Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911). · Go Syfert
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Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 2 distinct cases · …he immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …t is also true that the immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
531 citation events (94 in the last 25 years) across 65 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People of Michigan v. Nevin Hughes (mich, 2016-06-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1911 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1911 1968 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 36 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) People of Michigan v. Nevin Hughes (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Mich. · 2016 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
he immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) People of Michigan v. William Little (6×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
Mich. · 2016 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
he immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Earp v. Cullen (3×)
9th Cir. · 2010 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
t is also true that the immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Morales (2×)
Minn. · 2010 · confidence medium
The Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not protect an individual from prosecution for future perjury, id. at 131, 100 S.Ct. 948 , and accordingly, the Fifth Amendment cannot be invoked by an individual who plans to commit perjury after being compelled to testify, see id. at 132 , 100 S.Ct. 948 . (“[P]rior to the immunity grant the witness had no Fifth Amendment right to answer falsely.”) (Brennan, J., concurring).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Linda Quam
8th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Notwithstanding this broad, general duty, the Fifth Amendment allows an individual to avoid making self-incriminating statements in grand jury proceedings by remaining silent “without risking contempt, -3- but it ‘does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.’” United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977) (quoting Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Adams
Ohio Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Id. at 128, 100 S.Ct. 948 , 63 L.Ed.2d 250 . {¶ 37} The court’s key holding is as follows: “[T]he [perjury] exception surely would still be properly regarded as ‘narrow,’ once it is recognized that the testimony remains inadmissible in all prosecutions for offenses committed prior to the grant of immunity that would have permitted the witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege absent the grant.” Apfelbaum, supra, 445 U.S. at 128 , 445 U.S. 115 , 100 S.Ct. 948 , 63 L.Ed.2d 250 . {¶ 38} This rather cryptic holding has been universally interpreted to mean that the Fifth Amendment…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Jones (2×)
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2002 · confidence medium
As the Supreme Court long ago held, “the constitutional guaranty of the 5th Amendment does not deprive the lawmaking authority of the power to compel the giving of testimony, even [though] the testimony, when given, might serve to incriminate the one testifying, provided immunity be accorded * * * in all respects commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation.” (Glickstein v United States, 222 US 139, 141 [1911]; see also Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441 [1972].) The New York Legislature exercised this power by enacting CPL 50.20, which provides that “a …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Veal
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
It grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it ‘does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.’” (quoting Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 , 32 S.Ct. 71, 73 (1911)); see also United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 82 , 90 S.Ct. 363, 366 (1969) (explaining that the predicament of having to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood, as opposed to refusing to answer, does not justify perjury or answering falsely in a case involving filing a false tax return, the Court concluded that the defendant took “a course that the…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ABF Freight System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (2×)
SCOTUS · 1994 · confidence medium
See also United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969); Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966); Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 (1937); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shifflett v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 577, 582-583, 609 (1976); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 82 (1969); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Apfelbaum (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1980 · confidence medium
Its doctrinal foundation, as relied on in both Wong and Mandujano , is traceable to Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 142 (1911).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Acceptance of Position With Montgomery Ward Company by Consumer Product Safety Commission Employee
OLC · 1978 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. United Stales v. Brown, 333 U .S. 18, 25-26 (1948) (penal statutes), and Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142-43 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Vincent Moran Doss (2×)
6th Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
It grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it “does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.” Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 [ 32 S.Ct. 71, 73 , 56 L.Ed. 128 ] (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Scanlon
Mont. · 1977 · confidence medium
It grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it 'doesnot endow the per- son who testified with a license to commit perjury.' Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Wong
SCOTUS · 1977 · confidence medium
It grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it “does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.” Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 142 (1911).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mandujano (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1976 · confidence medium
As said in Glickstein v. United States, [ 222 U. S. 139, 142 (1911),] `. . . the immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.' " Id., at 314.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Richard Glasco, Jr.
5th Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
One reason for this result was articulated in Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 , 32 S.Ct. 71, 73 , 56 L.Ed. 128, 130 (1911): the immunity afforded by the constitutional guaranty (against self-incrimination) relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Williams
N.J. · 1971 · confidence medium
Ed. 754 , 763 (1952); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 142 , 32 S. Ct. 71 , 56 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Nolan (2×)
Minn. · 1950 · confidence medium
In Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141, 144 , 32 S. Ct. 71, 72, 73 , 56 L. ed. 128, 130, 131, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice White, said: “1st.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Botsford v. United States
6th Cir. · 1914 · confidence medium
That provision requires the bankrupt to submit to examination concerning his business, the cause of his bankruptcy, the character of his property and its whereabouts, and the like; but it is further provided that “no testimony given by him * * * shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding.” It was contended that since the immunity provision was couched in unambiguous words, the command to give testimony could not be so construed as to render such testimony admissible in a criminal prosecution for perjury; but, said Mr. Chief Justice White ( 222 U. S. 143 , 32 Sup. C…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heike v. United States
SCOTUS · 1913 · confidence medium
Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 143, 144 .) By the amendment of June 30, 1906, c. 3920, 34 Stat. 798 , immunity under the foregoing and other provisions “shall extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under oath or produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath.” The petitioner contended that, as soon as he had testified upon a matter under the Sherman Act, he had an amnesty' by the statute from liability for any and every offence that was connected with that matter in any degree, or, at least, every offence towards the discovery…
discussed Cited "see" People v. Bassage
Mich. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glickstein v United States, 222 US 139, 142 ; 32 S Ct 71 ; 56 L Ed 128 (1911) (“[T]he immunity afforded by the constitutional guarantee [of the Fifth Amendment] relates to the past, and does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.”); United States v Chevoor, 526 F2d 178, 181 (CA 1, 1975) (“The privilege against self-incrimination bars compelled testimony as to past crimes; it does not shelter new peijury.”), abrogated in part on other grounds Brogan v United States, 522 US 398 (1998).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Swift (4×)
C.A.A.F. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glickstein v. United States , 222 U.S. 139 (1911) (holding that similarly worded exclusionary-rule statute should not be interpreted to permit the giving of false testimony with impunity).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Arthur Berardelli (3×)
2d Cir. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glick-stein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911), and text discussion infra. 5 .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Chevoor (3×)
D. Mass. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Prior (3×)
M.D. Fla. · 1974 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1952).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Clarence Daniels (3×)
5th Cir. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128, 130 (1911); United States v. Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971).
examined Cited "see" Norman Kronick v. United States (5×)
9th Cir. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Simmons (3×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ed. 2d 250 (1980); see also Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 143 , 32 S. Ct. 71 , 56 L.
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Simmons (3×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
See United States v. Apfelbaum , 445 U.S. 115 , 127-30, 100 S.Ct. 948 , 63 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980) ; see also Glickstein v. United States , 222 U.S. 139 , 143, 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911) (testimony given under a license to commit perjury is not "testimony in the true sense of the word").
examined Cited "see, e.g." In Re the Welfare of S.J.T. (3×)
Minn. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence low
Credit Ass’n of Redwood Falls v. Good, 303 Minn. 524, 530 , 228 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1975); see also State v. Nolan, 231 Minn. 522, 529 , 44 N.W.2d 66, 71 (1950) (quoting Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 , 32 S.Ct. 71, 72-73 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911)).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Oxfort (3×)
C.A.A.F. · 1996 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911).
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Gallo (3×)
E.D.N.Y · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
In assessing the constitutionality of a grant of immunity, the fundamental inquiry is whether that immunity is “coextensive with the scope of the privilege.” Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449 , 92 S.Ct. at 1659 ; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 54 , 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964); see also Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 , 32 S.Ct. 71, 72 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911) (immunity must be “in all respects commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Gora (3×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911); State v. Williams, 59 N.J. 493, 498-500 (1971). *600 We also find no merit in the claims, raised for the first time on appeal, that the trial judge should on his own motion have severed the trial of the perjury charge from the other charges in the indictment, and that he should have conducted a hearing on his own initiative to insure that none of the trial evidence was derived from the grand jury testimony.
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Gora (3×)
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 , 32 S. Ct. 71 , 56 L.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Herman Eugene Lardieri (6×)
3rd Cir. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 , 32 S.Ct. 71 , 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911); United States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247, 259 (3d Cir. 1973). .
Glickstein
v.
United States
Dec 4, 1911.
222 U.S. 139
White.
102 Fed. Rep. 876
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 89%
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (3) · Michigan Supreme Court (3)
[*140] Mb. Chief Justice'White

delivered the opinion of the court.

Glickstein, an adjudicated bankrupt, was indicted for perjury in having falsely sworn in the bankruptcy proceeding, while under examination before a referee, as required by the seventh section, subdivision 9, of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The indictment was demurred to on the following grounds: “a. A prosecution for perjury against a bankrupt at'a.meeting of his creditors will not lie; b. The indictment was based upon testimony given by the bankrupt affecting the ádministration and settlement of his estate; c. A person cannot be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” At the trial which followed the overruling of the demurrer the testimony of Glickstein, which was the subject of the indictment, was offered and objected to on the same grounds upon which thé demurrer was based, and exceptions were taken to the admission of the testimony in evidence.

. When the legality of a conviction and sentence of Glickstein was before the court below, as the result of error prosecuted by him, the court, stating’the facts which we have recited, certified the following question:- “Is subsection 9 and the immunity afforded by it applicable to a prosecution for perjury committed by the bankrupt when examined under it?”

Section 7, subdivision 9, which we áre required to consider in order to solve the question,, is as follows:.

“The bankrupt shall . . .. (9) When present at the first meeting of his creditors, an'd- at such other times as the court shall order, submit to an examination concerning the conducting of his business, the-cause of his bankruptcy; his dealings with his creditors and. other persons, the amount, kind, and whereabouts of his property, and, in addition, all matters which may affect the administration and settlement of his estate; but no testimony given[*141] by him shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding.”

. It is difficult to determine from the contentions urged in favor of an affirmative answer, whether it is deemed the solution of the problem requires us to decide a question of constitutional right or simply calls for an interpretation of the provision of the Bankruptcy Act to which the question relates. To exclude irrelevant matter and to confine our attention to the precise subject to be passed upon, we state certain propositions which are not open to controversy because foreclosed by decisions of this court, or which if not expressly foreclosed are so indubitably the result of settled principles as to causé them also to be not subject to reasonable dispute.

• 1st. It is undoubted that the constitutional guarantee of the Fifth Amendment does not deprive the law-making authority of the power to compel the giving of testimony even although the testimony when given might serve to incriminate the one testifying, provided immunity be accorded, the immunity, of course, being required to be complete;, that is to say, in all respects commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation. The authorities which establish this eleméntary proposition are too numerous to be cited, and we therefore simply refer to a few of the leading cases on the subject. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591; Burrell v. Montana, 194 U. S. 572, 578; Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372; Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U. S. 186, 195; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 66, and Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423.

2nd. As the authority, which the proposition just stated embraces exists, and as the sanction of an oath and the imposition of a punishment for false swearing are inherently a part of the power to compel the. giving of testimony, they are included in -that grant' of authority and are not prohibited by the immunity as to self-inerimination. Of[*142] course this proposition is essentially the resultant of the first, since unless it be well founded the first also must be wanting in foundation. This must be' the result, as it. cannot be conceived that there is power to compel the giving of testimony where no_ right exists to require that the testimony'shall be given under such circumstances and safeguards as to compel it to be truthful. In other words,' this is but to say that an authority'which can only' extend to the licensing of perjury is not a power to compel the giving of téstimony. Of course, these propositions' being true, it is also true that the immunity afforded by the constitutional, guarantee relates to the past and does not endow the person who testifies with a license' to commit perjury. That this is hot disputable is shown by the fact that it has been accepted as self-evident in providing for immunity for one compelled to testify, as shown by the reservation in Rev. Stat., § 860, declaring that "the’ im- ' munity,shall not extend to “exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in discovering oi; testifying, as aforesaid,’'’ and by a like provision, contained in the, act of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat. .443, c. 83. . The first of these. provisions was con- . sidered in Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, and the second in Brown v. Walker, supra, where it was expressly decided that the statute containing it complied with the constitutional' guarantee.

With these propositions in hand it follows that the precise question for . decision is, Did the guarantee of immunity, contained in the ninth subdivision of .§ 7 of the Bankruptcy Act bar a prosecution for perjury for false swearing in giving testimony under the, command of the. section? Im other words, the sole question is, Does the statute, in compelling the giving of testimony, confer an immunity wider than that guaranteed by the Constitution? The argument to maintain that it does' is, that as the statute provides for immunity and does not contain the[*143] reservation found in either § 860, JEtev. Stat., or that embodied in the act of 1893, therefore, under the rule that the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other, such reservation cannot be implied. Or, to state the proposition in another form, it is that as the statute in the immunity clause says, “But no testimony given by him •(the witness who is compelled to be examined) shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding,” and as these words are unambiguous, there is no room for limiting the language so as to cause the immunity provision not to prohibit the offer of the testimony in a criminal prosecution for perjury. But the contention assumes the question for decision, since it excludes the possibility, of construction when on the face of the statute the meaning attributed to . the immunity clause cannot be given to it without destroying.the words of the statute and frustrating its obvious object and intent. This may not be denied, since the statute expressly commands the giving of testimony, and its manifest purpose is to secure truthful testimony) while the limited and exclusive meaning which the contention attributes to the immunity clause would cause the section to be a mere license to commit perjury, and hence not to command the giving of testimony in the true sense of the word.

The argument that because the section does not contain an expression of the reservation of a right to prosecute for perjury in harmony with .'the reservations in Rev. Stat.) § 8.60, and the act of 1893, therefore it is to be presumed that it was intended that no such right should exist, we think, simply begs the question for decision, since it is impossible in reason to conceive that Congress commanded the giving of .testimony, and at the same time intended that false testimony might be given with impunity in the absence of the most express and specific command to that effect.

Bearing in mind the .subject dealt with we think the reservation of the right to prosecute for perjury made in the[*144] statutes to which we have-referred was but the manifestation of abundant caution, and hence the absence of such reservation in the statute under consideration may not be taken as indicative of an intention on the part of Congress that perjury.might be committed at pleasure.

Some of the considerations which we have pointed out were accurately, expounded in Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. Rep. 636, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth-Circuit, and in Wechsler v. United States, 158 Fed. Rep. 579, by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. And this leads us to observe that the necessary result of the conclusion now reached is to disapprove the opinions in In re Marx et al., 102 Fed. Rep: 676, and In re Logan, 102. Fed. Rep. 876.

It follows that the question propounded must receive a' negative answer, and our order will be,

Question certified answered No.