delivered the opinion of the Court as follows :

The writ of error in this case is brought to reverse a judgment obtained by the Defendants in error against the Plaintiffs in an ejectment brought in the Circuit Court of West Tennessee. At the trial, the Plaintiffs in tiiat Court offered in evidence in order to make out their title, a deed bearing date the 9f.h of October, 1794, from J. G. Blount and Thomas Blount, of North- Carolina, to David Allison, of Philadelphia, 'which deed was recorded in the county in which the lands lie on the 28th day of December, 1808. The Defendants objected to the admission of this deed, and excepted to the opinion of the Court over-ruling the objection.

The original law inquiring the enregistering of deeds, passed in North Carolina, (then comprehending what is now the state of Tennessee,) in the year 1713. This act requires that the deed shall be acknowledged by the vendor, or proved by one or more evidences upon oath, either before the chief justice for the time being, or in the Court of the precinct where the land lies, and registered by the public register of the precinct Where the land lies within twelve months after the date thereof. It was afterwards enacted, that the deed might he registered by the clerk of the county in which the land lies, anil the time for the registration of- deeds was prolonged until Tennessee was erected into' an independent stale, after which the time for enregistering of deeds continued to be prolonged by the legislature of that state.

In the year 1797, the legislature of Tennessee enacted a law, declaring that deeds made without the limits of the state, should he admitted to registration on proof that the same was acknowledged by the grantor, or proved by one or more of the subscribing witnesses in open Court, in some one of the Courts of the United States, and on ho other proof whatever, except where the party holding such deed shall have the same proved [*476] or acknowledged within the limits of the state of Tennessee, agreeable to the mode heretofore in force and use in that state.

It is contended by the counsel for the Defendants in epror, that, tlife deed being recorded in the proper county, the judgment of a competent Court has been given ¡on the sufficiency of the testimony on which it was registere.d, and that judgment is'not examinable in any other tribunal. But this Court is not of that opinión, Táe proof on which a deed shall be, registered is prescribed by law, 'and it is enacted that the deed shall not be good and available in law, unless it be so provea and recorded.' The evidence, therefore is spread upon the. record, and is always attainable. The order that a deed should be admitted to record is an exparte order, and might often be obtained improperly if the order was conclusive. It is believed to be the practice of all Courts/ where the law- directs conveyances to-be accorded, and prescribes the testimony on which' they shall fie recorded in terms similar to those employed in the act of North Carolina, to hold themselves at liberty to examine the proof op which the registration has beep made.

This deed in the present case w-as proved before judge Haywood, in North-Carolina, by one of the subscribing witnesses thereto, on the 29th of. September, 1797, and registered in Stokers county, in North Carolina.

On flie 9th day of December, 1807, the hand-writing of the, subscribing witnesses, who were dead, and of fiie graniors, w-as proved before Samuel Powell, one of the judges of the Supreme Court of law and equity, in the state of Tenn-.-ssee, who thereupon ordered the deed to be registered; and afterwards in November term, 1808, the same proof was received in open Court in the county where the lands lie, and was ordered to be registered by t!>at Court, which order \yas executed.

This Court is of opinion, that the deed was not sufficiently preved according to i bp then existing law. The profeaty bpfnye judge Hay wood was not s. .fficient to prove it as a deed made out of the s af.e, because, the act of 1797 required that such probate should be made in open [*477] Court. The proof made before judge Powell, and in open Court, is insufficient, because it was not made by a subscribing witness.

0.n the 23d of November, 1809, the legislature of Tennessee passed an act, declaring that all deeds for land within the state, made out of the state by grantors residing without tin state, and •* which shall have been proven by one or more of the subscribing witnesses thereto, or acknowledged by the grantor or grantors before any judge of any Court in another state, .or before the mayor, &c, and shall have been registered iji this state in the..county where the land, or any part thereof lies, within the time required by law for registering the same, such probate and registration shall be good' and sufficient to entitle the same to he read in evidence in any Court within this state.”

This act. appears to the Court to cover the precise case. This was a deed for land lying within the state of Tenneseee, made out of the state by grantors residing without the state, which had been proven by one of the subscribing witnesses thereto before a judge of a Court of another state, and had been registered in the county where the land lay within the time required by Jaw-for registering the same,

This act gave complete, validity to the registration made in December, 1808, and eptitled the deed to be read in evidence. It looked back, in order to affiím and legalize certain,registrations made, on probates which did not satisfy the laws existing at-the time, but which the legislature deemed sufficient for the future.

In tracing his title, the Plaintiff in the Circuit Court gave in evidence a deed to himself which bore date posterior in point of time to the demise laid in the declaration of ejectipent. The Defendant, on this account, objected to the deeds going in evidence to the jury, but the Court over-yuled the objection, and declared the date of the lease to be immaterial, and that it sljould he oyérlooked, or the plaintiff have leave to amend. The declaration was amended by striking out the fiate of the lease mentioned in the declaration, and inserting a date posterior to the conveyance made to the Plaintiffi - .

[*478] In an ejectment the lease is entirely a fiction invented for the purpose of going fairly to trial on the title. Courts have exercised a full discretion in allowing it to be amended. A Plaintiff lias frequently been allowed to enlarge the term when it has expired before a-’fmaí de~ cisión of the cause. Between, making the- term extend a more d:stant day, and commence at a later day, the Court can perceive no difference in substance. They are modifications of,the same power intended to effect the same object,’ and although not precisely the same in form, the one is nut greater in degree than the other. The amendment therefore was properly allowed.

Although this Court is of opinion, that the Circuit Court erred in saying, that it was unnecessary to prove a title in’ the lessor of the Plaintiff at the date of the demise laid in the declaration, yet it is an error which could not injure the Defendants, or in any manner affect the cause. The amendment being allowed, 1 he question whether the deed could have been, read in evidence had the amendment not been made becomes wh lly immaterial, and this Court will not notice it.

For the purpose of showing that the original grant ivas void, the Defendant then offered evidence to-prove, that it ivas founded on a duplicate warrant issued by John Armstrong, entry-taker of western lands for the state of North Carolina, in the year 179S, the original warrant being” still in the hands of the surveyor general of the middle district within which the original entry was situated ,* and that the grantees, after the said grant ivas issued, obtained the original warrant from the surveyor general, and procured another grant founded thereon for other lands. To the admission of this testimony, the Plaintiff objected, and the Court sustained the objection. To this opinion also an exception was taken.

By the laws of North Carolina, under which this entry was made, any citizen ivas permitted to enter -with the- entry-taker any quantity of land not exceeding 5,GOO acres, which it was his duty to describe specifically. After the expiration of thrcé months the entry-taker .was to give him a copy of the entry, with a Warrant to the surveyor to survey the land. As no other [*479] land than that described could be surveyed under this entry and warrant* while the land really entered remained vacant, it was entirely unimportant whether the survey was made under the first or a second copy of the entry. If indeed two persons claimed the same land, under different surveys and grants, the elder patentee would of course hold the land at law- But no other than such subsequent patentee, or one claiming under him, could ' contest the elder grant. To the state, and to all the world, it was perfectly immaterial when this grant issued, whether it emanated on the first copy of the entry, or on any other copy, as no other use had then been made of the first copy, and this grant was unimpeachable.

In 1784, a power was given to remove entries. when they were made on lands’ previously granted or entered. But certainly this would not extend to the removal of an entry, and the survey of other lands on a copy thereof, which entry had already been executed and carried into grant, either on the first or on any other copy. .The face of the grant gave no notice that it had issued on a second copy of the entry, and as the case was not provided .for by law, it is not improbable that every copy given by the entry-taker would bear the same appearance. There was nothing which would indicate to a purchaser (hat some future fraud might possibly be practised whereby another grant might be obtained, and which might caution him, that a title, good to every appearance, was infected by a circumstance into which the law did not expect him to inquire. Had no subsequent patent issued in this case for other lands, it would not bo contended that this patent was either void or void-; able, and it is perfectly clear that a patent which was valid when issued, never can be avoided in the hands of a fair purchaser, by a subsequent fraud committed by the original patentee. It is the subsequent patent which injures the state, and which is obtained by fraud. It is the subsequent patent, if cither, the validity of which is questionable.

In the year 1795, an act passed directing the books of entry-takers to be delivered to the clerks of the several county courts in which such entry-takers respectively, resided: And in 1796, an.act passed prescribing the [*480] manner in which duplicates might be obtained, where the warrants were. lost, and others had not been issued, while the books remained with the entry-takers.

It is strongly to be infe. red, not only from the language of this act, but from the circumstance that no provision is made for duplicates to be issued by the entry-taker in future cases of lost warrants, that every copy of an entry which was granted by the entry-taker, was considered as an original, and as an equal autiiority to the surveyor to survey the land enlered. The entry being once executed, it was his duty not to execute it again.

This act provides, that where duplicates shall issue from the clerk, by order of the Court, the surv. yor shall note the fact in his plat, and it si,all appear on the face of the grant, that the same is issued on a duplicate, and shall be liablé to become null and void, if - it shall appear that a grant had beer, obtained on the original warrant.

This act applies only to grants issued .on duplicates obtained in conformity with its provisions, and would seem to respect only the junior patent. It cannot affect the grant in this case, which was issued before its. passage. But it affords strong, reason for the opinion, that the state of North Carolina did not purpose to impeach its own grants; unless they conveyed notice to the world that they were impeachable, and even then they were voidable, not void. An individual not claiming under the same entry, could not avail himself of their liability to be avoided.

It is the opinion of the Court that there is no error, and that the judgment be affirmed.