after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:

The only error alleged in the action of the Circuit Court lies in its ruling upon the peremptory exception. It is contended here, as in that court) that the mortgage and vendor’s privilege of Iloa were prescribed, and that the prescription resulted from the failure to reinscribe the mortgage within ten years from the date of the first inscription.

It is supposed that support for this position is found in article 3333 of the Civil Code of Louisiana; and such would be the case if, in the construction of the article, we were confined to its language, as given in English, in the printed volunie published by authority of the legislature of the State. It would seem from its reading, as thus given, that the omission to reinscribe a mortgage within the time designated, was intended to ha'ye the effect of defeating and annulling its operation. But, upon examining the language of the article as given in French, in the same volume (the English and French being printed in parallel columns), this construction becomes impossible. Bead in the light thus afforded its meaning is obvious. It was intended to declare the effect of the inscription in preserving the evidence of mortgages [*300] and privileges, and the effect of the omission to renew the inscription in destroying such evidence. It declares, that the inscription preserves such evidence for ten years, and that its effect ceases if not renewed before the expiration of that period. It is the effect of the inscription when not renewed, which ceases, not the effect of the mortgage. The object of requiring reinscription is to dispense with the necessity of searching for evidence of mortgages more than ten years back. *

Besides, the object of all registry laws is to impart information to parties dealing with property respecting its transfers and incumbrances, and thus to protect them from prior secret conveyances and liens. It.is to the registry, therefore, that purchasers, or others desirous of ascertaining the condition of the property, must look, and if not otherwise informed, they can rely upon the knowledge there obtained. But if they have notice of the existence of unregistered conveyances and mortgages, they cannot, in truth, complain that they are, in any respect, prejudiced by the want of registry. In equity, and in this country generally at law, they are not permitted to defeat, under such circumstances, the rights of prior grantees or incumbrancers, but are1 required to take the title or security in subordination to their rights. The general doctrine is that knowledge of an existing conveyance or moi’tgage is, in legal effect, the equivalent to notice by the registry. And such is the law of Louisiana as expounded by the decisions of her highest court. Thus, in Robinett v. Compton, † that court said: “The doctrine is now well settled, that the actual knowledge by a purchaser of an existing mortgage or title is equivalent to a notice resulting from the -registry. The formality, of recording is for the benefit of the public, and for. the purpose of giving notice to individuals. But if a party have knowledge of that of which it is the purpose of the law to notify him, by causing an act, instrument, or lien to be recorded, the effect is the same, and he is as much bound by his personal knowledge as [*301] if his information was derived from an inspection of the record.”

The cases of Planters’ Bank of Georgia v. Allard, * Bell v. Haw, † Rachal v. Normand, ‡ and Swan v. Moore, § are to the same effect.

In. the case at bar, Patterson had knowledge of the mortgage and vendor’s privilege of Hoa. They are stated in the mortgage to himself, which he placed on record. If, therefore,the act of sale, stipulating for the special mortgage and acknowledging the vendor’s privilege, had not, in fact, been recorded, he would have been bound by his knowledge'of their existence. He could not have urged the want of inscription to defeat Hoa’s priority, and, for like reasons, he cannot urge the want of reinscription.

Prescription of the mortgage and vendor’s privilege did not follow from the omission to 'reinscribe the act of sale. Prom its5 nature, prescription could' not have begun to run until the debt secured had matured.

But there is a "farther answer to the objection founded on the want of reinscription. By the terms upon which Patterson purchased the property at the marshal’s sale, and the stipulations contained in the marshal’s deed accepted by him and placed on retíord, he assumed to pay the amount due on Iloa’s mortgage. He cannot now avoid compliance with his contract, in this respect, on the ground that Hoa’s mortgage'had, in fact, at the time, lost its priority by not being reiuscribed before the expiration of ten years from its first inscription. ǁ

Judgment aeeirmed.