Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. 233 (1841).

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 40 U.S. 233 (1841). Book View Copy Cite

The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Complainants,
v.
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Mar 10, 1841.

40 U.S. 233

Google Scholar ↗ | CourtListener ↗

The demurrer was argued by Mr. Austin, and Mr. Webster, for the state of Massachusetts; and by Mr. Randolph, and Mr. Whipple, for the state of Rhode Island and Providence plantations.

Taney.

THIS case was before the Court, at -January, term, 1838? 12 Peters, 657; and again, at'January term, 1840, 14 Peters, 210. A bill was filed in the Supreme Court, on the 16th of March, 1832, by the state of Rhode. Island, and Providence Plantation, asking the Court to settle thé boundary between that state and the commonwealth of Massachusetts. Mr. Webster appeared for the commonwealth of Massachu-. setts. After various proceedings in the case, a plea and answer to the bill of the state of Rhode Island were filed by the commonwealth of Massachusetts; and, at January term, 1838, Mr. Webster, counsel for the commonwealth of Massachusetts, “ moved to dismiss the bill, on the ground that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in the cause.” , A full report of the matters contained in the bill, and in the plea and answer, will be found in 12 Peters, 659 — 669. The question of jurisdiction was argued by Mr. Austin, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Mr. Webster, on the part of the commonwealth of Massachusetts; and by Mr! Hazard and Mr. Southard, for the state of Rhode Island. Tha Court ordered that the motion to dismiss the bill of thé complainants should be overruled. Afterwards, at the same term, 12 Peters, 755, Mr. Webster, in behalf of the state of Massachusetts, as her counsel and attorney in Court, moved for leave to withdraw the plea filed in' the case on the part of the state of Massachusetts, and also the appearance which had been entered for the state. The Court, after argument, on the 24th Feb. 1838, 12 Peters, 761, ordered, “ That if the counsel for the state of Massachusetts shall elect to withdraw the appearance heretofore entered, that leave for the same be and was given; and the state of Rhode Island may proceed ex parte. But that, if the appearance be not withdrawn,.that then, as no testimony had been taken,,the parties be allowed to withdraw or amend the pleadings, under such order as the Court should thereafter make in the premises. The appearance of the state of Massachusetts was not withdrawn; and the case was argued, on the sufficiency of the plea, at January term, 1840: the bill of the complainants having been amended. 14 Peters, 210. On the 8th of January, 1841, the state of Massachusetts, by Mr; Austin,-the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, apd Mr. Webster-, “ for himself,” filed the following demurrer to the complainant’s bill: The defendant, by protestation, not confessing all or any of the matters and things in the complainant’s' bill of- complaint contained' to be true, doth demur to the said bill, and; for cause of demurrer, showeth: “That no case is stated by the bill authorizing this Court to grant the relief sought, or any other relief; That no such mistake or fraud is averred- in the bill, as is sufficient to set aside the awards and agreements between the parties, therein stated, nor. any other cause or reason sufficient for' that purpose; and that these awards and agreements conclude' the question : That the bill states nothing which can do awaly the effect of the possession by Massachusetts up to the line asserted by her to be the true line, which possession the bill itself admits to have been continued for more than á century, and which possession is itself conclusive on the title: That the bill states no case for the interference of this. Court, with the line of division actually existing between two independent states, fixed by treaty, compact, pr agreement betwéen them, and acquiesced in for a century, as is true of this case, according to the bill itself: That this Court has no power or jurisdiction to disturb or interfere- with a boundary line actually existing between two states, well known and defined, and resting on early compact and long continued acquiescence and possession, upon any allegation' of fraud or mistake in the original transaction. Wherefore, and for divers other good causes of demurrer, appearing in the said bill, the defendant doth demur thereto, and asks the judgment of the Court, whether said defendant ought, to' be ordered to make any further or other answer to said bill; and prays to be hence dismissed with costs.” Mr. Austin, for the respondents, in support of the demurrer. The object of the plaintiff is, by a decree of this Cour,:, to be confirmed and established in the title, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, which she sets up to a portion of territory, now and ever heretofore, in the possession, jurisdiction,' and sovereignty of the respondent. The bill describes this disputed territory with reasonable accuracy, so that it is seen to be included between the present actual southern boundary of Massachusetts, and a line nearly parallel thereto, drawn between three and four miles due north from it, along the whole border of Rhode Island, comprising an area of about one hundred square miles. The bill does not state that this territory is densely inhabited, and under a high state, of improvement; but if the Court' could judicially understand that it is occupied by seven thousand people, all of whom, as did their ancestors to remotest time, deem themselves to be citizens, and most of them native citizens of Massachusetts,; and that there is upoti it not less than a million of dollars of taxable property; the importance of the controversy could not be doubted. The. bill sets forth the alleged title of Rhode Island to the territory in dispute, and claims it as included in the charter of Charles II. -It describes accurately the title of Massachusetts to the territory secured to her by her colonial and provincial charters, the one granted in 1629, and the other in 1691; and alleges that her southern boundary is by a line, “three English myles on the south parte of the rivir called Charles rivir, or of any or every parte thereof;” and further alleges that the southern boundary of Massachusetts, and the northern boundary of Rhode Island, is by the same line; the one being contiguous to the other. All this is true. The bill avers that the actual line of posséssion on the part of Massachusetts, is more than three miles; viz.: seven miles south of Charles river, and of any and every part thereof. On this allegation, it is obvioiis the whole assumed merits of the plaintiff’s case depend. If it be not true, there is no pretence of right to disturb the ancient and existing possession of the respondent. Whether it be true or not, in point of fact, must depend on a legal construction of the words of the charter. As illustrative of that question, and not in the present aspect of the case, for any purpose of deciding it, the maps and plans of the territory heretofore used, and now before the Court, may be referred to. By universal admission, the Charles river has one main, or principal stream, which is supplied by other streams or branches. If these latter streams, which have also- local names, are any part of Charles river within the meaning of the charter, then the actual line of Massachusetts, which is within three rñiles of the principal branch, (sometimes locally called Mill river, at others, Jack’s Pasture brook;) is the true boundary by her charter. If, the main stream, and not the head waters, is alone entitled to be termed “ Charles river, or any and every part thereof,” then unquestionably the actual line of Massachusetts is not in conformity with the charter; because, in .ancient times, it was assumed, and now is believed to be true, that the true point of offset for the protraction, southwardly of the line of three miles from any part of Charles river, is from the most southerly stream, branch, or head waters of the river, and it was accordingly so drawn. It is believed that such is, and ever was the universal acceptance of the terms; and that wherever a different construction was put on the like phraseology, it was the construction made by power in violation of right. But the case now stands before the Court on demurrer; and in this form of pleading, the counsel for Massachusetts very well understand that this question of fact is not open to discussion. They are bound by the allegations of the bill, and must proceed to a hearing with this fact, pro hac vice, against them; and with an admission that the line of actual possession is not the true line of the charter. It is with full confidence in the opinion that the bill, (even admitting this great and fundamental error on the part of Rhode Island, to be received as she has stated it,) does not set forth a sufficient cause for the interposition of this Court; that Massachusetts has ventured to waive this consideration for the present; and to deny that even on this presumption, Rhode Island has any title, by her own showing, to the territorial jurisdiction which she demands by her bill. We suppose, indeed, this is already settled by this Court in effect, though not in form. The bill incorporates the defence of Massachusetts, on two other points; which, independent of the original accuracy of the boundary, are each, by itself, fatal to the plaintiff’s.demand. It admits the fact of an amicable settlement in 1710 and 1718, and the further fact of an actual possession on the part of Massachusetts, under and by virtue of such agreements, for now nearly a century and a half. It is again obvious that the' question of right between these parties depends, 1st. On the original correct location of the boundary line. 3d. On the effect of the agreements in establishing a boundary. 3d. On the undisturbed possession for more than one hundred' years.’ On the former hearing in this case, the respondent had filed a plea in bar, setting out, more fully than the plaintiff had done, the agreements of 1710, 1718; and relying up them as fair and perfect contracts, made fairly, with full and equal knowledge, and accompanied and followed by an undisturbed possession from the time they were made. We understood the Court to overrule th^.t plea, because it contained two defences instead of one’; upon a strict application of the severest rales of chancery practice, which, with great respect, we had contended could not apply to a case like the present, and were in no case applicable to the plea in the form in which it was presented. In pronouncing the opinion of the Court, the Chief Justice said, “ The defence set up by the plea is twofold: 1st. That there was an accord and compromise of a disputed right. 2d. Prescription, or an unmolested possession for more than one hundred years. These two defences are entirely distinct, and depend upon different principles.” And after considering them separately, the Chief Justice further remarks, “ Here, then, áre two defences in the same plea, contrary to the established rules of pleading.” And again, upon the form of pleading, the opinion of the Court is to the following effect: “ A plea in general supposes that the bill contains equitable 'matter, which the defendant, by his plea, seeks to displace. It is according to this principle of equity pleading that we have treated the case before us. If a defendant supposes that there is.no equity in the bill, his appropriate answer to it is a demurrer; which brings forward at once the whole case for argument. The case of Milligan v. Mitchell, 3 Cranch, 220. 228, illustrates this rule, arid shows that the defence here taken was more proper for an answer or demurrer than a plea. “ If the defendant supposes- that the bill does not disclose a case which entitles Rhode Island to the relief she seeks, the whole subject can be brought to a hearing by a demurrer to the bill. The whole cáse is open, and upon the rule to answer which the Court, will lay upon the defendant,-Massachusetts, is entirely at liberty to demur or answer, as. she may deem best for her interests.” ■ It seemed to us that the Court, haying thus decided, not, indeed, that we had the two valid defences set forth in our plea, but that, if in truth we did possess them, either was in itself a bar, though both could not be joined in the then present form; permitted, if they did not invite us to present them under such form as would authorize a joinder of both, and a consideration of either, independent of the other We had hope, therefore, that, the plaintiff, having, as we think, admitted both in his own declaration, would have been satisfied that- whenever they were considered they would of necessity prevail. The demurrer now joined ■ presents these defences, with all others growing,out of the plaintiff’s own statement of the case. It is a jamiliar and well established principle, that if; taking the' allegation's to be true, the bill would be dismissed at the'hearing, it may be dismissed on demurrer. Uttérron v. Mair, 2 Ves. Jr. 95. The object of a hearing is only to inquire whether.the allegations are proved, and the effect of them. When, therefore, if proved or confessed, a decree piust be had for defendant; the defendant may safely admit them, and may therefore as safely demur to the whole bill. Kemp v. Prior, 7 Ves. Jr. 245. Brooke v. Hewitt, 3\ Ves. Jr. 253. Verplank v. Cachis

Mr. Chief Justice Taney

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The attention of the Court has on several occasions been drawn to' this case by the important questions which have arisen in different . stages of the proceedings. At the last term, it came before us upon a plea in bar to the complainant’s bill, which upon the motion of the complainant had been set down for argument.

This part of the case is reported in 14 Peters, 210, where the allegations contained in the bill are so fully set out that it is unnecessary to repeat them here. The Court having overruled the' plea for the reasons stated in the report of the case, the defendant has since demurred; arid in this state of fhe pleadings the question is directly presented, whether the case stated by Rhode Island in her bill, admitting it to be true as ther.e stated, entitles her to relief.

The character of the case, and of the parties, has made it the duty of the Court to examine very carefully the different- questions which from time to time have arisen in these proceedings. And if those whieh are brought up by the demurrer were new to the Court, or if the judgment now to be pronounced would seriously influence the ultimate decision ; we should deem it proper to hold the subject under advisement until the next term, for the purpose of giving to it a more deliberate examination.;

But although the questions now before the Court did not arise upon the plea,' and of course were not then decided, yet much of the argument on that occasion turned upon principles which are involved in the case as it now stands. The facts stated in the bill were brought before us, and the grounds upon which the complainant claimed relief were necessarily discussed in the argument at the,bar, and the attention of the Court strongly drawn to the subject. The whole case as presented by the bill and demurrer, has been again fully and ably argued, at the' present term; and as the Court has made up its opinion, andaré satisfied that the delay of our judgment to the next term would not enable us to obtain more or better light upon the subject, it would be useless to postpone the decision.

[*270] The demurrer admits the truth of the facts alleged in the bill, and it is sufficient for the purposes of this opinion xo -state in a few words' the material allegations contained 'in it.

1st. It alleges that the true boundary line between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, by.virtue of their charters from the English crown, is a line run east and west three miles south of Charles river, or any or every part thereof; and sets out the charters which support, in this respect, the averments in the bill.

2d. That Massachusetts holds possession to a line seven miles south of Charles river,'which does not run east and west, but runs south of a west course; and that the territory between this line and the true one above mentioned, belongs to Rhode Island, and, that the defendant unjustly withholds it from her.

• 3d. That Massachusetts obtained possession of this territory under certain agreements, and proceedings of commissioners appointed by the two colonies, which are set out at large in the' bill; and the complainant avers that the commissioners on the part of Rhode Island, agreed, to this line under the mistaken belief that it was only three miles south of Charles river; and that they were led into this mistake by the representations made to them by the commissioners on the part of Massachusetts, upon whose statement they relied. ......

4th. That this agreement of the commissioners was never' ratified by either of the colonies: and the bill- sets out the various proceedings of the commissioners and legislatures of the two colonies, which if not sufficient to establish the correctness of the averment, are yet not incompatible with it.

5th. The bill further states that the mistake was riot discovéred by Rhode Island until 1740, when she soon afterwards took measures to correct it; that she never acquiesced in the possession of Massachusetts, after the mistake was discovered, but has ever since continually resisted it; and never admitted .any line as the true boundary between them, but the one called for by the charters. Various proceedings are set out, and facts stated in the bill; to show that the complainant never acquiesced; and to account for the delay in prosecuting her claim. Whether they are sufficient or not' for that purpose, is not now in question. They are certainly consistent with the averment, and tend to support it.

[*271] The case, then, as made by the bill, and to be now taken as true, is substantially this 5 The charter boundary between these colonies was three miles south of Charles river; and the parties intending to mark a line in that place, marked it by mistake, four miles further south, encroaching so much on the territory of Rhode Island; and the complainant was led into this mistake by confiding in the representations of the commissioners of the defendant. And as soon as the error was discovered, she made claim to the true line, and has ever since contended for It.

We speak of the. case as it appears .upon the pleadings. It may prove to be a very different one, hereafter, when the evidence on both sides is produced. But taking it as it now stands, if it were a dispute between two individuals, in relation to one of the ordinary subjects of private contract; and there had been no laches to deprive the party of his title to relief; would-a Court of Equity compel him to abide by a contract entered into under such circumstances ? It is one of the most familiar duties of the Chancery Court to relieve against mistake, especially when it has been produced by the representations of the adverse party. In this case, the fact mistaken, was the very foundation of the agreement. There was no intention on either side to transfer territory, nor any consideration given by the one to the other to obtain it. Nor was there any dispute arising out of conflicting grants of the crown, or upon the construction of their charters, which they proposed to settle by compromise. Each party agreed that the boundary was three miles south of Charles .river; and the only object was to ascertain and mark that point: and upon the case, as it comes before us, the complainant, avers, and the defendant admits that the place marked, was seven miles south of the river, instead of three, and was fixed on by mistake; and that the commissioners of Rhode Island were led into the error, by confiding in the representations of the Massachusetts commissioners. Now, if this mistake had been discovered a few days after the agreements were made, and Rhode Island had immediately gone before a tribunal, having competent jurisdiction, upon principles of equity, to relieve against a mistake committed by such parties, can there be any doubt that the agreement'. would have been set aside, and Rhode Island restored to the true charter line ? We think not. Agreements thus obtained, [*272] cannot deprive the complainant of territory, which belonged to her before; unless she has forfeited her title to relief, by acquiescence or unreasonable delay.

But it.has been argued, on the part of the defendant, that assuming the agreement to have been made by mistake, and that the complainant would have been entitled to set it aside, if she had prosecuted her claim within a reasonable, time; yet, as Massachusetts entered into the disputed territory immediately after the agreement, anc. has held it ever since, the complainant is too late in seeking relief: that after such a lapse of time, she is barred by prescription, or must be presumed to have acquiesced in the boundary agreed-upon ; and that if she did not acquiesce, she has been guilty of such laches and negligence in prosecuting her claim, that she is no longer entitled to the countenance of a Court of Chancery.

The answer to this argument is a very plain one. The complainant avers that she never acquiesced in the boundary claimed by the defendant, but has continually resisted it since she discovered the mistake; and • that' she has been prevented from prosecuting her claim at an earlier day, by the circumstances mentioned in her bill. These averments- and allegations, in the present state of the pleadings, must be taken as true; and it is not necessary to decide now, whether they are sufficient to excuse the delay. But when it is admitted by the demurrer that she never acquiesced; and has from time to time made efforts to regain the territory by negotiations with Massachusetts, and was prevented by the circumstances she mentions from appealing to the proper tribunal to grant her redress; we cannot undertake -to say, that the possession of Massachusetts has been such as to give her a title by prescription: or that the laches and negligence of Rhqde Island have been such as to forfeit her right to the interposition of a Court of Equity.

In cases between individuals,' where the statute of limitations would.be a bar kt law, the same rule is undoubtedly applied in a Court of Equity. And when the fact appears on the face of the bill, and no circumstances are stated, which take the case'out of' the operation of the act; the defendant may undoubtedly take advantage of it by demurrer, and is not- bound to plead or answer. The time necessary to operate as a bar in equity, is [*273] fixed at twenty years, by analogy to the statute of''limitations; and the rule is stated in Story’s Com. on Eq. Pl. 389, and is supported and illustrated by many authorities cited in the notes. It was recognised in this Court in the case of Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168-175. But it would be impossible with any semblance of justice to adopt such a rule of limitation in the case before us. For here two political communities are concerned, who cannot act with the same promptness as individuals; and the boundary in question was in a wild unsettled country, and the error not likely to be discovered, until the lands were granted by the respective colonies, and the settlements approached the disputed line: and the only tribunal that could relieve after the mistake was discovered, was on the other side of the Atlantic, and was not bound to hear the case' and proceed to judgment, except when it suited its qwn convenience. The same reasons that prevent the bar of limitations, make it equally evident, that a possession so obtained, and held by Massachusetts, under such circumstances, cannot give a title by prescription.

The demurrer, therefore, must be overruled.

But the question upon the agreements^ as well as that upon the lapse of time, may assume a very different aspect, if the defendant answers and denies the mistake; and relies upon the lapse of time as evidence of acquiescence, or of such negligence and laches-as will deprive the party of his right to the aid of a Court of Equity. It will then be open to him to show that there was no mistake; that the line agreed on is the true charter line; or that such must be presumed to have been the constructioh given to the charters by the commissioners of both colonies; or that the agreement was the compromise of a disputed boundary, upon which each party must be supposed to have had equal means of knowledge.

So, too, in relation to the facts stated in the bill to account for the delay. It will be in the power of the complainant to show, if she can, that her long continued ignorance of an error, (which, if it be one, was palpable and open,) was occasioned by the wild and unsettled state of the country; and that the subsequent delay was produced by circumstances sufficiently cogent to justify it upon principles of justice and equity; or was assented to by [*274] Massachusetts, or occasioned by her conduct. And, on the other hand, it will be the right of the defendant to show, if she can, that Rhode Island would not have been ignorant of the true position df this line until 1740; or, if she remained in ignorance until that time, that it must have arisen from such negligence and inattention to her rights, as would render it inexcusable; and should be treated, therefore, as if it had been acquiescence with" knowledge: or she may show that, after the mistake is admitted to have been discovered, Rhode Island was guilty of laches, in. not prosecuting her rights in the proper forum, and that the excuses offered for the delay áre altogether unfounded pr insufficient ; and that Massachusetts never assented to it, nor occasioned it.

We state these questions as. points that will remain open upon the final hearing, for the purpose of showing that the- real merits, of the controversy could not have been finally disposed of' upon the present pleadings; but without meaning to say that other questions may not be made by the parties,-if they shall suppose them to arise upon the proceedings hereafter to be had. The points above suggested, which are excluded by the ease as it now stands,, make it evident that this controversy ought -to be more fully before the Court, upon the answer, and the proofs to be offered on both sides, before it is finally disposed of.

The Court will, therefore, order and decree that the. demurrer be -overruled; and that the- defendant answer the complainant’s bill on or before the first day of August next.

This cause came on to be heard on the amended bill and demurrer, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered by this Court, that the said demurrer be, and the same is hereby, overruled; and it is also now further here ordered by this Court that the defendant answer the bill of complaint as amended, on or before the first day of August next.