Lee v. State, 162 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968). · Go Syfert
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Lee v. State, 162 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Poole v. State (gactapp, 2014-03-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Poole v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
In Lee v. State, 117 Ga. App. 765, 766 ( 162 SE2d 229 ) (1968), we held that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s demurrer to the indictment alleging threats of blackmail because the State “must allege the threat with such clearness and certainty as to apprise the accused of the particular acts or words or writing which is the gist of the offense.” Notably, however, we did not specify in Lee whether the defendant had filed a general or special demurrer to the indictment, and thus that procedural issue was never addressed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark Winford Poole v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Instead, as Poole’s counsel conceded at the hearing on the motion, the contention that the indictment failed to allege with sufficient particularity the “crime of violence” threatened against the victims was “more of a special demurrer issue that was missed.” See, e. g., State v. Delaby, 298 Ga. App. 723, 725-727 ( 681 SE2d 645 ) (2009) (defendant filed special demurrer to influencing a witness counts on ground that use of word “intimidation” in indictment was generic and should be defined with greater specificity); State v. Tate, 262 Ga. App. 311, 314 (2) (b) ( 585 SE2d 224 ) (2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Delaby (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
But the trial court also found that “[w]here the statutory definition of an offense includes generic terms, the indictment must state the species of acts charged; it must descend to particulars.” (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Lee v. State, 117 Ga. App. 765, 766 ( 162 SE2d 229 ) (1968).
Lee
v.
the State
43545.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
May 9, 1968.
162 S.E.2d 229
Kopp & Peavy, J. Edwin Peavy, Gibson, McGee & Blount, J. Baker McGee, Jr., for appellant., Delman L. Minchew, Solicitor, E. Kontz Bennett, for appellee.
Bell, Hall, Quillian.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
Bell, Presiding Judge.

Defendant took this appeal from the judgment of the trial court overruling his demurrers to an indictment for blackmail. Count 1 of the indictment alleged in part that defendant “did attempt to extort $5,000 in money from said Dr. ... by threatening to expose and publish . . . that the said doctor had been guilty of certain criminal and unethical medical practices, illegal and immoral personal activities.” Count 2 alleged in part that defendant “did demand that . . . Dr. . . . release his son from custody and that Dr. . . . cooperate fully with . . . [defendant] or otherwise he would expose and publish . . . that the said doctor had been guilty of certain criminal and unethical medical practices, illegal and immoral personal activities . . .” One ground of demurrer attacked both counts of the indictment for failure to state the alleged threats with particularity. Held:

Threats which may amount to blackmail under Code § 26-1801 are threats to “accuse another of a crime or offense, or expose or publish any of his or her personal or business acts, infirmities, failings, or compel any person to do any act, or to refrain from doing any lawful act, against his will.” The indictment here described the threats in general terms embraced by the statute. The general rule is that an indictment is sufficient in form if it states the offense in the terms and language of the Code or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may easily be understood by the jury. Code § 27-701. But an accused has the right to know enough of the particular facts[*766] constituting the alleged offense to enable him to prepare for trial. Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 444 (16 SE 92); Mell v. State, 69 Ga. App. 302, 303 (25 SE2d 142). Where the statutory definition of an offense includes generic terms, the indictment must state the species of acts charged; it “must descend to particulars.” Harris v. State, 37 Ga. App. 113, 114 (138 SE 922); Roberts v. State, 54 Ga. App. 704, 705 (188 SE 844); Ramsey v. State, 85 Ga. App. 245, 247 (69 SE2d 98); 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, 626 (1957 Ed.), § 1797. Cf., Cragg v. State, 117 Ga. App. 133, 134 (159 SE2d 717). Thus an indictment based on a threat amounting to blackmail under Code § 26-1801 must allege the threat with such clearness and certainty as to apprise the accused of the particular act or words or writing which is the gist of the offense. The indictment should set forth the threat either in haec verba or in substance. See 86 CJS 802, Threats, § 20 (d); State v. Smith, 182 Ore. 497 (188 P2d 998); Goulding v. State, 126 Tex. Cr. 73 (70 SW2d 200); cf., State v. Conradi, 128 La. 105 (54 S 577). The court erred in overruling the fifth ground of demurrer to both counts of the indictment.

Argued April 2,1968 Decided May 9, 1968. Kopp & Peavy, J. Edwin Peavy, Gibson, McGee & Blount, J. Baker McGee, Jr., for appellant. Delman L. Minchew, Solicitor, E. Kontz Bennett, for appellee.

The remaining grounds of demurrer are moot.

Judgment reversed.

Hall and Quillian, JJ., concur.