002).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nelson v. Campbell
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fugate v. Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.2003); Spivey v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir.2002); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1088-89 (11th Cir.1997); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 96 (11th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wallace M. Fugate, III v. Department of Corrections, Jim Wetherington
A complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from a sentence of death as cruel and unusual punishment “constitutes the ‘functional equivalent’ of a second habeas petition,” and “the district court [i]s subject to the law applicable to successive habeas petitions.” Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997), citing Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 96 (11th Cir.1996).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Akas
See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1208 (2000); Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1024 (1998); Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1997); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harmon v. Angelone
See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1208 (2000); Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1024 (1998); Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1997); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Chadwick v. Graves
Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 336 (8th Cir.) (where the petitioner’s action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was construed as the functional equivalent of a successive habeas action, but the leave required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3)(A) had not been requested or obtained, the district court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the action), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010 , 118 S.Ct. 595 , 139 L.Ed.2d 431 (1997); accord Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975-76 (10th Cir.) (where the petitioner failed to obtain the authorization required under § 2244(b)(3)(A), “the distric…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Libby v. Corrections, ME Comm
See Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 772 (5th Cir.1999); Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975-76 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 556 , 142 L.Ed.2d 462 (1998); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203 , 117 S.Ct. 1571 , 137 L.Ed.2d 714 (1997).
discussed
Cited "see"
Preston Jerome Taylor v. Kenneth Peters
(2×)
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Tompkins, 557 F.3d at 1259 .
discussed
Cited "see"
James v. Pettway
Accord Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.”) (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997)) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited "see"
James v. Weller
Accord Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.”) (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997)) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited "see"
James v. Raybon
Accord Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.”) (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997)) (per curiam). sentence); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 , 114 S. Ct. 2364 , 129 L.
discussed
Cited "see"
James v. Raybon
Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1278 ; accord Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.” (citing Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited "see"
Williams v. Jones
(2×)
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Tompkins, 557 F.3d at 1259 ; Young, 697 F. App’x at 662 .7 7 The Court also notes that Williams’s claim for DNA testing is not cognizable in a federal § 2254 habeas corpus action because success on such a claim would not necessarily imply that that Williams’s custody is unlawful.
discussed
Cited "see"
Conner v. Dunn
(2×)
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Tompkins, 557 F.3d at 1259 .
discussed
Cited "see"
Johnson v. United States
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (determining that “the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant Hill’s request for relief because Hill had not applied to this Court for permission to file a second habeas petition’’).
discussed
Cited "see"
Robertson v. Cooks
(2×)
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Hill, 112 F.3d at 1089 ); Allen, 2012 U.S. Dist.
cited
Cited "see"
Gary William Holt v. United States
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Jorge Luis Benitez
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam).
cited
Cited "see"
J.B. Farris v. United States
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997).
cited
Cited "see"
J.B. Farris v. United States
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.1997).
cited
Cited "see"
Walter HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joe S. HOPPER, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee
See Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir.1997).
examined
Cited "see, e.g."
Ronald Keith Spivey v. State Board of Pardons
(4×)
See also Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir.1997) (same).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 838, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 896 Walter Hill
v.
Joe S. Hopper, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections
v.
Joe S. Hopper, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections
97-6306.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Apr 17, 1997.
Barry J. Fisher, Palmer Singleton, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant., Beth Jackson Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendan1>-Appellee.
Hatchett, Cox, Black.
Cited by 48 opinions | Published
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Walter Hill, an Alabama inmate convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, challenges on appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 assault upon the constitutionality of electrocution as a means of execution. The State of Alabama intends to execute Hill by means of electrocution on May 2, 1997. On March 31, 1997, Appellant Hill filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama charging that the scheduled electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Among other relief, the complaint sought to enjoin Appellee Joe S. Hopper from employing electrocution to carry out Hill’s death sentence. By order dated April 10, 1997, the district court dismissed the complaint as an improper successive habeas petition. We affirm.
In Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 96 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 450, 136 L.Ed.2d 345 (1996), we held that a prisoner may not circumvent the[*1089] rules regarding second or successive habeas petitions by filing a § 1983 claim. Appellant Hill acknowledges that he has filed a previous federal habeas petition. See Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir.), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, 92 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 967, 136 L.Ed.2d 851 (1997). As Hill’s § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claim constitutes the “functional equivalent” of a second habeas petition, the district court was subject to the law applicable to successive habeas petitions. Felker, 101 F.3d at 96. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant Hill’s request for relief because Hill had not applied to this Court for permission to file a second habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.